Commonwealth v. Demor

691 A.2d 958, 456 Pa. Super. 766, 1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 792
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 31, 1997
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 691 A.2d 958 (Commonwealth v. Demor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Demor, 691 A.2d 958, 456 Pa. Super. 766, 1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 792 (Pa. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

POPOVICH, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County following appellant’s conviction on the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4) and (a)(5). 1 On *769 appeal, appellant contends that the results of his breathalyzer test should have been suppressed and that his conviction pursuant to Section 3731(a)(5) was unconstitutional. We find that the lower court did not err in failing to suppress appellant’s breath test results, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of sentence for his conviction under Section 3731(a)(4). However, we agree that Section 3731(a)(5) is unconstitutional, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of sentence with respect thereto.

Our standard of review in this case is well-settled. In reviewing an order from a suppression court, we consider the Commonwealth’s evidence, and only so much of the defendant’s evidence as remains uncontradicted. We accept the suppression court’s factual findings which are supported by the evidence and reverse only when the court draws erroneous conclusions from those facts. Commonwealth v. Guerrero, 435 Pa.Super. 440, 646 A.2d 585 (1994).

Keeping the applicable standard of review in mind, we find that the relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On January 28,1995, at approximately 3:08 a.m., appellant was stopped by Officer Lawrence Storch. Believing that appellant was driving while under the influence of alcohol, Officer Storch administered three field sobriety tests to appellant, all of which appellant failed. Appellant was arrested at 3:19 a.m. and immediately transported to the Monroeville police station. At approximately 3:55 a.m., while at the police station, appellant submitted to a breathalyzer test on the Intoxilyzer 5000. 2 The results of his breath test indicated that he had a blood alcohol content of .170%. Consequently, appellant was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1), (a)(4), and (a)(5).

*770 As a result of information learned through the discovery process, appellant filed a motion seeking to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test. During discovery, appellant learned that during the weeks prior to his breathalyzer test other suspects had been tested on the same machine and the results of their two consecutive tests deviated from one another by .020% or greater. Appellant also learned that while the machine was placed out of service and tested for accuracy and calibrations on January 10, 1995, two days after the last variance incident, the machine was not examined internally by a technician. 3

At the suppression hearing, appellant argued that the breathalyzer machine was to be examined internally before it was checked for accuracy and calibrations by Jerry Richey, the technician in charge of the machine. 4 Appellant further argued that the mere calibration and testing of the machine for accuracy following the last variance incident was insufficient to show that appellant’s breath test was done using the procedures prescribed by the Departments of Health and Transportation, 67 Pa. Code §§ 77.21-77.27, and, therefore, the results of his breathalyzer should be suppressed. Appellant also moved to dismiss count three of the information charging him under Section 3731(a)(5), alleging that this statutory section was unconstitutional.

The Commonwealth argued that Technician Richey strictly followed the rules governing the maintenance of breathalyzer machines when he placed the machine out of service and tested it for accuracy and calibrations on January 10, 1995. The Commonwealth further argued that after Technician Richey tested the machine for accuracy and calibrations, he *771 concluded that the machine was not broken but that the variance recorded prior to appellant’s breath test resulted from the subject blowing into the instrument incorrectly. Therefore, the Commonwealth argued, it was unnecessary for him to examine the internal components of the machine.

The suppression court found that the breathalyzer machine was maintained properly, and, therefore, denied appellant’s motion to suppress. The lower court declined to consider appellant’s motion to dismiss since Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 681 A.2d 162 (1996), was pending before the supreme court.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to Sections 3731(a)(4) and (a)(5). For his conviction under Section 3731(a)(4), appellant was sentenced to a mandatory term of thirty days incarceration, with an additional term of one year probation, and directed to pay a fine of $300.00, plus costs. N.T. 3/1/1996 pp. 167-168. He was given no further penalty for his conviction under Section 3731(a)(5). N.T. 3/1/1996 p. 168. This appeal followed.

In this case of first impression, appellant maintains that his breath test results should have been suppressed since Technician Richey failed to examine the internal components of the machine prior to checking the machine’s accuracy and calibrations. 5 Appellant argues that because of this error, the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate regulatory compliance requiring such machines to be “serviced, repaired and adjusted, as necessary ... .prior to being placed back into service.” See 67 Pa.Code § 77.24(c). We disagree.

Our legislature has provided that, under certain conditions, the results of chemical testing for blood alcohol content shall be admissible in court. The Motor Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part:

*772 (c) Test results admissible in evidence.-ln any summary proceeding or criminal proceeding in which the defendant is charged with violation of section 3731 ..., the amount of alcohol ... in the defendant’s blood, as shown by chemical testing of the person’s breath, ... which tests were conducted by qualified' persons using approved equipment, shall be admissible in evidence.
(1) Chemical tests of breath shall be performed on devices approved by the Department of Health using 'procedures prescribed jointly by regulations of the departments of Health and Transportation. Devices shall have been calibrated and tested for accuracy ... in a manner specified by regulations of the departments....

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(c) (emphasis added).

Pursuant to this statute, regulations governing the proper administration of breathalyzer tests were developed. The applicable regulations at issue in this case provide, in pertinent part:

§ 77M. Breath test procedures.
(b) Procedures.

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Bluebook (online)
691 A.2d 958, 456 Pa. Super. 766, 1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-demor-pasuperct-1997.