Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Francisco Roman.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0567
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-567

vs.

FRANCISCO ROMAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A District Court jury convicted the defendant of operating

under the influence of liquor and negligent operation. Claiming

insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, the defendant

appeals. We affirm.

The Commonwealth presented ample evidence on the element of

intoxication that is now challenged on appeal: the defendant

drove erratically and at high speed, crashed head-on into

another car, smelled of alcohol, admitted to drinking three

beers, presented with glassy and bloodshot eyes, spoke with

slurred speech, appeared unsteady on his feet, lost his balance

during field sobriety tests, admitted he could not complete one

test, had beer cans and a partially consumed hard lemonade in his vehicle, and appeared in the opinion of police officers to

be "drunk." Given these facts, "any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677

(1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319

(1979). See Commonwealth v. Rarick, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 353-

354 (2015) (evidence of impairment from speeding, odor of

alcohol, and bloodshot and glassy eyes); Commonwealth v.

Lavendier, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 506-507 (2011) (obvious signs

of impairment include "strong odor of alcohol, poor balance, and

glassy, bloodshot eyes"); Commonwealth v. Rollins, 59 Mass. App.

Ct. 911, 912 (2003), S.C. 441 Mass. 114 (2004) (impairment shown

by inability to perform field sobriety tests); Commonwealth v.

Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 321 (1994) (officer's opinion

on intoxication "may also be taken into account" when evaluating

sufficiency of evidence).

The defendant's arguments on appeal speak primarily to the

weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency. He points to the

absence of any investigation into the functionality of his

vehicle as a factor in the crash, chemical testing of the hard

lemonade, an MRI or CT scan before the field sobriety tests, or

testimony from someone seeing the defendant consume alcohol.

Contrary to the defendant's argument, the Latimore standard is

2 applied "without reference" to the "weight of the evidence."

Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 457 (1990). Moreover,

"[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the analysis is

not a static dissection of factors in isolation but an

evaluation informed by the dynamic fullness of the totality of

the circumstances." Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 87 Mass. App. Ct.

340, 342 (2015).

For similar reasons, we also conclude that the Commonwealth

presented sufficient evidence of negligent operation. Even

without considering whether there were "any mechanical problems"

with the car and putting aside evidence of intoxication, the

evidence showed a breathtaking level of negligence: the

defendant drove off the paved highway to pass another vehicle at

high speed, fishtailed upon returning to the roadway, exited the

highway at a speed of about one-hundred miles per hour, crossed

a grass median, and crashed into an oncoming vehicle. Jurors

could readily conclude that such evidence constituted a level of

negligence that placed the lives or safety of the public in

3 danger. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379

(2017).

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Hodgens & Allen, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: April 21, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.