Commonwealth v. Cobb

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Commonwealth v. Cobb

503 N.E.2d 945, 399 Mass. 191, 1987 Mass. LEXIS 1643

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedFebruary 10, 1987

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 503 N.E.2d 945 (Commonwealth v. Cobb) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. Cobb, 503 N.E.2d 945, 399 Mass. 191, 1987 Mass. LEXIS 1643 (Mass. 1987).

Pincite

Opinion

Nolan, J.

This case arises out of the same homicide as the preceding case, Commonwealth v. Millyan, ante 171 (1987). Hence, we shall not repeat the facts. Cobb was convicted of murder in the second degree; his codefendants, Andrew J. Millyan and Arthur A. Corbett, were found guilty of murder in the first degree. After Millyan’s verdict was reduced to murder in the second degree, a hearing was conducted on Cobb’s motion to reduce the verdict under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 896 (1979). The judge ordered Cobb’s conviction reduced to manslaughter. Both the Commonwealth and Cobb appealed and we transferred the appeals to this court on our own motion.

Cobb requests that we reverse his conviction and order a new trial on the grounds that (1) the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury on joint venture; (2) evidence of Millyan’s state of mind was improperly excluded; (3) the judge failed to *192 instruct the jury on the possibility of accident; and (4) Millyan’s testimony was erroneously impeached by the faulty introduction of criminal records. .These claims were all decided adversely to the defendants in Commonwealth v. Millyan, supra at 184-185, and therefore Cobb’s motion for a new trial was properly denied.

The only issue left is the Commonwealth’s appeal from the reduction of Cobb’s verdict. Rule 25 (b) (2) vests broad power in the trial judge. We defer to the trial judge because he has the advantage of face to face evaluation of the witnesses and the evidence at trial. He is in a far better position than we are to make the judgment required by the rule. Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 557 (1981).

As we stated in Commonwealth v. Millyan, supra at 189, rule 25 (b) (2) does not mean that a judge, in deciding whether to reduce a verdict, is confined to the standard used on a motion for a required finding of not guilty. Thus, the Commonwealth’s analysis of the judge’s failure to use this standard is misguided. Nor are we persuaded that the judge abused his discretion in reducing the verdict. The evidence in the record is sufficient to support the judge’s conclusion that, due to his intoxication, Cobb acted in a reckless fashion rather than out of malice. This was not an arbitrary or unreasonable conclusion. Therefore, we will not disturb the reduction of Cobb’s verdict to manslaughter.

Order affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Nolan, J.

This case arises out of the same homicide as the preceding case, Commonwealth v. Millyan, ante 171 (1987). Hence, we shall not repeat the facts. Cobb was convicted of murder in the second degree; his codefendants, Andrew J. Millyan and Arthur A. Corbett, were found guilty of murder in the first degree. After Millyan’s verdict was reduced to murder in the second degree, a hearing was conducted on Cobb’s motion to reduce the verdict under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 896 (1979). The judge ordered Cobb’s conviction reduced to manslaughter. Both the Commonwealth and Cobb appealed and we transferred the appeals to this court on our own motion.

Cobb requests that we reverse his conviction and order a new trial on the grounds that (1) the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury on joint venture; (2) evidence of Millyan’s state of mind was improperly excluded; (3) the judge failed to *192 instruct the jury on the possibility of accident; and (4) Millyan’s testimony was erroneously impeached by the faulty introduction of criminal records. .These claims were all decided adversely to the defendants in Commonwealth v. Millyan, supra at 184-185, and therefore Cobb’s motion for a new trial was properly denied.

The only issue left is the Commonwealth’s appeal from the reduction of Cobb’s verdict. Rule 25 (b) (2) vests broad power in the trial judge. We defer to the trial judge because he has the advantage of face to face evaluation of the witnesses and the evidence at trial. He is in a far better position than we are to make the judgment required by the rule. Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 557 (1981).

As we stated in Commonwealth v. Millyan, supra at 189, rule 25 (b) (2) does not mean that a judge, in deciding whether to reduce a verdict, is confined to the standard used on a motion for a required finding of not guilty. Thus, the Commonwealth’s analysis of the judge’s failure to use this standard is misguided. Nor are we persuaded that the judge abused his discretion in reducing the verdict. The evidence in the record is sufficient to support the judge’s conclusion that, due to his intoxication, Cobb acted in a reckless fashion rather than out of malice. This was not an arbitrary or unreasonable conclusion. Therefore, we will not disturb the reduction of Cobb’s verdict to manslaughter.

Order affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

503 N.E.2d 945, 399 Mass. 191, 1987 Mass. LEXIS 1643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-cobb-mass-1987.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack