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24-P-818 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. AMANDA L. BONIA.
No. 24-P-818.
Plymouth. September 9, 2025. – January 15, 2026.
Present: Rubin, D'Angelo, & Toone, JJ.
Animal. Dog. Practice, Criminal, Striking of testimony, Instructions to jury. Intent. Evidence, Intent. Statute, Construction.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Wareham Division of the District Court Department on February 1, 2022.
The case was tried before Edward H. Sharkansky, J.
Meghan K. Oreste for the defendant. Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
TOONE, J. Following a jury trial in the District Court,
the defendant, Amanda L. Bonia, was convicted of animal cruelty
for having "unnecessarily fail[ed]" to provide her dog "with
proper food, drink, shelter, sanitary environment, or protection
from the weather," in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 77. On
appeal, the defendant contends that (1) she was unfairly 2
prejudiced by two witnesses' inadmissible hearsay statements
that were struck by the judge, (2) the judge erred by refusing
to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth had to prove that the
defendant intended the dog to suffer, and (3) there was
insufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.
Background. "Because the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence presented, we summarize the facts
the jury could have found in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 431
(2015).
Prior to June 2020, an animal control officer for the town
of Wareham visited the defendant's house on several, though
fewer than six, occasions to conduct welfare checks on the
defendant's dog, Kayla. During the visits, the officer saw
"issues with proper shelter in bad weather, or lack of food."
Although they never met in person, the defendant told the
officer by phone that she was Kayla's owner and "taking care" of
her. After the officer told the defendant she needed a shelter
if Kayla was to be outside, the defendant obtained a "doggy
igloo." The officer also cited the defendant for failing to
license the dog. One of the defendant's neighbors testified
that she sometimes saw Kayla struggling to walk or just lying
outside. A second neighbor testified that, during the three or
four times he mowed the lawn at the defendant's house, Kayla was 3
always outside, without any food or water. Each time he mowed
at the house, he was there for about an hour.
On the afternoon of June 11, 2020, the first neighbor saw
Kayla lying on the porch without any water. The temperature was
in the seventies, the defendant was not home, and Kayla did not
appear to be breathing or able to lift her head. The second
neighbor also saw Kayla lying motionless on the porch that day,
which he described as "kind of warm," with no food or drink
nearby. The animal control officer was dispatched to the
defendant's house. The officer initially thought Kayla was dead
but then saw that she was alive but in distress: "very
emaciated, a lot of bones, just gasping for air." After the
officer called a colleague to assist, they carried Kayla in a
blanket to a vehicle and transported her to an animal hospital
in Buzzards Bay. During transport, Kayla's "body functions
appear[ed] to be stopping" as she "had vomited and defecated."
Records from the hospital described Kayla as a "mature
adult female husky" that was actively seizing with paddling
limbs and a chomping jaw. The attending veterinarian assessed
Kayla as having "[m]oderate to [s]evere" dehydration, "emaciated
body condition," and "severe diffuse muscle wasting." She was
"unkempt" with mud, dirt, and "unidentifiable ectoparasites" in
her coat and "hair loss over pressure points on [her] pelvis, 4
hind limbs, [and] shoulders."1 Due to her ongoing suffering,
upon the officer's authorization, Kayla was euthanized.
The defendant testified on her own behalf at trial and
denied that she had mistreated her dog. The defendant testified
that she bought Kayla, a husky-coyote mix, as a four month old
puppy and that Kayla was fifteen years old when she died. Kayla
spent most of her time outside because she was "part coyote" and
"that was her habitat." Although the defendant got the doggy
igloo after speaking with the animal control officer, Kayla
never used it because she "didn't want to be in there" or in the
house. According to the defendant, she always left out a bowl
of kibble so that Kayla could "eat whenever she wanted" and kept
a bowl of water by a tree. She walked Kayla several times a day
in the summer. About a week before June 11, 2020, Kayla became
ill and stopped eating and drinking. The defendant called the
animal control offices in Wareham and Carver, but she was told
that they did not euthanize elderly dogs. She called a
veterinarian's office, but she was told that Kayla would have to
be examined before being euthanized, and the defendant could not
afford the $500 fee. When the defendant got home from work on
1 According to the records, the animal control officer reported that Kayla had been "left on the deck for the past 2 days," although it is not clear from either the records or the officer's testimony what basis she had to make that statement. 5
June 11, she was distraught to find Kayla missing and did not
learn until days later that animal control officers had taken
her away.
Discussion. 1. Struck statements. The defendant claims
that she was unfairly prejudiced by two witness statements at
trial, even though both were struck by the judge. First, after
the prosecutor asked the first of the defendant's neighbors to
testify whether she ever saw Kayla in distress, she responded,
"I love my dogs, and the animal abuse going on was going on.
And I knew . . . ." Defense counsel objected and moved to
strike the statement, and the judge did so after a sidebar
conference. Second, in response to a question about what he
observed, the second neighbor volunteered, "There was a lot of
complaints made about the dog." Again, defense counsel
immediately objected and moved to strike the statement, and the
judge did so.
"[I]n response to the jury's exposure to inadmissible
evidence, the judge may 'correctly rel[y] on curative
instructions as an adequate means to correct any error and to
remedy any prejudice to the defendant.'" Commonwealth v.
Torres, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 272, 280 (2014), quoting Commonwealth
v. Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 503 (2006). "Only a compelling
showing of ineradicable prejudice would cause us to conclude
that the judge's instructions to disregard [a witness's] 6
testimony were inadequate." Commonwealth v. Thad T., 59 Mass.
App. Ct. 497, 508 (2003). The defendant has made no such
showing here. In his preliminary instructions, the judge
explained that, if he struck an answer from the record, the jury
"shouldn't consider it at all." After striking the first
neighbor's statement, the judge instructed the jury that they
"should not consider the comment that animal abuse was going on"
because that was "essentially the question you have to answer
today." Defense counsel did not object to this curative
instruction or ask for an additional instruction, a mistrial, or
any other relief. See Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702,
712 (2006) (curative instruction following witness's improper
testimony "was sufficient to remedy any prejudice against the
defendant"). The judge also immediately struck the second
neighbor's statement about complaints. "Jurors are presumed to
follow a judge's clear instructions and disregard [struck]
testimony." Commonwealth v. Auclair, 444 Mass. 348, 358 (2005).
2. Instruction on intent. Relying on Commonwealth v.
Russo, 494 Mass. 356, 365 (2024), the defendant contends that
the judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the
Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant "intended Kayla to
endure unnecessary suffering." The ruling in Russo is
inapplicable, however, because it involved a different provision
of the animal cruelty statute. The intent requirement for the 7
provision charged here required the Commonwealth to prove that
the defendant intentionally failed to provide Kayla with proper
food, drink, or shelter.
Massachusetts has a longstanding "public policy promoting
the humane treatment of animals." Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467
Mass. 746, 752, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 891 (2014). In 1641, the
Massachusetts Bay Colony established the first animal welfare
statutes in North America. E.S. Leavitt & D. Halverson, Animals
and Their Legal Rights: A Survey of American Laws from 1641 to
1990, at 1 (4th ed. 1990).2 In 1836, the Legislature enacted the
second animal cruelty statute in the United States and
substantially broadened its protections in 1868. St. 1868,
c. 212, § 1; St. 1836, c. 131, § 22. As drafted in 1868, the
statute was divided into two sections. The first established a
list of prohibited conduct against animals, and the second
prohibited "knowingly and wilfully" subjecting an animal to
unnecessary torture or cruelty. St. 1868, c. 212, §§ 1, 2. In
1972, these sections were consolidated in what is now G. L.
c. 272, § 77, but the "knowingly and willfully" standard
2 The Massachusetts Body of Liberties prohibited "Tirranny or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man's use" and required that any "Cattel" being driven or led be given periodic rest and refreshment. Massachusetts Body of Liberties, arts. 92, 93 (1641). 8
remained limited to the clause prohibiting unnecessary torture,
suffering, or cruelty. St. 1972, c. 46.
In Russo, the defendant was charged under the clause of
G. L. c. 272, § 77, that prohibits "knowingly and willfully
authoriz[ing] or permit[ting] [an animal] to be subjected to
unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind." Russo,
494 Mass. at 357, 362-363. As the Supreme Judicial Court
explained, this clause "stands out for its inclusion of the
heightened mental state of 'knowingly' and 'willfully.'" Id. at
363.3 Here, the defendant was charged with a different clause of
the statute, one of its "long list of 'thou shalt not'
provisions that directly prohibit a defendant's harmful actions
or omissions" (citation omitted). Id. at 362.4 This provision
applies to a person who, "having the charge or custody of an
animal, either as owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary
The court proceeded to examine these terms "to determine 3
the requisite criminal intent for this portion of the statute." Russo, 494 Mass. at 363. It interpreted "knowingly" to mean that "the defendant consciously authorized or permitted something that the defendant was aware would subject an animal to 'unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind,'" and it interpreted "willfully" to mean that the defendant intended "for the animal to be subjected to 'unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty'" (citations omitted). Id. at 364, 365.
When asked at the start of trial to identify the 4
Commonwealth's theory, the prosecutor stated that "[t]he allegations are that [the] dog . . . essentially wasn't provided food and water, and [was] left out in bad weather conditions." 9
cruelty upon it, or unnecessarily fails to provide it with
proper food, drink, shelter, sanitary environment, or protection
from the weather." G. L. c. 272, § 77. The use of the
disjunctive "or" evinces the Legislature's intent that a person
who unnecessarily fails to provide an animal with a listed need
may be found liable, regardless of whether that person inflicted
unnecessary cruelty on the animal. See Commonwealth v. Wade,
475 Mass. 54, 61 (2016).5
Importantly, although the provision charged here does not
require the heightened mental state of "knowing" and "willful"
conduct, it is still "directed at intentional conduct."
Commonwealth v. Trefry, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 573 (2016). See
id. at 573-574 (distinguishing misdemeanor offense for improper
chaining, tethering, and confinement of dogs under G. L. c. 140,
§ 174E [f], for which "no mental state is explicitly required").
Specifically, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant
5 Even though the Legislature added the language prohibiting the infliction of "unnecessary cruelty" to this clause in 1972, there is no indication that by doing so it intended to limit the scope of the preexisting prohibition against the unnecessary failure of owners and custodians to provide animals with the listed basic needs. See G. L. c. 272, § 77; St. 1972, c. 46. See also Commonwealth v. Curry, 150 Mass. 509, 512 (1890) (where statute prohibited both "unnecessarily failing to provide . . . proper food, drink, and protection from the weather" and "the infliction of unnecessary cruelty upon an animal," it "cannot be held as matter of law that the two clauses mean the same thing, or that the meaning of one clause is to be determined by the meaning of the other"). 10
"intentionally failed to provide" the animal with one of the
listed needs. See Commonwealth v. Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct.
172, 177 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1153 (2010). That
requires proof that the defendant acted "voluntarily and
deliberately," not accidentally, and "intended the act to occur
which constitutes the offense" (citation omitted). Id.
Accordingly, the judge properly instructed the jury that
the Commonwealth did not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that "the defendant knew she was violating the statute, or that
she specifically intended the harm that it forbids" but, rather,
that she intentionally did acts that violated the statute.6
6 The judge instructed the jury that "the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally and knowingly did acts that were plainly of a nature as would violate the statute" (emphasis added). See Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court, Instruction 7.270 (cruelty to animals) (2017). The model instruction's language reflects the intent requirement applicable to offenses that involve "the direct infliction of pain on an animal" but the "knowing and willfully" standard is not statutorily required. See id. See also Commonwealth v. Szewczyk, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 711, 716 (2016); Commonwealth v. Zalesky, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 909 (2009); Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 177, quoting Commonwealth v. Magoon, 172 Mass. 214, 216 (1898) ("in circumstances involving the direct infliction of pain on an animal all that must be proved is that the defendant 'intentionally and knowingly did acts which were plainly of a nature to inflict unnecessary pain'"). Even though "knowingly" is not part of the intent requirement for the offense charged here, Erickson, supra, the defendant was not prejudiced by an instruction that provided "more protection than the law afforded [her]," Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 589-590 (2001). 11
3. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant also
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support her
conviction under G. L. c. 272, § 77. We conclude that the
Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that the
defendant unnecessarily failed to provide Kayla with proper
shelter and protection from the weather, but the evidence did
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
unnecessarily failed to provide her with proper food and drink.7
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding
of not guilty, "we assess the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493 Mass. 303,
307 (2024), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-
678 (1979). "A conviction may rest exclusively on
circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that evidence, we
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth"
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 275
(2022). "The relevant question is whether the evidence would
7 The defendant does not argue that a specific unanimity instruction was required. See Commonwealth v. Palermo, 482 Mass. 620, 629-631 (2019). Nor does the defendant argue that the Commonwealth had to prove the deprivation of each listed need in order to sustain the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Inoa, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 263-265 (2020). 12
permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires
such a finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747
(1988). "Because the defendant moved for a required finding of
not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case, we review
the sufficiency of only the evidence presented at the time the
Commonwealth rested after its case-in-chief . . . ."
Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 483 Mass. 269, 271-272 (2019).
As discussed, the Commonwealth prosecuted the defendant
under the theory that, "having the charge or custody" of Kayla,
"either as owner or otherwise," the defendant unnecessarily
failed to provide Kayla with proper food, drink, or shelter.
G. L. c. 272, § 77. At the outset, we are unpersuaded by the
defendant's contention that, because she was not home when the
animal control officers found Kayla in distress and transported
her to the animal hospital, the defendant did not have "charge
or custody" of Kayla. There was sufficient evidence to find
that the defendant was Kayla's custodian at that time, including
her earlier statement to the officer that she was Kayla's owner
and "taking care" of her.
We interpret the applicable clause in G. L. c. 272, § 77,
to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
unnecessarily deprived the dog of either proper food, proper
drink, or proper shelter. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 304 Mass.
320, 322 (1939) ("Where [a] statute disjunctively prescribes 13
several acts in a series of acts, all of which are alleged in
the complaint, then the Commonwealth may prove the violation of
the statute by proof of the performance by the defendant of any
one of the said acts"). We also construe "unnecessarily" and
"proper" in their ordinary sense to require proof that, even
though the defendant could have provided food, drink, or shelter
as required to keep the animal in reasonably good health, she
failed to do so. See Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 495 Mass. 300,
306 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass.
366, 369 (1977) (in absence of statutory definitions, we "give
[words] their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these
meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose"); Curry, 150
Mass. at 512 (words used in predecessor statute "are common
English words, and it must be taken that they are used in their
ordinary signification"). This construction is consistent with
how other States have construed comparable prohibitions in their
animal cruelty laws. See, e.g., Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d
727, 732 (D.C. 1983) (construing "unnecessarily" and "proper" in
their ordinary sense to mean that "a person, although he could
provide food, drink or shelter as required to sustain the
animals in reasonably good health, failed to do so"); State v.
Persons, 114 Vt. 435, 437 (1946) (same).
So construed, this clause in G. L. c. 272, § 77, does not
envision unbounded criminal liability for, for example, every 14
failure to provide a pet its ordinary feeding. The term
"unnecessarily" contemplates that at least some failures to
provide animals with basic needs may be reasonable in the
circumstances, and thus not prohibited by the statute. Further,
not all deprivations of basic needs will amount to a failure to
provide what is required to keep an animal in reasonably good
health, as the term "proper" requires. It is true that the
clause does not require proof that the defendant's failure
caused the animal harm or even a risk of harm. Erickson, 74
Mass. App. Ct. at 178. See Curry, 150 Mass. at 512 (predecessor
statute did not require proof that "the failure to provide
proper food, drink, and protection must be such that on account
of it the animal has cruelly suffered"). Nevertheless, the
likelihood that a deprivation of a basic need will undermine an
animal's health is relevant to determining whether that
deprivation is sufficiently serious to establish liability under
the clause. See Curry, supra (leaving horse harnessed to
carriage in woods for twenty-four hours without food and drink
is "evidence of a failure to provide the horse with proper food
and drink" since that "treatment has some tendency to injure a
horse"). Finally, as discussed supra, the Commonwealth must
also prove that the defendant acted intentionally in the failure
to provide the animal with a basic need. Erickson, 74 Mass.
App. Ct. at 177. 15
Here, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677, the evidence did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unnecessarily
failed to provide Kayla with proper shelter. While the animal
control officer testified that there had been "issues with
proper shelter in bad weather" during her visits, it is
undisputed that the defendant obtained a doggy igloo after the
officer raised that issue. Absent other evidence, the
defendant's reasonable response to the officer's expression of
concern precludes a finding that she deprived Kayla of "proper"
shelter, or that she acted with the general intent required
under the statute. While the Commonwealth argues that the jury
could infer that Kayla was denied proper shelter because,
according to the animal hospital records, she was found with
hair loss and mud, dirt, and "unidentifiable ectoparasites" in
her coat, that inference "cannot bear the weight of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt" where there was no evidence that Kayla was
unable to use the doggy igloo. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 460
Mass. 64, 71 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456
Mass. 578, 583 (2010).8 In particular, the Commonwealth could
8 The defendant testified that Kayla, being part-coyote, did not want to be in either the doggy igloo or the house. At oral argument, the Commonwealth contended that an owner has the responsibility to bring a dog inside the house if the dog declines to use the outdoor shelter made available to her. That might be true in some circumstances, although the statute that 16
not meet its burden of proof in the absence of expert testimony
as to what, if anything, the unidentifiable ectoparasites in
Kayla's coat had to do with her being deprived of shelter. See
Commonwealth v. Corey, 493 Mass. 674, 688 (2024), citing
Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 364 & n.9 (2013) ("expert
testimony is needed where an issue is outside the general
knowledge and experience of the jury").
By contrast, there was sufficient evidence to prove that
the defendant unnecessarily failed to provide Kayla with proper
food and drink. As to water, one of the defendant's neighbors
testified that he mowed the lawn at the defendant's property for
an hour at a time on multiple occasions, and each time he saw
Kayla outside the house without any food or water. He could
also see the defendant's yard from his house and had observed
Kayla outside "all day long" and "never saw anything down for
the dog." On June 11, 2020, both neighbors saw the dog lying on
the porch without any food or water, even though it was a warm
day. The animal control officer testified that she observed a
"lack of food" during her earlier welfare checks at the house
governs the chaining, tethering, and confinement of dogs provides that they may be confined in a securely enclosed yard if they have, among other things, "access" to "appropriate dog shelter." See G. L. c. 140, § 174E (c), (d). Here, the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant intentionally deprived Kayla of proper shelter after getting the doggy igloo for her. 17
and described the dog on June 11 as "emaciated" and "a lot of
bones." The medical records described the dog as having
moderate to severe dehydration at the animal hospital before she
was euthanized.
The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient
because it "not only failed to establish that [she] intended for
Kayla to suffer unnecessarily but actually supported the
opposite: [she] did not want this dog to suffer at the end of
her life." The defendant refers to her own testimony that Kayla
had stopped eating and drinking a week before June 11, 2020, and
that she had sought to get Kayla euthanized. As discussed,
however, the pertinent clause of G. L. c. 272, § 77, does not
require the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant's conduct
caused the animal harm but, rather, that the defendant
unnecessarily failed to provide the animal with proper food or
drink. Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 178. Here, the jury
could have reasonably concluded that the defendant unnecessarily
left Kayla outside without food or water for substantial periods
of time on numerous days. They could have also reasonably
concluded that the defendant acted intentionally in doing so,
and that her conduct amounted to a failure to provide food and
drink required to keep Kayla in reasonably good health. See
Commonwealth v. Gomez, 495 Mass. 688, 693 (2025) (under Latimore
standard, inferences "need only be reasonable and possible and 18
need not be necessary or inescapable" [quotation and citation
omitted]).
Judgment affirmed.