Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedSeptember 17, 2019
Docket3:15-cv-00354
StatusUnknown

This text of Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP (Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP, (W.D. Ky. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-354-DJH-CHL

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Plaintiff,

v.

MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP, et al. MARATHON PETROLEUM CORPORATION, et al. SPEEDWAY, LLC, et al. Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Before the Court are numerous motions to seal filed by both plaintiff Commonwealth of Kentucky (“the Commonwealth” or “Plaintiff”) and defendants Marathon Petroleum Company LP, Marathon Petroleum Corp. and Speedway LLC (“Marathon” or “Defendants”). The Court will address the motions by grouping for clarity. For the reasons set forth below: The Commonwealth’s Motion DN 197 is GRANTED. The Commonwealth’s Motions DNs 164, 192, 202, 213 are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Marathon’s Motions DNs 155, 166, 189, 194, 198, 211, 210, 214 are GRANTED.

I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History The Commonwealth’s second amended complaint alleges that Marathon has engaged in anticompetitive conduct in violation of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Kentucky’s Consumer Protection Act, through its business dealings in Louisville and northern Kentucky. (DN 88, at PageID #1087.) Essentially, the Commonwealth alleges that Marathon has entered into contracts with various gasoline retailers for the distribution of its reformulated gasoline (“RFG”) that restrict its competitors’ ability to challenge Marathon’s market dominance. (Id. at 1087–88.) The Commonwealth has alleged, inter alia, that these distribution agreements unlawfully restrict the gasoline retailers’ ability to purchase RFG from Marathon’s competitors; separate contracts allegedly include deed restrictions that prevent competitors from entering the market. (Id.) Previously, this Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend its complaint. (DN 86.) The Commonwealth subsequently filed its second amended complaint, which added

Speedway LLC and Marathon Petroleum Corp. as co-defendants alongside Marathon Petroleum Co. LP. (DN 88.) Marathon Petroleum Corp. promptly filed a motion to dismiss for a want of personal jurisdiction (DN 92). A settlement conference was held on February 1, 2018 and parties were unable to come to an agreement. (DN 122.) On September 26, 2018, the Court denied Marathon Corp.’s and Speedway’s motion to dismiss. (DN 147.) On November 20, 2018, Marathon filed its motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction. (DN 156.) On April 5, 2019, Marathon filed a motion to exclude expert testimony and opinions of Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Michael J. Sattinger (DN 191) and a motion for summary judgment on all claims. (DN 195.) That same day, the Commonwealth also filed a motion to exclude the testimony and opinions of Marathon’s experts Ramsey Shehadeh and Michael Baye. (DN 193.)

II. Summary of Law

2 Although the Sixth Circuit has long recognized a “strong presumption in favor of openness” regarding court records, there are certain interests that overcome this “strong presumption.” Rudd Equipment Co., Inc. v. John Deere Construction & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 593 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983)). These interests include “certain privacy rights of participants or third parties, trade secrets, and national security.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179. The party seeking to seal the records bears a “heavy” burden; simply showing that public disclosure of the information would, for instance, harm a company’s reputation is insufficient. Id.; Shane Grp. Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016).

Instead, the moving party must show that it will suffer a “clearly defined and serious injury” if the judicial records are not sealed. Shane Grp. Inc., 825 F.3d at 307. Examples of injuries sufficient to justify a sealing of judicial records include those that could be used as “sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon v. Warner Comm’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). In rendering a decision, the Court must articulate why the interests supporting nondisclosure are compelling, why the interests supporting public access are not as compelling, and why the scope of the seal is no broader than necessary. Shane Grp. Inc., 825 F.3d at 306. Importantly, the presumption that the public has the right to access judicial records does not vanish simply because all parties in the case agree that certain records should be sealed. Rudd Equipment Co., Inc., 834 F.3d at 595 (noting that although the defendant did not

object to the plaintiff’s motion to seal, his lack of objection did not waive the public’s First Amendment and common law right of access to court filings); Shane Grp. Inc., 825 F.3d at 305

3 (“A court’s obligation to keep its records open for public inspection is not conditioned on an objection from anybody.”)

III. Analysis A. Marathon’s Motion for Summary Judgment- Personal Jurisdiction First, the Court addresses the parties’ request to seal certain documents related to Marathon’s motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction. (DNs 155, 164, 166.) Marathon requests the Court issue an order to seal portions of its memorandum in support

of its motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction as well as supporting Exhibits C, E, F, G and H. (DN 156.) The supporting exhibits are supply agreements for the sale of gasoline products in Louisville, northern Kentucky, and the surrounding areas of Kentucky with third parties, as well as amendments to and renewals of those agreements. (DN 155, at PageID #3379.) Exhibits F and G also include contract renewal analyses produced by Marathon LP prior to entering into the supply agreements. (Id. at PageID #3380.) Marathon contends the supply agreements and renewal documents contain sensitive pricing, volume and other commercial term information of third parties with whom Marathon negotiated. (Id. at PageID #3381.) Marathon states the corresponding portions of the memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment based on a lack of personal jurisdiction contain a detailed

discussion of these exhibits and the images embedded at pages 7-9 are taken directly from Exhibits C and E. (DN 156, at PageID #3402; DN 155, at PageID #3380.) Marathon states the

4 Court has previously granted Defendant leave to file Exhibits C, E, F and G under seal. (Id. at PageID #3379; DN 136, at PageID #3258.) Marathon contends it would be harmed if the documents are not sealed as it would compromise its ability to negotiate competitive supply agreements with other third parties in the future. Marathon also argues the Court should also consider the harm to the competitive standing of the third parties to the agreements contained in the Exhibits as well. (DN 155, at PageID #3383.) The Commonwealth requests that the Court seal the highlighted portions of its opposition to Marathon’s motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction and

accompanying Exhibits B and D-H of the Declaration of Todd Leatherman. (DN 164, at PageID #4386.) Other than the fact that these documents were disclosed by Marathon and marked as confidential, the Commonwealth does not offer any explanation as to why these documents should be protected from public disclosure.

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Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-of-kentucky-v-marathon-petroleum-company-lp-kywd-2019.