Commodore William Moss v. Walter E. Craven, Warden

Ninth Circuit

Commodore William Moss v. Walter E. Craven, Warden

427 F.2d 139, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9061

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 26, 1970

Docket22198

StatusPublished

Cited by42 cases

This text of 427 F.2d 139 (Commodore William Moss v. Walter E. Craven, Warden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Commodore William Moss v. Walter E. Craven, Warden, 427 F.2d 139, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9061 (9th Cir. 1970).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, a California prisoner, appeals from an order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

After an evidentiary hearing the district court found that “petitioner was properly represented by counsel and that he pleaded guilty with an understanding of the significance of the plea and the consequences stemming therefrom.” Based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, and the state court record, we cannot say that these findings are clearly erroneous. Knowles v. Gladden, 378 F.2d 761, 766-767 (9th Cir. 1967).

Petitioner contends that the state trial record was insufficient to establish the voluntariness of his guilty plea under the standards enunciated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the rule of McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), would apply only to guilty pleas accepted after the date of the McCarthy decision. We think that the reasoning of Halliday requires the denial of retroactive effect to the Boykin decision. Accord, United States ex rel. Hughes v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 134-135, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 585-586, 460 P.2d 449 (1969).

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, a California prisoner, appeals from an order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

After an evidentiary hearing the district court found that “petitioner was properly represented by counsel and that he pleaded guilty with an understanding of the significance of the plea and the consequences stemming therefrom.” Based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, and the state court record, we cannot say that these findings are clearly erroneous. Knowles v. Gladden, 378 F.2d 761, 766-767 (9th Cir. 1967).

Petitioner contends that the state trial record was insufficient to establish the voluntariness of his guilty plea under the standards enunciated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the rule of McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), would apply only to guilty pleas accepted after the date of the McCarthy decision. We think that the reasoning of Halliday requires the denial of retroactive effect to the Boykin decision. Accord, United States ex rel. Hughes v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 134-135, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 585-586, 460 P.2d 449 (1969).

Affirmed.

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427 F.2d 139, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9061, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commodore-william-moss-v-walter-e-craven-warden-ca9-1970.

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