Commonwealth v. Christopher D. Prairie.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: August 12, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0528
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-528

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

CHRISTOPHER D. PRAIRIE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant,

Christopher Prairie, was convicted of operating under the

influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), and negligent operation

of a motor vehicle.1 Because we conclude that the evidence at

trial was sufficient to prove the elements of each of these

offenses, we affirm the convictions.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. In assessing the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we ask

"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

1After a bifurcated trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to the OUI as a second offense. the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"

(quotation, citation, and emphasis omitted).2 Commonwealth v.

Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 791 (2022). "Proof of the essential

elements of the crime may be based on reasonable inferences

drawn from the evidence, . . . and the inferences a jury may

draw need only be reasonable and possible and need not be

necessary or inescapable." Commonwealth v. Wurtzberger, 496

Mass. 203, 205 (2025), quoting Kapaia, supra.

2. OUI. Where, as here, the Commonwealth seeks to

prosecute an OUI charge on a theory of impaired operation, the

prosecution must establish that the defendant (1) operated a

motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) while under the

influence of intoxicating liquor. See G. L. c. 90,

§ 24 (1) (a) (1); Wurtzberger, 496 Mass. at 205-206. In this

appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the

evidence proving the third element -- that he was "under the

influence" of liquor while driving. Put differently, the

defendant argues that the evidence failed to show an

"impairment, to any degree, of [his] ability to [drive] safely."

Commonwealth v. Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 218 (2019),

2 Although the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we nonetheless review the challenge on appeal using this standard. See Commonwealth v. McGovern, 397 Mass. 863, 867-868 (1986).

2 quoting Commonwealth v. Veronneau, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479

(2016). We do not agree.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the

evidence showed that, while the defendant drove along a two-lane

State road, he twice allowed the front tire of his truck to

cross the double yellow line separating the oncoming lane of

traffic from his own. The second time, he nearly collided with

an oncoming car, which happened to be a police cruiser.3

Although the officer then activated his emergency lights and

attempted to pull the defendant over, the defendant failed to

stop promptly.

When he did stop, the defendant was unable to locate his

license and registration until after he "fumbled through some

paperwork for a good couple of minutes." While talking with the

police officer, the defendant also displayed classic indicia of

intoxication, including a "glassy stare," red and bloodshot

eyes, slurred speech, and a "strong odor of an alcoholic

beverage on his breath." See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91

Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392-393 (2017) (describing classic indicia

of intoxication). When the defendant then got out of his truck

3 Due to the defendant's crossing over the double yellow line, the police officer driving in the opposite lane had to "slam[] [his] brakes on" to avoid colliding with the defendant.

3 at the officer's instruction, he "stumbl[ed] and sway[ed] as he

walked," and although he agreed to take several field sobriety

tests, he failed to complete them to the officer's satisfaction.

Moreover, while the defendant initially denied drinking

(although he admitted that he had "consumed some marijuana"), he

later spontaneously told the police that "he had consumed two

small alcoholic beverages earlier in the day."4

The officer ultimately formed the opinion that the

defendant was intoxicated and arrested him. During his booking

at the police station, the defendant's speech was tangential and

slurred, he was sometimes unsteady on his feet, and he was

briefly argumentative with the booking officer.5

We are satisfied that, taken together, this evidence was

sufficient to prove the defendant's impairment by alcohol. See

Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 219 (evidence that defendant

"nearly [struck]" parked cars; had glassy, bloodshot eyes;

4 The defendant did not argue at trial that he was intoxicated by marijuana, rather than by alcohol, and he does not make that argument here. See Commonwealth v. Stathopoulos, 401 Mass. 453, 457 (1988) (in OUI cases, Commonwealth must prove that "alcohol is one contributing cause of the diminished ability [to operate a vehicle safely]," but need not prove that it is "the sole or exclusive cause").

5 The booking process was video recorded. A copy of the video recording was introduced in evidence at trial and is part of our record.

4 smelled of alcohol; behaved belligerently to police; and was

unsteady on his feet was sufficient to prove defendant's

impairment), and cases cited. To the extent the defendant

argues that the jury could have weighed the evidence

differently, and thus could have found a basis on which to

acquit him, he misapprehends our standard of review. See

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).

3. Negligent operation. The defendant's challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence of his negligence is likewise

unpersuasive. As we note above, the jury could have found that

the intoxicated defendant allowed his truck to cross partway

into an oncoming lane of travel, where he nearly collided with

another vehicle. This was sufficient to prove negligence. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380 (2017),

and cases cited. Although the jury could have credited the

defendant's explanation for his erratic driving -- a sneeze --

they were not required to do so. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470

5 Mass. 682, 693 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass.

770, 779 (2005), S.C. 450 Mass. 215 (2007) (assessment of weight

and credibility of evidence "wholly within [jury's] province").

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Hand & Grant, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: August 12, 2025.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.