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24-P-1351 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. MANUEL BRUNETTE-SILVEIRA.
No. 24-P-1351.
Suffolk. November 4, 2025. – May 12, 2026.
Present: Hershfang, Hodgens, & Smyth, JJ.
Assault and Battery on Certain Public Officers and Employees. Threatening. Mental Health. Criminal Responsibility. Insanity. Evidence, Insanity, Expert opinion. Witness, Expert. Practice, Criminal, Motion for a required finding.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on June 2, 2023.
The case was heard by Mark H. Summerville, J.
Meghan K. Oreste for the defendant. Megan Keane (David D. McGowan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.
HERSHFANG, J. After a bench trial by a judge of the Boston
Municipal Court, the defendant was convicted of four counts of
assault and battery on a police officer in violation of G. L.
c. 265, § 13D, and one count of threatening to commit a crime in
violation of G. L. c. 275, § 2. The defendant contends, as he 2
did in two motions for a required finding of not guilty, that
the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to
permit a rational fact finder to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was criminally responsible at the time of the crimes.
We agree and reverse.
Background. Because the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, we describe the trial evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth
v. Griffin, 475 Mass. 848, 849 (2016). The charges arose after
two police officers were called to the Edward W. Brooke Court
House for a person causing a disturbance. Because our analysis
depends in large part on distinguishing evidence from inference,
we describe in some detail the testimony of those two officers,
who were the victims of the charged crimes and the
Commonwealth's only trial witnesses.
When the officers arrived at the court house, they spoke
with court officers who provided a description of the person and
the direction in which he had gone. The officers set out from
the court house and, about one minute later, found someone
matching the description (the defendant) sitting on the stairs
"right down the street." The officers approached the defendant,
saying "something to the effect[] of" "can we speak with you,"
or "how are you, sir?" The defendant responded, "What bitch"
and immediately spit on the face and chest of one of the 3
officers (first officer). The officers arrested and handcuffed
the defendant and put him in the cruiser for the short drive to
the police station.
At the station, the officers sought to remove the defendant
from the cruiser. He spit on the second officer's head and said
"something to the effect of, 'What, bitch, I'm going to punch
you in the face.'" The officers put the defendant "in [a]
holding cell because he wasn't being cooperative. [They] let
him calm down. Then [they] attempted to take him out and
fingerprint him." When they removed his handcuffs, the
defendant punched the second officer in the shoulder. The
officers replaced the handcuffs and returned the defendant to
the cell.
The second officer had no further contact with the
defendant. The first officer tried to remove the defendant from
the cell and the defendant "threw a cup of toilet water on
[him], in [his] face and [his] upper body."1 The defendant "was
eventually booked" without the involvement of either of the
arresting officers. The record is devoid of evidence as to how,
when, or by whom this booking was accomplished.
1 From the officers' testimony it is not clear whether this incident occurred during the second booking attempt (when the defendant punched the second officer) or a third booking attempt. Because it does not change our analysis, we need not try to resolve this ambiguity. 4
The defendant called an expert in forensic psychology, a
licensed psychologist from Bridgewater State Hospital who first
met and evaluated the defendant in 2019. The expert opined that
on the day of the offense the defendant suffered from a chronic,
major mental illness that included both psychotic symptoms and
mood episodes, including what the expert characterized as a
"manic episode" at the time of the offense. When the expert
spoke with the defendant, the defendant "talked about
experiencing hallucinations" in the police station, but "was not
able to go into more specific detail about how those may have
influenced his behavior." Because, in the expert's opinion,
"that second level of analysis would have been required to opine
whether such symptoms caused substantial impairments in [the
defendant's] appreciation of wrongfulness and criminality," the
expert was not able to reach a reliable conclusion on the
defendant's appreciation of wrongfulness or criminality.
The expert concluded that the defendant "was experiencing
substantial impairments in his ability to control his behavior
at the time of the offense," including behaviors of "excessively
masturbating and consuming his own semen" and "ingesting toilet
water" while in the holding cell. The expert testified further
that the "assaultive behavior, aggressive behavior, [and]
hypersexual behavior" the defendant exhibited at the time of the
offense "continued for multiple days . . . and did not stop 5
until he received multiple intramuscular injections of
antipsychotic medication five to seven days after the offense
occurred."
Discussion. "[A] required finding of not guilty by reason
of lack of criminal responsibility may rest on the failure of
proof of criminal responsibility." Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475
Mass. 806, 812 (2016). "A trial judge sitting without a jury is
presumed, absent contrary indication, to have correctly
instructed himself as to the manner in which evidence was to be
considered in his role as factfinder." Commonwealth v. Batista,
53 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 648 (2002).
When a defendant raises a defense of lack of criminal
responsibility and the trial evidence, if viewed "in the light
most favorable to the defendant, would permit a reasonable
finder of fact to have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant
was criminally responsible at the time of the offense," then
"the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible."
Lawson, 475 Mass. at 811. The Commonwealth then must "prove
negatives beyond a reasonable doubt," first, "that the defendant
did not have a mental disease or defect at the time of the
crime" or, second, "if that is not disproved beyond a reasonable
doubt, that no mental disease or defect caused the defendant to
lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 6
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 849-
850 (1999).
The Commonwealth may not simply rest on the so-called
"presumption of sanity." Lawson, 475 Mass. at 814. "[T]he
inference that the defendant is criminally responsible because
the great majority of persons are criminally responsible is not
sufficient alone to warrant a rational finder of fact to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is
criminally responsible." Id. at 815. Instead, "through the
inferences arising from the circumstances of the offense," the
Commonwealth must demonstrate criminal responsibility. Id. at
816. Expert testimony is not required. See Keita, 429 Mass. at
846. "A trier of fact may reject the testimony of experts that
a defendant lacked criminal responsibility and may infer sanity
from the defendant's conduct and the facts of the crime." Id.
To evaluate the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence
of criminal responsibility, we "examine the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth" to "determine whether
'the evidence and the inferences that reasonably could be drawn
from it were "of sufficient force"' to permit a rational finder
of fact to conclude that the defendant was criminally
responsible beyond a reasonable doubt." Lawson, 475 Mass. at
816, quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 820 (2015). 7
Accordingly, we "must disregard contrary evidence presented by
the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert,
unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the
Commonwealth's evidence, or any inference drawn from such
evidence, is 'conclusively incorrect'" (citation omitted).
Lawson, supra at 817. "It will be the rare case where the
totality of the evidence regarding the defendant's conduct and
the circumstances surrounding the offense will not be sufficient
to defeat a defendant's motion for a required finding of not
guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility." Id.
The evidence in this case -- particularly the expert's
testimony -- "viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant, would permit a reasonable finder of fact to have a
reasonable doubt whether the defendant was criminally
responsible at the time of the offense." Lawson, 475 Mass. at
811. The Commonwealth therefore bore "the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally
responsible." Id.
Having determined that the Commonwealth bore the burden of
proving the defendant was criminally responsible, we disregard
the testimony of the defendant's expert, see Lawson, 475 Mass.
at 817, and view both the remaining evidence and inferences
favorably to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth's proof must be
through "the inferences arising from the circumstances of the 8
offense, including evidence that the defendant planned the
offense, acted on a rational motive, made rational decisions in
committing the offense and in avoiding capture, and attempted to
conceal the offense or his or her role in the offense." Id. at
816. In assessing whether the Commonwealth met its burden,
"[w]e are not permitted to pile inference upon inference."
Commonwealth v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399 (1987). Having
applied this lens, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed to
prove criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although there was ample, uncontested evidence that the
defendant spit on, hit, and threw toilet water at the officers,
the trial evidence was insufficient to meet the Commonwealth's
burden to prove that he did not lack the substantial capacity to
(1) appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct
and (2) conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See
Commonwealth v. Rezac, 494 Mass. 368, 371 (2024).
There is no evidence of what happened on the short cruiser
ride from the scene of the first assault to the police station.
There is no evidence that the defendant "calmed down" when left
in the cell to do so. There is no evidence of how the defendant
was booked, or the process followed, or when the booking was
accomplished. The dissent rests on inferences as to what
happened when neither testifying witness was present, but that
failure of proof left an evidentiary hole that cannot be filled 9
solely with inference. See Commonwealth v. Simpkins, 470 Mass.
458, 461-462 (2015); Commonwealth v. Oyewole, 470 Mass. 1015,
1016 (2014) (Commonwealth may rely only on "reasonable and
possible" inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence to
satisfy its burden). This absence of evidence did not give rise
to an inference that the defendant's conduct proved criminal
responsibility.
The Commonwealth failed to carry its burden. In
Commonwealth v. Fujita, 497 Mass. 46, 59-62 (2026), for example,
the court ruled that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
reject the defendant's assertion of lack of criminal
responsibility in light of his clear motive for the killing, his
state of mind (upset about his breakup with the victim), and his
"calculated steps to avoid detection," including assuring that
no one would come home during the time the victim was there,
instructing her to park out of sight, taking care to ensure that
the murder was blocked from public view, and taking a "series of
methodical steps to disperse evidence and avoid detection." Id.
at 61. Similarly, in Griffin, 475 Mass. at 851-853, 856, the
defendant "appeared to be acting normally in the days leading up
to the killing," helped a friend care for his ailing father, and
prepared a "last will and testament" before leaving to kill his
daughter. Id. at 856. "There was also evidence that the
defendant carefully planned the killing . . . by assembling all 10
of the materials he might need during the assault and placing
them in his backpack." Id. He walked to the crime scene in the
rain to avoid making noise with his Jeep, cut telephone lines
both inside and outside the house, turned off the electricity,
"ensur[ing] that any occupants who awoke would be left in the
dark," and took care to clean up and repack his belongings, then
left the house without waking anyone. Id. at 857.
Those were extreme cases. But even in cases that were
closer to this one -- that is, closer to the line -- the
Commonwealth has provided more evidence. Lawson, like this
case, involved an assault on an arresting police officer.
Lawson, 475 Mass. at 818. There, the court determined that the
evidence was sufficient for a fact finder to infer that
"the defendant (1) told the doctor that he struggled with the officer because he feared he would be taken back to jail and therefore understood that the man was a police officer, with the power to arrest him; (2) attempted to divert the officers' attention by asking one of the officers to light his cigarette, because he feared that the officers were going to arrest him on an outstanding warrant and became violent once he realized that his ruse had failed; (3) fought the officers because he wanted to escape rather than be arrested and return to jail; and (4) was fabricating his claims that the person he assaulted was wearing a yellow suit with a reflective emblem and that he did not believe the person to be a police officer."
Id. Critical to the court's analysis was that, in addition to
evidence about what the defendant did when approached by the
officers, the judge had evidence of what the defendant did
beforehand ("walking, talking, and laughing with two other men," 11
and asking the officer to light his cigarette, id. at 808), as
well as the defendant's post hoc explanations of his behavior to
the testifying expert. No similar evidence was introduced here.
The trial evidence was limited to the defendant's charged
criminal conduct and did not include any evidence of his acting
in a rational, deliberate, or calculated manner.
Commonwealth v. McGillivary, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 501 (2023),
also involved an attempted assault on a police officer. In that
case, the Commonwealth carried its burden by offering "evidence
of the defendant's words and conduct before, during, and after
the offense." Id. at 504, quoting Lawson, 475 Mass. at 816. We
concluded that the evidence of criminal responsibility was
sufficient because it permitted a rational fact finder to infer
that
"(1) the defendant was aware of his own mental health issues when he called police to request hospitalization for a mental health evaluation hours before his confrontation with police; (2) the defendant's threats to shoot anyone who came to his door were motivated by police officers' refusal to 'get off [his] property' and 'leave [him] alone'; (3) the defendant knew that his threats and conduct toward police were wrong when he refused to leave his house despite multiple attempts by police to negotiate with him to come outside; and (4) the defendant possessed the ability to control his behavior because, while he was described as 'agitated,' 'angry,' and 'yelling' during interactions with the police, he was 'calm' when speaking with his cousin during the [eight-hour] standoff."
McGillivary, supra. Again, no such evidence appears on the
record before us. 12
Finally, in Keita, 429 Mass. at 844-845, the defendant
first spoke and gestured obscenely to a fellow passenger on a
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) red line train
and then, as she disembarked, lunged for her, groped her, and
muttered obscenities. He was apprehended by another person and,
when the victim returned with three uniformed MBTA officers, the
defendant "was cooperative and his arrest uneventful"; during
the booking process "immediately following his arrest," the
defendant "was docile and responsive to questions concerning his
personal history" (citation omitted). Id. at 845. A forensic
psychologist testified that the defendant was suffering from
mental illness on the day of the attack and would have had
"substantial difficulties conforming his behavior to the
requirements of the law." Id.
Affirming the conviction, the court identified (1) "police
testimony that, when arrested, the defendant did not struggle,
did not act in an erratic way, and was cooperative," (2) the
defendant's cooperative behavior during booking, and (3) the
fact that, when interviewed by the testifying psychologist, the
defendant's responses suggested he "knew what lawful conduct
was." Id. at 848-849. The court described this evidence as
"thin," but concluded that, taken together with the (later
questioned) "presumption of sanity," it was sufficient to 13
support the judge's finding of guilt. Id. at 849. See Lawson,
475 Mass. at 813-815 & nn.7, 8.
If the evidence in Keita was "thin," this was gossamer.
Without either the pre-Lawson "presumption of sanity" or a
factual basis from which to infer intent, awareness of
criminality, or rational action, see Lawson, 475 Mass. at 816,
it was an error of law to "pil[e] . . . inference upon inference
or conjecture and speculation," Commonwealth v. Armand, 411
Mass. 167, 170 (1991), and deny the defendant's motions for a
required finding of not guilty.2
The judgments are reversed, the findings are set aside, and
judgments of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal
responsibility shall enter. The case is remanded for the
process applicable to persons found not guilty by reason of lack
of criminal responsibility. See G. L. c. 123, § 16.
So ordered.
2 The cases cited by the dissent as to inferring sanity only drive home the distinction. In each, the fact finder was presented with evidence that went beyond the bare criminal acts to reveal purposeful behavior: in Commonwealth v. Cullen, 395 Mass. 225, 230 (1985), the defendant's history of steady employment before the crime, combined with his targeted and accurate shooting at police officers, followed by flight to the home of the defendant's lawyer and a surrender in response to being told to "give it up"; and, in Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 33, 35-36 (1980), plans to kill two specific coworkers while reassuring others -- accurately -- that they were safe and, after the shootings, behaving rationally during booking including calmly invoking Miranda rights. HODGENS, J. (dissenting). "It will be the rare case where
the totality of the evidence regarding the defendant's conduct
and the circumstances surrounding the offense will not be
sufficient to defeat a defendant's motion for a required finding
of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility."
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016). The evidence
presented by the Commonwealth shows that this is not that rare
case.
Such evidence, offered through the testimony of two
arresting officers, showed the defendant engaged in unlawful and
belligerent goal-directed behavior that also reflected a strong
"anti-police" animus aimed at the uniformed officers who
confronted him on the street: the defendant caused a
disturbance at the loading dock of the court house and left the
scene; two uniformed officers found him sitting on stairs about
a one-minute drive from the court house; the defendant
immediately spat on the first uniformed officer who spoke to him
and called the officer a bitch; the officers arrested the
defendant and transported him in a police cruiser to the station
where he spat on the second arresting officer, called him a
bitch, threatened to strike him, and later punched him in the
shoulder; the officers placed the defendant in a holding cell
where he calmed down; upon interacting with the first officer
again, the defendant threw toilet water at him; although 2
initially agitated during booking, the defendant changed his
behavior when the first arresting officer left the room; and the
defendant successfully completed the booking process with
another officer. Viewing the totality of this evidence, and
only this evidence, in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, I must conclude that the trial judge properly
denied the defense motion for a required finding of not guilty
by reason of insanity. See Lawson, 475 Mass. at 817 (reviewing
court and judge "must disregard contrary evidence presented by
the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert").
Until today, our appellate courts have never taken the
question of criminal responsibility away from the fact finder.
Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has repeatedly cautioned
against doing so. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rasmusen, 444
Mass. 657, 662 n.6 (2005) (required finding generally "not
appropriate where the defense is lack of criminal
responsibility"); Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 436 Mass. 671, 676
(2002) ("we are aware of no case in which we have ordered the
entry of a judgment of not guilty by reason of the defendant's
lack of criminal responsibility after a jury has rejected such a
defense"); Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 130 (2000)
(same). Especially given the "paramount role of the [fact
finder] in assessing the defendant's criminal responsibility," 3
the Commonwealth's evidence did not compel a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity. Rasmusen, supra at 663.
It is well settled that the Commonwealth is not required to
produce expert testimony to show that the defendant had the
mental capacity to commit the crime. See Lawson, 475 Mass. at
815-816. Sanity may be inferred from "testimony of lay
witnesses who observed [the] defendant at relevant times, [and]
the evidence as to the circumstances of the commission of the
crime." Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 765-766
(1977). Accord Lawson, supra. The fact finder may infer sanity
from the "facts underlying the crime and evidence of [the
defendant's] actions before and after the crime." Commonwealth
v. Cullen, 395 Mass. 225, 229 (1985). Those facts showed that
by aggressive words and actions, the defendant directed his
anger toward the two uniformed police officers who approached
him while he passively sat on stairs. His repeated acts
directed only at the two arresting officers evinced intentional,
goal-directed conduct successfully targeting the officers who
were the objects of his anger. See, e.g., Lawson, supra at 815,
quoting Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 515 (1969)
("anger, revenge, rejection, jealousy, hatred, insult,
intoxication, or the like" may account for behavior by sane
person); Commonwealth v. LaCava, 438 Mass. 708, 714 (2003)
("serious impediment" to husband's potential insanity defense to 4
murder of wife included "anger over their impending divorce");
Commonwealth v. Francis, 355 Mass. 108, 111 (1969), S.C., 411
Mass. 579 (1992) (rational motives supporting sanity may include
"jealousy, hatred, greed, envy, frustration of aroused sexual
desire or the like"). A fact finder could readily conclude that
anger and animosity rather than a mental disease or defect
motivated the defendant to act as he did. See Commonwealth v.
Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 47-48 (1983) (Commonwealth may carry its
burden even when conceding defendant suffered from mental
disease or defect).
Beyond discerning a rational motive, the fact finder could
also infer sanity from evidence and reasonable inferences
showing the defendant was "oriented as to time, place, and
persons." Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 36 (1980). He
caused a disturbance outside the court house, yet maintained the
presence of mind to leave before the police could arrive; he sat
passively on stairs along a city street, yet betrayed his
frustration at being tracked down by the police; and he spat on
the arresting officers and struck them, yet he managed to
complete the booking process with other officers. From this
sequence of events a fact finder could conclude that the
defendant engaged in "calculated behavior" and was "fully
capable of committing" the charged crimes. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 325 (1979). The defendant's situational awareness 5
became particularly evident when he showed the ability to turn
his hostility on when interacting with the arresting officers
and turn it off twice -- first, when placed in the holding cell,
and second, when another officer suggested that an arresting
officer leave the room to enable the defendant to complete the
booking process with different officers. See, e.g., Lawson, 475
Mass. at 807 (sufficient evidence of sanity where defendant
"resisted arrest and assaulted the officers" but had rational
motives); Cullen, 395 Mass. at 226 (sufficient evidence of
sanity where defendant "threw a rock at a marked police cruiser"
and fired gunshots at officers but attempted to evade capture);
Commonwealth v. McGillivary, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 502, 504
(2023) (sufficient evidence of sanity where defendant
"threatened to shoot" police but showed "ability to control his
behavior").
The majority characterizes the Commonwealth's evidence of
sanity as "gossamer," suggests certain inferences are
unwarranted, and provides a contrasting and detailed account of
the defense expert's opinion (based on the defendant's
"functioning, thoughts, feelings, [and] motivations at the time
of the offense," medical records, and psychiatric care rendered
five days after the arrest), but on appeal we should not be
reweighing evidence in all but name. See Cullen, 395 Mass. at
231 n.4 ("extreme thinness of evidence" speaks to weight of 6
evidence and is inappropriate appellate consideration [citation
omitted]). The sufficiency "inquiry does not require a court to
'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Jackson, 443
U.S. at 318-319, quoting Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966). Weighing the evidence and
inferences from the evidence is the role of the fact finder who
notably considered and expressly rejected the testimony of the
defense expert in its entirety. That alternative inferences may
be drawn from the evidence by an appellate court does not render
the evidence insufficient in the trial court. See Commonwealth
v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 678-679 (1979). An inference "need
only be reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or
inescapable" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Merola, 405
Mass. 529, 533 (1989). Also, just because the Commonwealth
could have presented more evidence, as has been done in
archetypal criminal responsibility cases such as homicides, does
not mean that the evidence presented here (through just two
police witnesses) was necessarily insufficient to prove criminal
responsibility for assault and battery on a police officer and
threatening to commit a crime. When reviewing the denial of a
motion for a required finding of not guilty, we should be
focused on the Commonwealth's evidence and indulge all
reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth. We should 7
also not engage in an extensive review of the defense expert's
testimony, particularly where the parties never disputed that
the Commonwealth shouldered the burden of proving the
defendant's criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v.
Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 737 (1996) (Commonwealth bears burden
to prove criminal responsibility "once the issue . . . is
raised"). Ultimately, "[t]he question of what inferences to
draw from this evidence is for the [fact finder] . . . and not
this court." Commonwealth v. Kappler, 416 Mass. 574, 579
(1993).
Finally, sufficiency of the evidence does not turn on the
level of the Commonwealth's ardor for the case -- it is
controlled by the evidence and inferences from the evidence. At
trial, the Commonwealth unsuccessfully attempted to stipulate to
the police reports, unsuccessfully attempted to stipulate to the
defense expert report, waived the opening statement, waived
cross-examination of the defense expert, waived the argument on
a required finding motion at the close of evidence, and in a
brief closing argument announced that the prosecution declined
to "contest[]" the testimony of the defense expert. Once the
parties submitted the case to the fact finder, the evidence, and
not the strategy or will of the parties, controlled the result.
That evidence enabled, but did not compel, the judge to conclude
that the defendant was criminally responsible for spitting on, 8
striking, and threatening the two police officers who arrested
him. At no point in the trial did the Commonwealth's evidence
compel the judge to find the defendant lacked criminal
responsibility for this conduct. Only by adverting to the
defense evidence can the majority reach the result that it does.
If, however, we look only at the Commonwealth's evidence and
draw all inferences in its favor, then we have a man on a city
street who directed anger and violence at two uniformed police
officers -- an event that is neither inexplicably irrational
nor, sadly, unusual.