TAMILIA, Judge.
The issue presented by these consolidated appeals is one of first impression in this Commonwealth, namely, whether relief is available under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 et seq., where a petitioner files a PCRA petition while still in custody but is fully discharged prior to final adjudication of the petition. We have certified this important issue for en banc consideration.
Clement McGuire, the appellant at No. 01946 Philadelphia, 1994, was arrested on April 1, 1988, two weeks after he fired a shot which narrowly missed a teenager on a Philadelphia street corner. Minutes prior to the gunshot, the teenager had engaged in a fist fight with a passenger in McGuire’s car. On [127] September 13, 1988, following a nonjury trial, McGuire was convicted of violating the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA),1 reckless endangerment2 and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC).3 McGuire’s post-trial motions were denied and he was ultimately sentenced4 to two (2) to five (5) years’ imprisonment on the VUFA count, six (6) to twelve (12) months consecutive on the reckless endangerment count and six (6) to twelve (12) months concurrent on the PIC count. Thus, McGuire’s sentence totalled two and one-half (2]/¿) to six (6) years’ imprisonment, with credit for time served. A panel of this Court affirmed McGuire’s judgment of sentence on September 15, 1989. Commonwealth v. McGuire, 394 Pa.Super. 631, 569 A.2d 1384 (1989) (unpublished Memorandum). On October 6, 1989, McGuire filed a pro se PCRA petition and present counsel was appointed to assist him. Thereafter, while McGuire was still imprisoned, two amended petitions were filed, both of which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. McGuire was paroled on December 16, 1990 and on August 31, 1993, a PCRA hearing was held. On April 1, 1994, McGuire’s parole expired and he was fully discharged. By Order dated May 18, 1994, McGuire’s PCRA petition was denied on the merits. This appeal followed.
On May 4, 1990, Clarence A. Ahlborn, appellant at No. 00601 Pittsburgh, 1995, pled guilty to three counts of driving under the influence (DUI)5 and one count of accident resulting in death or injury.6 Appellant was sentenced to forty-eight (48) hours to twenty-three (23) months on the first DUI count, a concurrent term of thirty (30) days to twenty-three (23) months on the second DUI count, a consecutive term of four (4) to twenty-three (23) months on the third DUI count [128] and a concurrent term of thirty (30) days to twenty-three (23) months on the accident resulting in death or injury count. On May 22, 1990, Ahlborn filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea but for reasons not apparent on the record, the motion was never adjudicated. On November 22, 1993, while still incarcerated, Ahlborn filed his PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed on January 25, 1994 alleging Ahlborn was misled into entering his guilty plea, he believed he was only pleading guilty to two DUI counts, he was never afforded a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea and he was denied access to court records. A PCRA hearing was scheduled for February 17, 1994. However, on February 14, 1994, Ahlborn completed his sentence and was unconditionally released from prison. Subsequently, the February 17, 1994 hearing was continued and, by Order dated June 8, 1994, the PCRA court dismissed Ahlborn’s petition on the basis that, having completed his sentence, he was no longer eligible for PCRA relief. This appeal followed.
By Orders dated October 10 and 11, 1995, respectively, we certified these appeals for en banc review.
Initially, section 9543(a)(1)(i) of the PCRA provides as follows:
§ 9543. Eligibility for relief
(a) General rule. — To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, a person must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following:
(1) that the person has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is:
(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime[.]
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(l)(i).
The Commonwealth argues McGuire and Ahlborn are ineligible for PCRA relief since neither is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole. Thus, the Commonwealth concludes, the instant petitions are moot. To the contrary, Ahlborn claims PCRA eligibility on the basis [129] that he was currently serving a sentence at the time his petition was filed. These appeals therefore require us to determine whether “currently serving” within section 9543(a)(l)(i) refers to the time the petition is filed or the time the petition is ultimately adjudicated. This question is not answered by Pennsylvania case or statutory law.
In support of its claim that appellants have failed to satisfy the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA, the Commonwealth relies principally on two cases. In the first, Commonwealth v. Pierce, 397 Pa.Super. 126, 579 A.2d 963 (1990), we considered “whether the doctrine of ‘collateral consequences’, which prevented a collateral attack on a criminal conviction from becoming moot after the sentence had been served, has been superseded by the provisions of the [PCRA].” Id. at 128, 579 A.2d at 964. Pierce completed the maximum term of a five (5) to fifteen (15) year sentence for second degree murder, then filed a PCRA petition alleging eligibility because of collateral criminal consequences flowing from his conviction.7
The Pierce Court began by discussing the “currently serving” provision of section 9543(a)(l)(i), which the trial court determined required dismissal of appellant’s petition. Finding the legislative history of the PCRA scant, the Court turned to its predecessor statute, the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. (1982), amended by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. (1988), which applied when the petitioner “is incarcerated”. The Court then noted that “[b]ecause of the general nature of this requirement, the Supreme Court created an exception to the mootness doctrine, which was known as the ‘collateral consequences’ doctrine.” Id. at 129, 579 A.2d at 964-965. This doctrine, as ultimately crafted by our Supreme Court, provided that a collateral attack upon a conviction for which a sentence has been fully served is not moot where the petitioner can demonstrate that the conviction will affect a subsequent criminal prosecution, Commonwealth [130] v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d 465 (1971), or will have either actual or potential civil consequences, Commonwealth v. Doria, 468 Pa. 534, 364 A.2d 322 (1976). However, according to the Pierce Court, since the PCRA limited eligibility to those “currently serving”, it necessarily superseded the doctrine of collateral consequences which was derivative of the language of the PCHA, which had been modified as indicated above. The Court also noted, “[t]he provision under the PCRA that a petitioner be ‘currently serving’ or waiting to serve a sentence for the prior conviction in order to be eligible for relief is consistent with the federal habeas corpus provision requiring that a petitioner be ‘in custody in order to obtain relief.” Pierce, supra at 131, 579 A.2d at 965-966. The Court concluded:
The Post Conviction Relief Act, when read as a whole and in conjunction with its predecessor, the Post Conviction Hearing Act and the law pertaining to federal habeas corpus relief, leads us to conclude that the language of the Post Conviction Relief Act pertaining to eligibility for relief was intended to limit relief to those petitioners whose sentences have not expired and to preclude relief for those whose sentences have expired, regardless of collateral consequences.
Id. at 131, 579 A.2d at 966.
The second case relied on by the Commonwealth is Commonwealth v. Hayes, 408 Pa.Super. 68, 596 A.2d 195 (1991), alloc. denied, 529 Pa. 646, 602 A.2d 856 (1992), in which our Court en banc considered “whether the interpretation of the [PCRA] announced by this court in [Pierce ] should be overruled.” Id. As in Pierce, the PCRA petition in Hayes was both filed and adjudicated after petitioner’s sentence had been fully served. The Hayes Court, tracking the Pierce analysis, engaged in an extensive review of federal habeas corpus law and also found relevant the legislature’s alteration of the PCHA “is incarcerated” requirement to the “currently serving” mandate of the PCRA.
Since the legislature rewrote the eligibility requirements, our examination of the specific language, in particular the [131] inclusion of the adverb “currently,” leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to limit post-conviction relief under the PCRA to individuals who at the time of filing for PCRA relief are serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for a conviction, regardless of the collateral criminal consequences from the conviction....
We conclude that the language changes in the PCRA were deliberately made to confront and alter the collateral criminal consequences rule. Therefore we decline to interject the collateral criminal consequences rule into the PCRA. To do so ignores the legislature’s intent and the plain meaning of the word changes made in the PCRA.
In summary, we find that the legislature has clearly modified the eligibility requirements under the PCRA from those that previously existed under the PCHA.... [W]e find the enactment of the PCRA precludes post-conviction relief under the PCRA where the petitioner’s sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole has expired prior to filing for relief....
Id. at 75-77, 596 A.2d at 199-200 (footnote omitted).8 As these statements indicate, Pierce and Hayes found that the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA was intended to abrogate the doctrine of collateral consequences.
From Pierce and Hayes, the Commonwealth concludes a case is moot under the PCRA when the defendant has finished serving his sentence. Although we address the mootness argument infra, we reject the Commonwealth’s contention that Pierce and Hayes assist our resolution of whether “currently serving” applies at the date of hearing or the date of adjudication. Both Pierce and Hayes involved PCRA petitions which were filed after the appellants had completed their sentences; the present cases were filed before petitioners were released from custody and pose the question of their eligibility for PCRA relief and whether Pierce and Hayes are distinguish[132] able.9 Further, our research has disclosed no other case discussing whether the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA applies at the date of filing of the date of adjudication.
Having found the question at issue has not been squarely addressed in Pennsylvania, we look to analogous case law from other jurisdictions. While Pierce and Hayes are of little assistance because the PCRA petitions in both cases were filed after release, their references to federal habeas corpus law provide us with a starting point. For instance, the Pierce court found the “currently serving” requirement of our PCRA “is consistent with the federal habeas corpus provision requiring that a petitioner be ‘in custody’ in order to obtain relief.” Id. at 131, 579 A.2d at 965. Since “currently serving” and “in custody” are analogous, we turn to factually similar habeas corpus cases defining “in custody.”
Foremost among these cases is Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). In Carafas, [133] like the cases sub judice, “petitioner’s application was filed ... when he was in state custody, [but] the petitioner was unconditionally released ... before his case could be heard[.]” Id. at 238, 88 S.Ct. at 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d at 558. “The issue presented then, [was] whether the expiration of petitioner’s sentence, before his application was finally adjudicated and while it was awaiting appellate review, terminates federal jurisdiction with respect to the application.” Id. at 237, 88 S.Ct. at 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d at 558. The Supreme Court resolved this issue as follows:
We conclude that under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such application.
The federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be “in custody” when the application for habeas corpus is filed.
Id. at 238, 88 S.Ct. at 1559-60, 20 L.Ed.2d at 558-559 (emphasis added).10
Consequently, unlike Pierce and Hayes, Carafas resolved the specific question at issue herein and found that “in custody”, a statutory requirement which our Court has found “consistent” with “currently serving”, Pierce, supra at 128-31, 579 A.2d at 964-965, applies to the date of filing rather than the date of adjudication.
The continuing validity of Carafas is beyond question. In fact, beginning a mere 21 days after the decision was rendered, an unbroken line of Supreme Court cases has relied on [134] Carafas for the proposition that an unconditional release of the petitioner does not divest the court of jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition, so long as the petition was filed while the petitioner was still “in custody.” See e.g., Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 1925, 104 L.Ed.2d 540, 544 (1989) (citing Carafas, “we have interpreted the statutory language as requiring that the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.”); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 830, 833 n. 4, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, 826 n. 4 (1985); Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 509, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 3236, 73 L.Ed.2d 928, 935 (1982) (“[In Carafas ], the Court allowed the writ in a challenge to a state-court judgment even though the prisoner, incarcerated at the time the writ was filed, had finished serving his sentence during the proceedings. The custody requirement had, of course, been met at the time the writ was filed____”); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 113 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1564 n. 7, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 791 n. 7 (1982); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 415 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 2438 n. 6, 69 L.Ed.2d 118, 123 n. 6 (1981); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 51, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1896, 20 L.Ed.2d 917, 928 (1968) (“[In Carafas ] we held unanimously that the writ of habeas corpus was available to test the constitutionality of a state conviction where the petitioner had been in custody when he applied for the writ, but had been released before this Court could adjudicate his claims.”)
We find that this authority suggests the proper construction of section 9543(a)(1)® of our PCRA to be that “currently serving” under that section is determined at the time of filing, regardless of whether petitioner is thereafter unconditionally released from custody.
Notwithstanding, our conclusion that the “currently serving” requirement necessary for jurisdiction is to be determined at the time the petition is filed does not preclude the possibility that the petition may thereafter become moot. In re Gross, 476 Pa. 203, 209, 382 A.2d 116, 119 (1978), citing G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, 1578 (9th ed. 1975) (“The moot[135] ness doctrine requires that ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed’.”). Accordingly, we return to the Commonwealth’s claim that the instant PCRA petitions are moot. The Commonwealth argues at great length that the legislative abrogation of the collateral consequences doctrine recognized by the Pierce and Hayes courts renders a PCRA petition moot once a petitioner is unconditionally released, regardless of whether the petitioner is in custody at the time the petition is filed. In regard thereto, the Commonwealth asserts
[Appellant’s] PCRA claims are moot. Since the collateral consequences doctrine has been eliminated in the PCRA statute, the sole PCRA relief that may be granted is release from custody. Where the petitioner is no longer in custody, there is nothing for the PCRA court to grant. It does not matter whether custody ended before or after the PCRA petition was filed. The only relief the PCRA court can grant is relief from non-collateral consequences of the conviction: i.e., custody. When the petitioner completes his sentence, whether before or after filing his petition, there are no more non-collateral consequences for the PCRA court to address.
Commonwealth’s McGuire brief at 7.
For reasons that follow, we agree with the Commonwealth’s ultimate conclusion that the PCRA petitions filed by McGuire and Ahlborn are moot. In clarification of our analysis we initially note that the Commonwealth’s argument ignores the distinction between jurisdiction and mootness. Specifically, the issue upon which we granted en banc review, and which we decided above, required us to determine the point in time (filing or hearing date) at which a petitioner satisfies the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA. This requirement must be met in order to confer upon a court jurisdiction to hear a PCRA petition. The fact that the case thereafter becomes moot, although relevant to the ultimate adjudication, is irrelevant in determining whether and at what point jurisdiction attaches under the PCRA. In short, jurisdiction must be determined independent of mootness. The Common[136] wealth’s claim that “[i]t does not matter whether custody ended before or after the PCRA petition was filed” is incorrect because if custody ends after filing, the court has jurisdiction to determine mootness, whereas the court lacks jurisdiction, as a threshold matter, over a petition filed after unconditional release from custody. Further discussion of the United States Supreme Court cases cited above demonstrates the flaw in the Commonwealth’s argument and highlights the important difference between jurisdiction and mootness.
The Commonwealth’s mootness argument is identical to the holding of Parker, supra, in which the Supreme Court found that a petitioner’s unconditional release from custody renders a habeas petition moot, even where the petitioner filed while still in custody. Id. at 574, 80 S.Ct. at 910, 4 L.Ed.2d at 965 (1960). Relying on Parker, the state of New York also advanced this argument before the Carafas Court. In rejecting New York’s argument and overruling Parker, the Carafas , court held as follows:
The substantial issue, however, which is posed by Parker v. Ellis, is not mootness in the technical or constitutional sense, but whether the statute defining the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in respect of persons in state custody is available here. In Parker v. Ellis, as in the present case, petitioner’s application was filed in the federal District Court when he was in state custody, and in both the petitioner was unconditionally released from state custody before his case could be heard in this court____ We conclude that under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in this District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings of such application.... [Hence], Parker v. Ellis must be overruled.
Id. at 238-240, 88 S.Ct. at 1559-61, 20 L.Ed.2d at 558-560.
Pursuant to Carafas, the question to be determined is not mootness, but rather “whether the statute defining ... jurisdiction ... is available here[;]” and “once the ... jurisdiction has attached ... it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings^]” Id.
[137] The Carafas holding that jurisdiction exists is not undermined by the fact the Court also relied upon the doctrine of collateral consequences to determine the petition was not moot. As noted, this finding was tangential to the court’s holding, since “[t]he substantial issue ... is not mootness[.]” Id. In fact, the Supreme Court’s recent clarification of Carafas in Maleng, supra, emphasizes this point:
In Carafas, the petitioner filed his habeas application while he was actually incarcerated under the sentence he sought to attack, but his sentence expired and he was unconditionally discharged from custody while his appeal from the denial of habeas relief below was pending before this Court. The state argued that the unconditional discharge rendered the case moot. We rejected this argument, holding that the “collateral consequences” of the petitioner’s conviction — his ability to vote, engage in certain businesses, hold public office, or serve as a juror — prevented the case from being moot. We went on to say, however, that the unconditional release raised a “substantial issue” as to the statutory “in custody” requirement. While we ultimately found that requirement satisfied as well, we rested that holding not on the collateral consequences of the conviction, but on the fact that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged conviction at the time the petition was filed.
Id. at 492, 109 S.Ct. at 1926, 104 L.Ed.2d at 545 (emphasis added).
Consequently, according to Maleng, the Carafas holding that petitioner had satisfied the “in custody” requirement of the statute was premised not on the absence of mootness “but on the fact that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged conviction at the time the petition was filed.” Id. It follows that Carafas and Maleng stand for the principle that the incarceration requirement of a jurisdictional statute must be determined independent of mootness. Similarly, our conclusion that the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA is determined at the time of filing means only that the instant PCRA courts had jurisdiction over appellants’ petitions. A subsequent determination of mootness does not [138] divest the courts of jurisdiction, although the case may nevertheless be dismissed.
Having clarified that jurisdiction and mootness are separate inquiries, and in determining jurisdiction over the petitions before us existed in the PCRA courts, we can proceed to determine if those petitions now are rendered moot.
It is axiomatic that an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of appellate review. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). Since the existence of an actual controversy is essential to appellate jurisdiction, if, pending an appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant any relief, the appeal will be dismissed. Commonwealth ex rel. Watson v. Montone, 227 Pa.Super. 541, 323 A.2d 763 (1974).
The cases presenting mootness problems involve litigants who clearly had standing to sue at the outset of the litigation. The problems arise from events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten under way — changes in the facts or in the law — which allegedly deprived the litigant of the necessary stake in the outcome. The mootness doctrine requires that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
In re Gross, supra at 209, 382 A.2d at 119, quoting G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, 1578 (9th ed. 1975). The appellate courts of this Commonwealth will not decide moot questions. Id., see also Ridley Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 407 Pa. 230, 180 A.2d 1 (1962); Graziano Construction Co., Inc. v. Lee, 298 Pa.Super. 311, 444 A.2d 1190 (1982).
Initially, we agree with the Commonwealth that the legislative abrogation of the collateral consequences doctrine11 [139] recognized in Pierce and Hayes has left us without a basis upon which to grant appellants relief. Since the doctrine of collateral consequences has been abrogated, we may consider no harm to appellants other than incarceration because any consequences of the challenged conviction other than incarceration are, by definition, “collateral.” Upon unconditional release from custody, all cognizable harm necessarily ends and a pending petition, regardless of when it was filed, becomes moot. We are simply unable to conceive of a basis upon which a petitioner who has been unconditionally released from custody would seek to challenge a conviction, other than to prevent the occurrence of possible future adverse collateral consequences. Since we are not permitted to consider these consequences, no case or controversy exists and the case is necessarily moot. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632, 102 S.Ct. at 1322, 1327, 71 L.Ed.2d 508, 515 (“A criminal case is moot ... [140] if if is shown that there is no possibility [of] any collateral legal consequences[.]”).12
Our conclusion that the petitions here appealed are moot also appears to be supported by Commonwealth v. Smith, 336 Pa.Super. 636, 486 A.2d 445 (1984), the sole Pennsylvania case we have found involving a hearing after the petitioner’s release from custody where the petition was filed prior to release. The pro se habeas corpus petition in Smith was filed on February 22, 1983, while petitioner was incarcerated. The petition, alleging petitioner’s lack of access to an adequate law library violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth [141] Amendment, was denied on February 25, 1983, and petitioner filed his appeal 30 days later. However, on January 13, 1984, before the appeal was adjudicated, petitioner was released unconditionally from custody. In dismissing the petition as moot, a panel of our Court held as follows:
Appellant’s appeal is rendered moot by the intervening change in the facts of his case, i.e., his release from the custody and control of the Lebanon County Prison in January of 1984. Thus, appellant no longer suffers from any alleged unconstitutional inadequacy of the Lebanon County Prison law library. Appellant no longer has any stake in the outcome of his case.
Furthermore, no exception to the mootness doctrine applies herein.... [Thus], [s]ince appellant seeks relief through a habeas corpus proceeding on the basis of an inadequate law library for a prisoner of the Lebanon County Prison, and since appellant no longer suffers from this alleged unconstitutional condition, we find that the matter before this Court is moot, and we dismiss the appeal....
Id. at 641-642, 486 A.2d at 448-449.
Although appellant’s petition was filed prior to his release, it was dismissed by the Smith Court because petitioner’s subsequent release rendered the case moot. While Smith did not involve the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA, and therefore did not assist our previous discussion of jurisdiction, we agree with the holding that a petitioner’s appeal “is rendered moot by the intervening change in the facts of his case, i.e. his release from ... custody”, id., regardless of when the petition was filed.
Finally, our conclusion that the petitions herein are moot also appears to be supported by section 9546 of the PCRA, which provides as follows:
§ 9546. Relief and order
(a) General rule. — If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall order appropriate relief and issue supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, [142] discharge, correction of sentence or other matters that are necessary and proper.
All of the named remedies in this section — rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge and correction of sentence— suggest that the petitioner has not fully served the sentence imposed, since none would be appropriate where the petitioner has been fully discharged. Further, as to “appropriate relief’ and “other matters that are necessary and proper,” we are aware of no construction of these phrases indicating that relief is available after a sentence has been fully served.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the “currently serving” requirement of 9543(a)(l)(i) is determined at the time a PCRA petition is filed. Petitions not filed prior to the petitioner’s unconditional release from custody are not cognizable under the PCRA and our courts are without jurisdiction to hear such petitions. Even where a petition is filed prior to the petitioner’s release from custody, it is nevertheless rendered moot by petitioner’s subsequent unconditional release.13 [143] The petitions herein fall within this latter category and therefore are moot. Thus, we affirm the May 18, 1994 Order dismissing McGuire’s petition14 and the June 8, 1994 Order dismissing Ahlborn’s petition.
Orders affirmed.
DEL SOLE, J., files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
CAVANAUGH, J., files a Dissenting Opinion in which CHULLO, P.J.E. and JOHNSON, J., joined.
CHULLO, President Judge Emeritus, files a Dissenting Opinion.