Commonwealth ex relatione Leslie v. County Commissioners

5 Rawle 75
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 1, 1835
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 5 Rawle 75 (Commonwealth ex relatione Leslie v. County Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth ex relatione Leslie v. County Commissioners, 5 Rawle 75 (Pa. 1835).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Rogers, J.

A rule has been obtained on the commissioners of the county of Philadelphia, at the instance of James Leslie, to show cause, why a mandamus should not issue, directing them to receive the return of the assessment made in Locust Ward, by James Leslie, Henry Vollum, and Nathan P. Sullivan; to make payment to said persons of the amounts prescribed by law for their services as assessor, and assistant assessors, of said ward; and to appoint as collector of taxes in said ward, one of the individuals returned to them for that purpose, by said Leslie, Vollum and Sullivan. Cause has been shown, the grounds of which are stated at large in the return of the commissioners to the rule.

For the relator to succeed in this application, it must clearly appear that the assessors de facto, were not duly elected; for if it were a doubtful election, a mandamus ought not to be granted. I do not take into view, that the assessors de facto, were not parties to this rule, as we shall consider the case in the same light as if the rule was amended by the insertion of their names on the record. [77]*77But still the objection remains, that when there is any doubt of the validity of the election, the court will not interfere by mandamus, but will put the party in the first instance to an information in nature of a quo warranto. Before a mandamus would be granted against the commissioners, we should require that there should be a judgment of ouster against those who were actually performing the duties of the office. And this would be a sufficient answer to the rule; for here it is plain, that the election or appointment of the officers defacto, is not apparently such a one as is merely colourable and void. Rex. v. Bankes et al., 3 Burr. R. 1454.

But we do not intend to rest the case on this ground, as the effect would merely be to turn the relators round to a new proceeding. This course would not meet the wishes of either party.

I shall examine the case in two points of view. 1. What is the title of the relators; and 2d, the title of the respondents, and by respondents I mean the officers de facto, to whom the commissioners directed their precept, and whom we take to be parties to the rule.

I must first premise, that as a prerequisite to the issuing of a mandamus, it must appear not only that the respondents have no title but that the relators have. The writ is grounded on the suggestion of their own right. It cannot be claimed as a right that the court is bound to issue a mandamus to compel the commissioners, for instance, to pay money for services rendered as assessors, when they are not legally such, nor even colourably so. And this makes it our duty to inquire by what title the relators claim to be assessors. The counsel for the relators rest their pretensions on the return of the constable, made in pursuance of the 4th section of the act of the 11th of April, 1799. The act directs that the constables holding elections shall make a return thereof, signed by the judges, within ten days, to the commissioners of the proper county, &c. who shall file the same in their office. They contend that the commissioners are compelled to receive and file the return of the constable, and to issue their precept to the persons therein named, to make the assessment. But conceding that the commissioners have no discretion in relation to the return, (a point which I shall hereafter notice,) yet it is not perceived how this helps the relator’s case, unless it can be also shown that the return is conclusive on the Supreme Court, and that in fact there is no tribunal in the commonwealth' competent to examine into, and correct gross fraud or illegality of procedure, on the part of the returning officer. It is in vain to deny, that this court have a superintending power by information, to examine and correct abuses in such cases, and I cannot conceive how this can be done in many cases unless we go behind the return. It is not sufficient that forms have been observed, but it is necessary to its validity that the election shall have been conducted in the manner prescribed by law. By the return of the commissioners in which the facts are stated, with the requisite clearness and precision, it [78]*78' appears that the constable, in pursuance of the directions of the act . of assembly, gave notice of the time and place of holding the election. That the electors assembled at the time, and the place designated, that being the place generally used for the purposes aforesaid; that much confusion and disorder having arisen, the constable and the two persons who it was alleged were elected judges, removed the election from the place designated, and opened the polls at a neighboring house; at which place the relators had the highest number of votes, and were returned by the constable and judges as duly elected assessors of the ward. The change of place was the act of the constable, or of the constable and judges; and if such authority is vested in him or them, it must be by virtue of some act of assembly which has not been produced. The only mode in which the place can be altered, is by force of the act of'the fifteenth of April, 1807, which makés it lawful for a majority of the qualified electors present at any meeting held at the usual place for electing assessors or inspectors, or other township officers, to change the place of holding said election to any suitable or convenient house, best adapted for the convenience of the inhabitants of the respective townships. Now whether the majority present would'have had the' right to adjourn the election it is useless to determine, as there is no evidence of an overwhelming necessity; nor is there any allegation that any vote was taken to ascertain the wish of the electors. We are therefore of the opinion, that the relators were not legally elected, and have no title to the office of assessors, and this is of itself a decisive answer to the rule for a mandamus.

I shall now proceed to examine the respondent’s title; and by the respondents, as before intimated, we mean the persons appointed assessors by the commissioners. In discussing the question, it will be necesssary to inquire what rights were acquired by the election held at the proper place. For after the secession of the constable, the electors who remained elected judges, who held an election at the- usual place designated by the constable, and who returned to the commissioners that John Rutherford, James M. Linnard, and John Benner, had received a majority of votes, stating the number each had received, and that they were duly elected assessors for the ward. This was a proceeding wholly unwarranted, for there is no law which authorizes an election under such circumstances, and in the manner above stated. For the 2d section of the act of the 15th of February, 1799, prescribes that if any constable shall neglect or refuse to perform the duties' required of him by that act, he shall forfeit the sum of fifty dollars; and in case of neglect, refusal, death, or absence from the county, of any constable or constables, the overseers of the poor of the township, ward or district. When there shall be no overseer of the poor, in such cases the supervisors of the highways shall perform the duties required to be done by the constable, &c. This act relates to the election of inspectors; but by [79]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
5 Rawle 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-ex-relatione-leslie-v-county-commissioners-pa-1835.