Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Bryant

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedOctober 28, 2024
Docket3:21-cv-00487
StatusUnknown

This text of Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Bryant (Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Bryant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Bryant, (W.D.N.C. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION 3:21-cv-00487-RJC-DCK

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING ) COMMISSION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) STORM BRYANT, ELIJAH BRYANT, III, ) CAPITALSTORM LLC, ) GENERATIONBLACK LLC, AND ) NCOME, LLC, ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 78), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default against Corporate Defendants, (Doc. No. 86). The Motion for Summary Judgment comes before the Court unopposed and is ripe for adjudication. As explained below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default is DENIED AS MOOT. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) filed this lawsuit on September 15, 2021, seeking injunctive and other equitable relief as well as civil monetary penalties under the Commodity Exchange Act (the “Act”) against Defendants Storm Bryant and Elijah Bryant, III (the “Bryants”), and Corporate Defendants CapitalStorm LLC, GenerationBlack LLC, and Ncome LLC. (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 30–33). In addition to each Defendant’s own liability, the Complaint alleges that the Bryants and the Corporate Defendants are liable for each other’s acts pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(1)(B) and 13c(b) and Commission Regulation (“Regulation”) 1.2, 17

C.F.R. §1.2, as principals for their agents’, the Bryants’, violations of the Act. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 11–12). Plaintiff’s statement of the facts remains undisputed. From March 2, 2018, through September 15, 2021, the Bryants, individually and through the Corporate Defendants, solicited clients and prospective clients, who were not eligible contract participants (“ECPs”) to engage in retail transactions in off-exchange foreign currency (“forex”) on a leveraged, margined, or financed basis. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶ 1 (citing Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶ 9, 10, 18, 25)). The Bryants controlled the

Corporate Defendants in their capacities as officers, agents, and principals of CapitalStorm, GenerationBlack, and Ncome. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶ 18; Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶ 8, 13–17, 34–43). Corporate Defendants, without registration as commodity trading advisors (“CTAs”), solicited clients through in-person meetings and the use of social media and the internet. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶ 4; Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶ 9, 12–16, 20, 25, 32). The Bryants, in their personal capacity, engaged in the same conduct without registration

as associated persons (“APs”) of a CTA. Id. Defendants set up the business as a Ponzi scheme, using money deposited by clients to pay out the same or other clients. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶ 3; Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶ 11, 20). Throughout the relevant time, Defendants misappropriated $1,993,414.58 from 233 clients by receiving and/or moving funds into accounts held in the Bryants’ own names and using the money to support their lavish lifestyle. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶¶ 2, 14; Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶ 9–11, 17–20). Most clients did not receive any return of funds, despite their repeated demands. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶ 16; Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶ 21, 23). Defendants made many material misrepresentations and omissions to induce

clients into depositing money, including statements regarding how clients’ funds would be used to open trading accounts; Defendants’ success, performance, and generous returns; and Defendants’ ability to lawfully trade for anyone. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶ 7; Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶ 13–16, 20–23, 27). Further, Defendants failed to disclose that they never opened accounts in clients’ names; they did not conduct trading for clients; the trading accounts clients viewed were demos; and neither Corporate Defendants nor the Bryants were registered with the CFTC. (Doc. No. 78-2 ¶ 9; Doc. No. 78-3 ¶¶

8–11, 16, 18, 20). On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment and requested that this Court enter a permanent injunction imposing trading and registration bans and enjoining Defendants from future violations of the Act and Regulations. (Doc. No. 78-1 at 23). Plaintiff further requested that this Court order Defendants to pay restitution, jointly and severally, in the amount of

$1,329,619.85, plus post-judgment interest, and order Defendants to pay a civil monetary penalty, jointly and severally, in the amount of $3,988,859.55, plus post- judgment interest. (Id. at 23–24). On January 19, 2024, this Court issued a Roseboro Order, ordering the individual Defendants to respond to the pending motion within fourteen days of the order and ordering the Corporate Defendants to retain counsel. (Doc. No. 81). Defendants failed to respond or retain counsel. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff moved for entry of default against Corporate Defendants for failure to retain counsel. (Doc. No. 86). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal citations omitted). “The burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ . . . an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. A failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment does not automatically establish for the moving party the burden imposed upon it by Rule 56. Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir.1993). In an uncontested motion for summary judgment, the moving party’s asserted facts are uncontroverted, and thus there is no genuine issue of material fact. However, the moving party must also establish “that it is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Thus, the court, “in considering a motion for summary judgment,

must review the motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has before it whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Id. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

III.

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Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Bryant, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commodity-futures-trading-commission-v-bryant-ncwd-2024.