RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0296-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JULIE M. GOODMAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 13-CR-01190
AHMAD RASHAD DAVIS APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JONES, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON,1 JUDGES.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from the
Fayette Circuit Court’s decision to expunge Ahmad Rashad Davis’s theft by
deception charge. As the circuit court appropriately found the judgment contains
1 Judge Kelly Thompson authored this Opinion before his tenure with the Kentucky Court of Appeals expired on December 31, 2022, and prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure on January 3, 2023. Therefore, all citations herein are to the former Civil Rules. Release of this Opinion was delayed by administrative handling. no conditions linking the dismissal of this charge to Davis pleading guilty to
Medicaid fraud, expungement was required, and we affirm.
In 2013, Davis was indicted for Medicaid fraud (Count 1) and theft by
deception (Count 2) for knowingly submitting incorrect timesheets for his work
providing services to a Medicaid recipient, for which Davis was compensated with
public funds.
In 2014, the Commonwealth offered a plea agreement in which the
theft by deception charge would be dismissed while Davis would plead guilty to
the Medicaid fraud charge, receive a one-year sentence with a recommendation
that this be probated, and make restitution. Davis accepted and the petition to enter
a guilty plea, and the oral representation at the plea hearing, consistently indicated
that Davis was pleading guilty to Count 1 and that Count 2 would be dismissed.
The final judgment provides that “[t]he defendant having entered a
plea of guilty on the 30th day of May 2014, and the court having adjudged the
defendant guilty of the crime; Count 1, Present Fraudulent Claims to Defraud
KMAP > $300, and the Dismissal of Count 2.” Davis was sentenced to one year
of imprisonment under Count 1, probated for three years and Count 2 was
dismissed.
Several years later, in 2021, Davis filed a form petition for
expungement of the dismissed theft charge. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
-2- 431.076(1)(b) generally provides that upon request, dismissed charges which were
not dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to other charges shall be expunged.
Davis checked a box denoting that the theft charge was not dismissed
in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense. The Commonwealth disagreed
with Davis’s assertion and filed a response opposing Davis’s expungement
petition, arguing that the theft charge could not be expunged because it had been
dismissed in exchange for Davis pleading guilty to Medicaid fraud. The circuit
court granted the expungement.2
The Commonwealth filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, again
arguing that the theft charge was statutorily ineligible for expungement. The
circuit court held a short videoconference hearing on the motion, at which it opined
that the written judgment did not explicitly state that the theft charge had been
dismissed in return for a guilty plea to the Medicaid fraud charge. Believing itself
to be bound solely by the plain language of the judgment (and stressing that the
Commonwealth had not ever sought to amend that judgment), the circuit court thus
2 We note that in filling out the form expungement order, the circuit court failed to check the box to indicate that the expunged charges had not been dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to other charges or any boxes to indicate the legal basis for the expungement. Better practice, of course, would be for the court to check all applicable boxes and to handwrite any additional comments or findings on all future expungement orders. However, the subsequent order on the Commonwealth’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate, clarified that the circuit court found that the expunged charge had not been dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea on other charges, thus satisfying its fact-finding responsibilities.
-3- denied the Commonwealth’s motion. The Commonwealth then filed this appeal.
Davis failed to file a responsive brief.3
The Commonwealth argues that the plain language of KRS
431.076(1)(b) resolves this matter and the circuit court’s findings otherwise are
directly contradicted by the record. Answering whether the theft charge was
eligible for expungement requires us to analyze KRS 431.076, and since “statutory
interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo; and the conclusions
reached by the lower court[] are entitled to no deference.” Commonwealth v. Love,
334 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky. 2011). We “interpret statutes in accordance with their
plain meanings, generally construing non-technical words according to their
common meanings.” Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
KRS 431.076 provides in relevant part:
(1) (a) . . .
(b) A person who has been charged with a criminal offense . . . against whom charges have been dismissed and not in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge . . . may petition the court in which the disposition of the charges was made to expunge all charges.
3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(8)(c) provides that when no appellee brief is filed, we may “(i) accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues as correct; (ii) reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain such action; or (iii) regard the appellee’s failure as a confession of error and reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the case.” “We have discretion to decide the way to respond to [Davis’s] failure to file a brief.” Hawkins v. Jones, 555 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Ky.App. 2018). Given the straightforward nature of this appeal, we elect to not penalize Davis.
-4- ...
(3) (a) If the court finds that the petition under subsection (1)(b) of this section is properly brought, the court shall grant the petition and order the expunging of the records.
KRS 431.076(3)(a) states that upon a showing that a petition meets the statutory
requirements for an expungement under (1)(b), the records “shall” be expunged.
This does not grant circuit courts any discretion to deny a petitioner who meets the
criteria in KRS 431.076(1)(b) from receiving an expungement.
We agree with the circuit court that “[t]he Judgment is the Record in
the case,” and that it was appropriate for the circuit court to decline to “look to
extraneous matters to interpret a document that is clear on its face.” Whatever
discussions or agreements were memorialized between the parties, “a court speaks
through the language of its orders and judgments.” Glogower v. Crawford, 2
S.W.3d 784, 785 (Ky. 1999). It is the judgment that is the final word as to what
has taken place in Davis’s case.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0296-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JULIE M. GOODMAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 13-CR-01190
AHMAD RASHAD DAVIS APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JONES, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON,1 JUDGES.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from the
Fayette Circuit Court’s decision to expunge Ahmad Rashad Davis’s theft by
deception charge. As the circuit court appropriately found the judgment contains
1 Judge Kelly Thompson authored this Opinion before his tenure with the Kentucky Court of Appeals expired on December 31, 2022, and prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure on January 3, 2023. Therefore, all citations herein are to the former Civil Rules. Release of this Opinion was delayed by administrative handling. no conditions linking the dismissal of this charge to Davis pleading guilty to
Medicaid fraud, expungement was required, and we affirm.
In 2013, Davis was indicted for Medicaid fraud (Count 1) and theft by
deception (Count 2) for knowingly submitting incorrect timesheets for his work
providing services to a Medicaid recipient, for which Davis was compensated with
public funds.
In 2014, the Commonwealth offered a plea agreement in which the
theft by deception charge would be dismissed while Davis would plead guilty to
the Medicaid fraud charge, receive a one-year sentence with a recommendation
that this be probated, and make restitution. Davis accepted and the petition to enter
a guilty plea, and the oral representation at the plea hearing, consistently indicated
that Davis was pleading guilty to Count 1 and that Count 2 would be dismissed.
The final judgment provides that “[t]he defendant having entered a
plea of guilty on the 30th day of May 2014, and the court having adjudged the
defendant guilty of the crime; Count 1, Present Fraudulent Claims to Defraud
KMAP > $300, and the Dismissal of Count 2.” Davis was sentenced to one year
of imprisonment under Count 1, probated for three years and Count 2 was
dismissed.
Several years later, in 2021, Davis filed a form petition for
expungement of the dismissed theft charge. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
-2- 431.076(1)(b) generally provides that upon request, dismissed charges which were
not dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to other charges shall be expunged.
Davis checked a box denoting that the theft charge was not dismissed
in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense. The Commonwealth disagreed
with Davis’s assertion and filed a response opposing Davis’s expungement
petition, arguing that the theft charge could not be expunged because it had been
dismissed in exchange for Davis pleading guilty to Medicaid fraud. The circuit
court granted the expungement.2
The Commonwealth filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, again
arguing that the theft charge was statutorily ineligible for expungement. The
circuit court held a short videoconference hearing on the motion, at which it opined
that the written judgment did not explicitly state that the theft charge had been
dismissed in return for a guilty plea to the Medicaid fraud charge. Believing itself
to be bound solely by the plain language of the judgment (and stressing that the
Commonwealth had not ever sought to amend that judgment), the circuit court thus
2 We note that in filling out the form expungement order, the circuit court failed to check the box to indicate that the expunged charges had not been dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to other charges or any boxes to indicate the legal basis for the expungement. Better practice, of course, would be for the court to check all applicable boxes and to handwrite any additional comments or findings on all future expungement orders. However, the subsequent order on the Commonwealth’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate, clarified that the circuit court found that the expunged charge had not been dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea on other charges, thus satisfying its fact-finding responsibilities.
-3- denied the Commonwealth’s motion. The Commonwealth then filed this appeal.
Davis failed to file a responsive brief.3
The Commonwealth argues that the plain language of KRS
431.076(1)(b) resolves this matter and the circuit court’s findings otherwise are
directly contradicted by the record. Answering whether the theft charge was
eligible for expungement requires us to analyze KRS 431.076, and since “statutory
interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo; and the conclusions
reached by the lower court[] are entitled to no deference.” Commonwealth v. Love,
334 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky. 2011). We “interpret statutes in accordance with their
plain meanings, generally construing non-technical words according to their
common meanings.” Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
KRS 431.076 provides in relevant part:
(1) (a) . . .
(b) A person who has been charged with a criminal offense . . . against whom charges have been dismissed and not in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge . . . may petition the court in which the disposition of the charges was made to expunge all charges.
3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(8)(c) provides that when no appellee brief is filed, we may “(i) accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues as correct; (ii) reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain such action; or (iii) regard the appellee’s failure as a confession of error and reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the case.” “We have discretion to decide the way to respond to [Davis’s] failure to file a brief.” Hawkins v. Jones, 555 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Ky.App. 2018). Given the straightforward nature of this appeal, we elect to not penalize Davis.
-4- ...
(3) (a) If the court finds that the petition under subsection (1)(b) of this section is properly brought, the court shall grant the petition and order the expunging of the records.
KRS 431.076(3)(a) states that upon a showing that a petition meets the statutory
requirements for an expungement under (1)(b), the records “shall” be expunged.
This does not grant circuit courts any discretion to deny a petitioner who meets the
criteria in KRS 431.076(1)(b) from receiving an expungement.
We agree with the circuit court that “[t]he Judgment is the Record in
the case,” and that it was appropriate for the circuit court to decline to “look to
extraneous matters to interpret a document that is clear on its face.” Whatever
discussions or agreements were memorialized between the parties, “a court speaks
through the language of its orders and judgments.” Glogower v. Crawford, 2
S.W.3d 784, 785 (Ky. 1999). It is the judgment that is the final word as to what
has taken place in Davis’s case.
While the Commonwealth repeatedly states that the theft by deception
charge was dismissed as part of a plea agreement in exchange for Davis pleading
guilty to Medicaid fraud, essentially arguing that this condition was obvious, the
judgment contains no conditions for such dismissal. Instead, this is just one
possible interpretation that is not clearly stated in the judgment. Furthermore, none
-5- of the documents in the record explicitly condition the dismissal of the theft charge
to the guilty plea on the Medicaid fraud charge.
The circuit court’s factual finding as to the nature of the plea
agreement reflected in the judgment, that the dismissal of the theft charge was not
conditioned on the guilty plea on the Medicaid fraud charge, is supported by
substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous. This constitutes a valid
interpretation of the circuit court’s judgment within its discretion.4
To look outside the judgment and infer, assume, or guess that the
Commonwealth’s agreement meant more or less than what the judgment reflects
most certainly runs afoul of both the letter and spirit of our expungement statutes.
In this analysis, we are further persuaded by fact that the evolution of our
expungement laws evince the legislature’s intent to both favor and broaden the
availability of expungements to the citizenry with regard to non-violent crimes.
We also agree with the circuit court that if the Commonwealth
disagreed with the representation of why the charge was dismissed as recited in the
judgment, it should have filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05
motion within a reasonable time after the judgment was entered, seeking to correct
4 We do note, however, that the circuit court judge who sentenced Davis was subsequently elected to this Court. Thus, the judge who granted the expungement was not the sentencing judge.
-6- it, rather than waiting until Davis filed his motion for expungement, nearly eight
years after the judgment was entered.
Therefore, Davis’s petition met the statutory requirements for
expungement under KRS 431.076(1)(b) and there was, and remains, no lawful
basis in the record for its denial. The circuit court acted appropriately in carrying
out its duty and expunging the theft charge.
Accordingly, the Fayette Circuit Court’s order of expungement is
affirmed.
JONES, JUDGE, CONCURS.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE OPINION.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew H. Kleinert Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-