Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Risk Capital Trading Group, Inc.

452 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60720, 2006 WL 2468277
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedAugust 14, 2006
Docket1:03CV2633 ODE
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 452 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Risk Capital Trading Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Risk Capital Trading Group, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60720, 2006 WL 2468277 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Opinion

ORDER

EVANS, District Judge.

This civil enforcement action brought under the Commodity Exchange Act (the “Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., is currently before the Court for findings of fact and conclusions of law as to Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Rick Siegel (“Siegel”) following a bench trial on June 12-15, 2006. 1

Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Plaintiff’ or “CFTC”) is the independent federal regulatory agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 1.1 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that Siegel, in his capacity as an Associated Person (“AP”) 2 of Risk Capital Trading Group, Inc. (“Risk *1234 Capital”), violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Act, specifically 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(i) and (iii), 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 33.10, in soliciting customers to buy and sell commodity futures contracts and options on commodity futures contracts. Plaintiff claims that Siegel caused his customers to invest money under a false impression of the probability of large profits. Almost all of Siegel’s customers lost all or substantial portions of their investments.

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction, restraining Siegel from further violating the Act and also from engaging in any commodity-related sales activity.

Plaintiff seeks restitution in the following amounts for the four former customers of Siegel who testified at trial: Etienne Brown — $2,985.12; Michael Maiorino— $ 9,432; Sandra Brothers — $8,301.92; and Dean Wiegand' — $2,892.41. Plaintiff also seeks restitution for all of Siegel’s other customers in the amount of $990,492.55.

Plaintiff seeks disgorgement of Siegel’s compensation derived from his customers in the amount of $102,417.

Finally, Plaintiff seeks civil monetary penalties in the maximum amount allowed under the Act of $120,000 for each violation of the Act.

Having heard the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and having reviewed their briefs which have been filed, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

I. Findings of Fact

Beginning in January 2001, Risk Capital operated as an “introducing broker,” 3 soliciting orders for options and futures contracts. Its primary place of business was in Atlanta, Georgia. Risk Capital sold predominantly commodity options to small retail customers whose business was sought through “cold call” telemarketing. Risk Capital closed in September 2003, following an investigation and Complaint by the National Futures Association (“NFA”), an investigation by the CFTC, and the filing of the instant lawsuit.

The trial evidence showed that Risk Capital was a scam: Its principals had been involved in other similar schemes. By using aggressive sales techniques and false and misleading representations with clients who were gullible and vulnerable, Risk Capital induced the clients to pay commissions (often on a repeat basis) for speculative investments which had no real chance of success.

From 2002 to 2003 Risk Capital took in approximately $7,300,000 in commissions in $200 and $100 increments. It had over 1,000 customers who collectively lost over $11,000,000. Approximately 97% of Risk Capital’s customers lost money — exceeding the 85% loss rate which has been estimated for the small investor commodity industry as a whole.

Risk Capital’s customers usually purchased “call” options. 4 The owner of a call *1235 option on a futures contract has the right to purchase the underlying futures contract at a specified price (“strike price”) at any time before a specified date in the future. Risk Capital sold primarily so-called “deep out of the money” call options. These options are cheap in relation to other options because the strike price is so far above the futures market price (when the option is purchased) that it is highly unlikely that the futures market price will ever reach the strike price. In the highly unlikely event that the market rises above the strike price, the option holder can make a large leveraged profit. Otherwise a modest profit can be made by selling the option on the secondary options market if and when the market price for the option has risen above the price originally paid by the client. Of course, the client’s breakeven point includes not only the price of the option (called the “premium”) but also commissions and NFA fees. 5

The movement of the commodity options market is unpredictable and can be volatile. Capturing a profit (or minimizing a loss) through sale of the option requires close, continuous attention to the market and an element of luck in effecting the sale before the market worsens. Sale of an option at a loss may be the best course of action. The passage of time (moving toward the expiration date) tends to degrade the option’s value. When an out-of-the-money option expires, it is worthless and the customer will have lost his total investment (the price of the option plus commissions and NFA fees).

Occasionally Risk Capital’s clients would purchase commodity futures contracts. A commodity futures contract is a contract to buy (or sell) a standard quantity of a particular commodity at a specified price and time in the future. The owner of a futures contract is exposed to risk far beyond the purchase price of the futures contract. If he still owns the contract at maturity, he would be forced to purchase (or sell) the specific commodity at the price set in the contract or to meet his obligation through alternative means. 6

Risk Capital purchased names and telephone numbers of potential customers. Its representatives would make cold calls to these prospects, often using misleading sales scripts. The cold caller would fill out a prospect information sheet which would describe the call. If the prospect showed some interest, the cold caller would send Risk Capital’s “Risk Disclosure Packet” and the prospect information sheet would be turned over to an account executive (such as Siegel) who would make a followup sales call. If an account was opened, the account executive would make the first options purchase. The account would then be turned over to a “trading advisor” who determined when the option should be sold and who would pitch another investment. Risk Capital had four trading advisors.

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Related

Troyer v. Heneghan
N.D. Indiana, 2019
Troyer v. Nat'l Futures Ass'n
290 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Indiana, 2018)
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Brockbank
505 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Utah, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
452 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60720, 2006 WL 2468277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commodity-futures-trading-commission-v-risk-capital-trading-group-inc-gand-2006.