NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-216
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CESAR VALENTIN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of
assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); assault and
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b);
and disturbing a correctional institution, G. L. c. 268, § 30;
in connection with a jailhouse assault. On appeal, the
defendant raises two issues. He argues that the judge should
have given a missing witness instruction because the
Commonwealth did not call the victim as a witness. Second, he
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the admission of a video recording that captured the assault
on the ground that it was improperly authenticated. We affirm. Background. The defendant and the victim were detainees at
a jail. A surveillance video recording (video) of the jail's
common area, which was admitted in evidence at trial, showed the
victim talking on a pay phone. As soon as a sheriff's deputy
climbed a stairway leading away from the common area, the
defendant approached the victim from behind and punched him in
the head. The defendant proceeded to repeatedly punch the
victim in the head as he wrestled the victim to the ground.
Upon hearing the victim scream, the deputy radioed for help and
ran back down the stairs. Pursuant to protocol, the deputy
waited for backup to arrive before intervening. The defendant
continued to kick and punch the victim -- even throwing a metal
bookcase onto him -- until deputies stormed into the common area
and subdued the defendant. The deputy who climbed the stairs
witnessed the melee. At trial, he testified, "I saw the
defendant punching the detainee on the phone, continuously.
. . . he was bleeding. He was on the ground, he was being
punched, kicked."
The Commonwealth laid a foundation for the surveillance
video through the deputy. After viewing a "short clip" of the
video, the deputy identified himself in the video and testified
that he agreed with the prosecutor that the video was a "fair
and accurate representation of what was going on" in the jail's
common area on the date in question. The judge admitted the
2 video in evidence and trial counsel did not object. After
examining one other deputy who responded to the fight, the
Commonwealth rested. The defendant presented his case solely
through cross-examination; he did not call any witnesses. In a
pretrial motion in limine, the defendant argued that the judge
should instruct the jury that they could construe the absence of
an expected witness, namely the victim, against the
Commonwealth. During the charge conference, the defendant
renewed his pretrial motion for a missing witness instruction,
which the judge denied.
Discussion. 1. Missing witness instruction. The
defendant argues that the judge erred by denying the defendant's
request for a missing witness instruction. We review the
judge's decision for abuse of discretion and will not reverse
unless the decision was "manifestly unreasonable." Commonwealth
v. Saletino, 449 Mass. 657, 667 (2007).
"[W]hen a party 'has knowledge of a person who can be
located and brought forward, who is friendly to, or at least not
hostilely disposed toward, the party, and who can be expected to
give testimony of distinct importance to the case,' and the
party, without explanation, fails to call the person as a
witness," a missing witness instruction may be appropriate. Id.
at 667-668, quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 411 Mass. 279, 280
n.1 (1991). A missing witness instruction permits the jury to
3 "infer that the [missing witness], had he been called, would
have given testimony unfavorable to the party" that failed to
call him. Saletino, supra at 668, quoting Anderson, supra. A
judge may give the instruction only when the moving party meets
certain "foundational requisites." Saletino, supra at 669; see
Mass. G. Evid. § 1111(b) (2024). Those foundational requisites
include the importance of the missing witness's testimony, the
physical availability of the witness, whether the evidence could
be produced from other sources, and whether the witness is
equally available to either party. Commonwealth v. Williams,
450 Mass. 894, 900 (2008). In addition, courts may consider
whether the party has a plausible reason for not calling the
witness. Anderson, supra at 282-283.
Because an adverse inference can be severely damaging, the
judge retains discretion to refuse to give a missing witness
instruction even when the foundational requirements are met.
See Anderson, 411 Mass. at 283 ("the trial judge has discretion
to refuse to give the [missing witness] instruction . . . and,
conversely, a party who wishes the instruction cannot require it
of right"). See also Williams, 450 Mass. at 900-901, quoting
Commonwealth v. Schatvet, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 134 (1986)
("[b]ecause the inference, when it is made, can have a seriously
adverse effect on the noncalling party -- suggesting, as it
does, that the party has willfully attempted to withhold or
4 conceal significant evidence -- it should be invited only in
clear cases, and with caution").
The judge acted within his discretion in refusing to give
the instruction because the defendant failed to meet the
foundational requisites. The defendant made no showing that the
Commonwealth was in a better position to call the victim as a
witness. See Commonwealth v. Hoilett, 430 Mass. 369, 376 (1999)
(missing witness instruction not proper where witness was
equally available to both parties). The victim was equally
available to both parties -- he was believed to be incarcerated
at the time of the trial. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 39 Mass.
App. Ct. 410, 412 (1995) (no showing that jailed witness's
presence at trial could not have been secured by either party).
Trial counsel could have subpoenaed the victim to testify but
did not do so.
Although there was no preliminary showing that the witness
would be hostile to the Commonwealth, "[l]ogic would dictate
that, because of his status, and the Commonwealth's role in
prosecuting him, [the witness] would be naturally antagonistic
toward the Commonwealth's interests." Anderson, 411 Mass. at
283. The Commonwealth had a strong case without the victim's
testimony, which would have been, at best, cumulative.
Schatvet, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 134 (no basis for missing witness
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-216
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CESAR VALENTIN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of
assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); assault and
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b);
and disturbing a correctional institution, G. L. c. 268, § 30;
in connection with a jailhouse assault. On appeal, the
defendant raises two issues. He argues that the judge should
have given a missing witness instruction because the
Commonwealth did not call the victim as a witness. Second, he
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the admission of a video recording that captured the assault
on the ground that it was improperly authenticated. We affirm. Background. The defendant and the victim were detainees at
a jail. A surveillance video recording (video) of the jail's
common area, which was admitted in evidence at trial, showed the
victim talking on a pay phone. As soon as a sheriff's deputy
climbed a stairway leading away from the common area, the
defendant approached the victim from behind and punched him in
the head. The defendant proceeded to repeatedly punch the
victim in the head as he wrestled the victim to the ground.
Upon hearing the victim scream, the deputy radioed for help and
ran back down the stairs. Pursuant to protocol, the deputy
waited for backup to arrive before intervening. The defendant
continued to kick and punch the victim -- even throwing a metal
bookcase onto him -- until deputies stormed into the common area
and subdued the defendant. The deputy who climbed the stairs
witnessed the melee. At trial, he testified, "I saw the
defendant punching the detainee on the phone, continuously.
. . . he was bleeding. He was on the ground, he was being
punched, kicked."
The Commonwealth laid a foundation for the surveillance
video through the deputy. After viewing a "short clip" of the
video, the deputy identified himself in the video and testified
that he agreed with the prosecutor that the video was a "fair
and accurate representation of what was going on" in the jail's
common area on the date in question. The judge admitted the
2 video in evidence and trial counsel did not object. After
examining one other deputy who responded to the fight, the
Commonwealth rested. The defendant presented his case solely
through cross-examination; he did not call any witnesses. In a
pretrial motion in limine, the defendant argued that the judge
should instruct the jury that they could construe the absence of
an expected witness, namely the victim, against the
Commonwealth. During the charge conference, the defendant
renewed his pretrial motion for a missing witness instruction,
which the judge denied.
Discussion. 1. Missing witness instruction. The
defendant argues that the judge erred by denying the defendant's
request for a missing witness instruction. We review the
judge's decision for abuse of discretion and will not reverse
unless the decision was "manifestly unreasonable." Commonwealth
v. Saletino, 449 Mass. 657, 667 (2007).
"[W]hen a party 'has knowledge of a person who can be
located and brought forward, who is friendly to, or at least not
hostilely disposed toward, the party, and who can be expected to
give testimony of distinct importance to the case,' and the
party, without explanation, fails to call the person as a
witness," a missing witness instruction may be appropriate. Id.
at 667-668, quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 411 Mass. 279, 280
n.1 (1991). A missing witness instruction permits the jury to
3 "infer that the [missing witness], had he been called, would
have given testimony unfavorable to the party" that failed to
call him. Saletino, supra at 668, quoting Anderson, supra. A
judge may give the instruction only when the moving party meets
certain "foundational requisites." Saletino, supra at 669; see
Mass. G. Evid. § 1111(b) (2024). Those foundational requisites
include the importance of the missing witness's testimony, the
physical availability of the witness, whether the evidence could
be produced from other sources, and whether the witness is
equally available to either party. Commonwealth v. Williams,
450 Mass. 894, 900 (2008). In addition, courts may consider
whether the party has a plausible reason for not calling the
witness. Anderson, supra at 282-283.
Because an adverse inference can be severely damaging, the
judge retains discretion to refuse to give a missing witness
instruction even when the foundational requirements are met.
See Anderson, 411 Mass. at 283 ("the trial judge has discretion
to refuse to give the [missing witness] instruction . . . and,
conversely, a party who wishes the instruction cannot require it
of right"). See also Williams, 450 Mass. at 900-901, quoting
Commonwealth v. Schatvet, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 134 (1986)
("[b]ecause the inference, when it is made, can have a seriously
adverse effect on the noncalling party -- suggesting, as it
does, that the party has willfully attempted to withhold or
4 conceal significant evidence -- it should be invited only in
clear cases, and with caution").
The judge acted within his discretion in refusing to give
the instruction because the defendant failed to meet the
foundational requisites. The defendant made no showing that the
Commonwealth was in a better position to call the victim as a
witness. See Commonwealth v. Hoilett, 430 Mass. 369, 376 (1999)
(missing witness instruction not proper where witness was
equally available to both parties). The victim was equally
available to both parties -- he was believed to be incarcerated
at the time of the trial. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 39 Mass.
App. Ct. 410, 412 (1995) (no showing that jailed witness's
presence at trial could not have been secured by either party).
Trial counsel could have subpoenaed the victim to testify but
did not do so.
Although there was no preliminary showing that the witness
would be hostile to the Commonwealth, "[l]ogic would dictate
that, because of his status, and the Commonwealth's role in
prosecuting him, [the witness] would be naturally antagonistic
toward the Commonwealth's interests." Anderson, 411 Mass. at
283. The Commonwealth had a strong case without the victim's
testimony, which would have been, at best, cumulative.
Schatvet, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 134 (no basis for missing witness
instruction where testimony would have been cumulative). The
5 video, along with the deputy's testimony, was sufficient to
allow the jury to find the elements of all three offenses. The
Commonwealth made a reasonable tactical decision that relying on
a video of the attack, rather than a potentially hostile
witness, would be a simpler and more effective means of proving
its case. See Saletino, 449 Mass. at 668 ("[s]uch an
instruction should not be given where the Commonwealth has
legitimate tactical reasons for not calling the witness").
The Commonwealth had no burden to prove motive, and no
obligation to peremptorily rebut a self-defense claim that was
never raised. The defendant nevertheless characterizes the
Commonwealth's failure to assist in raising a self-defense claim
as an attempt to sidestep exculpatory evidence. In fact, this
gave the Commonwealth a "legitimate tactical reason" for not
calling the victim. Saletino, 449 Mass. at 668. If the
defendant had wished to assert self-defense, he could have
called the victim as a witness. Where, as here, "the
circumstances, considered by ordinary logic and experience,
suggest a plausible reason" for not calling the witness, the
missing witness instruction should not be given. Anderson, 411
Mass. at 282-283. The judge did not abuse his discretion.1
1 The defendant also argues that the judge erred in not allowing him to make an argument in closing related to the alleged missing witness. Given the defendant's failure to show he was entitled to the instruction, he has also failed to show
6 2. Authentication of the video recording. The defendant
contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the admission of the video for lack of authentication.
We disagree with this contention because the video was properly
authenticated. The deputy testified to his firsthand
observation of the assault, which was consistent with what was
depicted on the video.
The heart of the defendant's argument is that while the
deputy's testimony was sufficient to authenticate the "short
clip" of the video that was played in court, it was insufficient
to authenticate the video in its entirety. The deputy
identified himself in a still frame in the video, watched a
"short clip" of himself climbing the stairs, and testified that
the recording was "a fair and accurate representation of what
was going on."2 The defendant emphasizes that the deputy did not
he was entitled to make such an argument. See Saletino, 449 Mass. at 670 ("once it was determined that the judge would not give a missing witness instruction in this case, he should not have permitted counsel to make the missing witness argument to the jury").
2 The record is silent on exactly what the "short clip" of the video depicts. The prosecutor asked the deputy the following question: "So Deputy, just to play a short clip of it, you mentioned that is you in the uniform, beginning to go up the stairs?" About ten seconds elapsed from when the deputy began to climb the stairs to when the defendant first punched the victim. For reasons outlined below, whether the "short clip" showed the fight itself is immaterial to the outcome of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
7 testify that he had watched the entire video. Trial counsel did
not object to the admission of the video.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the defendant must show a "serious incompetency, inefficiency,
or inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel falling
measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary
fallible lawyer -- and, if that is found, then, typically,
whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise
available, substantial ground of defen[s]e." Commonwealth v.
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96-97 (1974).
The defendant does not satisfy the first prong of the
Saferian test because objecting to the admission of the video
would have been futile. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass.
255, 261 (2014) (counsel not ineffective for failing to make
futile objection). To authenticate an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence to support a finding that the
item is what its proponent represents it to be. Commonwealth v.
LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 704 (1977). A video may be
authenticated with eyewitness testimony that the video is a fair
and accurate representation of what the witness perceived. See
Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 855 (2011)
(testimony by witness that she and three other individuals could
be seen on surveillance video and that video was fair and
accurate depiction of scene was sufficient to authenticate
8 video); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 586
(2017) (authentication of video typically achieved by "having an
eyewitness testify that the video is a fair and accurate
representation of what he saw on the day in question"). A video
may also be authenticated by circumstantial evidence, including
its "[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or
other distinctive characteristics." Commonwealth v. Davis, 487
Mass. 448, 466 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran,
460 Mass. 535, 546 (2011).
The deputy identified himself in the video and agreed with
the prosecutor that the video was "a fair and accurate
representation of what was going on" at the jail on the night in
question. This testimony supported a finding that the video was
authentic. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. at 855-856. The defendant
cites no case law that requires the witness to watch the entire
video in court, or prior to testifying, to authenticate it, nor
does case law require a witness to continually authenticate a
video "frame by frame" as it is played.
Assuming arguendo that this testimony was insufficient to
authenticate the video, the remainder of the deputy's testimony
authenticated the video by circumstantial evidence. The deputy
testified, "I saw the defendant punching the [victim] on the
phone, continuously. . . . he was bleeding. He was on the
ground, he was being punched, kicked. And then there was a
9 bookcase, like a metal bookcase that was right near there, and
that was picked up by [the defendant] and thrown on [the
victim]." This testimony matches what is shown on the video.
See Davis, 487 Mass. at 466 ("plentiful circumstantial evidence"
authenticated video where witness testimony matched substance of
what was shown on video). The defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim falls short.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Singh & Hershfang, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: March 4, 2025.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.