Commonwealth v. Black, C., Aplt.

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 16, 2026
• Docket: 71 MAP 2024
• Status: Published

Opinions

[J-82-2025] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 71 MAP 2024 : Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the : Superior Court at No. 1028 MDA : 2022 entered on October 23, 2023, v. : Affirming the Judgment of Sentence : of the York County Court of : Common Pleas, Criminal Division, CYNTHIA CAROLYN BLACK, : at No. CP-67-CR-0002801-2020 : entered on June 17, 2022. Appellant : : ARGUED: October 8, 2025

OPINION

JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: June 16, 2026 In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether the crimes of theft by deception 1

and receiving stolen property (RSP)2 are continuing offenses for purposes of the statute

of limitations. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d). Generally, an offense is committed when every

element of the crime has occurred. The statute of limitations begins to run the next day.

However, the limitations period may be extended when the legislature has plainly

indicated that the purpose of a particular crime is to prevent a continuing course of

conduct. In that instance, the crime is committed when either the course of conduct, or

the defendant’s complicity therein, is terminated, and the statute of limitations begins to

run the next day. See id. Today, we hold that the theft by deception statute does not

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a). clearly indicate the legislature’s intent to prohibit a continuing course of conduct. Thus,

the limitations period for theft by deception begins to run the day after the crime is

committed — that is, the day after the last deceptive act that creates or reinforces a false

impression. However, we hold that the RSP statute is intended to prevent a course of

conduct that continues so long as the defendant retains possession of the stolen property.

Once the defendant disposes of the property, the statute of limitations period commences.

For these reasons, we conclude the Commonwealth charged Appellant, Cynthia Carolyn

Black, with theft by deception and RSP after the statute of limitations period for each

crime expired. Therefore, we vacate her convictions for both crimes, and remand for

further proceedings.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Beginning in 2000 or 2001, Black lived with her grandmother, Glenora Delahay

(Grandmother), at a home in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. During this time, Grandmother

received monthly payments from the Social Security Administration (SSA), which were

deposited into a bank account shared by Grandmother, Black, and Glenora Waltzinger

(Black’s mother). 3 Sometime between 2001 and December 2005, Grandmother passed

away. 4 Black did not report Grandmother’s death to the authorities or the SSA. Rather,

“[a]fraid to lose the [social security] payments[,]” Black moved Grandmother’s body to a

freezer located in the basement of the Ardmore home. Stipulations of Fact for Trial

(Stipulated Facts), 3/15/2022, at 3 (unpaginated). The SSA continued to deposit

Grandmother’s monthly payments into the joint bank account.

3 Waltzinger died in 2011.

4 Black later told authorities she found Grandmother deceased in the home in March 2004.

See Stipulations of Fact for Trial, 3/15/2022, at 2-3 (unpaginated).

[J-82-2025] - 2 In 2007, Black purchased a home in York County. When she moved, she took the

freezer with her and placed it in an outbuilding on the property. Meanwhile, in the fall of

2010, the SSA sent letters to Grandmother at an address in Hagerstown, Maryland,

requesting an in-person meeting at her residence to determine if she was receiving the

proper benefits. 5 After receiving no response, the SSA ceased paying monthly benefits

in November 2010.

In May 2018, the bank foreclosed on Black’s York County property. When Black

moved out of the home, she left the freezer. On February 7, 2019, the locked freezer was

discovered by two visitors to the property. Upon prying it open, they observed human

remains inside a garbage bag and immediately notified the Pennsylvania State Police.

Troopers later interviewed Black, who admitted she found Grandmother deceased in the

Ardmore home in 2004, and that “a decision was made to place the body … in the freezer

in the basement” so as not to lose Grandmother’s social security benefits. Stipulated

Facts at 3. In May of 2020, the human remains were identified as Grandmother’s.

On May 26, 2020, the Commonwealth charged Black with theft by unlawful taking,

RSP, and abuse of a corpse. 6 Black filed an omnibus pretrial motion in February 2021,

5 Copies of the letters were attached as exhibits to Black’s “Motion to Remove from Trial

List and Schedule a Stipulated Bench Trial” filed on March 15, 2022. 6 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3921(a), 3925(a), and 5510, respectively.

Although Waltzinger also had access to the shared bank account, the parties do not discuss Waltzinger’s potential involvement in these crimes. However, as noted above, Waltzinger passed away in 2011, eight years before Grandmother’s body was uncovered. Moreover, during the stipulated bench trial, the Commonwealth’s attorney naturally focused on Black’s complicity. At the time of Grandmother’s death, Black was the only person in the home capable of transporting Grandmother’s body to the basement freezer — Waltzinger was 67 years old, and Black’s then-husband was disabled. See N.T., 4/6/2022, at 14; Stipulated Facts at 3. Further, the Commonwealth highlighted that in documents Black filed seeking a mortgage reduction for the York County property, she included Grandmother’s SSA benefits as her own “household income.” N.T., 4/6/2022, (continued…)

[J-82-2025] - 3 requesting, inter alia, the trial court quash the theft and RSP charges because they were

filed after the five-year statute of limitations period expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b)(1)

(prosecution for theft, theft by deception, and RSP must be commenced within five years

after crime is committed). In April 2021, the Commonwealth moved to amend the criminal

information to include one count of theft by deception. 7 Black objected, and the trial court

conducted a hearing on June 11, 2021, to address both Black’s pretrial motion and the

Commonwealth’s motion to amend. Ultimately, the court granted the Commonwealth’s

motion to amend the information to add a charge of theft by deception, dismissed the

charge of theft by unlawful taking as filed beyond the statute of limitations, and denied

Black’s statute of limitations challenge to the other charges.

The case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial conducted on April 6, 2022, at which

time the trial court found Black guilty of all three offenses — theft by deception, RSP, and

abuse of a corpse. On June 17, 2022, the court sentenced Black to concurrent terms of

11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment for theft by deception and RSP, and a consecutive two

years’ probation for abuse of a corpse. Black filed a timely direct appeal, challenging the

trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the charges of theft by deception and RSP as

untimely filed. 8

In a unanimous, unpublished decision, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment

of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Black, 307 A.3d 680 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpub.

memo. at *1).

at 16. Thus, while Waltzinger may have been an accomplice or co-conspirator, there was ample evidence demonstrating Black was implicated in the criminal activity. 7 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1).

8 Black did not challenge her conviction for abuse of a corpse.

[J-82-2025] - 4 The Court first considered Black’s conviction of theft by deception, in terms of its

five-year statute of limitations. See Black, 307 A.3d at *2 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b)(1)).

The Superior Court explained theft by deception requires proof the defendant

“intentionally obtain[ed] or with[held] property of another by deception[,]” and that a

“person deceives if [s]he intentionally … creates or reinforces a false impression[.]” Id.

(citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1)). The panel stated that in order to obtain a conviction for

theft by deception, the “Commonwealth must prove that the victim relied upon the false

impression.” Id. (citations omitted).

While Black argued that the limitations period commenced in November 2010, after

the SSA issued its last payment to Grandmother, the Superior Court disagreed. Relying

upon its prior decisions in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 682 A.2d 811 (Pa. Super. 1996), and

Commonwealth v. Succi, 173 A.2d 269 (Pa. Super. 2017), the Court explained that the

limitations period does not begin to run until the victim becomes aware of the deception.

Here, the Court concluded, the statute of limitations commenced when “the victim, the

SSA, discovered that [Black] had hidden [Grandmother’s] body in order to deceive the

SSA into continuing to issue monthly checks to [Grandmother] after her death so that

[Black] could obtain those funds.” Black, 307 A.3d at *3. Thus, the panel agreed with the

trial court’s conclusion that the limitations period did not begin to run until after the SSA

was made aware of Black’s deception in May 2020, when Grandmother’s body was

identified, and the criminal complaint filed that same month fell within the statute of

limitations. See id. Accordingly, the Court denied relief on Black’s first claim.

Next, the Superior Court considered whether the RSP offense was charged within

the limitations period. The panel observed that the statute of limitations for RSP is the

same as for theft by deception — five years. See Black, 307 A.3d at *4 (citation omitted).

Like her prior argument, Black asserted that the limitations period for RSP began to run

[J-82-2025] - 5 after the SSA deposited Grandmother’s last monthly payment in November 2010. She

argued that “because she received only monetary, [and] not discrete, property[,] she could

not have retained the specific monetary property for a continuing course of time” and,

therefore, “the crime was complete” in November 2010. Id. at *3.

The Superior Court disagreed and concluded that RSP is an “ongoing offense,

which continues as long as the perpetrator retains possession of the stolen property.”

Black, 307 A.3d at *4 (citing Commonwealth v. Farrar, 413 A.2d 1094, 1095 (Pa. Super.

1979); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 439 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 1982)). An RSP

conviction requires proof that the defendant “intentionally receive[d], retain[ed], or

dispose[d] of” property they know, or should have reason to believe, is stolen. Id. (citing

18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a)). Because Black had not “returned or relinquished” any of the SSA

payments she received after Grandmother’s death, the Court concluded she “retained the

stolen funds” and the offense was still ongoing at the time the Commonwealth brought

the charges. Id. Thus, the Superior Court found both crimes were charged within the

applicable limitations period, and Black was entitled to no relief.

II. ISSUES

Black petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, which we granted on the

following issues: (1) Does the Superior Court’s decision create uncertainty in the statute of limitations surrounding theft and fraud cases where it used an improper start date for the offenses of theft by deception?

(2) [D]oes the Superior Court’s decision create uncertainty in the statute of limitations surrounding receiving stolen property where it improperly held [Petitioner] engaged in a continuing offense? Commonwealth v. Black, 326 A.3d 395 (Pa. 2024).

[J-82-2025] - 6 III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

While a “criminal statute of limitations is an act of legislative grace, not a right[,]” 9

we have long recognized its purpose is to limit exposure to criminal [p]rosecution to a certain fixed period of time[, and] to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. … Commonwealth v. Cardonick, 292 A.2d 402, 407-408 (Pa. 1972) (citing Toussie v. United

States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970)). Although statutes of limitations encourage prompt

investigations by law enforcement, they were enacted primarily to protect those accused

of criminal activity. Accordingly, we construe statutes of limitations “liberally … in favor

of the defendant and against the Commonwealth.” Id. at 407 (citations omitted).

Pennsylvania’s criminal statutes of limitations are codified in Sections 5551

through 5554 of the Judicial Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5551-5554. Relevant to the case

before us, Section 5552(b) declares that, for a delineated list of “major offenses” —

including theft by deception and RSP — “the prosecution must be commenced within five

years” after the crime is committed. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b)(1) (requiring five-year statute

of limitations for theft offenses codified under Sections 3921 through 3933 of the Crimes

Code). Notably, the statute provides an exception for offenses involving fraud. 10 Even if

9 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 553 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. 1989). See also Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 514 (1880). 10 Section 5552(c) and (c.1) set forth several other exceptions to the stated limitation

periods, none of which are relevant here. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(2) (offenses committed by public officer or employee while in office or employed); (c)(3)-(3.1)(certain sexual crimes committed against a victim who is a minor, or under the age of 23); (c)(4) (certain firearm offenses); (c)(5)-(6) (human trafficking offenses); and (c.1) (certain sexual offenses when the perpetrator is identified by DNA).

[J-82-2025] - 7 the limitations period has expired under subsection (b), the Commonwealth may still

prosecute a defendant for [a]ny offense a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this paragraph extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(1) (emphases added). Therefore, when fraud is an element of the

charged offense, the Commonwealth may file charges within one year of the date the

fraud is discovered by the victim; however, the limitations period cannot be extended

more than an additional three years. In other words, the limitations period for a fraud

offense listed under Section 5552(b)(1) is, at most, eight years — even if the victim does

not discover the fraudulent conduct until after that time expires.

Regardless of whether a particular offense falls under the general five-year

limitations period or the extended eight-year period for fraud, the key inquiry is: when

does the limitations period commence? Section 5552(d) directs that the statute of

limitations begins to run “on the day after the offense is committed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d).

Further, and pertinent here, subsection (d) provides that “[a]n offense is committed either

when every element occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing

course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the

complicity of the defendant therein is terminated.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d) (emphasis

added). This Court has never addressed the “continuing course of conduct” language in

subsection (d). That language — and in particular what is required to demonstrate that a

legislative purpose to prohibit such conduct “plainly appears” in the statute — is squarely

at issue in the case before us.

[J-82-2025] - 8 IV. THEFT BY DECEPTION

Black first challenges the timeliness of her prosecution for theft by deception.

Codified in Section 3922 of the Crimes Code, theft by deception requires proof that a

person “intentionally obtain[ed] or with[held] property of another by deception.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). The statute further explains that a “person deceives if [s]he

intentionally … creates or reinforces a false impression[.]” Id.

Black stipulated to the following facts supporting her conviction of this offense. She

shared a bank account with Grandmother, in which Grandmother’s monthly SSA

payments were deposited. See Stipulated Facts at 1, 3. She admitted to authorities that

Grandmother died in the home they shared in March 2004, and that “a decision was made

to place [her] body … in the freezer in the basement” so that the SSA payments would

continue after her death. Id. at 3. Black moved the freezer to her home in York County

in 2007, and the SSA continued sending monthly payments to Grandmother, which were

deposited into the shared bank account, until November 3, 2010. See id. at 2-3. These

stipulations, coupled with the fact that Black did not inform either the SSA or local

authorities of Grandmother’s death, were sufficient to prove that she intentionally created

a “false impression” that Grandmother was still alive, so that she could obtain

Grandmother’s SSA benefits. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1).

Under these facts, Black maintains the statute of limitations for theft by deception

began to run on November 4, 2010, the day after the final SSA deposit, when every

element of the crime had been committed. See Black’s Brief at 17-18 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5552(d)). Accordingly, she contends the five-year statute of limitations expired in

November 2015, but she was not criminally charged until May 2020. Moreover, Black

notes that even if we determine fraud is a material element of theft by deception pursuant

[J-82-2025] - 9 to Section 5552(c)(1) 11 — which permits the Commonwealth to file charges “within one

year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party” — that statutory exception

extends the limitations period only for an additional three years, that is, a maximum

eight-year limitations period. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(1). Thus, the statute of limitations for

her offense would have expired in November 2018, still two years before the

Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint.

Black insists that the only way her conviction “can … be salvaged[,]” is if we

conclude, under Section 5552(d), that “a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing

course of conduct plainly appears” in the theft by deception statute. Black’s Brief at 19

(citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d)). Black argues that because no such purpose “plainly”

appears in the language of the statute, and theft by deception “is not the sort of conduct

that can only be viewed as inherently continuous[,]” the crimes should not be considered

a “continuing offense” for purposes of Section 5552(d). Id. at 27.

Conversely, the Commonwealth maintains Black engaged in a continuing cover-

up by concealing Grandmother’s body in the freezer. Thus, it insists the statute of

limitations did not commence until May 2018, when Black moved out of the York County

residence and left the freezer unattended. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. The

Commonwealth contends that “ongoing activity of a cover-up precludes the statute of

limitations from running until the cover-up is discovered.” Id. at 13 (citing Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 615 A.2d 1322 (Pa. Super. 1992)). Here, it explains “[t]he deception ceased

in May of 2018, when [Black] lost dominion over the body due to the foreclosure on the

[York County] property, as that is when [Black] ended the control over the freezer and

11 In Succi, the Superior Court found the fraud exception in Section 5552(c)(1) applied to

the crime of theft by deception. Succi, 173 A.3d at 281.

[J-82-2025] - 10 [G]randmother’s corpse therein.” Id. at 17. Because the criminal complaint was filed only

two years later (May 2020), the five-year statute of limitations had not yet expired.

The Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General (OAG) submitted an amicus brief in

support of the Commonwealth. It focuses on the phrase “withholds property of another”

in the theft by deception statute, and argues the Legislature intended to prohibit

“continuing conduct” when it added the term “withholding[,]” which is not in the Model

Penal Code. 12 Amicus Brief at 7, 9 (emphasis in original). Indeed, the OAG analogizes

the withholding of property with the continued possession of property, noting this Court

has found “[p]ossession is clearly an ongoing act[.]” Id. at 8 (citing Commonwealth v.

Gross, 101 A.3d 28, 35 n.5 (Pa. 2014)).

The question before us is one of statutory interpretation; thus, “our scope of review

is plenary and our standard of review is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d

298, 304 (Pa. 2022) (citations omitted). Section 3922, defining the crime of theft by

deception, is a penal statute. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231, 1236

(Pa. Super. 2000) (“[A] penal statute is a statute that define[s] criminal offenses and

specif[ies] corresponding fines and punishment.”) (citation and some punctuation

omitted). Thus, the rule of lenity applies, so that if the provision is ambiguous, it “must be

strictly construed in favor of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Rosario, 294 A.3d 338,

350 (Pa. 2023) (citations omitted). Moreover, Section 5552(d), like any statute of

limitations, must be “liberally construed in favor of the defendant and against the

Commonwealth.” Cardonick, 292 A.2d at 407 (citations omitted).

The pertinent question presented in Black’s first issue is when did the statute of

limitations begin to run on her charge of theft by deception? Section 5552(d) provides

12 The Model Penal Code defines theft by deception as follows: “A person is guilty of theft if [s]he purposely obtains property of another by deception.” Model Penal Code, § 223.3 (Theft by Deception) (emphasis added).

[J-82-2025] - 11 two alternatives: (1) when every element of the crime occurred; or (2) “if a legislative

purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears,” then the period

commences when either the “course of conduct or the complicity of the defendant therein

is terminated.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d). While the parties’ arguments focus on whether

theft by deception is a continuing crime, the Superior Court (and the trial court) implied

that the offense was not completed until the SSA learned of Black’s deception, i.e., when

Grandmother’s remains were identified in May 2020. See Black, 307 A.3d at *2-*3 (citing

Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/22, at 4-5). See id. at *2 (“The statute of limitations for theft by

deception does not commence until the victim discovers the deception.”) (citing Fisher,

682 A.2d at 818). We disagree.

As defined in the Crimes Code, theft by deception requires two elements: (1) the

defendant must intentionally obtain or withhold property of another by deception; and (2)

she must do so by intentionally creating or reinforcing a false impression. See 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3922. While the Commonwealth must prove the victim relied on the deception — i.e.,

in order to establish that the defendant obtained or withheld the property by deception —

the plain language of the statute does not require the Commonwealth to prove the victim

was aware of the deception as an element of the crime. This is contrary to the Superior

Court’s conclusion. Thus, we must consider whether “a legislative purpose to prohibit a

continuing course of conduct plainly appears” in the theft by deception statute. 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5552(d).

As Black points out, when the Legislature intends for the offense to be a continuing

one for purposes of the statute of limitations, it has expressly stated so. See Black’s Brief

at 20-21. For example, the criminal conspiracy statute explicitly declares that “[f]or

purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d) … conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct

which terminates when the crime or crimes which are its object are committed or the

[J-82-2025] - 12 agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with

whom he conspired[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(g)(1) (emphases added). See Commonwealth

v. Volk, 444 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“For purposes of the statute of limitation,

the crime of conspiracy is a continuing offense … [a]nd any conspiracy that is renewed

by repetitions may be prosecuted at any time within two years after the commission of the

last offense.”) (citations omitted). The Medicaid Fraud Abuse and Control Act 13 also

plainly states that a violation of subsection (a) of the Act (knowingly or intentionally

presenting a false or fraudulent claim for payment) “shall be deemed to continue so long

as the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein continues; the

offense is committed when the course of conduct or complicity of the defendant therein

is terminated in accordance with the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d) (relating to

other offenses).” 62 P.S. § 1407(b)(1) (emphases added). Finally, the language of the

Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 911, proclaims that “[a] violation of [the Act] shall

be deemed to continue so long as the person who committed the violation

continues to receive any benefit from the violation.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(c) (emphasis

added). There can be no clearer expression of legislative intent to prohibit a continuing

offense.

The OAG asserts that the crime of possession of a firearm is also “clearly an

ongoing act — in other words, a course of conduct.” Amicus Brief at 8 (citing Gross, 101

A.3d at 34 n.5). Relying on our decision in Gross, the OAG emphasizes that this Court

stated that “[a]s long as one is in unlawful possession of a firearm, one is committing an

offense.” Gross, 101 A.3d at 34 n.5. While it correctly cites Gross, the OAG fails to

acknowledge that decision focused on whether venue was proper, not whether the

defendant was charged within the applicable limitations period. Moreover, the defendant

13 62 P.S. §§ 1401-1418.

[J-82-2025] - 13 in Gross was charged with conspiracy to provide her boyfriend with “unlimited possession

and unconditional access to a firearm” when he was prohibited from possessing a firearm

as a result of an outstanding protection from abuse order. Gross, 101 A.3d at 31, 34.

Thus, this Court’s commentary, in a footnote, that “unlawful possession of a firearm”

continues so long as the prohibited person possesses the firearm amounts to dicta with

respect to the statute of limitations question before us. Id. at 34 n.5 (citation omitted).

However, the theft by deception statute is markedly different. It does not reference

Section 5552(d) or explicitly state the offense continues for any period of time. Nor is

theft by deception a possessory offense. Rather, a person is guilty of theft by deception

if she “intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by deception.” 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3922(a) (emphases added). It is evident the act of “obtain[ing] property of another”

does not connotate a continuing course of conduct. Id. Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary

defines “obtain” as “[t]o bring into one’s own possession; to procure, esp. through effort[,]”

and Merriam-Webster defines the term as “to gain or attain usually by planned action or

effort.” Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“OBTAIN”); Merriam-Webster

(“OBTAIN”), https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/obtain (last accessed June 9, 2026).

Thus, the moment a defendant gains possession of property by deceptive means, the

crime has been committed and the statute of limitations begins to run.

Theft by deception also criminalizes the “withhold[ing] property of another by

deception.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a) (emphasis added). The OAG insists that “[w]ithholding

[is a] word[] that describes continuing conduct[,]” like possession. Amicus Brief at 9.

Therefore, so long as the deception continues, and the defendant withholds the property,

the statute of limitations does not commence. However, the term “withholds” can

connotate continuous behavior or be limited to a specific period in time. Merriam-Webster

Dictionary defines “withhold” as “to hold back from action” or “to refrain from granting,

[J-82-2025] - 14 giving, or allowing[.]” Merriam-Webster (“WITHHOLD”), https://merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/obtain (last accessed June 9, 2026). Thus, the term “withhold”

can mean that the defendant refused to return the property upon request. This would

trigger the statute of limitations at a single, definite point in time. Nevertheless, the term

“withhold” may also allude to an offense that continues so long as the defendant is in

possession of the property. At best, therefore, the term “withholds” is ambiguous, and

must be construed in favor of the defendant. See Rosario, 294 A.3d at 350; Cardonick,

292 A.2d at 407.

The statute also provides that a person deceives intentionally if she “creates or

reinforces a false impression[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). This language requires some

affirmative action on the part of the defendant. Here, Black’s affirmative deception began

when she hid Grandmother’s death (and body) and ended when the SSA made the last

monthly payment to Grandmother’s account. Black did not respond to the centenarian

letters or contact the SSA to question why the payments stopped. At this point, Black did

nothing more to “reinforce” the “false impression” she created that Grandmother was still

alive. Thus, we conclude the limitations period for Black’s charge of theft by deception

commenced the day after Grandmother’s last SSA payment in November 2010, and the

charges filed in May 2020 were untimely. 14

Although the Superior Court issued several decisions which imply theft by

deception is a continuing offense for purposes of the statute of limitations, none

addressed the language of Section 5552(d), and each is distinguishable on its facts.

Fisher, which the Court below relied upon, involved a real estate scheme in which the

14 As previously mentioned, even if we conclude the fraud exception in Section 5552(c)(1)

applies, which would have permitted the Commonwealth to file charges within one year after the SSA discovered the theft, that exception extends the limitations period only for an additional three years. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired, at the latest, in November 2018.

[J-82-2025] - 15 defendant convinced numerous victims to purchase property or services from him, but he

never delivered the property or completed the services. See Fisher, 682 A.2d at 813-

814. While the Fisher Court analogized the defendant’s deceptive conduct to criminal

conspiracy — and described theft by deception as a “continuing offense” — the Court

found that the prosecution for each count “commence[d] within five years from the date

of [the] last deception relating to that count.” Id. at 818 (emphasis added). Therefore,

the theft by deception was a “continuing offense” only because the defendant continued

to affirmatively deceive the victims. See id. (noting that within five years of charges: (1)

defendant accepted payments on the property from a victim; (2) defendant refused a

victim’s demand for return of their money after discovering the fraud; (3) a victim

terminated their contract with defendant; (4) defendant refused to discuss record owner

of property and potential refund with a victim; or (5) defendant concealed the fact that the

contracted services would not be performed until after statute of limitations expired).

Here, Black did nothing to affirmatively deceive the SSA after it stopped Grandmother’s

monthly payments.

The facts in Succi were similar to Fisher in that the defendant engaged in an

ongoing scheme to deceive customers who contracted with him to perform home

improvement services. The Court below cited Succi for the proposition that the statute of

limitations for theft by deception was “tolled” until the victims discovered they were

deceived. Black, 207 A.3d at *2 (citing Succi, 173 A.3d at 281). Importantly, however,

the Succi Court used this language because it found the fraud exception to the five-year

statute of limitations applicable. See Succi, 173 A.3d at 281 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. §

5552(c)(1)). The Superior Court then determined that the defendant engaged in

deceptive conduct with respect to each victim within eight years of the date the victims

collectively learned of the defendant’s deception (the day the warrant was issued for the

[J-82-2025] - 16 defendant’s arrest). See id. at 281-282. Thus, the Succi Court concluded the charges

were timely filed because they fell within the eight-year fraud exception. In fact, the Succi

Court considered the issue before us — whether theft by deception is a continuing offense

under Section 5552(d) — and explicitly stated it was “unable to find a legislative purpose

to prohibit a continuing course of conduct ‘plainly appear[ed]’ in” the theft by deception

statute. Succi, 173 A.2d at 280. In other words, the Superior Court rejected the

Commonwealth’s present argument that theft by deception is a continuing crime, as do

we.

In Commonwealth v. McSloy, 751 A.2d 666 (Pa. Super. 2000), the defendant

conspired with another to stage an automobile accident and collect the insurance

proceeds. See id. at 668. Although the defendant was charged with theft by deception

eight years after the accident, the Court determined the statute of limitations commenced

when the defendant “first received payment from the insurance companies[,]” which was

less than five years before the charges were filed. Id. at 669. The Court noted that every

element of the offense was committed when the defendant obtained the property (i.e.,

insurance proceeds) by deception. See id.

The Commonwealth also relies upon a more recent unpublished Superior Court

decision, Commonwealth v. McGogney, 293 A.3d 610 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpub. memo.).

See Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. In that case, the victims’ son died in a car accident in

November 2010, and they hired the defendant to represent his estate. See McGogney,

293 A.3d at *1. The defendant settled the insurance claims without the victims’ knowledge

and retained the funds as his own, while telling the victims “the litigation had not been

settled” and blaming the delay on the Internal Revenue Service. Id. (citation omitted).

The victims eventually hired another attorney, who uncovered the defendant’s deception.

In 2016, the defendant delivered a cashier’s check to the victims, minus a significant

[J-82-2025] - 17 amount for his purported fee. See id. at *2. When charges were filed in 2019, the

defendant argued that the offense of theft by deception was untimely because the crime

was completed in 2011, when he received (and retained) the insurance settlement; thus,

the statute of limitations expired five years later in 2016. See id. However, the Superior

Court disagreed. While the Court referred to the crime as a “continuous course of

conduct[,]” it explained that the defendant continued to deceive the victims for years after

the settlement was paid, noting that his deceptions, “including the allegation that the IRS

was preventing disbursement of the … money, began in 2012 and continued through …

2018, when [he] corresponded by email with” the victims’ new attorney. Id. at *4 (citations

omitted). Like in Fisher and Succi, the defendant in McGogney continued to affirmatively

deceive the victims within the five-year limitations period. 15

Finding no clear purpose in the language of Section 3922 that indicates the

legislature intended the crime of theft by deception to be a continuing offense, we

conclude the statute of limitations in Black’s case commenced the day after the last SSA

payment was deposited into Grandmother’s joint bank account. Black’s silent acceptance

of that payment was an affirmative act which “reinforce[d] a

false impression” she, herself, had created that Grandmother was not deceased. 18

Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). Since the Commonwealth commenced Black’s prosecution for theft

by deception after the limitations period expired, we vacate her conviction for that offense.

15 The Commonwealth’s reliance on Johnson — and the so-called “‘Continuing Coverup’

Doctrine” — is similarly untenable. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11; see also id. at 14-15, 17. The co-defendants in Johnson were not charged with theft by deception. Instead, they challenged the timeliness of their prosecutions for conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations. See Johnson, 615 A.2d at 1329. The Johnson panel correctly observed that “the crime of conspiracy is a continuing offense.” Id. That decision has no relevance to the case before us.

[J-82-2025] - 18 V. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY Next, Black challenges her conviction of RSP, which is codified at Section 3925 of

the Crimes Code: A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a) (emphasis added). While the statue explains that “receiving”

property means “acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the

property[,]” it does not define what constitutes “retain[ing]” property for purposes of the

offense. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(b). That is the focus of the parties’ arguments.

Clearly, the date a defendant receives or disposes of property she knows or

believes to be stolen refers to a specific point in time — the offense of RSP is complete

on that date. However, the pertinent question is whether the offense continues when the

defendant retains stolen property after the five-year limitations period has expired, and,

specifically, whether the addition of this language plainly demonstrates “a legislative

purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct” for purposes of extending the

limitations period under Section 5552(d). 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d).

Black insists the language of the RSP statute does not plainly indicate an intent to

prohibit “a continuing course of conduct[.]” Black’s Brief at 36. She argues that while

“retaining” property could refer to “continuing conduct[,]” at best, the language is

ambiguous since it could “plausibly refer to the momentary decision to keep such property

after acquiring the requisite guilty knowledge.” Id. at 38-39. Black references a “split of

authority” from other jurisdictions as to whether “such offenses can be viewed as

continuing in nature.” Id. at 39. See also id. at 40-42 (collecting cases). Because the

term is ambiguous, Black maintains it must be construed in her favor, and the statute of

limitations period commenced when she received (and retained) the last SSA payment in

[J-82-2025] - 19 November 2010. See id. at 43-44. To the extent the Commonwealth contends she used

Grandmother’s SSA funds to pay her mortgage, Black asserts the Commonwealth “never

identified when the last of [those] funds might have been spent and disposed of;” thus, it

did not prove that she “disposed of” those funds within the five-year limitations period. Id.

at 44. While Black acknowledges the Superior Court’s holding in Farrar that RSP is a

“continuing offense,” she characterizes the Court’s analysis as “paper-thin[,]” and

distinguishes that case on its facts. Id. at 45. In Farrar, the defendant continuously

retained the stolen antique furniture at issue; whereas, here, Black emphasizes “there

was no showing below that [she] even had the funds in question within five years of the

filing of the” RSP charge. Id. at 46-47.

The Commonwealth, of course, takes a different approach. Relying on Farrar, it

insists RSP “is an ongoing offense which continues as long as the perpetrator retains

possession of the stolen property.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 20 (emphasis added).

While the Commonwealth recognizes that in Hawkins, the Superior Court distinguished

non-fungible property (i.e., antique furniture) from fungible property (i.e., checks), it insists

that decision focused on the fact that there was no evidence the defendant “retained the

stolen funds after the funds were converted from traceable checks to untraceable mutable

cash.” Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted) (citing Hawkins, 439 A.2d at 752). Here, however,

the Commonwealth maintains there was “specific paperwork showing that [Black] used

funds from her joint direct deposit account with [Grandmother] to pay the mortgage on

the” York County property. Id. (record citations and emphasis omitted). Accordingly, it

concludes the trial court made a “reasonable inference … from the joint stipulations that

[Black] retained funds in the account uninterrupted from their direct deposit, or in the

alternative at the very least retained the stolen funds in the form of home equity until

[J-82-2025] - 20 foreclosure on the house in May of 2018.” Id. at 22. Therefore, the RSP offense charged

in May 2020 was timely.

Similar to its discussion of the first issue, the OAG focuses on the language of the

statute, and specifically the term “retains.” Amicus Brief at 7. It insists “retains” describes

“continuing conduct,” and, therefore, the Legislature intended the offense of RSP “to

prohibit the course of conduct it has made criminal” for purposes of the statute of

limitations. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). The OAG refutes Black’s assertion that the term

“retains” can mean “momentary control” because the statute “already penalizes

‘receiving’” stolen property; thus, the term “retain” would be rendered mere surplusage.

Id. at 11. While the OAG recognizes the Legislature employed specific language in other

statutes to plainly indicate its intent that the offense constitutes a “continuing course of

conduct[,]” it asserts that the language was required in those statutes because, unlike

RSP, the elements of those crimes “do not make them continuing.” Id. at 14-15 and n.3

(asserting (1) corrupt organizations requires two acts which are not continuing offenses;

(2) the crime of conspiracy is arguably complete when the agreement to commit an

offense is reached; and (3) “[t]he elements of Medicaid fraud are not continuing acts[,]”

but simply disparate ways to submit improper claims). The OAG concludes that the term

“retains,” like “possesses,” “necessarily describe[s] ongoing conduct.” Id. at 14.

Our analysis, as with the first issue, focuses on the statutory language of the

Crimes Code and the Judicial Code. 16 We must determine whether the RSP statute —

which criminalizes the retention of stolen property — evinces a legislative purpose to

prohibit a continuing course of conduct. See 18 Pa.C.S § 3925(a); 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(d).

16 Our standard of review of a question involving statutory interpretation is de novo, and

our scope of review is plenary. See Gamby, 283 A.3d at 304 (citation omitted).

[J-82-2025] - 21 Relying on its prior decisions in Farrar and Hawkins, the Superior Court concluded

RSP is “an ongoing offense, which continues as long as the perpetrator retains

possession of the stolen property.” Black, 307 A.3d at *4. Because Black did not return

or relinquish any of the stolen SSA funds, the Court concluded she “retained” the funds

and the offense was still ongoing at the time the Commonwealth filed the charges against

her. Id.

Farrar supports this conclusion. In that case, the defendant, her husband, and her

son entered a man’s home in Maryland without his permission in March 1974 and stole

three pieces of antique furniture. See Farrar, 413 A.2d at 1096. The family moved to

Pennsylvania six months later, taking the furniture with them. Nearly two years later, in

August 1976, a Pennsylvania state trooper, armed with a warrant, searched the

defendant’s home and seized two of the stolen antiques. The trooper returned a week

later with the sister of the Maryland man whose home was robbed. At that time, the

trooper seized the third stolen antique. On August 17, 1976, the defendant was charged

with, inter alia, RSP. See id.

On appeal, the defendant raised seven issues, the first two of which are relevant

to our discussion. First, she maintained the trial court did not have jurisdiction “because

the crime occurred before she and her family moved to Pennsylvania[;]” instead, the

offense was complete when she received and retained the stolen antiques in Maryland.

Farrar, 413 A.2d at 1098. In a brief analysis, the Superior Court opined that RSP is an

“ongoing” offense based upon the “legislature’s inclusion of a prohibition against

retaining and disposing of stolen property[.]” Id. (emphasis added). The Court relied

upon a footnote in another decision characterizing RSP as an ongoing offense, albeit in

[J-82-2025] - 22 a different context, 17 and cases from California and Louisiana. See id. (citations omitted).

Because the defendant still retained the stolen antiques while in Pennsylvania, the panel

determined the trial court had jurisdiction.

Next, the defendant argued that the then two-year statute of limitations for RSP

expired before she was charged with the offense. She asserted that “she committed the

offense when she first received and retained the property in March 1974,” but was not

charged until August 1976. Farrar, 413 A.2d at 1098. In a one-sentence analysis, the

Superior Court rejected the claim: “[W]e have just concluded that [the] offense was a

‘continuing’ one, which did not terminate until the stolen property was taken from her in

August 1976.” Id.

Thus, while the Superior Court’s analysis of the statute of limitations claim in Farrar

was less than robust, the Court determined that the crime was not complete until the

Pennsylvania troopers seized the stolen antiques — in other words, the defendant

continued to “retain” the stolen property while living in Pennsylvania.

This subtle distinction became clearer in Hawkins, a case that involved stolen

checks, as opposed to antique furniture. In Hawkins, like here, the defendant was

charged with theft by deception and RSP, among other offenses, after it was discovered

she “fraudulently obtain[ed] funds from the federal Manpower” program. Hawkins, 439

A.2d at 749. In 1974 and 1975, she received and cashed checks for work she did not

perform. She was charged following a grand jury proceeding in 1978, and later found

guilty by a jury.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the charges were filed after the then two-

year statute of limitations period had expired. The Superior Court determined that her

17 See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 335 A.2d 512, 515 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1975) (holding officer

had probable cause to arrest defendant for RSP when he encountered defendant carrying an adding machine in a high crime area at 2:00 a.m.).

[J-82-2025] - 23 prosecution of theft by deception was timely under the fraud exception 18 — the Court

determined that the discovery of the offenses occurred, at the earliest, on April 12, 1977,

when the defendant admitted she received and cashed the checks, and the charges were

filed less than one year later, on April 11, 1978. See Hawkins, 439 A.2d at 750-751.

However, the Court reversed the defendant’s RSP conviction, finding the

prosecution commenced after the limitations period expired. First, the Court determined

that the fraud exception was not applicable because “fraud is not required to prove the

elements of” RSP. Hawkins, 439 A.2d at 752. Second, it rejected the Commonwealth’s

reliance on Farrar, because the defendant did not retain the stolen property (i.e., the

checks) within the relevant statutory limitations period. The Superior Court opined: We are unable to conclude, in the instant case, that there has been any “retention” of property beyond that point prior to the commencement of the investigation when the [defendant] received the proceeds from the checks. We distinguish Farrar not because, as the Commonwealth suggests, the items there were “unique”, but quite simply because Farrar involved property that was retained and the instant case does not. Id. (reformatted).

Thus, both Farrar and Hawkins support the argument that RSP is a continuing

offense, so long as the defendant retains the stolen property. Neither case, however,

considered the limitations period in the context of the statutory language at issue here —

Section 5552(d). As explained above, an offense is committed — and the limitations

period begins to run — “either when every element occurs, or, if a legislative purpose

to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the

course of conduct or the complicity of the defendant therein is terminated.” 42 Pa.C.S. §

5552(d) (emphasis added). Thus, we turn to the RSP statute and consider whether the

18 The Hawkins Court cited the fraud exception, which at that time was codified as 18

Pa.C.S. § 108(c)(1). See Hawkins, 439 A.2d at 750. It was identical to the present exception codified at Section 5552(c)(1). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(1).

[J-82-2025] - 24 addition of language criminalizing the retention of stolen property evidences a legislative

purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “retain” as “[t]o hold in possession or under control;

to keep and not lose, part with, or dismiss.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)

(“RETAIN”). The definition in Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary is similar — “to keep in

possession or use[.]” Merriam-Webster (“RETAIN”), https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/retain (last accessed June 9, 2026). The Commonwealth insists

the language of the statute clearly demonstrates the Legislature intended to prohibit a

continuing course of conduct that terminates only when the defendant “has returned or

relinquished” the stolen property. Commonwealth’s Brief at 19. Here, it argues, Black

“retained” the funds because she used them to pay the mortgage on her York County

property. Id. at 21. It was not until 2018, when the property was foreclosed by the bank,

that she no longer “retained” the SSA funds. Id. at 22.

Black insists that the term “retain” — like “withhold” — is ambiguous. She

maintains “it could just as plausibly refer to the momentary decision to keep [stolen]

property after acquiring the requisite guilty knowledge[,]” as it could refer to the continuous

possession of stolen property. Black’s Brief at 38-39. We disagree. The term “retain” is

synonymous with “possess.” Merriam-Webster (“RETAIN”), https://www.meriam-

webster.com/thesaurus/retain (last accessed June 9, 2026). The statute provides in the

disjunctive that a person is guilty of RSP “if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes

of” stolen property. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, the

Commonwealth may file RSP charges against a defendant so long as she intentionally

retains (or continues to possess) property, that she knows, or reasonably should have

known, was stolen, absent an intent to restore the property to the owner. See id.

[J-82-2025] - 25 Our conclusion that RSP is a continuing offense, however, does not resolve

Black’s challenge. Rather, we must consider whether Black retained possession of the

stolen SSA funds within five years of the date the charges were filed.

The facts in the case before us are more similar to Hawkins than Farrar. Although

the Commonwealth insists it presented competent evidence to prove Black used the

stolen SSA payments to pay the mortgage on her York County property, she no longer

retained the stolen property in the form in which it was received — that is, a deposit of

funds in the joint account. If we were to accept the Commonwealth’s reasoning, the

statute of limitations would be rendered meaningless in any case in which a defendant

steals currency, or converts a stolen item — be it cash, checks, or even objects — into

something else. What if the defendant in Farrar traded the antiques for a new car? Would

the statute of limitations begin to run on the day of the trade, or would we conclude the

defendant “retained” the value of the antiques as long as she kept the car? The latter

proposition is contrary to the text of the statute.

Under the RSP statute, there are three starting points for the commencement of

the statute of limitations — the date the defendant received the stolen property, the period

during which she retained the property, or the date she disposed of the stolen property.

Logically, a defendant no longer retains stolen property after she disposes of it. Here, the

Superior Court focused on the fact Black had not returned or relinquished the property

to its owner (the SSA) by the time the charges were filed. See Black, 307 A.3d at *4.

However, the date a defendant returns or relinquishes stolen property to its rightful owner

is not a relevant consideration under the plain language of the statute. Rather, it is when

a defendant disposes of stolen property — in whatever form — that the statute of

limitations begins to run.

[J-82-2025] - 26 Even assuming Black used the SSA funds to pay her mortgage, she “disposed” of

the stolen funds when she transferred those funds from the joint account to the mortgage

holder — and the limitations period began to run on that date. Neither the parties’ trial

stipulations, nor the records attached thereto, identify when the last SSA payment was

transferred to the bank. See Stipulated Facts at 1-4. Further, the mortgage modification

paperwork, which the Commonwealth insists proves that Black used the SSA funds to

pay her mortgage, is dated March 2010 — more than five years before the RSP charge

was filed. See Motion to Remove from Trial List, 3/15/22, Exhibit F (Mortgage

Modification paperwork). Absent any evidence Black “retained” the SSA funds — even

in a separate account — the statutory period commenced in November 2010, when the

last SSA payment was deposited in the joint account. Therefore, the RSP charge filed in

May 2020, was well beyond the five-year statute of limitations, and we vacate Black’s

conviction of RSP.

VI. CONCLUSION

There is no indication in the language of the theft by deception statute that the

legislature intended the crime to be a continuing offense for purposes of extending the

commencement of the statute of limitations. Rather, the limitations period begins to run

when every element of the crime has occurred — that is, when a defendant intentionally

obtains or withholds property of another by deception. The crime continues so long as

the defendant affirmatively creates or reinforces the false impression supporting the

deception. Here, the statute of limitations for Black’s crime commenced the day she

obtained her dead grandmother’s last SSA benefit payment, and failed to notify the SSA

(or any authority) of the death.

[J-82-2025] - 27 Conversely, the language of the RSP statute provides that the crime continues so

long as the defendant “retains” the stolen property. However, once the defendant

“disposes” of the property, or converts it to another form, the statute of limitations begins

to run. Here, the statute of limitation for Black’s RSP charge also commenced the day

after she obtained her the final SSA payment intended for her dead grandmother. There

was no evidence presented that she “retained” those funds after that date. The fact that

she may have transferred them to pay for her mortgage is irrelevant.

For the reasons above, we vacate Black’s convictions for theft by deception and

RSP, and remand for further proceedings.

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue and Dougherty join the opinion.

Justice Brobson files a concurring opinion.

Justice Wecht files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

Justice Mundy files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

[J-82-2025] - 28