Commonwealth of Virginia v. Christopher Neil Dotson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: February 7, 2023
• Docket: 1341223
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Fulton, Friedman and Raphael UNPUBLISHED

Argued by videoconference

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1341-22-3 JUDGE JUNIUS P. FULTON, III FEBRUARY 7, 2023 CHRISTOPHER NEIL DOTSON

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY James R. McGarry, Judge

John W. Beamer, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.

Samantha Offutt Thames, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on brief), for appellee.

Christopher Neil Dotson is charged with two counts of possessing a controlled substance,

possessing controlled paraphernalia, and possessing marijuana. On August 5, 2022, Dotson filed a

motion to suppress evidence obtained by police during a search of his vehicle. Following an

evidentiary hearing and argument by counsel, the circuit court granted Dotson’s motion, holding

that no probable cause existed to justify the search under the Fourth Amendment. The

Commonwealth appealed. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

When considering on appeal the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to Dotson, the prevailing party below, and grant him all

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence. Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517,

520 (2010); Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067 (1991).

The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on August 16, 2022. The only evidence the

circuit court received at that hearing was in the form of the testimony of Daquan Hodge, a deputy

sheriff with the Henry County Sheriff’s Office at the time of the search. Hodge testified that on

June 24, 2021, he was dispatched to 3801 Fairystone Park Highway, located in a business area in

Bassett, Virginia, in reference to a report that someone was “smoking something” in the area.

When Hodge arrived, he found Dotson alone in the driver’s seat of his truck. The truck was

legally parked in front of a retail establishment in a public lot, with the windows open. Dotson’s

mouth was “agape,” and he was “twitching.” On cross-examination, Hodge clarified that

Dotson’s “position reminded [him] of drug overdoses.” Hodge attempted to wake Dotson but

was unsuccessful. After attempting to awaken Dotson, Hodge circled the truck to see if there

were any weapons in plain view. While circling the truck, Hodge observed that there was a large

empty knife sheath, approximately one foot to eighteen inches in length, “in the passenger’s side

area of the truck,” an open black handbag-sized satchel in Dotson’s lap with what Hodge

believed to be marijuana protruding out of it, and an unlabeled, translucent-orange pill bottle also

in Dotson’s lap.

Ultimately, Hodge was able to wake Dotson and they started talking. Dotson told Hodge

that he was “tired, sleepy, and just trying to get back home.” When Hodge motioned to the

satchel and pill bottle in Dotson’s lap and asked, “what’s that?” Dotson immediately handed

Hodge the pill bottle, explaining that “everything was his girlfriend’s.” Without opening the

bottle, Hodge observed that the pills in the bottle were blue, and based on observing similar pills

in the past, he believed the pills to be Xanax. Hodge later consulted with a pill identifier book to

confirm that the pills were, in fact, Xanax pills.

-2- Because Dotson was “moving around” and “being fidgety,” Hodge requested that he get

out of the truck. Dotson complied and was handcuffed and placed in the rear of Hodge’s police

vehicle. While detained in Hodge’s vehicle, Dotson repeated that “anything in the vehicle would

be his girlfriend’s.” Hodge ran a criminal history check on Dotson and discovered that he was a

convicted felon.

Hodge returned to the truck and did a “wingspan” search to see if he could locate the

knife from the empty sheath. Hodge was unable to locate the knife. Hodge then proceeded to

search the black satchel, which Dotson had removed from his lap and placed on the driver’s seat

of the truck. Inside the satchel, Hodge found “green plant-like material,” a white powdery

substance which field tested positive for cocaine, a crystal-like substance that field tested

positive for methamphetamine, three “grinders,” and “multiple smoking devices.”

The trial court granted Dotson’s motion and suppressed the evidence, ruling from the

bench. In doing so, the trial court found that Hodge, in essence, responded to a call for a

well-being check and that Hodge was handed the pill bottle and he “thought that they might be

Xanax.” The trial court noted that Hodge did not testify that he thought the pills were “illegal at

that time.” Moreover, the trial court emphasized that Hodge did not arrest Dotson at that point

for possessing a prescription medication without a prescription. The trial court stated, “[t]he pills

maybe could have gotten there, but that’s not his testimony. That’s not the testimony today that

he searched it because he thought Mr. Dotson was in possession of illegal prescription

medication. I think he was honest with his testimony, that’s not what he was thinking.”

The trial court stated that marijuana possession was a civil offense, which could not give

rise to probable cause to search a vehicle. The trial court suspected that the officer had been

operating under the “old law” when he conducted this search, and a reasonable officer should

have known better.

-3- Finally, the trial court found that Hodge “didn’t testify to anything that would give him

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the vehicle.” The trial court determined that an

empty knife sheath was not enough for probable cause to search, and if the officer was actually

concerned with officer safety, the trial court stated that Hodge could have patted Dotson down.

The trial court explicitly found that this information, in total, was not enough for Hodge to

assume “oh, he must be in possession of the knife that used to be in there.”

Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence

found in the satchel. The trial court’s order listed case numbers for the misdemeanor charges

(CR21-0746 & -0773) and felony charges of possession of methamphetamine and cocaine

(CR21-0744 & -0745). Thus, the ruling applied to all four charges in the case.

That same day, September 6, 2022, the Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal and

accompanying certificate. However, the notice of appeal noted only one misdemeanor case

number (CR21-0746) and one felony case number (CR21-0745), as cases to be appealed. The

body of the notice stated that the Commonwealth was appealing “the judgment entered by the

Henry County Circuit Court on September 6, 2022, which ordered the evidence seized from the

defendant suppressed for purposes of trial.” The accompanying certificate filed by the

Commonwealth certified, among other things, that “the suppressed evidence is substantial proof

of facts material to the Commonwealth’s case, to wit: illegal narcotics (cocaine and

methamphetamine).”

Seemingly realizing the omission, the Commonwealth filed an amended notice of appeal

on September 30, 2022. The amended notice of appeal included both felony case numbers

(CR21-0744 and -0745), as well as both misdemeanor case numbers. The Commonwealth did so

without leave to amend.

-4- ANALYSIS

The Commonwealth appeals the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress, arguing

that: (1) the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that Hodge had probable cause to believe

that Dotson was in possession of illegal narcotics, (2) the totality of the circumstances

demonstrated that Hodge had probable cause to believe that Dotson was in possession of a

concealed weapon as a convicted felon, and (3) the trial court erred in determining that the

observation of marijuana in Dotson’s possession could not give rise to probable cause to search

Dotson’s vehicle.

This Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for appeal on November 9, 2022. In

that order, this Court also directed the parties to brief the issue of:

Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal in CR21-0744 given that the notice of appeal filed on September 6, 2022, did not identify it as being subject to the Commonwealth’s appeal and the amended notice of appeal filed on September 30, 2022, was not filed within the time permitted under Code § 19.2-400.

Further, this Court’s order clarified that this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider a

Commonwealth’s appeal in misdemeanor cases, pursuant to Code § 19.2-398(A).1

Because we determine that this Court does have jurisdiction to consider the appeal in case

number CR21-0744, and the totality of the circumstances gave rise to probable cause at the time

of the search for Hodge to believe that Dotson was in possession of illegal substances, we do not

reach the second and third assignments of error. We reverse the trial court’s decision and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

1 To the extent that the Commonwealth attempts to appeal the trial court’s ruling as it pertains to the two misdemeanors, we dismiss any such appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Code § 19.2-398(A). -5- I. This Court’s Jurisdiction over Case Number (CR21-0744)

Raising this issue sua sponte, this Court inquired of the parties whether the

Commonwealth had forfeited its appeal of the possession charge related to methamphetamine by

failing to include the relevant case number, (CR21-0744), in the notice of appeal, thus depriving

this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal for that case.

It has long been held that the “constitutional and statutory authority for Commonwealth

appeals is narrowly circumscribed,” Commonwealth v. Brown, 8 Va. App. 41, 43 (1989), and is

limited to those rights explicitly granted to them by the General Assembly. See Va. Const. art.

VI, § 1. “A litigant who seeks to appeal a judgment to . . . the Court of Appeals must file a

notice of appeal.” Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 300 Va. 17, 22 (2021). Code § 19.2-400

requires that the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal is filed “within seven days after entry of the

order of the circuit court from which the appeal is taken.” While any other defect in the notice of

appeal may be considered “procedural,” and waivable on appeal, the timeliness of the notice and

adequately identifying the case to be appealed are mandatory requirements that must be met

before this Court may exercise jurisdiction over the case. Roberson v. Commonwealth, 279 Va.

396, 407 (2010). “As its name indicates, ‘the purpose of the notice of appeal is merely to place

the opposing party on notice and to direct the clerk to prepare the record on appeal.’” Nicholson,

300 Va. at 22 (quoting LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 469 n.* (2012)). “Given the

simple function of the notice of appeal, which is to provide notice, we have ‘never required that a

notice of appeal be precise, accurate, and correct in every detail before [an] appellate court can

acquire jurisdiction over the case in which the notice is filed.’” Id. (quoting Ghameshlouy v.

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 379, 391 (2010)). “In order to confer active jurisdiction on an appellate

court, a notice of appeal must be timely, and it must ‘adequately identif[y] the case to be

appealed.’” Id. (quoting Roberson, 279 Va. at 407). “Any defect in the notice of appeal that

-6- does not touch on its timeliness or the identity of the case to be appealed is procedural only.” Id.

(quoting Roberson, 279 Va. at 407).

As an initial matter, we agree with Dotson that the amended notice of appeal, filed

September 30, 2022, was untimely filed, and our Court would have no jurisdiction to consider an

appeal pursuant to that notice. Therefore, it is the September 6, 2022 notice of appeal that must

adequately identify the case or cases to be appealed in order for this Court to exercise jurisdiction

over the appeal related to case number CR21-0744, the methamphetamine charge.

The Commonwealth first characterizes its failure to include the case number for

CR21-0744 as merely a “procedural defect” which does not prevent this Court from obtaining

jurisdiction over the entire case. As our Supreme Court has stated, however: “A docket number

. . . does more than direct the clerk to file a pleading. A docket number is a specific identifier for

a particular case. . . . A docket number is relevant in identifying the case that is being appealed.”

Nicholson, 300 Va. at 23-24.

While the September 6, 2022 notice of appeal included sufficient information to identify

the trial court judgment from which the Commonwealth wished to appeal, the notice of appeal

did not properly identify the cases it was appealing—at least as to the possession of

methamphetamine charge (CR21-0744). The motion and suppression hearing conducted on

August 16, 2022, pertained to four separate charges each of which is its own case, as indicated

by the case numbers assigned to the charges by the clerk of the trial court. There was nothing in

the notice which would lead one to conclude that the Commonwealth intended to appeal the trial

court’s decision as to all four cases. Instead, the notice merely indicated the Commonwealth’s

intention to appeal the two cases it identified in the September 6, 2022 notice of appeal:

(1) possession of cocaine (CR21-0745), and (2) possession of drug paraphernalia (CR21-0746).

-7- The notice of appeal, therefore, by itself, is insufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement

that the notice of appeal identify the case or cases to be appealed.

This is not the end of the inquiry, however, as the Commonwealth raises a second

argument. The Commonwealth argues that the information contained in the “certificate,” filed

with the notice of appeal pursuant to Code § 19.2-400 and Rule 5A:6(d), adequately “identifies

the types of cases, possession of ‘illegal narcotics (cocaine and methamphetamine).’” The

Commonwealth argues that the certificate may be read in conjunction with the notice of appeal

to cure any deficiency the notice may have in adequately identifying the cases to be appealed.

We agree.

While this Court has not directly addressed this issue, several Virginia appellate cases

stand for the proposition that the “certificate” may supplement the notice of appeal in order to

fulfill the requirements of the notice.

Quoting M.G. v. Albemarle County Department of Social Services, 41 Va. App. 170, 177

(2003), Dotson argues that “this Court has ‘never held . . . that Rule 5A:6(d)’s provisions

regarding the contents of the accompanying certificate are jurisdictional.’” Dotson maintains

that “[i]t therefore stands to reason that jurisdictional information—such as the identity of the

case appealed . . . cannot be contained in the certificate, but rather in the notice itself.” This

quotation is taken out of context, however, and the decision in M.G. actually weighs in favor of

the Commonwealth in the instant case.

This Court in M.G. simply clarified that the information and certifications that must be

included in the certificate are not jurisdictional, but merely procedural, and therefore waivable by

either party, similar to the requirements for the notice of appeal, save for timeliness of the notice

and identification of the case to be appealed. What this Court did not do was draw an iron

curtain between the two, and never the twain shall meet. In taking a closer look at M.G., we note

-8- that this Court actually utilized the notice of appeal in conjunction with the accompanying

certificate to fulfill the requirements of each. See M.G., 41 Va. App. at 178-79 (“Although the

certificate did not indicate whether mother mailed a copy of the notice to the children’s guardian

ad litem, the notice of appeal was accompanied by a cover letter signed by mother’s guardian ad

litem that did, in fact, provide such information. . . . Thus, the record establishes that appellant

complied with the requirements of Rule 5A:6(a) . . . . Further, although the certificate itself

omitted other information required by Rule 5A:6(d), other portions of the notice contained

everything but appellant’s address, the name and address of the appellee, and the telephone

number for appellee’s counsel. The certificate clearly indicated that mother provided appellee’s

counsel with notice of the appeal.”); cf. Watkins v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 42

Va. App. 760, 774 (2004) (“[A]ll the indispensable parties must be named, in either the notice of

appeal or the accompanying certificate, thereby joining those parties in the appeal.” (emphasis

added)). While we agree with Dotson that the notice of appeal and the certificate “are two

separate entities . . . with separate requirements and standard,” we hold that the two may still

supplement each other in appropriate cases.

Here, while the notice of appeal may have been deficient on its own, the accompanying

certificate clarified what cases the Commonwealth intended to appeal by stating that the

suppressed evidence was “substantial proof of facts material to the Commonwealth’s case, to

wit: illegal narcotics (cocaine and methamphetamine).” The certificate makes clear that the

Commonwealth intended to appeal both the possession charge related to cocaine, as well as the

possession charge related to methamphetamine. Because the Commonwealth did in fact file a

timely notice of appeal, and because that notice of appeal, read in conjunction with the

certificate, adequately identified the cases to be appealed, we hold that, under the facts of this

case, dismissal for failure to satisfy the rules governing notice of appeal is not warranted, as we

-9- have jurisdiction over the appeal related to case number CR21-0744. Cf. Carlton v. Paxton, 14

Va. App. 105, 111, aff’d on reh’g en banc, 15 Va. App. 265 (1992).

II. Probable Cause

We turn next to the question of whether the search conducted by Hodge was justified.

“In an appeal by the Commonwealth of an order of the circuit court suppressing evidence, the

evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant and findings of fact are

entitled to a presumption of correctness unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to

support them.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App. 486, 487 (1992). However, this Court

“review[s] de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as probable cause

and reasonable suspicion to the particular facts of the case.” Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44

Va. App. 347, 356 (2004). “It is the appellant’s burden to show that when viewing the evidence

in such a manner, the trial court committed reversible error.” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68

Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)).

The Commonwealth argues that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that

Hodge had probable cause to believe that Dotson was in possession of illegal narcotics.2 We

agree.

“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes three categories of police citizen

[contacts]: (1) consensual encounters, (2) brief, minimally intrusive investigatory detentions

based upon specific, articulable facts, commonly referred to as Terry stops, and (3) highly

intrusive arrests and searches founded on probable cause.” Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40

Va. App. 412, 420-21 (2003) (quoting Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 169

(1995)). “A consensual encounter between the police and an individual ‘will not trigger Fourth

Because we agree with the Commonwealth’s first assignment of error, we do not reach 2

the second and third assignments of error, as judicial restraint obligates us to reach decisions on the best and narrowest grounds available. See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017). - 10 - Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature’ and renders the person seized under

the Fourth Amendment.” Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 390 (2012) (quoting

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).

“Under the Fourth Amendment, officers cannot search a place without a warrant unless

one of several delineated exceptions to this warrant requirement apply.” Duncan v.

Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179 (2009) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14

(1999)). “A warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow

and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13 (citing Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). “The Fourth Amendment prohibits only

‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ not reasonable ones.” King v. Commonwealth, 49

Va. App. 717, 723 (2007). “[T]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not

capable of precise definition or mechanical application . . . and ‘requires a balancing of the need

for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.’” Saal v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 413, 426 (2020) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559

(1979)). Further, “[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in

which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”

Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).

“Under long-standing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a police officer may, before

making an arrest and without obtaining a search warrant, search a vehicle . . . so long as the

officer has probable cause to do so.” Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 621 (2018).

“[P]robable cause exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in a particular place.’” Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 (2009)

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006)). The

automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is predicated upon the

- 11 - fact that the officer believes the car contains evidence of a crime. Duncan, 55 Va. App. at 179

(quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999)). In evaluating “whether a police

officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, as occurred here, we

examine the events leading up to the search, and then decide whether these historical facts,

viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable

cause.” Curley, 295 Va. at 622 (quotation omitted).

Here, the testimony revealed that Hodge was dispatched to the scene following a report

that somebody was smoking something in the area. There, Hodge found Dotson in the driver’s

seat of his truck. Hodge testified that Dotson’s position reminded him of a drug overdose.

Hodge “didn’t know if [Dotson] was overdosing or what was going on.” The windows were

down. Hodge attempted to awaken Dotson, to no avail. Hodge then circled the truck, peering in

through the windows, to look for possible weapons. He observed what he believed to be

marijuana in an open satchel in the defendant’s lap as well as an unlabeled, transparent pill bottle

containing blue pills that Hodge believed to be Xanax. Hodge testified that he believed that the

pills were Xanax pills because he had “seen blue pills like this before.” Further, Hodge observed

what he believed to be a knife sheath approximately one foot to eighteen inches in length in the

back seat of the truck.

Hodge again attempted to awaken Dotson a second time by knocking on the outside of

the truck, and Dotson stirred awake. Hodge asked Dotson about the open satchel in his lap as

well as the unlabeled pill bottle, asking “what’s that?” Dotson voluntarily handed the pill bottle

to Hodge. Dotson immediately disclaimed ownership of everything in the truck, including the

pill bottle, stating that anything in the truck belonged to his girlfriend. Hodge also testified that

“Dotson wouldn’t quit you know moving around, being fidgety, so [Hodge] instructed him to

exit the vehicle.” Dotson complied, and thereupon Hodge placed Dotson in handcuffs and took

- 12 - Dotson to the back of Hodge’s police vehicle. Once placed in the back of Hodge’s police

vehicle, Dotson again repeated that “anything in the vehicle would be his girlfriend’s.” Hodge

ran a criminal history check on the defendant and discovered that he was a convicted felon. As

Dotson correctly states, it was at this moment that the consensual encounter became a detention,

of which thereafter any subsequent search of the vehicle would need to be supported by probable

cause. See Beasley, 60 Va. App. at 390. Only after Hodge went back to the vehicle and searched

the satchel did he find cocaine and methamphetamine.

Considering these facts objectively, based upon “a reasonable and trained police officer’s

view of the totality of the circumstances,” Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 419 (2005),

Hodge had probable cause to believe that Dotson was in possession of illegal substances. Xanax

is a Schedule IV controlled substance, and the possession of Xanax without a “valid prescription

or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice” is a Class 2

misdemeanor. See Code §§ 18.2-250(A)(b1), 54.1-3452. Hodge testified that he believed that

the blue pills were Xanax because he had seen pills like that before. Further, the pills were in an

unlabeled, translucent bottle, and Dotson immediately disclaimed them. Dotson was also fidgety

and would not stop moving. And finally, Dotson again disclaimed anything found in the truck.

The fact that the pills were in an unmarked bottle adds to the likelihood that Dotson did

not possess them lawfully, pursuant to a valid prescription. Further, Dotson’s immediate

disclaimer of the pills and his repeated assertion that anything found in the truck would be his

girlfriend’s demonstrated his guilty knowledge that there would be illegal contraband in the

truck. Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696 (2004) (A “false or evasive account is a

circumstance, similar to flight from a crime scene, that a fact-finder may properly consider as

evidence of guilty knowledge.”). These circumstances when coupled with the defendant’s

“fidgety” demeanor and prior felony conviction were sufficient to demonstrate there was “a fair

- 13 - probability” that the defendant’s truck contained further “contraband or evidence of a crime.”

Jones, 277 Va. at 178. And “[i]f the officer ‘should . . . discover contraband other than [the

contraband he was looking for] during this investigation, ‘he . . . cannot be required to ignore [it],

and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances.’” Pierson v.

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 202, 204 (1993) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050

(1983)). Therefore, Hodge’s search after discovering Dotson’s illegal possession of the Xanax

pills was justified, as was his subsequent discovery of cocaine and methamphetamine in the

satchel.

Dotson points out that the trial court, in making its ruling, expressly disavowed this

theory of probable cause, stating:

Deputy Hodge thought that [the pills] might be Xanax. Deputy Hodge didn’t say anything about them potentially being illegal at that point in time. He didn’t arrest Mr. Dotson at that time for possessing, you know, prescription medication without a prescription, or anything like that. . . . The pills maybe could have gotten there, but that’s not his testimony. That’s not the testimony today that he searched it because he thought Mr. Dotson was in possession of illegal prescription medication. I think he was honest with his testimony, that’s not what he was thinking.

The trial court’s observation of Hodge’s subjective intent in searching the vehicle is not

dispositive. “[A]n ‘officer’s subjective characterization of observed conduct is not relevant’ to

an objective application of the Fourth Amendment.” Mason v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 292,

302 (2015) (en banc) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 665, 673 (2010)). “So strong is

this principle that, even when an officer’s testimony shows that he misjudged the legal basis for

the stop, his subjective misjudgment does not undermine the objective validity of a stop that

could be based on a wholly different legal basis.” Id. at 302 n.5 (citing Slayton v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 101, 109 (2003)). The fact that Hodge did not immediately arrest

Dotson for illegal possession of Xanax is similarly inconsequential. See Kentucky v. King, 563 - 14 - U.S. 452, 467 (2011) (“We have said that ‘[l]aw enforcement officers are under no constitutional

duty to call a halt to criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to

establish probable cause.” (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966))). The trial

court therefore erred in suppressing this evidence.

CONCLUSION

This Court has jurisdiction to consider the Commonwealth’s appeal from case number

CR21-0744. Viewed in the light most favorable to Dotson, the record contained sufficient

evidence of probable cause to justify Hodge’s search of Dotson’s vehicle. The trial court

therefore erred in granting Dotson’s motion to suppress.

Reversed and remanded.

- 15 -