NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-382
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CHRISTIAN M. REYES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, Christian M.
Reyes, of rape of a child (occurring in Scituate), dissemination
of material depicting a child in a state of nudity (two counts),
possession of material depicting a child engaged in sexual
conduct (two counts), posing or exhibiting a child engaged in
sexual conduct (two counts), and furnishing alcohol to a minor.
Claiming deficiencies in the grand jury presentation as well as
errors at trial, the defendant appeals. We affirm.
1. Grand Jury. Challenging the denial of a pretrial
motion to dismiss, the defendant claims that the Commonwealth
presented "distorted" and "insufficient" evidence to the grand
jury. Applying de novo review, see Commonwealth v. Barlow- Tucker, 493 Mass. 197, 204 (2024), we conclude that the motion
judge did not err.
a. Integrity of Grand Jury Presentation. The defendant
has not met his "heavy burden" to show the prosecutor impaired
the integrity of the grand jury presentation. Commonwealth v.
Stevenson, 474 Mass. 372, 376 (2016). He posits that the
prosecutor misled grand jurors to believe that the victim was
less than sixteen years old in two video recordings depicting
sexual acts with the defendant. Evidence before the grand jury
consisted of testimony from an investigating police officer and
four exhibits (including a video recording of the victim and the
defendant in the woods in Scituate, a video recording of the
victim and the defendant in a car in Duxbury, photographs from
the victim's cell phone, and the defendant's statement to the
police). Testimony showed that the victim reported to a school
resource police officer that when she was fifteen the defendant
had sex with her "at least twice." One of those incidents
occurred in the woods in Scituate where the defendant made a
video recording. This Scituate incident formed the basis for
the defendant's indictment and conviction for rape of a child.
Testimony also showed that the defendant had sex "multiple
times" with the victim in his car, where he recorded one of
those incidents while they were in Duxbury. The officer further
2 testified that at the time of "the incident in the woods, and
one of the incidents in the car, [the victim] is the age of 15."
From this testimony, we discern no "false or deceptive" evidence
being presented to the grand jury. Commonwealth v. Mayfield,
398 Mass. 615, 621 (1986). The police officer's testimony made
clear that there were multiple incidents, at least two occurred
when the victim was fifteen years old, many occurred in the
defendant's car, the victim was fifteen during the recorded
incident in the woods in Scituate, and the victim was fifteen
during one of the incidents in the defendant's car.
This evidence did not impair the grand jury presentation
simply because more detailed evidence emerged at trial showing
that the Duxbury video recording was made after the victim
turned sixteen. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass. 145, 158-
159 (2020) (integrity of grand jury unimpaired though grand jury
witness testified that cell tower data could pinpoint
defendant's location, but trial expert testified data could not
provide exact location). Had the police officer here
"specifically clarified" that the Duxbury video recording
depicted the victim at the age of sixteen, "there is no
likelihood that the grand jury would not have indicted the
defendant" for rape of a child given evidence that the victim
was under the age of sixteen during "at least" two incidents,
3 one of which was memorialized by a video recording taken in
Scituate. Id. at 159.
Even if the grand jury testimony could have been more
precise as to the victim's age in the Duxbury video recording,
the defendant has not shown that any possible uncertainty
influenced the decision to indict. See Commonwealth v.
Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 456 (2002) (grand jury integrity
unimpaired though "presentation of the evidence was not entirely
clear"); Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 423 Mass. 230, 238, (1996)
(grand jury integrity unimpaired though "[t]here was
disagreement among the witnesses as to whether there were two
shooters or three and there was no unanimity with respect to the
clothes the shooters were wearing"); Commonwealth v. Reyes, 98
Mass. App. Ct. 797, 806 (2020) (grand jury integrity unimpaired
though "ambiguity" in evidence).
We likewise discern no impropriety from additional grand
jury testimony related to evidence obtained from cell phones.
The defendant contends that the prosecutor misled grand jurors
to believe that the police extracted incriminating video
recordings from the defendant's cell phone and conducted a
forensic analysis of the victim's cell phone. We disagree.
Testimony before the grand jury showed that, through a "forensic
analysis" of the defendant's cell phone, investigators extracted
4 video recordings. The officer testified that "[t]here was also
phone evidence taken from [the victim's] phone" (without
explanation as to the method used to obtain the video
recordings) and "screen shots" that the victim provided. Even
if the forensic analysis of the defendant's cell phone did not
yield incriminating evidence, as the defendant maintains,
additional testimony showed that the defendant "took" the
Scituate video recording and "sent" it to the victim, and he
sent her a sexually explicit photograph in connection with the
Duxbury video recording. Thus, we discern no impropriety.
We also discern no impairment of the grand jury proceeding
through testimony about a partially recovered text message
exchanged between the defendant and the victim that included the
number "15." During her grand jury testimony, the police
officer stated that the number in the text message "alludes to
the idea that [the victim] was 15." We need not decide whether
such testimony was warranted because even if the officer
overstated the content of the text message, the testimony did
not impair the grand jury proceeding. As previously discussed,
other evidence established that the victim was fifteen during at
least two incidents. Also, the defendant's knowledge of the
victim's age was not required to establish liability for rape of
a child. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 522 (1982)
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-382
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CHRISTIAN M. REYES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, Christian M.
Reyes, of rape of a child (occurring in Scituate), dissemination
of material depicting a child in a state of nudity (two counts),
possession of material depicting a child engaged in sexual
conduct (two counts), posing or exhibiting a child engaged in
sexual conduct (two counts), and furnishing alcohol to a minor.
Claiming deficiencies in the grand jury presentation as well as
errors at trial, the defendant appeals. We affirm.
1. Grand Jury. Challenging the denial of a pretrial
motion to dismiss, the defendant claims that the Commonwealth
presented "distorted" and "insufficient" evidence to the grand
jury. Applying de novo review, see Commonwealth v. Barlow- Tucker, 493 Mass. 197, 204 (2024), we conclude that the motion
judge did not err.
a. Integrity of Grand Jury Presentation. The defendant
has not met his "heavy burden" to show the prosecutor impaired
the integrity of the grand jury presentation. Commonwealth v.
Stevenson, 474 Mass. 372, 376 (2016). He posits that the
prosecutor misled grand jurors to believe that the victim was
less than sixteen years old in two video recordings depicting
sexual acts with the defendant. Evidence before the grand jury
consisted of testimony from an investigating police officer and
four exhibits (including a video recording of the victim and the
defendant in the woods in Scituate, a video recording of the
victim and the defendant in a car in Duxbury, photographs from
the victim's cell phone, and the defendant's statement to the
police). Testimony showed that the victim reported to a school
resource police officer that when she was fifteen the defendant
had sex with her "at least twice." One of those incidents
occurred in the woods in Scituate where the defendant made a
video recording. This Scituate incident formed the basis for
the defendant's indictment and conviction for rape of a child.
Testimony also showed that the defendant had sex "multiple
times" with the victim in his car, where he recorded one of
those incidents while they were in Duxbury. The officer further
2 testified that at the time of "the incident in the woods, and
one of the incidents in the car, [the victim] is the age of 15."
From this testimony, we discern no "false or deceptive" evidence
being presented to the grand jury. Commonwealth v. Mayfield,
398 Mass. 615, 621 (1986). The police officer's testimony made
clear that there were multiple incidents, at least two occurred
when the victim was fifteen years old, many occurred in the
defendant's car, the victim was fifteen during the recorded
incident in the woods in Scituate, and the victim was fifteen
during one of the incidents in the defendant's car.
This evidence did not impair the grand jury presentation
simply because more detailed evidence emerged at trial showing
that the Duxbury video recording was made after the victim
turned sixteen. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass. 145, 158-
159 (2020) (integrity of grand jury unimpaired though grand jury
witness testified that cell tower data could pinpoint
defendant's location, but trial expert testified data could not
provide exact location). Had the police officer here
"specifically clarified" that the Duxbury video recording
depicted the victim at the age of sixteen, "there is no
likelihood that the grand jury would not have indicted the
defendant" for rape of a child given evidence that the victim
was under the age of sixteen during "at least" two incidents,
3 one of which was memorialized by a video recording taken in
Scituate. Id. at 159.
Even if the grand jury testimony could have been more
precise as to the victim's age in the Duxbury video recording,
the defendant has not shown that any possible uncertainty
influenced the decision to indict. See Commonwealth v.
Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 456 (2002) (grand jury integrity
unimpaired though "presentation of the evidence was not entirely
clear"); Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 423 Mass. 230, 238, (1996)
(grand jury integrity unimpaired though "[t]here was
disagreement among the witnesses as to whether there were two
shooters or three and there was no unanimity with respect to the
clothes the shooters were wearing"); Commonwealth v. Reyes, 98
Mass. App. Ct. 797, 806 (2020) (grand jury integrity unimpaired
though "ambiguity" in evidence).
We likewise discern no impropriety from additional grand
jury testimony related to evidence obtained from cell phones.
The defendant contends that the prosecutor misled grand jurors
to believe that the police extracted incriminating video
recordings from the defendant's cell phone and conducted a
forensic analysis of the victim's cell phone. We disagree.
Testimony before the grand jury showed that, through a "forensic
analysis" of the defendant's cell phone, investigators extracted
4 video recordings. The officer testified that "[t]here was also
phone evidence taken from [the victim's] phone" (without
explanation as to the method used to obtain the video
recordings) and "screen shots" that the victim provided. Even
if the forensic analysis of the defendant's cell phone did not
yield incriminating evidence, as the defendant maintains,
additional testimony showed that the defendant "took" the
Scituate video recording and "sent" it to the victim, and he
sent her a sexually explicit photograph in connection with the
Duxbury video recording. Thus, we discern no impropriety.
We also discern no impairment of the grand jury proceeding
through testimony about a partially recovered text message
exchanged between the defendant and the victim that included the
number "15." During her grand jury testimony, the police
officer stated that the number in the text message "alludes to
the idea that [the victim] was 15." We need not decide whether
such testimony was warranted because even if the officer
overstated the content of the text message, the testimony did
not impair the grand jury proceeding. As previously discussed,
other evidence established that the victim was fifteen during at
least two incidents. Also, the defendant's knowledge of the
victim's age was not required to establish liability for rape of
a child. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 522 (1982)
5 (rape of child "may be committed with or without any knowledge
on the defendant's part of the age of the victim"). Grand
jurors also had the chance to examine the defendant's statement
to the police where he initially denied knowing the victim,
having sex with her, or knowing she was under sixteen, but
ultimately admitted having sex with her and speaking with her
for the last time during a prepandemic period -- a time during
which the victim was still fifteen.
b. Sufficiency of Grand Jury Evidence. The decision of
the grand jury to return an indictment "is enough to call for
trial of the charge[s] on the merits." Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). Courts "will not inquire into
the competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand
jury," Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205, 211-12 (1948),
unless the grand jury abdicates its constitutional role and
returns an indictment without receiving "any evidence of
criminal activity by the defendant" (emphasis added),
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1983). A "grand
jury must hear sufficient evidence to establish the identity of
the accused" as well as "probable cause to arrest." Id.
Judicial review of the grand jury's determination is limited to
considering the evidence presented "in the light most favorable
6 to the Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Truong Vo Tam, 49 Mass.
App. Ct. 31, 31 (2000).
We reject the defendant's various claims challenging the
evidence presented to the grand jury. The defendant repeatedly
criticizes the motion judge's reasoning, but our review is de
novo without deference to the judge's rationale. See Barlow-
Tucker, 493 Mass. at 204. We also do not weigh the evidence or
entertain possible competing inferences suggested by the
defendant. See Truong Vo Tam, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 31.
Furthermore, evidence before the grand jury is not insufficient
or untrustworthy merely because some testimony may be
inadmissible at trial or vulnerable to cross-examination. See
McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 162 ("indictment may be based solely on
hearsay"); Galvin, 323 Mass. at 211-212 (1948) (courts do not
inquire into competency of evidence before grand jury); Mass. G.
Evid. § 1101(c)(2) (2025) (apart from sections on privileges,
guide to evidence does not apply to "[p]roceedings before grand
juries"). "Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate
guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue
its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the
evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal
trial." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
Evidence before the grand jury here established that the victim
7 informed the police that the defendant provided alcohol to her
when she was under twenty-one, had sexual intercourse with her
in the woods of Scituate when she was fifteen, posed or
exhibited her engaged in sexual conduct in Scituate and Duxbury
when she was under eighteen, possessed images depicting their
sexual conduct in Scituate and Duxbury when she was under
eighteen, and disseminated images depicting her in a state of
nudity when she was under the age of eighteen. Viewed in a
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence, even if
based on hearsay, established probable cause for the indictments
at issue. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344-345 ("grand jury's
sources of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an
indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence
considered").
2. Trial. a. Sufficiency of Evidence. We disagree with
the defendant's contention that the Commonwealth failed at trial
to present sufficient evidence of rape of a child and possession
and dissemination of the video recordings. Viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, "[a]ny rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt" (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).
8 Contrary to the defendant's claim, jurors could conclude
from the evidence that the victim was under the age of sixteen
when she and the defendant had sexual intercourse. See G. L.
c. 265, § 23 (prohibiting sexual intercourse with child under
the age of sixteen). The victim so testified, repeatedly on
direct and cross-examination, that they first had sex when she
was "[f]ifteen," and had sex "at least once before I turned 16."
To establish her age at the time of the event, nothing more than
the victim's testimony was required to survive a motion for a
required finding of not guilty. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 100
Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3 (2021) ("sworn testimony of the victim of a
sexual assault, including rape, is evidence of the facts
asserted" and standing alone suffices to support conviction).
Because this evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the absence of
corroborating evidence or the presence of conflicting evidence,
the judge properly denied the motion for a required finding of
not guilty.
Evidence also contradicts the defendant's claim that he
neither possessed nor disseminated the two video recordings
(created in Scituate and Duxbury) depicting nudity and sex with
the victim. Because the victim testified that the defendant
"sent" the Scituate video recording to her, sent the "videos" to
9 her, and "record[ed]" the Duxbury video recording, jurors could
logically conclude that the defendant possessed and disseminated
the material depicted in the video recordings. See G. L.
c. 272, § 29B (a) (prohibiting dissemination of material
depicting child under eighteen in state of nudity); G. L.
c. 272, § 29C (vii) (prohibiting possession of material
depicting child under eighteen engaging in sexual conduct). The
defendant argues that because the victim testified that she was
"not positive" whether the Duxbury video recording was made with
the defendant's cell phone or her cell phone, he was entitled to
a required finding of not guilty on charges related to that
video recording. We disagree. The device used to make the
recording is not determinative. Assuming the defendant borrowed
the victim's cell phone to create the Duxbury video recording,
jurors could reasonably infer that he possessed the Duxbury
video recording and disseminated it to her by returning her cell
phone. Thus, whether he created the Duxbury recording on his
own cell phone and sent it to her electronically or created the
Duxbury video recording on the victim's cell phone and gave the
cell phone to her, the defendant both possessed and disseminated
the contents of the cell phone.
b. Closing argument. Although the defendant objected to
only one phrase in the prosecutor's closing argument, he now
10 raises four claims on appeal. None of these claims evince an
error that merits relief.
The prosecutor argued that the defendant and the victim
"had sex pretty much right off the bat." Noting the defendant's
objection, the judge concluded, "I do think there is some basis
to infer that [sex] was early" in their relationship. Given the
timeline of their relationship, this argument was fair. They
met in the summer and first had sex sometime before her
sixteenth birthday in the middle of August. Thus, they
necessarily started a sexual relationship within weeks (June
through the middle of August) of meeting, which could arguably
be considered "pretty much right off the bat" as the prosecutor
put it. Especially given the judge's instruction that arguments
are not evidence, and the ability of jurors to evaluate the
timeline for themselves, we discern no error and no prejudice.
See Commonwealth v. Chism, 495 Mass. 358, 401 (2025) (review for
prejudicial error where objection raised to closing argument).
As to the remaining claims, raised for the first time, the
prosecutor's arguments did not amount to an error creating a
"substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v.
Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 564 (1967). In his brief, the defendant
claimed the prosecutor falsely said, "he finally admits it [in
his statement]" but the prosecutor actually said, "Listen to how
11 he finally admits it. Kind of like I had sex with her once,"
and encouraged jurors to watch the video recording of his
statement and trace the denials evolving into an admission. He
next contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by
saying that the defendant "sent" the video recordings to the
victim, but evidence showed that the defendant disseminated the
video recordings either by creating them on his cell phone and
sending video recordings to the victim's cell phone or by
borrowing the victim's cell phone to create the video recordings
and returning the cell phone to her. Finally, the defendant
claims that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by saying that
the defendant "keeps reaching out, and . . . makes her feel
overwhelmed to finally" talk to a counselor, but the evidence
showed that on cross-examination the victim testified, "That's
why I had wanted to talk to my counselor because I was just kind
of overwhelmed, and I wanted him to stop reaching out to me."
Bearing in mind that "[a] prosecutor's argument may be based not
only on the evidence, but also on the fair inferences to be
drawn from it," Commonwealth v. Phillips, 495 Mass. 491, 502
12 (2025), we discern no error. That alternative arguments may be
made does not render the arguments improper.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Walsh & Hodgens, JJ.1),
Clerk
Entered: September 26, 2025.
1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.