Commonwealth v. Antony M. Atkinson-Gedutis.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1145
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1145

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ANTONY M. ATKINSON-GEDUTIS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Antony Atkinson-Gedutis, appeals from the

denial of his motion to return property as well as the denial of

his motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

On February 2, 2024, the defendant admitted to sufficient

facts to warrant a finding of guilty on an amended complaint

charging improper storage of a firearm. A District Court judge

continued the case without a finding for six months. Two months

after changing his plea, the defendant filed a motion for the

return of the firearm that had been seized during the execution

of a search warrant. At a hearing on the motion, defense

counsel informed the judge that the defendant's license to carry

had been suspended because of the improper storage of the firearm and that the defendant sought to designate a "friend"

with a license to carry to take possession of the firearm. The

judge denied the motion in an endorsement order and cited G. L.

c. 276, § 3 (disposition of evidence seized under a warrant).

In a motion for reconsideration, the defendant argued that the

judge relied upon the wrong statute. The judge denied that

motion as well. We discern no abuse of discretion where the

defendant did not establish that he followed the procedure for

transferring the firearm to a "friend." See Commonwealth v.

Fleury, 489 Mass. 421, 429 (2022) ("judges may exercise their

discretion" regarding disposition of seized property).

Lawfully possessed firearms that are found to be improperly

secured are not subject to the forfeiture provisions of G. L.

c. 276, § 3. See Fleury, 489 Mass. at 430-431. Instead, the

disposition of an improperly secured firearm is governed by

G. L. c. 140, § 129D, as amended through St. 2014, c. 284, § 42.

According to that governing statute, when the right to possess a

firearm has been suspended or revoked, the firearm may be

transferred "to any licensed dealer or any other person legally

permitted to purchase or take possession of the firearm[]" so

long as certain procedures are followed. Id.

Here, the defendant did not follow the procedures set forth

in the governing statute. For example, the defendant failed to

2 identify his "friend" or a licensed dealer, to provide evidence

of written notice to the licensing authority, and to produce a

written affirmation from a purchaser or transferee that the

firearm would not be transferred back "to the former owner."

G. L. c. 140, § 129D. Therefore, even though the judge relied

on the wrong statute, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

ultimate decision. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental

Cas. Co., 413 Mass. 730, 734–735 (1992) (decision may be

affirmed on appeal if judge is "right for the wrong reason").

Order denying motion to return property affirmed.

Order denying motion for reconsideration affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Hodgens & Toone, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: May 6, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.