Commonwealth v. Bender

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Commonwealth v. Bender

313 A.2d 309, 226 Pa. Super. 482, 1973 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1388

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedDecember 11, 1973

DocketAppeals, Nos. 871 and 1558

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 313 A.2d 309 (Commonwealth v. Bender) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. Bender, 313 A.2d 309, 226 Pa. Super. 482, 1973 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1388 (Pa. Ct. App. 1973).

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Opinion

Opinion by

Hoppman, J.,

Appellant Donald Lee Bender appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief following his 1966 eonvic[484]*484tions for robbery and rape.¹ At appellant’s request, the cases were severed, and separate jury trials were held, both of which resulted in convictions.

Appellant contends that the in-court identification made during the robbery trial was the result of a prior illegal identification of him from a lineup at which he was denied the assistance of counsel. He asserts that this lineup proceeding was therefore violative of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as enunciated in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967). We find, as did the court below, that the lineup in question was not subject to the Wade guarantee, because the decision in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967), restricted the application of Wade to identifications made after June 12,1967. Appellant’s lineup and trial both preceded that date.

Appellant further contends, apart from the right to counsel issue, that the lineup was overly suggestive, thus denying his constitutional right to due process of law. Our review of the record fails to disclose any evidence to support appellant’s contention that because of his manner of dress he stood out from the other men in the lineup.

Appellant attacks his rape conviction claiming that the judge’s charge to the jury was so prejudicial that he was denied due process of law. This issue was raised for the first time in this present appeal. It was never raised in prior post-conviction proceedings, nor on previous appeals to this Court. Since appellant has failed to “prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue” as required by the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of Jan. 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, Sec. 4, 19 P.S. §1180-4 (b) (2), he is deemed to have waived this issue.

The orders below are affirmed.

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Opinion by

Hoppman, J.,

Appellant Donald Lee Bender appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief following his 1966 eonvic[484]*484tions for robbery and rape.¹ At appellant’s request, the cases were severed, and separate jury trials were held, both of which resulted in convictions.

Appellant contends that the in-court identification made during the robbery trial was the result of a prior illegal identification of him from a lineup at which he was denied the assistance of counsel. He asserts that this lineup proceeding was therefore violative of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as enunciated in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967). We find, as did the court below, that the lineup in question was not subject to the Wade guarantee, because the decision in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967), restricted the application of Wade to identifications made after June 12,1967. Appellant’s lineup and trial both preceded that date.

Appellant further contends, apart from the right to counsel issue, that the lineup was overly suggestive, thus denying his constitutional right to due process of law. Our review of the record fails to disclose any evidence to support appellant’s contention that because of his manner of dress he stood out from the other men in the lineup.

Appellant attacks his rape conviction claiming that the judge’s charge to the jury was so prejudicial that he was denied due process of law. This issue was raised for the first time in this present appeal. It was never raised in prior post-conviction proceedings, nor on previous appeals to this Court. Since appellant has failed to “prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue” as required by the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of Jan. 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, Sec. 4, 19 P.S. §1180-4 (b) (2), he is deemed to have waived this issue.

The orders below are affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

313 A.2d 309, 226 Pa. Super. 482, 1973 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1388, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-bender-pasuperct-1973.

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