Commonwealth v. Alex Labadie.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 12, 2025
• Docket: 23-P-0606
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-606

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ALEX LABADIE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a bench trial, a Boston Municipal Court judge

convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol (OUI), in violation of G. L. c. 90,

§ 24 (1) (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant contends that the

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof because it was

equally likely that he was under the influence of Rohypnol

rather than alcohol. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,

378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). On March 22, 2021, the defendant

drove his car into a parked car. After the initial crash, the

defendant continued to press the gasoline pedal as if he were "trying to drive [his car] through" the parked car. The owner

of car attempted to speak with the defendant, but the defendant

was unresponsive. A police officer arrived at the scene and saw

the defendant sitting in the driver's seat of the car with a

flask on his lap. A cupholder in the car contained a plastic

water bottle partially filled with a brown liquid that smelled

of alcohol. The defendant's eyes were bloodshot and glassy, his

speech was slurred, he struggled to stand without support, and

an odor of alcohol emanated from his car. The officer

administered three field sobriety tests, all of which the

defendant failed. At that point, the officer formed the opinion

that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.

At trial, the defendant did not deny that he drove while

impaired on a public way. He claimed, however, that he was not

under the influence of alcohol. The theory of the defense was

that the defendant had involuntarily ingested Rohypnol, a drug

which has similar effects to alcohol. To this end the defendant

presented expert testimony from a physician who testified about

the effects of Rohypnol. The defendant also testified on his

own behalf and suggested that he had been given Rohypnol by a

friend of the woman with whom he was socializing before the

accident and who was a passenger in the car at the time of the

crash.

2 Discussion. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to

determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt" (citation omitted). Latimore, 378 Mass. at

677. Where, as here, the defendant has moved for required

findings at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at

the close of all the evidence, we review the evidence to

determine whether the Commonwealth's case has deteriorated. In

doing so, we "must disregard contrary evidence presented by the

defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert, unless

the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's

evidence, or any inference drawn from such evidence is

conclusively incorrect" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016). The elements

of operating under the influence are (1) operation of a vehicle,

(2) on a public way, (3) while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).

The defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the

evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol, contending

that "[t]he evidence was equally consistent" with Rohypnol

intoxication. To the contrary, the defendant's testimony that

he might have ingested Rohypnol was based on speculation. He

never saw anyone tamper with his drinks, never sought bloodwork,

3 never saw a physician, and agreed that he was "kind of guessing"

that he might have been drugged. In contrast, the defendant

exhibited classic indicia of alcohol impairment, including

slurred speech and bloodshot and glassy eyes. See Commonwealth

v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 636 (2015), abrogated on other grounds

by Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021). Additionally, the

defendant had a flask in his lap, alcohol in his car's

cupholder, and admitted to having ingested two alcoholic drinks.

The arresting officer testified that the defendant appeared to

be under the influence of alcohol. Moreover, according to his

own expert's testimony, the defendant's intoxication was more

similar to alcohol intoxication than Rohypnol intoxication

because he slurred his speech, struggled to walk, and did not

have a memory of that night. In sum, the Commonwealth's

evidence did not deteriorate. See Lawson, 475 Mass. at 817.

Thus, the evidence was sufficient to permit the judge to find

that the defendant's consumption of alcohol resulted in his

4 diminished capacity to operate his motor vehicle safely. See

Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392 (2017).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Brennan & D'Angelo, JJ. 1),

Clerk

Entered: March 12, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.