Commonwealth v. Banks

8 Va. 338
Court of Appeals of Virginia·Decided April 15, 1798·Published

Opinion

Pendleton, President,

delivered the resolution of the judges, as follows:

The court are, at present, of opinion, that although the demands might have been originally well founded against the commonwealth, yet if the claimants neglected to exhibit their claims to a county court, under the act of 1781, or the subsequent acts continuing that mode until September 1787, their claims were barred by that act, unless they can shew that they made such application to a court, or were diverted from doing so, by some proceeding between them and the executive, or the auditor.

In Cunningham’s case, there was an application, and such valuation recently made, but adjudged by this court not to be binding to fix the value, because at the time, the law, meant to be pursued, was expired; and against this mistake the court relieved him, since he meant to use the legal diligence in due time. We think, at present, that case went far enough, and ought not to be extended to let in all stale claims for impressments, in which no step was taken to es[342] tablish them, if existing, by adjustment of a county court, during the period from 1781 to September 1787.

In the present cases, no application is proved, or even stated, nor any excuse assigned for its omission, and the legal objection applies, without any equity to encounter it.

But as the claimants may be able to shew a court’s valuation of their claims, such as Cunningham's, or a reasonable excuse for not shewing it, and may have forborne to exhibit them, from a mistaken impression of the principles of decision in Cunningham's case, the court are willing for the sake of justice in these cases, not confined to pleadings as in ordinary cases, to afford them an opportunity of producing them.

As delays may be injurious to the claimants or the commonwealth, upon whomsoever of them the loss shall fall, in an application to the United States, the real debtors, if the papers are now ready, the court are willing to receive and judge of them; otherwise the cause must be continued to have the defect supplied.

I said for the sake of justice, the court not allowing the similitude to be just, between the introduction of such papers here, and that of recurring to subsequent laws.

The petitioners not having any additional evidence ready, the causes were continued; and, at the next term, they filed affidavits upon the subject.

Banks proved by a witness, that Hunter, Banks & Co., about the year 1783 or 1784, applied to the auditor for payment, but was refused : and that about the same time he applied to the executive,-who thought there was no redress : and upon his requesting them in 1787 to lay the claim before the assembly, they refused.

North & Co. proved by several witnesses, that they had, in the year 1784, and at sundry times afterwards, applied to the auditor for payment, but could not obtain it.

The foregoing testimony was now insisted on by the counsel for- the petitioners, as establishing their right to payment under the opinion of the court at the last term.

[343] Pendleton, President, delivered the resolution of the judges. That the additional evidence did not supply the defects contemplated by the former opinion of the court. That the meaning of the court was, that the claimants should shew that they were diverted from an earlier and proper pursuit, by hopes of payment given them by the executive or the auditor. But so far from that being shewn, the additional evidence proved that both of them had refused it: which left the petitioners at liberty to have pursued the legal steps, if they had thought proper; and that the failure to do so proceeded from themselves. That, therefore, the judgments were to be reversed; and that the following was to be the entry:

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Commonwealth v. Banks, 8 Va. 338 (Va. Ct. App. 1798).

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