Commonwealth v. Danyael Torres.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 24-P-1348
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1348

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DANYAEL TORRES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a bench trial, a District Court judge convicted the

defendant of carrying a firearm without a license. On appeal,

the defendant contends that the motion judge erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence seized after a warrantless stop

and search. The defendant also argues that he is entitled to a

new trial because the trial judge erred by failing to instruct

himself that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving the

defendant's lack of firearms licensure, and this error was not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. We summarize the

facts as found by the motion judge, supplemented with undisputed

evidence from the record. See Commonwealth v. Garner, 490 Mass. 90, 93-94 (2022). On February 7, 2021, at around 1:55 P.M., a

Lowell police officer received a dispatch that "a suspect had

fired shots and he was traveling across the Lord Overpass." A

911 caller had described the suspect as a white male in his

early twenties, wearing a black sweatshirt, who had "snow on his

person" because he had just fallen in the snow. Within a minute

or two, the officer saw the defendant "just after he passed the

Lord Overpass," approximately one-quarter mile from the reported

location of the shots fired. The defendant matched the caller's

description -- he was a white male, wearing a black sweatshirt,

who appeared to be in his early twenties, and had snow on his

clothing that looked like it came from having "just recently

fallen in the snow." The officer stopped the defendant, who

"appeared nervous and kept turning away [from the officer]."

The officer pat frisked the defendant and found a firearm in his

waistband.

"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we

accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear

error . . . ." (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489

Mass. 342, 346 (2022). "We review independently the application

of constitutional principles to the facts found" (citation

omitted). Id. The defendant contends that the officer lacked

reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant; however, he does not

challenge the subsequent frisk. He argues that the 911 caller's

2 description was too general to provide the officer with an

individualized suspicion that the defendant was the suspect.

See Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 235 (2017). We

disagree.

The first part of the description -- that the suspect was a

white male, in his early twenties, in a black sweatshirt --

potentially could apply to many people in the area, as the

defendant contends. See Commonwealth v. D.M., 100 Mass. App.

Ct. 211, 216 (2021) (physical description of young black man in

hooded sweatshirt and jeans too general to justify stop).

However, the officer had additional information about the

suspect that was more specific than race, gender, age range, and

a general clothing description. A 911 caller reported the

suspect had snow on his clothing from a recent fall, which

distinguished him from others who may simply have been outdoors

while it was snowing. The 911 caller also gave the location and

direction of travel of the suspect, which was consistent with

where the officer located the defendant. See Commonwealth v.

Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. 1, 15 (2023) (location of likely

flight path relevant for reasonable suspicion). This

information was particularly pertinent where the officer saw the

defendant within a minute or two of the 911 caller's report, at

a location less than one-quarter mile from where the gunshots

were reportedly fired. See Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass.

3 530, 536 (2016) (temporal and geographic proximity between stop

and location of crime are relevant factors). Moreover, that the

report was of shots fired added an "edge" to the reasonable

suspicion calculus, given the potential imminent threat to

public safety. See Commonwealth v. Doocey, 56 Mass. App. Ct.

550, 557 (2002). In sum, the additional particularized details

given to police in this case made it "reasonable [for the

officer] to surmise that the [defendant] was involved in the

crime under investigation." Meneus, 476 Mass. at 237.

Therefore, the officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop the

defendant. See Commonwealth v. Karen K., 491 Mass. 165, 174

(2023).

2. Judge's failure to instruct himself on the

Commonwealth's burden to prove lack of firearms licensure.

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York

State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the

Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Commonwealth bears

the burden of proving that a defendant lacked the requisite

license to possess a firearm. Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491

Mass. 666, 690-692 (2023), S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023), cert.

denied, 144 S. Ct. 2683 (2024). The Commonwealth does not

dispute that the judge failed to instruct himself properly on

the burden of proof of the defendant's lack of a firearms

license, where the trial took place after Bruen but before

4 Guardado. Defense counsel did not object, and therefore we

review this error to determine whether it was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Bookman, 492 Mass. 396,

401 (2023).

In Bookman, 492 Mass. at 401, the court concluded that

omission of the licensure instruction -- mandated prospectively

by the holding in Guardado -- was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt where an officer testified that neither the defendant nor

his codefendant had a firearms license, and there was "nothing

in the record to suggest that the defendant disputed this

testimony, or that the officer's credibility was in question."

Here, the officer testified that the defendant admitted he did

not have a license to carry a firearm or a firearm

identification (FID) card and that dispatch confirmed the

defendant's lack of firearms licensure. There is nothing in the

record to suggest the defendant disputed this testimony or that

the officer's credibility was in question. See Bookman, supra.

We are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument on appeal that

the officer's inability to recall at trial details about the

defendant's clothing and the showup identification procedure

that occurred just prior to the defendant's arrest amounted to a

successful attack on the officer's credibility. Furthermore,

the defendant did not cross-examine the officer regarding his

testimony that the defendant lacked a valid firearms license and

5 FID card. To the contrary, the defendant relied on that

testimony to argue in closing that, because the defendant had

"truthfully indicated" he did not have a license to carry or an

FID card, the judge should find that his possession of the

firearm was transitory. On this record, we conclude that the

judge's omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See

id.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Massing & Brennan, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: February 17, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.