Commonwealth v. Carlos Lacen-Santiago.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0222
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-222

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

CARLOS LACEN-SANTIAGO.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Carlos Lacen-Santiago, appeals from his jury

convictions of trafficking in ten or more grams of fentanyl,

G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (c1/2), and possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c). He contends that

his motion to suppress should have been allowed because the

search warrant affidavit did not establish the veracity of a

confidential informant and that at trial the prosecutor

misstated evidence in closing argument. We affirm.

Background. In July 2021, based on an affidavit of New

Bedford Detective Samuel A. Algarin-Mojica setting forth

information from a confidential informant (CI), a District Court

clerk-magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the search of a black Honda Accord used by the defendant. Police executed the

warrant and seized evidence including fentanyl and cocaine.

The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the

supporting affidavit failed to establish the CI's veracity

because it set forth information about only a single occasion on

which the CI had previously provided information that led to an

arrest; the information about that arrest was stale because it

was five years earlier and did not result in a conviction; the

police did not corroborate the CI's tip in this case; and the

affidavit did not establish a sufficient nexus between the

defendant's drug sales and the Honda. A Superior Court judge

(motion judge) denied the motion to suppress, finding that the

case arising from the CI's previous information had been

dismissed because of an improper strip search, and not as the

result of any issue related to the CI's veracity.

At trial before a different judge (trial judge), Detective

Algarin-Mojica testified that while conducting surveillance just

before executing the search warrant, he saw the defendant

"waiting around" near the Honda for a few minutes with his cell

phone. A man wearing red shorts and a black tank top approached

the defendant, who then unlocked the Honda and got into the

front passenger seat. The man reached into the Honda through

the front passenger window and put something into his pocket.

2 The police then executed the search warrant and from the

Honda seized evidence including 13.65 grams of fentanyl, 0.75

grams of cocaine, three digital scales, a card bearing white

residue, and documents in the defendant's name. Police arrested

the defendant and seized three cell phones from a crossbody bag

on his person and about $965 in cash from the bag and his

pocket. At the same time, police stopped the man in the red

shorts and black tank top and found on his person a plastic bag

containing three and one-half grams of fentanyl.

The defendant testified that the Honda belonged to his son,

whose name was similar and who had asked him to repair it, and

the man who interacted with him was explaining the repairs. The

cash in the defendant's crossbody bag came from a friend for

whom he had repaired a boat, and the defendant planned to use it

to buy parts for the Honda. The defendant testified that he did

not know there were drugs in the Honda's glove compartment.

The jury convicted the defendant of trafficking in more

than ten grams of fentanyl and possession of cocaine with intent

to distribute. The defendant appeals.

Discussion. 1. Search warrant. The defendant contends

the motion judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the

evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The defendant

argues that the search warrant affidavit did not demonstrate

3 probable cause because it did not establish the CI's veracity or

a sufficient nexus between the drugs and the Honda.

We review de novo whether there was probable cause for the

magistrate to issue the search warrant. See Commonwealth v.

Defrancesco, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 211 (2021). Our review

"begins and ends with the four corners of the affidavit"

(citation omitted). Id. "In order to establish probable cause

to issue a search warrant, the affidavit must contain enough

information for the issuing magistrate to determine that the

items sought are related to the criminal activity under

investigation, and that they may reasonably be expected to be

located in the place to be searched" (quotation and citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 813 (2009).

"The affidavit should be interpreted 'in a commonsense fashion'

and 'read as a whole,' rather than 'parsed, severed, and

subjected to hypercritical analysis'" (citation omitted).

Defrancesco, supra. See Commonwealth v. Andre-Fields, 98 Mass.

App. Ct. 475, 481 (2020). "[I]nferences drawn from the

affidavit need only be reasonable, not required." Connolly,

supra, citing Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 110-111

(2009).

a. Affidavit. The search warrant affidavit set forth the

following facts. The CI, a cocaine user, told Detective

Algarin-Mojica that, within seventy-two hours before the

4 detective applied for the search warrant, the CI had purchased

cocaine from the defendant. The CI said that the defendant was

selling cocaine from a black Honda bearing a temporary license

plate that was parked on Morton Avenue, and that the defendant

stored cocaine packaged for street level sales in the Honda's

glove compartment. The affidavit averred that in the past, the

CI had given "detailed and accurate information, which led to

arrests and the seizures of several grams of cocaine," referring

to a criminal case with a 2016 docket number. The defendant had

prior convictions for crimes including trafficking in heroin.

Detective Algarin-Mojica confirmed that a Honda matching that

description was parked on Morton Avenue near the defendant's

apartment and near another vehicle that the CI stated the

defendant also used.

b. Veracity prong. The defendant contends that the

affidavit did not establish the veracity of the CI because it

relied on a single tip that the CI made five years previously,

and the police did not corroborate the tip with a controlled

purchase.

"When a search warrant affidavit is based on information

supplied from an informant, art. 14 [of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights] requires the [judge] to apply the

familiar Aguilar-Spinelli standard." Commonwealth v. Ponte, 97

Mass. App. Ct. 78, 81 (2020). An affidavit relying on

5 information from a CI must provide "some of the underlying

circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the

information was 'credible' or [the CI's] information 'reliable'

(the veracity test)." Commonwealth v. Byfield, 413 Mass. 426,

429 (1992). 1 The "most common indicator of 'veracity[]' [is] a

history of dispensing information to the government which led to

convictions or seizure of narcotics." Commonwealth v. Luce, 34

Mass. App. Ct. 105, 108 (1993). Where that history is absent,

"[i]ndependent police corroboration may make up for deficiencies

in one or both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis," Ponte,

supra, citing Commonwealth v. Depiero, 473 Mass. 450, 454

(2016), and that corroboration may include supervised controlled

purchases, see Commonwealth v. Valdez, 402 Mass. 65, 71 (1988).

We conclude that the averments in the affidavit that the CI

had previously provided information that "led to arrests and the

seizures of several grams of cocaine," including reference to

the 2016 docket number, sufficed to demonstrate the CI's

reliability and thus "satisfy the veracity prong." Commonwealth

v. Gonzalez, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 104 (2016) (reliability of

1 The affidavit must also show "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the contraband was where he claimed it was (basis of knowledge test)." Byfield, 413 Mass. at 429. The defendant does not contest that the affidavit established that the CI satisfied the basis of knowledge test.

6 CI satisfied by accuracy of past tips). See Defrancesco, 99

Mass. App. Ct. at 212 n.5. Contrast Ponte, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at

82 (search warrant affidavit listed defendant's "arraignments,"

but not whether they resulted in convictions). In addition, the

CI was registered with the New Bedford police department, and

the CI's identity and personal information were known to police.

Contrary to the defendant's argument, the passage of five

years since the CI provided the prior information did not

diminish the CI's veracity. To be sure, an informant's basis of

knowledge or the reliability of an informant's specific

information may diminish over time. But an informant's veracity

is not dulled by the passage of time, which "does not usually

erode one's truth-telling propensities." Commonwealth v.

DiPietro, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 638, 642 (1993). See Commonwealth

v. Santos, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 700 & n.4 (2019) (informant's

veracity established by tip seven years before that led to

seizure of unlawfully possessed shotgun). "Thus, we do not

think that a staleness problem prevented a finding that the

informant was reliable." DiPietro, supra.

As for the defendant's argument that the affidavit did not

demonstrate the CI's veracity because police did not corroborate

the CI's information with a controlled purchase, we are not

persuaded. Although in some circumstances a search warrant

affidavit demonstrates the veracity of information, particularly

7 that given by a first-time informant, by corroborating the

credibility of the information with a controlled purchase, see

Ponte, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 81-82, that is not required where

the informant's reliability is shown by the CI's having

previously provided information that led to the seizure of

contraband. Because we have concluded that the affidavit

established the CI's veracity, we need not reach the question

whether police surveillance of the Honda amounted to independent

police corroboration. See id. at 81.

c. Nexus between drug sales and Honda. The defendant next

contends that the search warrant affidavit did not show a

sufficient nexus between the drugs and the Honda at the time the

warrant issued. He claims that there was "nothing to suggest"

that the defendant used the Honda to store or sell drugs. We

disagree.

As mentioned, the search warrant affidavit set forth that,

within the previous seventy-two hours, the CI had bought cocaine

packaged for sale that the defendant kept in the Honda's glove

compartment. That amounted to probable cause, i.e., "a quantum

of proof from which the magistrate can conclude, applying common

sense and reasonable inferences, that evidence is 'reasonably

likely' to be found in the [Honda]." Defrancesco, 99 Mass. App.

Ct. at 213. The fact that the police in Defrancesco, see id. at

210, 212-213, also had information that the defendant was

8 previously arrested at his home for a drug offense does not

render the quantum of probable cause here insufficient. See

Commonwealth v. Torres, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 364 (2023),

quoting Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 576 (2002)

("[t]he issue is not the comparative strength of the evidence

[to other like cases], but whether the evidence here was

sufficient to support a finding of probable cause").

2. Prosecutor's closing argument. The defendant contends

that the prosecutor misstated the evidence when she said in

closing argument that police found fentanyl in the drug

customer's "pocket," because a detective testified that the

fentanyl was found "on his person." The defendant did not

object to the comment, but claims on appeal the statement

created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. We

"A prosecutor must limit comment in closing statement to

the evidence and fair inferences that can be drawn from the

evidence." Commonwealth v. Lugo, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 234

(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 333 (2015).

We review the prosecutor's remarks "in the context of the entire

argument, and in light of the judge's instruction to the jury,

and the evidence at trial." Commonwealth v. Sanders, 101 Mass.

App. Ct. 503, 511 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Braley, 449

Mass. 316, 328-329 (2007).

9 At trial, Detective Algarin-Mojica described the

defendant's interaction with the man in the red shorts and the

black tank top. After the man reached into the Honda's front

passenger-side window where the defendant was sitting, "[h]e

placed an item into his left-hand pocket." 2 Detective Jordan

DaSilva then testified that he searched the man and found "on

his person" a bag of fentanyl. The jury could reasonably infer

that the bag of fentanyl that Detective DaSilva found on the

man's person was the item that Detective Algarin-Mojica had seen

the man place in his pocket, and thus the prosecutor's argument

was a fair inference based on the evidence. See Commonwealth v.

Ortega, 441 Mass. 170, 181-182 (2004). See also Commonwealth v.

Nova, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9 (2022) (inference that ringing

2 The transcript reflects that Detective Algarin-Mojica testified that the man placed the item in his "left-hand pocket," but the prosecutor then referred to it as the man's "left pant pocket." The discrepancy is immaterial to our analysis.

10 cell phone belonged to defendant was "reasonable, though not

inescapable").

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Singh & Grant, JJ. 3),

Clerk

Entered: July 1, 2026.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.