Commonwealth v. Cleveland Jones.
This text of Commonwealth v. Cleveland Jones. (Commonwealth v. Cleveland Jones.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-238
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CLEVELAND JONES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant challenges the order revoking his probation
on the grounds that the judge (1) improperly considered evidence
that had not been authenticated, (2) impermissibly excluded
witness testimony, and (3) failed to make necessary written
findings. We affirm.
The defendant pleaded guilty in March 2023 to threatening
to commit a crime (G. L. c. 275, § 2) and was sentenced to a
term of probation with conditions including staying away from
the victim. By June the defendant was alleged to be in
violation of his probation terms because he had engaged in
multiple attempts to contact the victim. Because this appeal
focuses on the evidence adduced at the probation revocation hearing, we discuss those facts in combination with the
applicable legal principles.
"The decision to revoke probation, based on a violation
shown by a preponderance of the evidence, lies within the
discretion of the judge." Commonwealth v. Sargent, 98 Mass.
App. Ct. 27, 29 (2020). "[W]e uphold a judge's finding of a
probation violation if it is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id.
The defendant first contends that the judge erred in
admitting six exhibits, screen shots from the victim's cell
phone of messages and calls via Instagram (a social media site),
because the evidence did not establish that they were authentic
and came from the defendant. In addressing this argument, we
ask whether the evidence established that these exhibits were
reliable. See Sargent, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 30. It did.
"The requirement of authentication . . . as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims." Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 447
(2011), quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 901(a) (2011). Formal
authentication procedures need not be followed in a probation
revocation hearing, see Sargent, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 27, where
"standard evidentiary rules do not apply." Commonwealth v.
Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 117 (1990). Instead, the "preeminent
2 concern with respect to the evidence presented and considered at
revocation proceedings is its reliability." Sargent, supra at
30, quoting Commonwealth v. Thissell, 457 Mass. 191, 196 (2010).
Here, the victim testified that she had known the defendant
since May 2019 and that she had been in a relationship with him
between March and December of 2022. They had followed each
other on Instagram since 2022; she recited part of his Instagram
username from memory; and, when shown his Instagram page, she
identified it by the username, by photographs of him, and from
having followed that account since 2022. The judge, who could
see the defendant, was also able to examine the photographs and
conclude for himself whether they depicted the defendant. The
victim explained that Instagram allowed for the exchange of
messages and calls from one user's profile to another and
testified that she had exchanged messages with the defendant by
Instagram in the past. After reading messages in which the
defendant threatened to kill her and do psychological harm to
her daughter, she confirmed that the defendant had once met her
daughter. Another message related to the victim's having
"pressed charges" against the defendant, which she had done by
seeking an abuse prevention order. Taken together, this
evidence adequately established the reliability of exhibits two
through five.
3 The defendant also challenges the admission of exhibits six
and seven, screen shots of the Instagram call and of a call log.
The victim testified that the screen shots fairly and accurately
represented (1) the appearance of her ringing phone, including
showing the defendant's name and face, and (2) her call log.
Exhibits six and seven depict the same photograph and Instagram
username as the earlier Instagram messages. Because we
concluded that exhibits two, three, four, and five were
adequately authenticated, the judge did not err in admitting
exhibits six and seven.
Second, the defendant argues that the judge violated his
due process rights by not admitting testimony from a proposed
defense witness. We review to determine whether there was error
and, if so, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 483
(2016). The defendant offered the witness to help the judge
"understand background about [the defendant's] and [the
victim's] relationship, their credibility." Defense counsel
agreed that the witness did not have any firsthand "knowledge of
the restraining order" or "the alleged violations." The judge
carefully probed whether the witness would testify as to the
matter at hand (violation of probation or the restraining order)
and reasonably concluded that the defendant was offering
impermissible character evidence. Based on the representations
4 of defense counsel, this conclusion was not error. See id. at
481-482.
Finally, the defendant maintains that the judge denied him
due process by failing to issue a written statement describing
the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking his
probation. The judge orally stated his findings in the
transcript, which the defendant has. That is sufficient. See
Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 484 n.8 (due process right to statement
of evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation
satisfied by oral findings of which probationer obtains
transcript). See also Fay v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 498, 504-
505 (1980) (same).
Order revoking probation and imposing sentence affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman, Hershfang & Toone, JJ. 1),
Clerk
Entered: May 20, 2026.
1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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