Commonwealth v. Cara L. Rintala.

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-418

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

CARA L. RINTALA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2023, following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the

defendant, Cara L. Rintala, was convicted of voluntary

manslaughter.1 On appeal she argues that her conviction must be

reversed because (1) the Commonwealth exercised a discriminatory

peremptory challenge, (2) the judge failed to declare a mistrial

based on the jury's exposure to extraneous information during

deliberations, and (3) the judge failed to provide a portion of

1In 2011, a grand jury indicted the defendant for murder. The case went to trial in 2013 and resulted in a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict. The case went to trial a second time in 2014 and again resulted in a mistrial after the second jury did not reach a unanimous verdict. In 2016, the case went to trial a third time and resulted in a conviction of first-degree murder. In 2021, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Rintala, 488 Mass. 421 (2021). her requested instruction regarding the adequacy of the police

investigation. We affirm.

Background. On the evening of March 29, 2010, police

officers were dispatched to the home of the defendant and her

wife (victim) for a "possible domestic." Upon arrival, an

officer heard crying from the basement, went downstairs, and saw

the defendant whom he recognized from her work as a paramedic.2

The defendant was sitting on the basement floor, crying, and

holding the victim across her lap. The officer heard the

defendant stating "I can't believe she's dead. She's dead. I

can't believe she's dead." The responding officer, along with

another officer who had arrived at the scene, saw a "large

amount of what appeared to be wet paint all over the area, as

well as all over" the victim and the defendant. The defendant

had one hand on the back of the victim's head and "the other

hand was essentially on [the victim's] stomach, rubbing and

spreading paint." The paint was wet and "[t]here was no

coagulation." The paint was "easily transferred" when one of

the officers walked through it.

The officer checked the victim for a pulse, found none, and

determined that the victim was "beyond life-saving measures."

The victim's body was "extremely cold," and "[h]er skin was very

2 Both the victim and the defendant worked as paramedics.

2 rigid and very stiff to touch." Her face was "bluish." A

paramedic also observed wet, shiny, non-coagulated paint "all

over the place." He checked the victim and saw that she had no

pulse; had "[i]ce cold extremities"; her "muscles were locked in

a rigid position"; and she was in full rigor mortis.

The responding officer told the defendant that he needed to

"take her away from this area," at which time the defendant

"continuously" said, "I came home. The door was open. I don't

know what happened." The defendant stated that she and the

victim "had been arguing since last night and this morning."

The medical examiner determined the victim's cause of death

to be manual strangulation. She also observed injuries to the

victim's head, face, and neck, contusions on the head, and areas

of bruising on the victim's arms and legs. The medical examiner

opined that the victim died approximately six to eight hours

before the officers and first responders arrived.

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced testimony from

witnesses who responded to the home, cell phone evidence, crime-

scene evidence, physical exhibits, evidence of motive, and video

of the defendant's police interview. The Commonwealth contended

that after killing the victim, the defendant went shopping in

order to craft an alibi and, upon returning home, sought to

contaminate the crime scene by pouring paint on the victim's

3 body and throughout the basement. The Commonwealth further

maintained that the fresh, wet paint at the crime scene had been

"freshly poured" and thus did not "match up" with the cold,

stiff body of the victim who had been killed hours earlier.

The defense at trial centered on the claim that the police

rushed to judgment and failed to conduct an adequate

investigation of other suspects. The defense pointed to other

people with whom the victim had prior relationships as suspects

who also had motives to commit the crime.

Discussion. 1. Peremptory challenge. The defendant

claims that the Commonwealth used age as a pretext to exclude a

female Hispanic woman (juror no. 40) from the jury. Where the

judge followed the protocol dictated by Commonwealth v. Soares,

377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), and its

progeny, and found the reasons proffered by the Commonwealth to

be genuine and adequate, we discern no abuse of discretion.

Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights

prohibits the exercise of peremptory challenges "to exclude

members of discrete groups solely on the basis of bias presumed

to derive from that individual's membership in the group."

Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 544 (2017), quoting

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 804, 807 (2000).

"Peremptory challenges are presumed to be proper, but that

4 presumption may be rebutted on a showing that (1) there is a

pattern of excluding members of a discrete grouping and (2) it

is likely that individuals are being excluded solely on the

basis of their membership in that group." Oberle, supra at 545.

"Once . . . a pattern is found, the burden shifts to the party

exercising the challenge to provide a 'group-neutral'

explanation for it." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Maldonado,

439 Mass. 460, 463 (2003). "The judge must then determine

whether the explanation is both 'adequate' and 'genuine.'"

Oberle, supra, quoting Maldonado, supra at 464. "[T]he critical

point of focus for the trial judge as well as the appellate

court turns to the adequacy and genuineness of the explanation

proffered by the party seeking to exercise the peremptory

challenge." Oberle, supra at 546. See generally Mass. G. Evid.

§ 1116 (2026). We review for abuse of discretion. See

Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 304 (2012).

Here, on the second day of empanelment, the Commonwealth

exercised a peremptory challenge of juror no. 40, a twenty-year-

old female college student from Spain. Defense counsel objected

to the challenge based on race, gender, and age.3 At this point

in the process, the Commonwealth had exercised five peremptory

3 On appeal, the defendant centers her argument on the claim of a gender-based challenge, but our analysis addresses all three bases, i.e., gender, race, and age.

5 challenges (one of which the judge denied), only striking men

from the jury.4 Although there was no pattern of striking

females or persons of Hispanic heritage, the judge asked the

Commonwealth to justify the challenge. The Commonwealth

provided a comprehensive explanation and stated, inter alia,

that juror no. 40 was only twenty years of age; that "older

jurors tend to bring with them greater life experience"; and

that juror no. 40 had referenced her heavy courseload at school

due to her double major. Defense counsel responded, in part,

that the Commonwealth did not challenge a twenty-three-year-old

Hispanic male earlier in empanelment who was seated on the jury.

Defense counsel also stated that she "always object[s] when they

try to get rid of young jurors because . . . when you do that

then the [d]efendant does not get a fair cross-section of the

jury." The judge found that the Commonwealth's explanation was

genuine, sincere, the "actual basis for the challenge," and

"personal to this juror," and thus overruled the objection.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's ruling.

Peremptory challenges may indeed be based on age, see Oberle,

4 Prior to objecting to the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge of juror no. 40, the defendant had made Batson-Soares objections to other peremptory challenges exercised by the Commonwealth. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986); Soares, 377 Mass. at 489-491. This included an objection to the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge of a white male, alleging that the challenge was impermissibly based on race and gender.

6 476 Mass. at 545, and we disagree with the defendant's claim

that the Commonwealth's reasons were pretextual. To the

contrary, the Commonwealth's reasons were race- and gender-

neutral and specific to juror no. 40; and the judge's findings

that the Commonwealth's justifications were genuine, adequate,

and personal to juror no. 40 are supported by the record. The

judge -- here and throughout jury empanelment -- followed the

Soares protocol with precision and care. He did not abuse his

"considerable discretion." Prunty, 462 Mass. at 304. See

Oberle, 476 Mass. at 545 (reviewing court defers to trial

judge's sound discretion rather than substitute its review of

transcript); Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 466 (appellate courts

"particularly ill-equipped to assess [explanation's]

genuineness").

2. Jury deliberations. At the close of the jury's third

day of deliberations, the judge received a note from the

foreperson stating that

"Jurors have become aware of an outcome of a past trial with [the defendant] that came from a fellow juror. We as a group would like you to be aware of this. Some of the jury did not know/were not aware of the shared information. Thank you. . . . Info was that [the defendant] had been incarcerated for five years."

The following day of deliberations, the judge advised that he

would conduct individual voir dire of each juror, starting with

the foreperson, to determine whether each juror could remain

7 fair and impartial. The judge also told counsel that "if you

want me to ask any additional questions, I will do that." The

parties did not object to this procedure. Following the voir

dire of the foreperson, the judge conducted a voir dire of juror

no. 15, who acknowledged that she had shared the extraneous

information with the jury. Following several questions,

including questions proposed by defense counsel, the judge found

that juror no. 15 could not be fair and impartial and excused

her. The judge conducted voir dire of the remaining jurors and

ultimately excluded juror no. 18 at the request of defense

counsel. Two alternate jurors were added to the deliberating

jury, and the judge instructed the jury to begin deliberations

anew. The following day, the defendant moved for a mistrial.

Based on the judge's voir dire of each juror and his findings

that the remaining jurors could remain fair and impartial, he

denied the motion.

Here, the defendant argues that the jurors were exposed to

such prejudicial extraneous information that the prejudice was

"irremediable," and a new trial is required.5 Commonwealth v.

Kamara, 422 Mass. 614, 620 (1996). "[W]hen a claim of

extraneous influence on a jury is raised, a trial judge must

The defendant does not argue that the trial was infected 5

with structural error.

8 assess the possible prejudicial effect of the jury's exposure to

extraneous information, and weigh the impact of that extraneous

information on the jurors by conducting an individual voir dire

of each juror." Id. at 616. If the judge conducts an adequate

inquiry, the resulting decision to deny a motion for mistrial

based on extraneous information is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Id.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the judge

conducted a thorough and adequate individual voir dire of each

juror and followed the protocol delineated in our precedent.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 268, 280-281

(2010). The judge was in a much better position than an

appellate court to assess any impact on the jurors, as well as

the demeanor and credibility of the jurors. Moreover, the

defendant cites no authority to support the proposition that

exposure to sensitive extraneous information, standing alone,

mandates a new trial. As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court,

"The defendant has cited no Massachusetts case, nor have we found one, in which, after individual voir dires of the jurors and explicit findings by the judge such as we have here, an appellate court has held that the taint of extraneous information was irremediable. We are not prepared to substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge who heard the evidence, carefully interviewed the jurors individually, and made a finding that each juror could do his or her job unaffected by whatever extraneous information had been injected into the jury room."

9 Kamara, 422 Mass. at 620. See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 50

Mass. App. Ct. 762, 766 (2001) (despite juror's exposure to fact

that defendant had previously been convicted, judge properly

denied motion for mistrial after conducting individual voir dire

of each juror). In view of the judge's careful and meticulous

handling of the jury issue, adherence to the protocol

established by our precedent, and clear findings on the record,

we discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion

for mistrial.

3. Bowden instruction. At trial, the defense centered, in

part, on the claim that the police rushed to judgment and did

not conduct an adequate investigation. The defendant requested

a Bowden instruction, see Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472,

485-486 (1980), which the judge agreed to provide to the jury.

The defendant further asked the judge to add to the Bowden

instruction the following language:

"I have instructed you elsewhere that your verdict may not be based on speculation. However, I instruct you that if you determine there were relevant omissions in the police investigation that bear upon your verdict, that would not be improper speculation."

The judge declined to add the requested language because he

believed it could confuse the jury and instead gave the standard

and comprehensive Bowden instruction. The defendant contends

that the failure to provide the requested language caused

10 confusion, undercut the defense, and constituted reversible

error. We disagree.

"[I]t is within the discretion of the judge whether to

provide the jury with a Bowden instruction that explains to the

jury the inferences they may draw if they were to find the

investigation inadequate." Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 480 Mass.

299, 316 (2018). See Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 23

(2011) (judge not required to instruct on claimed inadequacy of

police investigation). "Bowden simply holds that a judge may

not remove the issue from the jury's consideration."

Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 590 (2000).

The defendant does not contend otherwise, but instead cites

Alvarez, supra at 318, to support her claim that the Bowden

instruction here was insufficient. It is true that in Alvarez,

the Supreme Judicial Court noted in the context of a potential

retrial on that case that

"if the judge decides not to give a Bowden instruction . . . it would be prudent to omit from the instructions the sentence, 'You are not to engage in any guesswork about any unanswered questions that remain in your mind,' to avoid the risk that the jury may interpret this sentence as undercutting the defendant's Bowden argument."

Id. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Alvarez.

Here, the judge did allow the defendant to present a full Bowden

defense and did provide a Bowden instruction. Thus, the concern

expressed in Alvarez -- where the judge did not provide a Bowden

11 instruction -- does not apply to the present circumstances.

Moreover, in Alvarez the court recognized that where a judge

instructs the jury in the final charge "to decide the case based

solely on the evidence rather than on guesswork or conjecture,

it is unlikely that the jury will hear that instruction as a

derogatory comment on the defendant's Bowden argument." Id.

Accordingly, the defendant's reliance on Alvarez here is

unpersuasive.

We have reviewed the judge's instructions as a whole and

discern no errors. The transcript further demonstrates that the

judge provided defense counsel with substantial leeway to

develop its Bowden defense throughout trial and in closing

argument. In short, the defense was not undermined, and the

argument is unavailing. The defendant received a fair trial.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, D'Angelo & Allen, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: July 21, 2026.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.