RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2026 TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0449-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2023-CA-0769 HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 22-CR-00211
RUSSELL T. AMBOREE APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CONLEY
AFFIRMING
This case is before the Court upon discretionary review after the Court of
Appeals vacated the Appellee’s, Russell Amboree, six-year sentence for two
counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance (POCS), first degree under
KRS 1 218A.1415. The Commonwealth sought discretionary review arguing the
Court of Appeals’ opinion conflicts with Eldridge v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.3d
614 (Ky. App. 2015). Upon review, we conclude the plain language of KRS
218A.1415(2)(a) prohibits any application of KRS Chapter 532 that would
increase the term of incarceration for POCS convictions beyond three years.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. I. Facts and Procedural Posture Russell Amboree was convicted by a jury of two counts of POCS, first
degree under KRS 218A.1415(1). These are class D felonies. KRS 218A.1415(2).
Amboree was also convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, possession of
marijuana. KRS 218A.1422. The jury recommended the maximum three-year
penalty for each POCS conviction to be served consecutively for a total of six
years. It also recommended a forty-five-day sentence for the marijuana
possession to be served concurrently.
At his sentencing hearing, Amboree argued to the trial court that a six-
year sentence exceeded the statutory maximum of three years. The trial court
ignored his objection. The trial court asked if Amboree understood the jury’s
recommendation, and he again repeated his belief that the recommendation
exceeded the maximum penalty allowed. The trial court asked a second time if
he understood the recommendation, and when Amboree replied in the
affirmative, it imposed the six-year sentence. Amboree appealed.
At the Court of Appeals, both parties relied upon Eldridge v.
Commonwealth to support their position, and both parties relied upon various
provisions of KRS Chapter 532. Amboree focused on language in KRS 532.080
while the Commonwealth focused on KRS 532.110(1)(c). Relying upon KRS
532.080(8), which excludes convictions under KRS 218A.1415, the Court of
Appeals held,
Subsection (8) prevents other provisions of the PFO statute from enhancing sentences for possession beyond the three-year limit in KRS 218A.1415(2)(a). Because the PFO statute authorizes nothing beyond the maximum three-year sentence for possession, circuit 2 courts may not impose consecutive sentences exceeding that length under KRS 532.110(1)(c). In dealing with Eldridge v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals held that
it was limited to Trafficking in Controlled Substances convictions under KRS
218A.1413. 479 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Ky. App. 2015). The Court of Appeals also
noted that Eldridge merely followed this Court’s analysis in Gamble v.
Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 716, 720-21 (Ky. 2015).
The Commonwealth sought discretionary review to answer this specific
question: can consecutive sentences for Class D POCS crimes exceed an
aggregate of three years? The Commonwealth argues KRS 218A.1415(2)(a)
“does nothing to cap aggregate sentences at three years[.]” In brief, the essence
of the Commonwealth’s argument is “running two separate three-year
sentences consecutively does not increase the sentence for any single
possession conviction to more than three years.” Amboree, of course, argues
the Court of Appeals is correct and should be affirmed. Notably, his brief
discusses the underlying legislative purpose of KRS 218A.1415, which was to
move to a rehabilitative-oriented approach to drug possession crimes and,
hopefully, relieve the Commonwealth’s financial burden from what some may
call over-incarceration of drug addicts. See generally Edward M. O'Brien,
Course Corrections: House Bill 463 and Reforming Kentucky's Broken Criminal
Justice System Through Evidence-Based Reinvestment Strategies, 51 U.
Louisville L. Rev. 647 (2013).
We now address the merits of the appeal.
3 II. Analysis Our standard of review is de novo. Gamble, 453 S.W.3d at 718. “[T]he
most logical method of discerning the General Assembly's intent is to look to
the plain wording of the statute, assigning ‘the words employed in the statute
... their ordinary meaning.’” Id. (quoting Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d
813, 814 (Ky. 1995)). Indeed, it is the judiciary’s
duty to interpret and enforce a statute according to its plain-text meaning. Barnett v. Central Kentucky Hauling, LLC, 617 S.W.3d 339, 341 (Ky. 2021). “Only if the language is unclear do we consider the legislatures’ unspoken intent, the statute's purpose, and the broader statutory scheme.” Id. at 341-42. “Where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as it is written.” Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, 458 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. 1970). Normandy Farm, LLC v. Kenneth McPeek Racing Stables, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 129,
137 (Ky. 2024).
The statute at issue here states, “Possession of a controlled substance in
the first degree is a Class D felony subject to the following provisions: The
maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than three (3) years,
notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532[.]” KRS 218A.1415(2)(a). The most
significant comment heretofore made by this Court upon this language was in
Gamble. In that case, the interpretation of KRS 218A.1413, Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance, was at issue and the question was whether a conviction
for trafficking could be enhanced beyond three years by the persistent felony
offender statute. 453 S.W.3d at 719.
4 KRS 218A.1413(2)(b)1 states, “A Class D felony for the first offense,
except that KRS Chapter 532 to the contrary notwithstanding, the maximum
sentence to be imposed shall be no greater than three (3) years[.]” (emphasis
added). We held,
Despite the rather puzzling language, the General Assembly made it clear that the “sentence to be imposed shall be no greater that [sic] three (3) years.” Therefore, the maximum penalty a sentencing court may bestow upon a first time offender of KRS 218A.1413(1)(c) is three years, despite the crime's Class D classification. Gamble, 453 S.W.3d at 719. We then proceeded to discuss KRS 218A.1415,
stating,
Unlike the TICS2 statute, KRS 218A.1415 has much clearer language. The statute states that despite its classification as a Class D felony, first-degree possession of a controlled substance carries a “maximum term of incarceration [ ] no greater than three (3) years, notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532.” (Emphasis added). The wording implies that no section of KRS Chapter 532 can increase the sentence beyond three years, including a PFO enhancement. In the TICS2 statute, however, the General Assembly used the phrase “Chapter 532 to the contrary notwithstanding”, which leads this Court to believe that it meant something other than the entire Chapter of KRS 532 is inapplicable. Instead, what we believe the General Assembly meant is that that the sentencing court must ignore the contrary penalty range for Class D felonies as detailed in KRS 532.060(2)(d) specifically, but not the PFO provision.
Id. at 720-21.
While Gamble’s discussion of KRS 218A.1415 was technically dicta (the
statute was not the one Gamble was convicted under), it was dicta with a
purpose. We interpret statutes as a whole. Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147
S.W.3d 56, 58-59 (Ky. 2004). The contrast between the KRS 218A.1415(2)(a)
5 and KRS 218A.1413(2)(b)1 was a crucial pillar supporting the Court’s
conclusion. The two statutes had different phrasing and structure in spite of
their superficial similarity, and this demanded a different interpretation
between them. We, therefore, do not regard Gamble’s discussion as mere
“surplusage” but instead “entitled to respect according to [its] reasoning and
application[.]” Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Ky. 1952).
This leads to the very purpose of this appeal. What exactly does “[t]he
maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than three (3) years,
notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532” mean? We conclude the language is
unambiguous. Incarceration is synonymous with imprisonment and “maximum
term of incarceration” means nothing other than maximum period of
imprisonment. “No greater than three years” is also unambiguous in its
meaning. The sentence then concludes with “notwithstanding KRS Chapter
532.” This phrase is equally unambiguous. It makes no distinction between
different parts of KRS Chapter 532. It does not say KRS 532.080, nor KRS
532.060(2)(d), nor KRS 532.110(1)(c). It says “notwithstanding KRS Chapter
532” which can only mean “the entire Chapter of KRS 532 is inapplicable” if it
would make the term of incarceration longer than three years. Gamble, 453
S.W.3d at 721.
This interpretation is demanded by the word “notwithstanding.” “[T]he
U.S. Supreme Court defines notwithstanding to mean ‘in spite of’ or ‘without
prevention or obstruction from or by.’” Landrum v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Beshear, 599 S.W.3d 781, 791 (Ky. 2019) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc.,
6 580 U.S. 288, 301 (2017)). It is well-recognized that when the General
Assembly uses the word “notwithstanding” it is “a fail-safe way to ensuring the
clause it introduces will absolutely, positively prevail.” A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 128 (2012). When there is a
conflict between statutes, the word “notwithstanding” has only one purpose:
“the provision to which [it] accords priority prevails.” Id.
As Gamble contrasted KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) to explain its interpretation
of KRS 218A.1413(2)(b)1, so the reverse is illustrative. 2 The latter statute reads,
“A Class D felony for the first offense, except that KRS Chapter 532 to the
contrary notwithstanding, the maximum sentence to be imposed shall be no
greater than three (3) years[.]” “A Class D felony” is a noun phrase with the
adverbial modifier “first offense[.]” The comma then introduces the exceptive
clause “KRS Chapter 532 to the contrary notwithstanding,” creating a
subordinating conjunction that is followed by the content clause: “the
maximum sentence to be imposed shall be no greater than three (3) years[.]”
Gamble correctly concluded the sentence structure indicated that the entirety
of KRS Chapter 532 was not excluded from application but only the penalty
range found in KRS 532.060(2)(d). Gamble, 453 S.W.3d at 721.
The different structure in KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) leads to a different
interpretation. “The maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than
2 “‘[S]entences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar, and from
this presumption it is not permissible to depart,’ unless it should lead to an absurd result.” Cab. for Health and Family Serv. v. D.W., 680 S.W.3d 856, 861 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Gilbert v. Greene, 216 S.W. 105, 108 (Ky. 1919)).
7 three (3) years,” is an appositive clause introduced by the “following provisions”
language found in KRS 218A.1415(2). It is followed by “notwithstanding KRS
Chapter 532[,]” which is an adverbial modifier. While the sentence could be
read as substantively no different than that found in KRS 218A.1413(2)(b)1—
i.e., both only exclude the sentencing range of KRS 532.060—Gamble rejected
that interpretation outright. “The wording implies that no section of KRS
Chapter 532 can increase the sentence beyond three years, including a PFO
enhancement.” Gamble, 453 S.W.3d at 721. We see no reason to alter this
understanding. It is the natural reading of the text and, secondly, the statutory
language remains unchanged since Gamble.
Whereas Gamble was concerned with PFO enhancements, and, therefore,
specifically mentioned it, we are now concerned with aggregate consecutive
sentences. KRS 218A.1413(2)(b)1’s structure and phrasing creates a discrete
exception to KRS Chapter 532; KRS 218A.1415(2)(a)’s structure and phrasing
creates an absolute exception that applies to KRS Chapter 532 in its entirety if
it would extend the term of incarceration beyond three years. Our
interpretation is nothing more than a reaffirmation of Gamble, and an
extension of its reasoning to an issue it had no need to address. 3
3 Accordingly, we see no need to wrestle with Eldridge v. Commonwealth as the
Court of Appeals correctly understood that case; it did nothing but apply Gamble as the controlling decision. 479 S.W.3d 614, 615 (Ky. App. 2015) (“Because the Supreme Court of Kentucky's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Gamble, 453 S.W.3d 716 (Ky. 2015), supports the circuit court's decision to run the sentences consecutively, we affirm.”); see also Id. at 620 (“In Gamble, the Supreme Court specifically reversed this Court's holding that KRS 218A.1413(2)(b) was not subject to PFO enhancement, which is the basis of Eldridge's argument in the present appeal.”).
8 The Commonwealth is of course happy to concede Amboree’s convictions
could not be enhanced by the PFO statute. It argues that the theoretical limit
provided by the PFO statute is, however, still applicable to the class of crime
Amboree was convicted of. The dissent also relies on a difference between
enhancing a sentence via PFO and aggregating multiple sentences via
consecutive sentencing. We agree there is a difference, but both the
Commonwealth and the dissent sidestep the more basic inquiry: where is the
authority for the trial court to aggregate multiple sentences consecutively
found? It is found in KRS 532.110(1). Where does the theoretical limit the
Commonwealth argues for ultimately rest? It rests in KRS 532.110(1)(c). Both
are creatures of KRS Chapter 532. KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) makes no distinction
between sentence enhancements and aggregating sentences. It states generally
that “the maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than three years
notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532.” (Emphasis added). Aggregating Amboree’s
sentences consecutively makes his term of incarceration greater—it goes from
three years to six years. There is no escaping the “notwithstanding KRS
Chapter 532” language. That statute cannot apply, in whole or in part, if
applying it would make the term of incarceration greater than three years. We
simply will not read “notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532” to mean
“notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532 except for KRS 532.110(1)(c)” as the
Commonwealth essentially implores us to do.
We might be accused of threatening the entire scheme of concurrent or
consecutive sentencing with this rationale given the similar language of KRS
9 532.060(2) regarding maximum sentencing lengths. That would mistake the
significance of the “notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532” language. At the risk of
stating the obvious, KRS 532.060 does not contain such a phrase. In fact, the
phrase occurs only two other times in our statutes, KRS 506.010(5) and KRS
507.070(3), both involving murder or attempted murder of a first responder. In
both statutes the phrase begins the relevant subsection, and the subsequent
language makes clear that its exception only serves to establish alternative
mandatory minimum sentences. In KRS 218A.1415(2)(a), however, the phrase
occurs at the end of a sentence and there is no subsequent modifying
language. To put an even finer point on it, the language of KRS 218A.1415(2)(a)
is unique in our statutes. Even its counterparts in KRS Chapter 218A instead
mimic the language of KRS 218A.1314(2)(b)1. 4 There is no justifiable reason to
believe our decision in this case will have any impact beyond the scope of KRS
218A.1415(2)(a).
In brief, there is no authority for a trial court to impose consecutive
sentences for multiple convictions of POCS, first degree under KRS 218A.1415
if doing so extends the term of incarceration beyond three years. That may
shock some people who consider the power to order consecutive or concurrent
sentences basic to the judiciary. 5 It may displease those in our criminal justice
4 See KRS 218A.1414(2)(b)2; KRS 218A.1422(2); and KRS 218A.1451(2).
5 And for what it is worth, the common law provided “judges with little
sentencing discretion[.]” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 108 (2013). “[O]nce the facts of the offense were determined by the jury, the ‘judge was meant simply to impose the prescribed sentence.’” Id. (quoting Langbein, The English Criminal Trial 10 system who believe in a “tough on crime” approach. It might strike some as
altogether anomalous that POCS, first degree convictions should not be eligible
for consecutive sentencing beyond three years. Despite these concerns, and the
several others which learned men might bring to bear, “in the absence of doubt
and ambiguity, [we] will uphold and enforce the statute as written.” McGlone v.
Horton, 80 S.W.2d 522, 524-25 (Ky. 1935).
If KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) were “ambiguous, we could consider an
interpretation that takes the apparent anomaly into account.” Commonwealth
v. Moore, 545 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Ky. 2018). We discern no ambiguity. “[T]he
power to define crimes and assign their penalties belongs to the legislative
department[.]” McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694, 700 (Ky. 2010)
(quoting Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Ky. 2004)). “[T]he appropriate
range for the length of sentence is determined ‘purely [as] a matter of legislative
prerogative.’” Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Ky. 1984)
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)). Our decision does
nothing more than read an unambiguous statute with the assumption “that
the Legislature meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what it meant.”
Moore, 545 S.W.3d at 851 (quoting Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d
644, 648 (Ky. 2017)).
Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France, Germany 1700–1900, p. 36-37 (A. Schioppa ed. 1987)).
11 Finally, even if our construction of the statute prohibiting consecutive
sentences for multiple POCS, first degree offenses beyond three years can be
said to sanction an anomalous result, that is not a reason to ignore the plain
text reading. “We cannot presume this differential treatment is unintended[.]”
Id. at 852. This is true even if we believed the result was “most likely an
unforeseen consequence” of the General Assembly’s drafting. Id. Only when the
plain text reading leads to an absurdity is a court authorized to depart from the
text. An absurdity “does not mean an odd result but a result so unreasonable
that the legislature could not have intended it.” Lee v. Kentucky Dep't of Corr.,
610 S.W.3d 254, 262 (Ky. 2020). Indeed, the absurdity must be of such a
magnitude “that it cannot possibly be reasonable.” Owen v. Univ. of Ky., 486
S.W.3d 266, 273 n.30 (Ky. 2016). Prohibiting consecutive sentences for
multiple POCS, first degree convictions beyond three years does not defy
reason. It is a decision firmly within the General Assembly’s authority to set
penalties and define the lengths of sentences. Whether this Court agrees with
the wisdom of that decision is immaterial. If the General Assembly believes we
have misinterpreted the statute it has only to amend it and clarify its intent.
III. Conclusion The General Assembly has unambiguously declared that for POCS, first
degree convictions under KRS 218A.1415(2)(a), the term of incarceration shall
be no greater than three years notwithstanding any provision in KRS Chapter
532 that might make it greater. Aggregating Amboree’s two sentences for
POCS, first degree and ordering them to be served consecutively pursuant to
12 KRS 532.110(1) makes the term of incarceration greater than three years and
violates the statute. We affirm the Court of Appeals in vacating Amboree’s
sentence and remand to the Henderson Circuit Court for resentencing.
All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Goodwine, and Thompson, JJ., concur. Nickell,
J., dissents by separate opinion which Bisig and Keller, JJ., join.
NICKELL, J., DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. In my estimation,
the operative phrase, “maximum term of incarceration,” as used in KRS
218A.1415(2)(a), simply refers to the maximum term of incarceration for a
single conviction and does not speak to the maximum length of multiple
consecutive sentences. If the legislature had intended to limit the maximum
length of multiple sentences for first-degree possession of a controlled
substance to three years’ imprisonment, it would have used the technical legal
phrase, “aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms” to except KRS
218A.1415(2)(a) from the general statute on consecutive sentencing, KRS
532.110(1)(c). Therefore, I would hold that KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) does not limit
the maximum aggregate length of consecutive sentences to three years’
imprisonment and would reverse and remand the decision of the Court of
Appeals with directions to reinstate the judgment and sentence imposed by the
trial court.
A plain language reading of a statute does not require a court to ignore
the legal context. Dunn v. Solomon Foundation, 723 S.W.3d 711, 724 (Ky.
2025) (interpreting constitutional provisions). Particularly, words and phrases
which have acquired a technical legal meaning should be accorded that
13 meaning. Commonwealth v. Wombles, 346 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. 1961). Stated
differently, “[i]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source,
whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.”
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 73 (2012) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)). Moreover, courts are not at
liberty to expand the scope of a statute “beyond its fair import” through the
addition of words by interpretation or implication. G.G. v. Cabinet for Health &
Fam. Servs., 718 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Nickell, J., dissenting) (quoting Hatchett v.
City of Glasgow, 340 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Ky. 1960)).
To properly contextualize the specific “notwithstanding KRS Chapter
532” exception contained in KRS 218A.1415(2)(b), it is necessary to examine
the general structure of criminal sentencing relative to the interplay between
KRS Chapter 532 and those offenses defined outside the Penal Code. KRS
532.005 states, without exception, “KRS Chapters 532, 533 and 534 apply to all
classes of crimes committed outside the provisions of the Penal Code.” For the
purpose of sentencing, KRS 532.010 classifies felony offenses into five
categories: “(1) Capital offenses; (2) Class A felonies; (3) Class B felonies; (4)
Class C felonies; and (5) Class D felonies.”
KRS 532.020 designates non-Penal Code offenses consistently with the
classification of felony offenses under KRS 532.010 and the maximum terms of
imprisonment authorized under KRS 532.060. KRS 532.020(1)(a) specifically
provides:
14 (1) Any offense defined outside this code for which a law outside this code provides a sentence to a term of imprisonment in the state for:
(a) At least one (1) but not more than five (5) years shall be deemed a Class D felony[.]
(Emphasis added).
KRS 532.060 governs “the authorized maximum terms of imprisonment
for” each class of felony. Specifically, KRS 532.060(2)(d) provides, “[f]or a Class
D felony,” the maximum term of imprisonment is “not less than one (1) year
nor more than five (5) years.” Notably, the maximum term of imprisonment for
a single conviction for each class of felony under KRS 532.060(2) is subject to
the exception, “[u]nless otherwise provided by law[.]”
Tracking the language of KRS 532.060(2)(d), KRS 218A.1415(2)(a)
establishes an exception to the maximum term of imprisonment for a single
conviction of a Class D Felony and states in pertinent part as follows:
(2) Possession of a controlled substance in the first degree is a Class D felony subject to the following provisions:
(a) The maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than three (3) years, notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532[.]
(Emphases added).
By contrast, general statutory limitations on the maximum length of
consecutive sentences do not refer to a “maximum term of incarceration” or
imprisonment. The legislature has specifically used the technical phrase “the
aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms” when referring to the imposition
of multiple consecutive felony sentences. KRS 532.110(1)(c). Moreover, the
formula for determining the maximum aggregate of consecutive sentences
15 under KRS 532.110(1)(c) does not depend on the range of years used to
ascertain the maximum term of imprisonment for a single conviction under
KRS 532.060(2)(d). In addition, the consecutive sentencing provisions of KRS
532.110(1)(c) do not contain any exception comparable to the “[u]nless
otherwise provided by law” language employed by KRS 532.060 in connection
with the maximum term of imprisonment for a single conviction.
Properly understood in context, the technical legal phrases, “maximum
term of incarceration” as used in KRS 218A.1415(2)(a), and “aggregate of
consecutive indeterminate sentences” as used in KRS 532.110(1)(c), are not
interchangeable. The three-year “maximum term of incarceration” contained in
KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) clearly refers to the punishment for a single conviction.
Thus, the phrase “notwithstanding KRS Chapter 532,” merely qualifies the
three-year “maximum term of incarceration” to differentiate the three-year
maximum term for a single conviction under KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) from the
five-year maximum term for a single conviction under KRS 532.060(2)(d). If the
legislature had intended to limit the maximum length of multiple sentences
under KRS 218A.1415(2)(a), it would have stated that the maximum aggregate
of consecutive sentences shall not exceed three years of imprisonment.
By conflating the technical terms “maximum term of incarceration” and
“aggregate of consecutive sentences,” the majority has ignored the pertinent
legal context of KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) and inappropriately expanded the scope of
the exception contained therein. Because such a result does not comport with
the statutory text and sound principles of interpretation, I respectfully dissent
16 and would reverse and remand the decision of the Court of Appeals with
directions to reinstate the judgment and sentence imposed by the trial court.
Bisig and Keller, JJ., join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs Assistant Attorney General
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Molly Mattingly Kathleen K. Schmidt Assistant Public Advocates