Commonwealth v. Blair

14 Pa. D. & C.5th 518
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County
DecidedJuly 20, 2010
Docketno. CP-14-CR-1702-2009
StatusPublished

This text of 14 Pa. D. & C.5th 518 (Commonwealth v. Blair) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Blair, 14 Pa. D. & C.5th 518 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).

Opinion

GRINE, J.,

Presently before the court is an omnibus pretrial motion brought by Brandon M. Blair (defendant). On or about September 7, 2009, defendant was charged with one count of sexual assault (18 Pa.C.S. §3124.1) two counts of aggravated indecent assault(18 Pa.C.S. §3125(a)(1) and two counts of indecent assault (18 Pa.C.S. §3126(a)(1). The charges stem from alleged conduct which occurred on September 7, 2009 in Centre Hall, Centre County, Pennsylvania. Defendant filed a motion in limine asking the court to quash Count 3 and Count 5 of the information. Additionally defendant seeks to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct.

FINDINGS OF FACT

(1) The complainant in this shall be referred to as “Victim”

(2) Victim claims that she had know Brandon Blair (defendant) for approximately a year.

(3) Victim testified at the preliminary hearing in this matter which was held on September 16, 2009.

(4) Victim testified that she knew defendant through her boyfriend, Coty Johnson.

(5) Victim testified that she worked on September 6, 2009, until about 7 p.m. and then went home before she went out with Coty, defendant, and several other friends.

[521]*521(6) Victim and her friends, including Coty and defendant, went to Cato to ride four-wheelers and trucks.

(7) The group had pizza at Coty’s residence and left for Cato around 9 p.m.

(8) Victim was drinking on the night of September 6, 2009. She estimated that she had two beers and five Mike’s Hard Lemonades over a period of at least four hours.

(9) Victim estimated that she, Coty, defendant and Jake Lucas left Cato around 1 a.m. to go to a party in Centre Hall.

(10) When they arrived at the party in Centre Hall, Victim claims that she was not feeling well and decided to remain in the truck. She also claims that she was passing in and out of consciousness.

(11) At one point Victim left the truck to vomit and then returned to the truck again.

(12) The next thing Victim remembers is waking up to find that someone was having sex with her. Victim did not remember consenting and was not sure who the person was.

(13) At some point, Victim remembers someone walking by the truck and saying something to the effect of “Coty, aren’t you even going to shut the door?”

(14) Victim claims that she believed that the defendant was her boyfriend, Coty, and that she would have been okay with having sex with Coty.

(15) Jake Lucas testified that Victim was drunk. Jake Lucas initially thought that Victim was having sex with Coty, and realized this was not the case at some point.

[522]*522(16) Jake Lucas testified that when he saw Victim having sex with a person he later found out was defendant, her eyes were closed and her head was rolled back and to the side.

(17) State Police Trooper James Ellis spoke with defendant after giving him his Miranda rights at about 9:05 a.m. on September 7, 2009.

(18) Defendant told Trooper Ellis that after they arrived at the party in Centre Hall, he was outside smoking and decided to check on Victim, who had remained in the truck.

(19) Defendant asked her if Coty had come back, and she muttered something he didn’t understand.

(20) Defendant then told Trooper Ellis that he opened the door, pulled Victim’s pants down and engaged in sexual activity with her.

(21) Defendant claims that there was no conversation, but that he thought the sexual activity was consensual.

(22) Trooper Ellis first had contact with defendant at approximately 8:45 a.m. on September 7, 2009.

(23) Trooper Ellis claims that when he went to defendant’s residence on September 7, 2009, defendant was woken up by their presence and defendant seemed groggy.

(24) Trooper Ellis testified that defendant had the smell of alcohol on him.

(25) Trooper Ellis also testified that defendant had bruises on him.

(26) Defendant signed a waiver of his Miranda rights at approximately 9:05 a.m. on September 7, 2009.

[523]*523CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

18 Pa.C.S. §3104(a) sets forth as a general rule that “Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.”

(2) “The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a trial from shifting its focus from the culpability of the accused toward the virtue and chastity of the victim.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. 2009).

(3) “[V]ia interpretive efforts by the courts of this Commonwealth, the Rape Shield Statute has been found to bow to the following exceptions: (1) evidence that negates directly the act of intercourse with which a defendant is charged; (2) evidence demonstrating a witness’ bias or evidence that attacks credibility; and (3) evidence tending to directly exculpate the accused by showing that the alleged victim is biased and thus has motive to lie, fabricate, or seek retribution via prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684, 690 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Allburn, 721 A.2d 363, 367 (Pa. Super. 1998).

(4) “Before introducing an extra-judicial admission, the Commonwealth must establish by independent evidence that a crime has in fact been committed; however, [524]*524the Commonwealth is not required to prove the existence of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Reyes, 545 Pa. 374, 381, 681 A.2d 724, 727 (1996).

(5) “An exception to the corpus delicti rule known as the closely related crime exception was specifically approved of by this court in Commonwealth v. McMullen, [545 Pa. 361,] 372, 681 A.2d [717,] 723 (1996). This exception comes into play where an accused is charged with more than one crime, and the accused makes a statement related to all the crimes charged, but the prosecution is only able to establish the corpus delicti of one of the crimes charged. Under those circumstances where the relationship between the crimes is sufficiently close so that the introduction of the statement will not violate the purpose underlying the corpus delicti rule, the statement of the accused will be admissible as to all the crimes charged.” Commonwealth v. Bardo, 551 Pa. 140, 147, 709 A.2d 871, 874 (1998).

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Related

Commonwealth v. Majorana
470 A.2d 80 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Commonwealth v. Allburn
721 A.2d 363 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1998)
Commonwealth v. Burns
988 A.2d 684 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Commonwealth v. Bardo
709 A.2d 871 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1998)
Commonwealth v. McMullen
681 A.2d 717 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1996)
Commonwealth v. Reyes
681 A.2d 724 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
14 Pa. D. & C.5th 518, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-blair-pactcomplcentre-2010.