Commonwealth v. Eric Joseph Dickerson.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 31, 2023
• Docket: 22-P-0156
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-156

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ERIC JOSEPH DICKERSON.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a bench trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the

defendant, Eric Dickerson, was found guilty of assault and

battery on a police officer in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13D.

Dickerson appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

Background. We summarize the relevant facts in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Latimore,

378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). On September 22, 2018, Boston

firefighters approached Dickerson after receiving reports of a

male suffering a seizure at the Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority (MBTA) Chinatown station. Dickerson and the

firefighters were having a verbal argument and Dickerson refused

to speak to anyone until the police arrived. After MBTA police officers arrived and identified themselves, they and the

firefighters asked Dickerson whether he wanted medical

treatment. Dickerson repeatedly explained to the officers that

he was not suffering a seizure and was only sleeping. At this

point, the officers chose to eject Dickerson from the station

because he was yelling obscenities and acting disorderly.

Dickerson refused to leave the station, assumed a fighting

stance, threw a series of punches at one of the officers, spit

on the same officer, and began striking him on the head. The

officers subdued and handcuffed Dickerson, and, with the

assistance of onsite firefighters, led him out of the station.

During the removal, Dickerson was alleged to have struck one of

the firefighters with his boot.

Dickerson was arrested and placed in the rear of the MBTA

officers' vehicle. He was charged with assault and battery on a

police officer, injuring a firefighter, and assault and battery

by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot). The second count,

injuring a firefighter, was amended to assault and battery on a

public employee. At trial, Dickerson testified that he did not

recall anything after he entered the MBTA Chinatown station, as

he "blacked out." Dickerson did not cite a specific medical

condition to explain the blackout but did claim that he

previously had suffered a concussion and had experienced two

blackouts of shorter durations. Additionally, Dickerson

2 testified that this incident occurred after he had worked an

eighteen-hour shift. Dickerson was convicted of assault and

battery on a police officer and acquitted of the other charges.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. Dickerson

argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

sustain the conviction of assault and battery on a police

officer. He argues the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible.

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we determine

whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"

(citation omitted). Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. After a review

of the record, we affirm the conviction because Dickerson never

provided notice of his intention to raise an issue of his mental

condition at the time of the incident, as required by Mass. R.

Crim. P. 14 (b) (2), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1626 (2019), and

failed to raise the affirmative defense of lack of criminal

responsibility through evidence presented at trial.1

1 Defendants in criminal case are required to provide the Commonwealth with notice if they intend to assert the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility. Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2). Here, Dickerson failed to provide the requisite written notice. Of the five pretrial motions Dickerson filed, none directly stated or indirectly alluded to the defendant's intent to assert a lack of criminal responsibility. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wright, 479 Mass. 124, 138

3 The Commonwealth is required to "prove criminal

responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt only after there is

evidence presented of lack of criminal responsibility that is

sufficient to warrant a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.

Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 816-817 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v.

Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 612 & n.5 (2010). A lack of criminal

responsibility defense "may be raised properly by the admission

of any evidence which, if believed, might create a reasonable

doubt concerning the defendant's criminal responsibility at the

time of the [crime]" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Mills,

400 Mass. 626, 627 (1987). "Although expert testimony is not

required to raise the issue of insanity, something more than the

defendant's own characterizations that he freaked out and lost

control is required" (citation and quotations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 425 Mass. 507, 516 (1997).

Here, Dickerson did not provide the necessary threshold

evidence at trial to indicate a lack of criminal responsibility.

Indeed, Dickerson did not articulate or suggest a lack of

criminal responsibility defense during the trial. Dickerson did

not produce medical records or opinions by lay or expert

(2018) (defendant showed intent to raise lack of criminal responsibility by informing court before empanelment that he was "seeking a murder two conviction . . . based on diminished capacity" and "psychiatric testimony" would be introduced).

4 witnesses to verify either his claimed concussion or history of

blackouts. Contrast Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794,

797 (2011) (defendant introduced evidence of long history of

mental illness through psychiatric testimony and corresponding

records); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 812-815 (1975)

(defendant presented lay witness' observations of defendant's

changed behavior and testimony by two psychiatrists). The only

evidence that tended to show Dickerson's lack of criminal

responsibility was his own testimony that he had suffered a

concussion at some unspecified time. Dickerson did not,

however, explain a connection between the concussion and claimed

blackout. See Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416,

427 (2020) (defendant failed to introduce any evidence

connecting claimed head injury to behavior on day of incident).

Simply put, this testimony was not enough. Although the

defendant is not required to present expert testimony, the facts

of this case do not provide sufficient evidence to indicate

Dickerson lacked criminal responsibility. Contrast Mills, 400

Mass. at 627 (defendant did not present expert witness but

instead established lack of criminal responsibility by facts of

case, including suicidal attitude and memory loss).

Finally, even assuming Dickerson presented sufficient

evidence to raise such a defense, the Commonwealth's evidence,

when viewed in its totality and in a light most favorable to it,

5 sufficiently established criminal responsibility. Both officers

testified that Dickerson spoke to them, and that Dickerson made

several statements that indicated his awareness of the

circumstances and that he was speaking to public officials.

When asked if he required medical assistance by onsite police

officers and firefighters, Dickerson repeatedly responded that

he was not suffering a seizure and was only sleeping.

Dickerson's responses indicate he was oriented to time, place,

and persons. See Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 47-48

(1983).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, Englander & Walsh, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: March 31, 2023.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.