Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. McHarg

282 F. 560, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 2669
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedMay 22, 1922
DocketNo. 193
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 282 F. 560 (Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. McHarg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. McHarg, 282 F. 560, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 2669 (2d Cir. 1922).

Opinion

ROGERS, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). This case presents an interesting and important question. The defendant McHarg is an attorney at law, and was a member of a law firm composed of himself and one other; the firm being employed by the plaintiff as its counsel. As already stated, McHarg was also a director in the plaintiff corporation, as well as its secretary and treasurer during the time of the transactions complained of. At a meeting of the executive committee of the corporation, held at its office in New York City on December 31, 1918, McHarg, as treasurer of the corporation, submitted a list of delinquent subscribers to the stock of the corporation and recommended that appropriate action be taken immediately to forfeit their subscriptions. Thereupon resolutions were introduced declaring the subscribers named therein to be delinquent in the amounts specified therein, and directing the secretary of the corporation to notify the delinquents of the action taken, and authorizing, empowering, and directing him to sell so much of the said shares as were not theretofore redeemed at public auction to the highest bidder at a place named in the city of Pierre, S. D., on January 6, 1919. And it was also resolved that the plaintiff corporation should, at the said sale, bid in and purchase all or any part of said shares which it might be entitled to do under and in the manner provided by the laws of South Dakota. And it is to be kept in mind that the secretary, who was empowered to make the sale, was the same Mr. McHarg who is the defendant herein, and who was also one of the plaintiff’s attorneys during the period involved.

[563]*563It appears that under the laws of the state of South Dakota, the plaintiff being a South Dakota corporation, the plaintiff was not entitled to bid in the stock, if there should be any other bidders to the extent of the assessments due and the costs of sale. But, if no such other bidders appeared, then the corporation might itself buy in the stock. Revised Code of South Dakota, § 8807. Prior to the day fixed for the sale McHarg who was empowered to make the sale for his corporation and to buy in the stock for the corporation, in the contingency above mentioned, advised the assistant secretary in charge at Pierre that money had been paid to him in New York for the purchase of the stock and that it was to be bid in to the extent indicated in his letter of instructions and was to be issued in the names of the persons mentioned in such letter, the persons so mentioned being Mc-Harg’s codefendants in this suit.

The District Judge, in his opinion below, makes the following statement as to the facts:

“A consideration of all tlie evidence convinces me that the purchase of the stock here in suit was made for the benefit of the defendant McHarg. He was the secretary and treasurer of the plaintiff corporation, as well as a director, and one of its attorneys. It was under his instructions, pursuant to appropriate resolution of the directors, that the sale of the defaulted stock subscription‘con tract was carried out. Nevertheless, under a pretense that tne defendants Benedict, Stevens, and Fuller had supplied him with funds to bid in for their account a certain number of shares of plaintiff’s capital stock, McHarg became the beneficial owner thereof. The fact seems to me to be so plainly established as to make unnecessary a detailed statement of the evidence whereon the finding is based.”

We do not deem it necessary to review the testimony which appears in the record, although we shall, as we proceed, have occasion to refer to some portions of it. We have read the testimony with care, and it is sufficient now to say that it has made the same impression upon us that it made upon the District Judge. The defendant McHarg, whose law firm was employed as the plaintiff's legal advisers in respect to its legal business and presumptively, therefore, as to its foreclosure suits, and who in his individual capacity as secretary was empowered to make the sale of these stocks, stood in the relation of a fiduciary to this plaintiff.

No principle is better established in the law than that loyalty to his trust is the first duty which every agent owes to his principal. It underlies all agencies. The law condemns as contrary to public policy any conduct in an agent which involves a breach of fidelity in that relationship which is most jealously guarded. An agent will not be permitted to place himself in a position where his own interests may become antagonistic to those of his principal. As was said in the Chancery Court of New Jersey in Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq. 174, 176, the law by which an agent is bound to regulate his conduct “is a law of jealousy.” And an agent who is authorized to sell his principal’s property certainly cannot, without his principal’s consent, purchase the property for himself. Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178, 22 L. Ed. 482; Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U. S. 673, 14 Sup. Ct. 741, 38 L. Ed. 592. In Porter v. Woodruff, supra, the Vice Chancellor well said:

[564]*564“The general interests of justice and the safety of those who are compelled to repose confidence .in others alike demand that the courts shall always inflexibly maintain that great and salutary rule which declares that an agent employed to sell cannot make himself the purchaser, nor, if employed to purchase, can he De himself the seller.”

And, of course, what tire law does not permit an agent to do directly, it will not permit him to do indirectly. He cannot evade the law by causing the property to be purchased ostensibly for another, but in reality for himself. The court in all such cases looks behind the appearance in which the transaction has been clothed, and will decide the case in accordance with the naked facts, which it has been sought to cover up and conceal. Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 257; Eldridge v. Walker, 60 Ill. 230; Merriam v. Johnson, 86 Minn. 61, 90 N. W. 116; Hughes v. Washington, 72 Ill. 84.

In such cases it is needless to say that it is quite immaterial that the sale made is a public one. Harrison v. McHenry, 9 Ga. 164, 52 Am. Dec. 435; Perkins v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 144; People v. Township Board, 11 Mich. 222. And it applies to the officers and directors ■ of corporations, who are regarded in courts of equity as trustees. Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, 22 L. Ed. 492; Greenfield Savings Bank v. Simons, 133 Mass. 415; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Hoffman Steam Coal Co., 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 159.

But it is to be kept in mind that McHarg was not merely an agent or a quasi trustee. He was also plaintiff’s attorney. The law makes it .the duty of an attorney to exercise in all his relations to his client the most scrupulous good faith and fidelity. He is bound/to exercise the highest degree of honor, integrity, and fidelity to his client’s interests. Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144, 50 Am. Dec. 386; Pierce v. Palmer, 31 R. I. 432, 77 Atl. 201, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 181. The relation is one of peculiar and exceptional confidence, so much so that tire courts have held that a gift made by the client to his attorney during the continuance of the relationship cannot be upheld, but must be declared to be absolutely void. Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G., M. & G. 270; Greenfield’s Estate, 14 Pa. 489, 506; Morgan v. Minett, 6 Ch. D. 638, 646, in which Vice Chancellor Bacon declared that to give effect to a gift from the client to his attorney “that relation must be severed.” In O’Brien v.

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Bluebook (online)
282 F. 560, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 2669, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-finance-corp-v-mcharg-ca2-1922.