Commonwealth of Virginia v. Kenneth David Roulhac

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 1094254
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Lorish, Callins and White UNPUBLISHED

Argued by videoconference

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1094-25-4 JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS DECEMBER 9, 2025 KENNETH DAVID ROULHAC

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Susan J. Stoney, Judge

Matthew J. Beyrau, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.

Robert A. Pomeroy, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

The Commonwealth appeals the order of the circuit court granting Kenneth David

Roulhac’s motion to suppress evidence of child pornography discovered when police executed a

search of Roulhac’s computer. The Commonwealth contends the affidavit in support of the

search warrant properly authorized the seizure and transport of Roulhac’s computer to a

laboratory to conduct a search for digital evidence. The Commonwealth further contends that, in

any event, the “good faith” exception applies to preclude suppression of the evidence discovered

in the execution of a deficient warrant. Because we agree that the good faith exception would

apply to preclude exclusion of the digital evidence, if there were an error here, we reverse the

circuit court’s judgment.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). BACKGROUND

On April 8, 2023, Detective Choi investigated a peer-to-peer file-sharing network and

homed in on a user sharing videos depicting child pornography. Subpoenaing the user’s

information through an IP address, Detective Choi identified the user as Roulhac, residing on

Elm Forest Way in Fairfax.

The detective sought a search warrant for Roulhac’s home. In the supporting affidavit

Choi explained that “individuals who collect[ed] child pornography often save[d] the[] images in

digital format” on computers and cell phones. The detective further explained that because

multiple devices are often found during a search, it is difficult to determine which device

contains child pornography, thus it “may require agents to seize most or all computer items . . . to

be processed later by a qualified analyst in a laboratory” and the “sorting process” is

“impractical” to perform on-site.

The judge granted and signed the warrant. The warrant authorized the search of

Roulhac’s residence and referenced an “Attachment A” as identifying the items to be seized.

These items included in part:

Any electronic evidence in relation to the use of any computer systems to facilitate crimes against children as defined in § 18.2-374.1:1. Possession, reproduction, distribution, solicitation, and facilitation of child pornography, and any related crime involving the exploitation of children, in any form wherever it may be found . . . [including] within any computer, computer system, cell phone, and related peripherals.

The warrant authorized the officers “to seize said property . . . if they be found.” The court

stapled the warrant and affidavit together. Upon execution, Roulhac was served with the warrant

signed by the judge, Attachment A which listed what was to be seized, and the affidavit.

The police seized three computers, two cell phones, two hard drives, and one tablet from

Roulhac’s home. Although they returned one cell phone to Roulhac after a brief examination,

-2- the police delivered the remaining devices for forensic examination. On one of the computers, a

forensic examiner found multiple videos depicting child pornography. Roulhac was indicted on

five counts of reproduction of child pornography, in violation of Code § 18.2-374.1:1(C), and ten

counts of possession of child pornography, in violation of Code § 18.2-374.1:1(A).

Roulhac moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his computer. He argued the

scope of the warrant did not extend to authorize the physical seizure of the electronic devices

found in his home, nor did it permit police to search electronic data contained within any seized

device. The circuit court granted Roulhac’s motion, concluding that, although the search warrant

authorized a search of the premises and the items identified in Attachment A, it did not permit

the police to move the devices offsite or to search the device contents. The court held that while

the language of the affidavit “sought permission” to perform an offsite search, “the search

warrant itself d[id] [not] grant” that permission. The court further held that Code § 19.2-53 did

not cure the deficiency in the warrant because the statute did not apply to “a search warrant for a

residence with items in the residence.” Finally, the court concluded the good-faith exception was

inapplicable to the circumstances of this case. The Commonwealth appeals.

ANALYSIS

The Commonwealth’s argument on appeal is two-fold. First, she argues the search

warrant, taken with its supporting affidavit, authorized the police to search and seize all

referenced devices. Second, she argues that, even were the search warrant deficient, the police

relied on it in good faith to seize Roulhac’s computer and take it offsite for forensic examination.

We agree with the Commonwealth that the good faith exception applies to cure any deficiency in

the search warrant.

-3- A. Standard of Review

We begin our analysis by recognizing that, on review of the Commonwealth’s appeal of

an order granting a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to

Roulhac. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App. 486, 487 (1992). The circuit court’s factual

findings “are entitled to a presumption of correctness unless they are plainly wrong or without

evidence to support them.” Id. Nonetheless, whether a motion to suppress has been properly

granted “presents a mixed question of law and fact that an appellate court must review de novo.”

Commonwealth v. Robertson, 275 Va. 559, 563 (2008). Similarly, “we review the trial court’s

determination that the good faith exception applied de novo.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 48

Va. App. 737, 745 (2006).

B. The Fourth Amendment and the Good-Faith Exception

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the event

of a Fourth Amendment violation, the resulting “evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule,

which prohibits the introduction of evidence, tangible or testimonial, acquired during an

unlawful search.” Carlson v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 749, 758 (2019). “The purpose of

the exclusionary rule is to ‘deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and

magistrates.’” Adams v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 260, 272 (2008) (quoting United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)). Yet a court will not exclude such evidence “if the police acted

‘in objectively reasonable reliance’” on a warrant subsequently found to be defective. Herring v.

United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922); see also Collins v.

Commonwealth, 297 Va. 207, 212 (2019) (discussing Herring and the availability of the

exclusionary rule in light of objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant).

We commonly refer to “objectively reasonable reliance” as the “good faith exception” to the

exclusionary rule. Good-faith analysis considers the totality of the circumstances, including the

-4- “sworn, written facts stated in the search warrant affidavit,” as well as facts and circumstances

within an executing officer’s knowledge though not included in the affidavit. Adams, 275 Va. at

270. This approach serves the purpose of the exclusionary rule to “deter police misconduct” while

avoiding the effect of an overly broad application disincentivizing police officers “acting in

objective good faith.” Id. at 272 (first quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916; and then quoting Derr v.

Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 422 (1991)).

C. The Good Faith Exception Applies Here

Here, we hold that if the search warrant was deficient, the police acted in good faith and

thus the exception applies to validate the search and seizure of Roulhac’s computer.1

We confine the good-faith inquiry “to the objectively ascertainable question whether a

reasonably well trained [sic] officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the

[judge’s] authorization.” Id. at 268 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). To that end, we recognize

four circumstances in which a court properly rejects good faith and suppresses evidence:

(1) Where the magistrate was misled by information in the affidavit which the affiant knew was false or should have known was false, (2) the issuing magistrate totally abandoned his judicial role, (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable or (4) where the warrant was so facially deficient that an executing officer could not reasonably have assumed it was valid.

Colaw v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 806, 811 (2000) (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 9

Va. App. 462, 464 (1990)). Absent a finding that one of these circumstances exists, evidence seized

in good-faith reliance on a defective search warrant is admissible. See Ward v. Commonwealth, 273

1 It is unclear from his briefing whether Roulhac challenges the validity of the warrant or merely its scope. Rather than choose for Roulhac, we hold that even if the warrant is invalid, to any extent, the good-faith exception applies. This constitutes the best and narrowest grounds for deciding this appeal. See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 396 (2020) (instructing that “[t]he ‘best’ answer . . . is the one with which the least number of jurists would disagree” and “[t]he ‘narrowest’ answer . . . is the one affecting the least number of cases”). -5- Va. 211, 223 (2007); Polston v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 500, 503 (1998) (characterizing the Colaw

circumstances as a “test” by which a court determines the appropriateness of suppression).

Roulhac contends the warrant here was so lacking in specificity and particularity as to

render it “facially deficient” and, thus, the executing officers’ reliance unreasonable. We disagree.

First, the warrant, on its face, appears to authorize the search. The language of the warrant

expressly permits the officers to search Roulhac’s home for the items identified in Attachment A

and to “seize” those items. The items identified in the attachment include “Any electronic

evidence” related to “crimes against children” that could be found “within any computer,

computer system, cell phone, and related peripherals.” Detective Choi’s supporting affidavit

indicates that the subject items would likely be stored on devices that would need to be seized

and transported to a laboratory because the necessary search could not practically be conducted

in Roulhac’s home. Upon attaching an affidavit to a warrant, it becomes a part of the warrant

when served as an attached unit. See Code § 19.2-56(A) (“The judge . . . shall attach a copy of

the affidavit required by § 19.2-54, which shall become a part of the search warrant and served

therewith.” (emphasis added)); Lebedun v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 697, 709 (1998)

(recognizing that an attached affidavit cures a search warrant defective under Code § 19.2-56

because the supporting affidavit becomes part of the search warrant). Although the warrant does

not explicitly state that police may seize computers and move them to a lab, the affidavit serves

to supplement this information and renders the warrant facially sufficient. Construing the search

warrant with Attachment A and the affidavit together, an officer could reasonably read the scope

of the warrant to permit the removal of the computers to be searched at a lab.

Moreover, Attachment A included sufficient particularity to satisfy good-faith reliance.

The attachment, explicitly referenced in the search warrant, states the place to be searched

(Roulhac’s home address) and the things to be seized (“[a]ny electronic evidence in relation to

-6- . . . crimes against children”). The attachment further details at great length all the potential

places to search within his home, including computers, floppy disks, flash memory drives, digital

cameras, and myriad other electronic devices that could store digital and physical evidence

related to child pornography. Beyond devices, Attachment A also lists books, magazines, films,

videos, and negatives “containing any depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit

conduct.” Cf. Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 26 (2000) (en banc) (applying good-faith

exception to suppression where a warrant described things to be seized as “‘photographs . . .

depicting nudity and/or sexual activities involving children,’ ‘written materials (letters, diaries)

. . . related to sexual conduct between juveniles and adults,’ and ‘books . . . and photographs

depicting nudity and/or sexual activities of juveniles’” (alterations in original)). Because the

search warrant references Attachment A, and together with Detective Choi’s affidavit, the police

could reasonably have read the documents alongside each other and concluded the scope of the

warrant allowed them to remove the computers seized to a laboratory for search. See United

States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 470 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The particularity requirement of the

Fourth Amendment may be satisfied by cross-reference in the warrant to separate documents that

identify the property in sufficient detail.”).

Finally, Code § 19.2-53(B) permits any search and seizure of a computer to “include the

search and seizure of the physical components and the electronic or digital information contained

in any such computer.” (Emphasis added). Subsection (C) of the statute goes further,

authorizing “[a]ny search, including the search of the contents of any computer, . . . [to] be

conducted in any location and . . . not limited to the location where the evidence was seized.”

(Emphasis added). Police officers could reasonably rely on these two statutory provisions to

search and seize not only the contents within the computer, but the computers themselves, and to

remove the computers for examination at a laboratory.

-7- As a general matter, “[a]n officer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence

that he or she was acting in good faith.” Adams, 275 Va. at 273 (quoting United States v. Koerth,

312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002)). Roulhac’s attempt to analogize this case to Riley v.

California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), is unpersuasive. There, defendants challenged the warrantless

search of their cell phones seized incident to their arrest. The United States Supreme Court held

that, although officers could examine physical aspects of a cell phone incident to arrest to guard

against their use as weapons, in the absence of relevant exigencies, they could not search the

contents of the phone without a warrant. Id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police

must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a

warrant.”). Here, the officers had a warrant on which, together with its attachment and

supporting affidavit—and considering applicable statutes—they could reasonably rely to

authorize their conduct. The circumstances of the search are readily distinguishable from those

presented in Riley. As the warrant was not “so facially deficient that an executing officer could

not reasonably have assumed it was valid,” the circuit court erred in declining to apply the

good-faith exception here. Colaw, 32 Va. App. at 811 (quoting Atkins, 9 Va. App. at 464).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

-8-