NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-646
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ALMILKAL M. RUIZ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The Commonwealth appeals from a District Court judge's
order allowing the defendant's motion to suppress evidence
obtained from a detention and patfrisk following a traffic stop.
The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred in allowing the
motion because the patfrisk was justified by reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. We
affirm.
Background. We recite the facts as found by the motion
judge, "supplemented by additional undisputed facts where they
do not detract from the judge's ultimate findings."
Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015). On April
5, 2024, Sergeant Gary Hagerty was on patrol around Rockaway Street in Lynn. This is considered a high crime area of Lynn
and "an area that police were focused on as a result of an
increase in gang activity in the approximately four months prior
to April, 2024," which included a "triple shooting" and "double
murder" in December 2023. That evening, Sergeant Hagerty was on
patrol in an unmarked vehicle when he saw a motor vehicle travel
through a stop sign without slowing or stopping. He checked the
license plate, which "came back to a Black Infiniti, but the
vehicle was a Subaru." The license plate was associated with a
vehicle belonging to Brian Khampharasavath (Khampharasavath).
Sergeant Hagerty knew Khampharasavath from a prior firearms-
related arrest and his association with gangs in the area.
Sergeant Hagerty radioed for marked units to assist in making a
motor vehicle stop. Sergeant Hagerty "put the blue lights on"
and performed a motor vehicle stop. Of note, the vehicle
stopped in the middle of the road and not close to the curb.
As Sergeant Hagerty executed the stop, he saw the passenger
door open and the passenger, later identified as the defendant,
get out of the Subaru.1 After the defendant got out of the
vehicle, the defendant was ordered to remain at the vehicle by
the police, which he did. Sergeant Hagerty noted that the
1 There was no exit order given to the defendant as he had already stepped out of the vehicle after the stop and as the police were approaching.
2 defendant's exit from the vehicle seemed "quicker" than a normal
exit. The defendant's quick exit heightened Sergeant Hagerty's
concerns because, based on his training and experience, people
trying to get out of motor vehicles quickly after being stopped
by police do so because of what is in the car or on their
person. As the defendant walked back to the vehicle, Sergeant
Hagerty "observed a satchel-type bag around his body." The
defendant's wearing of this bag, in the present circumstances,
heightened Sergeant Hagerty's concerns because "he had made at
least [ten] arrests wherein persons were carrying firearms in
this type of bag." Accordingly, Sergeant Hagerty patfrisked the
defendant's bag but did not find anything therein. Sergeant
Hagerty then patfrisked the defendant's waist and felt what
turned out to be a black nine millimeter firearm with no serial
number.
Upon locating the loaded firearm, Sergeant Hagerty
testified that he "demanded" the defendant produce a license to
carry a firearm. In response the defendant said that he was in
the "process of getting one." The defendant was placed under
arrest.
Discussion. "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact
absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [the
3 judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (quotation
and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642,
646 (2004). We "leave to the [motion] judge the responsibility
of determining the weight and credibility to be given . . .
testimony presented at the motion hearing." Commonwealth v.
Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 234 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004). However, we "make an
independent determination of the correctness of the judge's
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).
The Commonwealth contends that the totality of the facts
found and credited by the motion judge provided the officers
with reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and
dangerous, justifying the detention and patfrisk of the
defendant. We disagree.
"A patfrisk is permissible only where an officer has
reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual may be armed
and dangerous." Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741,
744 (2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 135 (2022). "In assessing
whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to justify a
patfrisk, we ask whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the
[officer's] position would be warranted in the belief that the
safety of the police or that of other persons was in danger"
4 (quotations and citation omitted). Id. "An innocent
explanation for an individual's actions 'does not remove [those
actions] from consideration in the reasonable suspicion
analysis.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass.
367, 373 (2007).
The Commonwealth urges us to reverse the allowance of the
defendant's motion to suppress because the totality of
circumstances showed that (1) Sergeant Hagerty was patrolling a
high crime area; (2) tensions and gang violence were heightened;
(3) the car from which the defendant exited bore a license plate
which was registered to a person with known gang associations
and a prior firearms-related arrest; (4) the vehicle carrying
the defendant and another person stopped in the middle of the
road rather than at the curb; (5) the defendant made a "quicker"
than normal exit from the vehicle; and (6) Sergeant Hagerty saw
the defendant wearing a satchel-type bag from which Sergeant
Hagerty had recovered firearms on prior occasions.
Although the above factors provide evidence of a heightened
need for caution and perhaps reasonable suspicion that the
defendant may be dangerous, the totality of the facts did not
provide reasonable suspicion that the defendant was also armed.
See Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 744. There was no particular
reason to believe that the defendant was carrying a weapon.
5 Indeed, our case law is clear that merely exiting a vehicle
during a police stop does not support a finding of reasonable
suspicion. Commonwealth v.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-646
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ALMILKAL M. RUIZ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The Commonwealth appeals from a District Court judge's
order allowing the defendant's motion to suppress evidence
obtained from a detention and patfrisk following a traffic stop.
The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred in allowing the
motion because the patfrisk was justified by reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. We
affirm.
Background. We recite the facts as found by the motion
judge, "supplemented by additional undisputed facts where they
do not detract from the judge's ultimate findings."
Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015). On April
5, 2024, Sergeant Gary Hagerty was on patrol around Rockaway Street in Lynn. This is considered a high crime area of Lynn
and "an area that police were focused on as a result of an
increase in gang activity in the approximately four months prior
to April, 2024," which included a "triple shooting" and "double
murder" in December 2023. That evening, Sergeant Hagerty was on
patrol in an unmarked vehicle when he saw a motor vehicle travel
through a stop sign without slowing or stopping. He checked the
license plate, which "came back to a Black Infiniti, but the
vehicle was a Subaru." The license plate was associated with a
vehicle belonging to Brian Khampharasavath (Khampharasavath).
Sergeant Hagerty knew Khampharasavath from a prior firearms-
related arrest and his association with gangs in the area.
Sergeant Hagerty radioed for marked units to assist in making a
motor vehicle stop. Sergeant Hagerty "put the blue lights on"
and performed a motor vehicle stop. Of note, the vehicle
stopped in the middle of the road and not close to the curb.
As Sergeant Hagerty executed the stop, he saw the passenger
door open and the passenger, later identified as the defendant,
get out of the Subaru.1 After the defendant got out of the
vehicle, the defendant was ordered to remain at the vehicle by
the police, which he did. Sergeant Hagerty noted that the
1 There was no exit order given to the defendant as he had already stepped out of the vehicle after the stop and as the police were approaching.
2 defendant's exit from the vehicle seemed "quicker" than a normal
exit. The defendant's quick exit heightened Sergeant Hagerty's
concerns because, based on his training and experience, people
trying to get out of motor vehicles quickly after being stopped
by police do so because of what is in the car or on their
person. As the defendant walked back to the vehicle, Sergeant
Hagerty "observed a satchel-type bag around his body." The
defendant's wearing of this bag, in the present circumstances,
heightened Sergeant Hagerty's concerns because "he had made at
least [ten] arrests wherein persons were carrying firearms in
this type of bag." Accordingly, Sergeant Hagerty patfrisked the
defendant's bag but did not find anything therein. Sergeant
Hagerty then patfrisked the defendant's waist and felt what
turned out to be a black nine millimeter firearm with no serial
number.
Upon locating the loaded firearm, Sergeant Hagerty
testified that he "demanded" the defendant produce a license to
carry a firearm. In response the defendant said that he was in
the "process of getting one." The defendant was placed under
arrest.
Discussion. "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact
absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [the
3 judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (quotation
and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642,
646 (2004). We "leave to the [motion] judge the responsibility
of determining the weight and credibility to be given . . .
testimony presented at the motion hearing." Commonwealth v.
Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 234 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004). However, we "make an
independent determination of the correctness of the judge's
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).
The Commonwealth contends that the totality of the facts
found and credited by the motion judge provided the officers
with reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and
dangerous, justifying the detention and patfrisk of the
defendant. We disagree.
"A patfrisk is permissible only where an officer has
reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual may be armed
and dangerous." Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741,
744 (2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 135 (2022). "In assessing
whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to justify a
patfrisk, we ask whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the
[officer's] position would be warranted in the belief that the
safety of the police or that of other persons was in danger"
4 (quotations and citation omitted). Id. "An innocent
explanation for an individual's actions 'does not remove [those
actions] from consideration in the reasonable suspicion
analysis.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass.
367, 373 (2007).
The Commonwealth urges us to reverse the allowance of the
defendant's motion to suppress because the totality of
circumstances showed that (1) Sergeant Hagerty was patrolling a
high crime area; (2) tensions and gang violence were heightened;
(3) the car from which the defendant exited bore a license plate
which was registered to a person with known gang associations
and a prior firearms-related arrest; (4) the vehicle carrying
the defendant and another person stopped in the middle of the
road rather than at the curb; (5) the defendant made a "quicker"
than normal exit from the vehicle; and (6) Sergeant Hagerty saw
the defendant wearing a satchel-type bag from which Sergeant
Hagerty had recovered firearms on prior occasions.
Although the above factors provide evidence of a heightened
need for caution and perhaps reasonable suspicion that the
defendant may be dangerous, the totality of the facts did not
provide reasonable suspicion that the defendant was also armed.
See Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 744. There was no particular
reason to believe that the defendant was carrying a weapon.
5 Indeed, our case law is clear that merely exiting a vehicle
during a police stop does not support a finding of reasonable
suspicion. Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 159 (1997)
("It is not unnatural for either the driver or the passenger in
an automobile [or both] to get out of the vehicle to meet a
police officer who has signalled the vehicle over to the side of
the road"). Moreover, Sergeant Hagerty's initial concerns were
based on the driver's traffic violation, the record of the
driver of the vehicle, and his associations with gangs, not the
defendant's identity. See id. at 157.
We acknowledge that the police officers were confronted
with a potentially dangerous situation in real time and we are
loathe to say that Sergeant Hagerty acted unreasonably in light
of the factors delineated above and his training and experience.2
We further note that reasonable suspicion is lower than the
standard of probable cause and requires only "the sort of
common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior upon which
2 We acknowledge the difficult result reached here. Although "[t]he touchstone of search and seizure law is reasonableness," Commonwealth v. Harris, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 63 (2018), and "police officers need not gamble with their personal safety when there are legitimate safety concerns to justify [their actions]" (quotations and citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Demos D., 497 Mass. 78, 87 (2026), our jurisprudence requires reasonable suspicion that a defendant is both dangerous and "armed" in order to justify a patfrisk. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 744.
6 practical people -- including government officials -- are
entitled to rely" (quotations and citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 6, 11-12 (2018).
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth did not present adequate evidence
to justify the patfrisk. The defendant did get out of his car
rapidly but complied with officer instructions to return to the
vehicle. The defendant did not make any furtive gestures or
movements that were consistent with carrying a firearm. See
Commonwealth v. Powell, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 755, 762-763 (2023).
The defendant's use of a satchel-type bag is also not enough to
provide reasonable suspicion that he was armed; the defendant
made no attempt to conceal or hide the bag justifying
"reasonable suspicion that the bag contained an illegal firearm
or other contraband" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Johnson-Rivera, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2024). Moreover,
we only consider that an area is high crime if the "high crime"
nature of the area has a "direct connection with the specific
location and activity being investigated." Commonwealth v.
Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 41 (2020). Here, the police were
investigating a civil motor vehicle infraction, and
Khampharasavath's associations with gang activity dated years
back. Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's
7 conclusion that there was no reasonable suspicion to conduct a
patfrisk of the defendant.
Order allowing motion to suppress affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Neyman & Sacks, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: February 17, 2026.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.