Commonwealth v. Brown

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Commonwealth v. Brown

372 N.E.2d 530, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 844, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 675

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DecidedFebruary 14, 1978

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 372 N.E.2d 530 (Commonwealth v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. Brown, 372 N.E.2d 530, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 844, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 675 (Mass. Ct. App. 1978).

Pincite

Opinion

The defendant appeals from the denial, after hearing, of his motion to vacate his plea of guilty to an indictment charging carnal knowledge of a female child, G. L. c. 265, § 23, as appearing in St. 1966, c. 291, and for a trial thereon, on the ground that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. The defendant argues that a judge, on taking a guilty plea to a violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23, fails to fulfil his constitutional duty to insure that the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [1969]), if he does not inform the defendant that he will be ineligible, under G. L. c. 127, § 129, to receive good time deductions from his sentence. The procedure for accepting a guilty plea was discussed in Commonwealth v. Stanton, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 614 (1974), where, at 622, we stated that a judge is not required to advise a defendant of the "practical complexities of the parole law.” Good time, like parole eligibility and the operation of G. L. c. 123A, is but a "contingent consequence of being confined.” Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 606 (1973).

Judgment affirmed.

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The defendant appeals from the denial, after hearing, of his motion to vacate his plea of guilty to an indictment charging carnal knowledge of a female child, G. L. c. 265, § 23, as appearing in St. 1966, c. 291, and for a trial thereon, on the ground that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. The defendant argues that a judge, on taking a guilty plea to a violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23, fails to fulfil his constitutional duty to insure that the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [1969]), if he does not inform the defendant that he will be ineligible, under G. L. c. 127, § 129, to receive good time deductions from his sentence. The procedure for accepting a guilty plea was discussed in Commonwealth v. Stanton, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 614 (1974), where, at 622, we stated that a judge is not required to advise a defendant of the "practical complexities of the parole law.” Good time, like parole eligibility and the operation of G. L. c. 123A, is but a "contingent consequence of being confined.” Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 606 (1973).

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

372 N.E.2d 530, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 844, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 675, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-brown-massappct-1978.

Opinion

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