Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission

906 F.2d 705, 285 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9704, 1990 WL 82247
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJune 19, 1990
Docket89-5231
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 906 F.2d 705 (Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission, 906 F.2d 705, 285 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9704, 1990 WL 82247 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

The Federal Election Commission determined that the Republican National Independent Expenditure Committee (RNIEC) and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) were not affiliated within the meaning of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5), and therefore that there was not probable cause to believe that they had exceeded the expenditure limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a, in their support of Dan Evans’s 1983 campaign for the United States Senate. The district court upheld the agency’s conclusion. Common Cause v. FEC, 715 F.Supp. 398 (1989). We reverse because the FEC did not adequately analyze the issue of affiliation in the terms prescribed by the governing statute and regulation.

I. BACKGROUND

Common Cause filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that the RNIEC and the NRSC were affiliated within the meaning of § 441a(a)(5) of the FECA, and that, in furtherance of Evans’s Senate race, they had coordinated their expenditures within *706 the meaning of § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). If the committees were affiliated, or if they coordinated their expenditures on behalf of Evans, then they exceeded the spending limit of § 441a.

Common Cause’s affiliation claim was based upon three facts. First, Mr. Rodney Smith served as Financial Director and Treasurer of the NRSC until two months before he co-founded and became Treasurer of the RNIEC. Second, Senator John Heinz continued to be a member of the NRSC for a short time after he co-founded and joined the Advisory Panel of the RNIEC. Third, as a result of the RNIEC’s use of the NRSC’s mailing list, there was a substantial overlap in the roster of contributors to the two committees.

Following an investigation, the General Counsel of the FEC concluded that the RNIEC and the NRSC were not affiliated and did not coordinate their expenditures; he therefore recommended that the FEC find no probable cause to believe that there had been a violation of the Act. Specifically, the General Counsel concluded that Mr. Smith had not taken advantage of his links to the two organizations in order to further Evans’s campaign; that “despite th[e] overlap in memberships, Senator Heinz did not communicate in any manner with the NRSC concerning the Evans senate race” and “was not provided with information concerning NRSC’s plans and activities”; and that although the RNIEC’s use of the NRSC’s contributor list was “instrumental” in its establishment, “there is a genuine dispute as to ownership of the list thus militating against the list as a presumption of the affiliation of the two committees.” The General Counsel also found generally that “the NRSC attempted to distance itself from the RNIEC and its independent activities.”

The Commission, without opinion, adopted the General Counsel’s recommendation, thus concluding that there is no probable cause to believe that a violation occurred. Common Cause sought review in the district court, which — on the assumption that the FEC adopted the reasoning of the General Counsel’s brief, see FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 38 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 38, 45 n. 19, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981) — upheld the agency’s putative findings that the RNIEC and the NRSC were not affiliated and had not coordinated their expenditures in re Evans. 715 F.Supp. at 401-05. Common Cause now appeals only the “not affiliated” aspect of that decision.

II. Analysis

Judicial review of the FEC’s decision is deferential: a court is to reverse the agency only if its decision is “contrary to law.” 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(C); see Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 37, 102 S.Ct. at 44. Accordingly, we consider whether the agency’s decision was based upon an impermissible interpretation of the FECA or was arbitrary and capricious. Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C.Cir.1986). Because, in so doing, we are “dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, [we] must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). We will, however, uphold an agency decision “of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974).

In this instance, we are unable to uphold the Commission’s decision (equating it with the General Counsel’s brief) because it gives no indication that the agency considered whether the NRSC and the RNIEC were affiliated as that term is defined in the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions. Indeed, the brief lacks any discussion of the affiliation issue that is independent of the analysis of the separate coordination issue.

Section 441a(a)(5) of the FECA defines affiliated committees as those that are “established or financed or maintained or controlled” by the same person or group. At the time in question, the Commission had implemented this definition by promulgat *707 ing a regulation listing several “indicia” of affiliation, including “[t]he authority, power, or ability to hire, appoint, discipline, discharge, demote, or remove or otherwise influence the decision of the officers or members of an entity;” and “[s]imilar patterns of contributions.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(g)(2)(ii)(C), (D) (1989) (since revised).

The brief merely mentions the statutory criteria, which were also incorporated into the Commission’s regulations, § 100.5(g)(2); it makes no attempt to tie those criteria to the facts of this case. Even more telling, the brief makes no reference to the relevant indicia of affiliation listed in the implementing regulations, cf., e.g., In re Mondale for President Comm., Inc., MUR 1667, First General Counsel’s Report (May 7, 1984), and thus fails to address the specific grounds urged by Common Cause for holding that the committees were affiliated. As a result, there is simply no indication that the agency ever considered whether Mr. Smith or Senator Heinz had the “authority, power, or ability to hire, appoint, discipline, discharge, demote, or remove or otherwise influence the decision of the officers or members of” the two committees.

Thus, with respect to Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
906 F.2d 705, 285 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9704, 1990 WL 82247, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/common-cause-v-federal-election-commission-cadc-1990.