Commitment of K B

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 25A-MH-00925
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of K.B., Nov 25 2025, 9:18 am

Appellant-Respondent CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health, Appellee-Petitioner

November 25, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-MH-925 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Sarah Glasser, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-2503-MH-14108

Opinion by Judge Mathias Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 1 of 14 Mathias, Judge.

[1] When a trial court orders a person to be involuntarily and temporarily

committed, Indiana Code section 12-26-6-8(b) (2024) requires the trial court to

order the facility to which the person is committed to file a treatment plan with

the court. Here, following the trial court’s order that K.B. be committed to the

care of Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health (“Community”) for not more

than ninety days, 1 Community filed a treatment plan summary, later amended,

with the trial court. K.B. then sought to compel Community to file a more

definite treatment plan, which the trial court denied.

[2] On appeal, K.B. raises two issues for our review, but we consider only the

following question of first impression: whether the trial court erred when it

denied K.B.’s request to compel Community to file a more definite treatment

plan. We initially conclude that K.B.’s apparent argument that the filed

treatment plan precluded his ability to challenge the forcible nature of his

treatment is incorrect. K.B. had the opportunity at the hearing on the petition

for his involuntary commitment to challenge his treatment plan, and he does

not identify a post-order change in his treatment plan that justifies reversal of

the trial court’s decision. We also conclude that, while we agree with K.B. that

the required treatment-plan filing must be sufficiently detailed so as to put the

patient on reasonable notice as to what his or her treatment plan is, K.B. does

1 We appreciate Community’s recognition that this appeal is not moot. See Appellee’s Br. at 12 n.2 (citing J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260 (Ind. 2025)).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 2 of 14 not demonstrate that Community’s amended filing failed to meet that standard.

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied K.B.’s

request.

Facts and Procedural History [3] Since at least 2016, K.B. has been treated for various psychotic and mood

disorders. K.B.’s symptoms have included paranoid delusions, auditory

hallucinations, disorganized thoughts and behaviors, “ups and downs” in

mood, and poor self-care. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 17-18. Around late 2024, K.B. told his

mother, who lived in Florida at the time, that he was going to stop taking

medication for his mental health because he was “no longer . . . schizophrenic,”

and, thus, “he no longer need[ed] medication.” Id. at 9.

[4] In early March 2025, when K.B. was thirty-two years old, K.B.’s mother

became especially “concerned” for his mental health, and she moved to

Indianapolis “to be able to help” him. Id. K.B. moved in with his mother

shortly thereafter. However, in late March, K.B. became “out of control.” Id.

He broke several televisions in his mother’s home; “he was paranoid going

from room to room . . . checking to see if anyone was coming in the house”; he

was “arguing” and “talking to himself”; he became aggressive with his mother;

and he turned on a faucet and “s[at] there letting water overflow” onto the

floor. Id.

[5] K.B.’s mother called law enforcement, and K.B. was transported to

Community. There, he met with Dr. Syed Hasan, a psychiatrist, on four

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 3 of 14 occasions. On one of those occasions, Dr. Hasan and staff went into K.B.’s

room and observed that K.B. had “urinated all over . . . the room,” spread

“fecal material” and “food all over the place,” and soaked his own clothing in

urine, “sleeping on it” all with “no regard about his own self-care.” Id. at 18.

When staff attempted to have K.B. “take [a] bath,” K.B. became “very

aggressive” and would not allow the staff to assist him. Id.

[6] On another occasion, Dr. Hasan observed K.B. “pacing the unit” alleging that

another patient “has H.I.V.” Id. K.B. was also “yelling . . . profanity” toward

that other patient. Id. And Community officials observed K.B. “vomiting very

frequently” and avoiding “line of sight instructions” while also attempting to

“intoxicate himself with . . . water.” Id.

[7] Dr. Hasan diagnosed K.B. with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Dr.

Hasan concluded that K.B. does not have insight into his own mental illness,

which results in K.B. believing that he does not need to be treated and does not

need to take prescribed medications. Dr. Hasan further concluded that K.B.

would not be able to “interact appropriately” with his mother if he returned to

her home. Id. at 19. That conclusion included K.B. not being able to engage in

appropriate self-care or to avoid hostility that results from his paranoias.

[8] Community petitioned the court to order K.B.’s temporary commitment. K.B.’s

mother and Dr. Hasan testified in support of the petition at an ensuing

evidentiary hearing. With respect to K.B.’s treatment plan and to whether

K.B.’s commitment was appropriate, Dr. Hasan specifically testified as follows:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 4 of 14 [Counsel for Community]: In your opinion why is a commitment for a period not to exceed ninety days necessary to provide an improvement in [K.B.’s] condition?

Dr. Hasan: It’s the least restrictive treatment option in my opinion for him[;] ninety days should be adequate at this time to start the medications and have his condition stabilized.

[Counsel]: And if commitment were granted, could you please tell the court your anticipated treatment plan for [K.B.]?

Dr. Hasan: . . . [W]e w[ould] like to have him on the injectable medication Invega Sustenna[. The] record does indicate that he had . . . Risperdal previously so the order tolerance has already established and[,] if we can have him on one injection[,] that would be fine . . . .

[Counsel]: How long do you anticipate the patient will remain in[-]patient?

Dr. Hasan: I think if we start the treatment, five to seven days.

***

Dr. Hasan: . . . [T]he patient’s condition will improve quickly with these medications and then we can transition him to outpatient with active follow up.

[Counsel]: And have you considered any alternative forms of treatment?

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 5 of 14 Dr. Hasan: At this time, I don’t see any alternative treatment other than the medication to stabilize his condition.

Id. at 23-25 (all caps removed).

[9] Following the hearing, the trial court found and concluded that K.B. was

suffering from a mental illness; that he was gravely disabled; that he was in the

need of custody, care, and treatment that Community would be able to provide;

and that K.B.’s placement with Community was the least-restrictive yet suitable

environment to meet K.B.’s needs. Accordingly, the court ordered K.B. to be

committed to Community’s care for a period not to exceed ninety days.

[10] In accordance with Indiana Code section 12-26-6-8(b), the trial court’s order

also directed Community to timely file a treatment plan with the court, and

Community complied by filing a “Treatment Plan Summary.” Appellant’s App.

Vol. 2, p. 31. Community’s treatment plan summary identified K.B.’s diagnosis

as schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; identified his specific needs as

including the need for improved insight; the need for medication and treatment

compliance; the need for improved coping skills; and the need for education on

his mental illness. The treatment plan summary further described Community’s

short-term and long-term goals for K.B. as follows: “Short term: decreasing

psychosis, improving sleep, decreasing aggression. Long term: continue with

medications, going to outpatient app[ointments], working to get stable housing,

[and] addressing legal matters.” Id. Although the treatment plan summary

identified an estimated discharge date, it did not expressly identify discharge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 6 of 14 criteria or a discharge plan, and it did not specifically repeat Dr. Hasan’s

testimony regarding the need for injectable medication.

[11] Two days after Community filed its treatment plan summary with the court,

and eleven days after the court’s order for K.B.’s temporary commitment, K.B.

filed a “Petition for Consideration of Proposed Treatment Plan.” Id. at 35. In

that filing, K.B. argued that, “[b]ecause there is no specificity detailed in the

filed treatment plan,” he was “unable to exercise his statutory right” to have the

trial court consider the appropriateness of Community’s plan for his treatment

and whether his placement in Community’s care was the least-restrictive

placement available to him. Id. at 36-37.

[12] The trial court reviewed K.B.’s petition and ordered Community to “respond

and[/]or amend [the] treatment plan to be more specific” within seven days. Id.

at 4. Accordingly, Community timely filed an amended treatment plan

summary. 2 The amended treatment plan summary again identified K.B.’s

diagnosis, his specific needs, and an estimated date for discharge. It further

identified the following amended short-term and long-term goals for K.B.:

“short term—start medications, monitor effectiveness, offer group

programming, stabili[ze] acute mood[;] long term—engage in outp[atient]

treatment, medication compliance, improve insight into illness.” Id. at 54.

Community attached to its amended treatment plan detailed information

2 The Chronological Case Summary included in K.B.’s appendix does not reflect this filing. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 5, 54.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 7 of 14 regarding K.B.’s injectable medication as well as a new prescription for an oral

medication. Community also attached a description of K.B.’s “after visit”

instructions, including his most immediate “next steps,” and follow-up

appointments. 3 Id. at 55-61 (capitalization removed). The attached documents

further explained the basis for K.B. being discharged as well as “[d]ischarge

[o]rders” for K.B. to follow upon his release from his commitment. Id. at 57, 59-

60.

[13] Although Community filed an amended treatment plan summary, Community

also formally opposed K.B.’s post-order petition to consider the filed treatment

plan.4 The next day, the trial court denied K.B.’s petition with the note that

Community had filed an amended treatment plan.5

[14] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision [15] On appeal, K.B. argues that the trial court erred when it denied his post-order

petition because Community’s amended treatment plan summary was

3 Community discharged K.B. prior to the expiration of his temporary commitment, but K.B. was later readmitted. 4 The Chronological Case Summary included in K.B.’s appendix does not reflect this filing. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 5, 62. 5 The Chronological Case Summary included in K.B.’s appendix does not reflect this filing. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 5, 67.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 8 of 14 insufficiently specific. 6 In particular, K.B. argues that the purported lack of

specificity in Community’s amended treatment plan summary denied him the

opportunity to “demonstrate [Community’s] compliance with [Indiana Code

section] 12-27-2-1 . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 13. Indiana Code section 12-27-2-1

states:

Subject to [I.C. § 12-27-2-2], a patient is entitled to all of the following:

(1) Mental health services or developmental training:

(A) in accordance with standards of professional practice;

(B) appropriate to the patient’s needs; and

(C) designed to afford a reasonable opportunity to improve the patient’s condition.

(2) Humane care and protection from harm.

(3) The right to practice the patient’s religion.

6 Community’s amended treatment plan summary superseded the initial treatment plan summary. Thus, K.B.’s challenges on appeal to the sufficiency of the initial treatment plan summary are moot, and we do not consider them. Further, insofar as K.B. suggests that the trial court’s order for his commitment should be reversed because the amended treatment plan summary is insufficient to demonstrate that his placement in Community’s care was appropriate, K.B.’s argument is not supported by cogent reasoning. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). The trial court’s finding that K.B.’s placement was appropriate occurred after the fact- finding hearing and was premised on the record made at that hearing; the subsequently filed amended treatment plan summary had no bearing on that determination.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 9 of 14 (4) Contact and consultation with legal counsel and private practitioners of the patient’s choice at the patient’s expense.

And Indiana Code section 12-27-2-2 states:

(a) The rights set forth in [I.C. 12-27-2-1] are subject to the limitation that there may be certain conditions for which there is no known effective treatment or developmental training.

(b) A service provider is not required to afford mental health services or developmental training where treatment would not be likely to produce a significant improvement.

[16] K.B. also asserts that the purported lack of specificity in the amended treatment

plan summary denied him his rights under Indiana Code section 12-27-5-2.

That statute provides:

(a) An involuntary patient[7] who wants to refuse to submit to treatment or a habilitation program may petition the committing court or hearing officer for consideration of the treatment or program.

7 Given the statute’s broad reference to any “involuntary” patient, we reject Community’s argument that the statute does not apply to patients who are involuntarily committed on a temporary basis. Further, Indiana Code section 12-27-1-2 expressly excludes individuals “receiving mental health services or developmental training under the [D]epartment of [C]orrection” from article 12-27; there is no similar provision for patients who have been involuntarily committed on a temporary basis. Indeed, the relevant definition of a “service provider” under title 12 includes “[a]ny . . . hospital . . . if the individual receiving mental health services or developmental training was admitted without the individual’s consent.” I.C. § 12-7-2-175(7); see also 12-27-5- 2(b) (noting that the “service provider” may proceed with forcible treatment in the absence of a petition for judicial review). Community does not suggest in this appeal that it is not captured by that definition.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 10 of 14 (b) In the absence of a petition made under subsection (a), the service provider may proceed with the proposed treatment or habilitation program.

I.C. § 12-27-5-2.

[17] Our Court has previously recognized that Indiana Code sections 12-27-2-1 and

12-27-5-2 operate together to “provide avenues by which a committed patient

may place the appropriateness of a particular course of treatment or habilitation

program before a court for judicial review.” In re T.S., 959 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added), trans. denied. In particular, those statutes

enable judicial review of “forcible” treatment or medication; that is, treatment

or medication that would be provided against the will of the involuntarily

committed patient. Id. at 958-59.

[18] Thus, K.B.’s argument appears to be that, in the absence of a sufficiently

specific treatment-plan filing, he is unable to protect himself against the

possibility of unwanted, forcible treatment. But K.B. is incorrect. Dr. Hasan

expressly testified at the hearing on Community’s petition to order K.B.’s

involuntary commitment that K.B.’s treatment plan would include injectable

medication. A treatment plan of injectable medication in support of a petition

for involuntary commitment is straightforwardly a forcible treatment plan. K.B.

had the opportunity at that hearing to challenge the treatment plan, and, having

entered the order for K.B.’s temporary commitment, the court necessarily

approved the treatment plan as appropriate to break K.B.’s cycle of psychosis

notwithstanding his objections. In other words, K.B. was specifically informed

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 11 of 14 of the forcible nature of the proposed treatment plan at the hearing on the

petition for his involuntary commitment, and the court approved the use of that

force as necessary.

[19] A person who has been involuntarily committed by court order and then seeks

judicial review of forcible treatment under Indiana Code sections 12-27-2-1 and

12-27-5-2 must show that there has been some change in the treatment plan

beyond the treating medical professional’s testimony that resulted in the order

of temporary commitment. Further, that change need only be “proposed” by

the service provider under the statutes; section 12-27-5-2 does not condition the

right to judicial review on whether a treatment plan showing the change has

been filed with the trial court. See I.C. § 12-27-5-2(b). Nonetheless, here, the

amended treatment plan summary reflected a change in K.B.’s treatment plan

by adding an oral prescription. K.B. does not argue on appeal that the trial

court’s denial of his post-order petition for consideration was erroneous based

on that addition. And the addition of an oral medication to a treatment plan is

not so substantive that it materially affects the rights of an involuntarily

committed patient. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court’s denial of

K.B.’s petition for consideration following the order of his temporary

commitment was erroneous.

[20] Still, K.B. also asserts that the amended treatment plan summary “was so vague

it prevented him from asking . . . whether his treatment was: in accordance with

standards of professional practice; was appropriate for his circumstances; was

designed to afford a reasonable opportunity to improve his condition; and was

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 12 of 14 the least restrictive alternative.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Likewise, K.B. contends

that the amended treatment plan summary did not inform him of “what

benchmarks he must achieve before obtaining out-patient status.” Id. K.B.

suggests that those alleged failures denied him his due-process rights.

[21] Although we agree with K.B.’s general proposition that the required treatment-

plan filing must be sufficiently detailed so as to put a patient on reasonable

notice as to what his or her treatment plan is, K.B.’s arguments here do not

demonstrate that Community failed to meet that standard. Indeed, a facility’s

filing of a patient’s treatment plan following an order of temporary commitment

is not the time for any of K.B.’s proffered questions. The treatment plan is a

statutorily required filing that comes after the court’s entry of an order of

temporary commitment, and the order of an involuntary temporary

commitment, of course, comes after an evidentiary hearing before the court. See

I.C. §§ 12-26-6-4, -8(b). Questions regarding a facility’s compliance with

professional standards, the appropriateness of the placement that is sought, and

whether the placement is the least-restrictive option available have, as a matter

of law, already been adjudicated by the time the treatment plan is filed. See I.C.

§§ 12-26-2-5(e), -6-8(b). Accordingly, K.B.’s arguments here are also not

persuasive.

[22] For all of these reasons, K.B.’s challenge to the purported sufficiency of

Community’s amended treatment plan fails, and we affirm the trial court’s

order for his temporary commitment.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 13 of 14 [23] Affirmed.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Ellen M. O’Connor Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jenny R. Buchheit Abby V. DeMare Rani B. Amani Ice Miller LLP Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MH-925 | November 25, 2025 Page 14 of 14