MerriMON, C. J
-after stating the facts: The defendant contended in this Court that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and, therefore, the action must be dismissed. This objection is unfounded in any aspect of it. The parties have corporate capacity to sue and be sued, and the plaintiff may maintain an action against the defendant as to any cause of action against it it may have, of which the Court ordinarily has jurisdiction. It certainly has the right to have its cause of action and rights in and about the same, when denied and withheld,
litigated, settled, enforced and administered by appropriate judicial procedure — certainly in all cases where some particular effectual method of redress is not prescribed.
Clearly, the plaintiff alleges a cause of action. As to that part of the county of Vance taken from the county of Gran-ville, the statute creating the former county provides, as it might do, that “the citizens and taxable property” therein “shall not be released from their proportion of the outstanding” public debt of the county of Granville; and it prescribes further, that such proportion of that debt shall be ascertained and determined by certain County Commissioners “in such manner and by such method as may be agreed upon.” Thus, an important pecuniary liability to, and in favor of, the county of Granville was continued, to be settled and determined in the way prescribed. But the Commissioners directed and required to ascertain and determine that liability failed, neglected and refused, as is alleged, to ascertain and determine the same. Has the county of Gran-ville no redress in such case? Has the Court no jurisdictional authority to compel the defaulting Commissioners to a discharge of the duties imposed upon them by proper action and the application of pertinent principles of law and equity ? The very purpose of the Court is to afford appropriate remedy and grant relief. Such actions in cases in many respects like this have been oftentimes entertained.
The Code,
§§702-705;
Commissioners
v.
Commissioners,
79 N. C., 565.
It was further objected, that the statute provides that “said proportions (of the outstanding debt of the county of Granville), to be ascertained and determined by the County Commissioners of Granville, Franklin and Vance counties, in such manner and by such method as may be agreed upon,” and that the Commissioners of the County of Franklin were not called upon to join in the discharge of such duties, and are not parties to this- action. \\7e think that
this clause, properly interpreted, implies that the Commissioners of Vance and the Commissioners of Granville should have co-operated, for the purpose specified, as to the claim of Granville County, and the Commissioners of Vance and Franklin counties,.as to the like claim of Franklin County. The purpose was to ascertain and determine the claims of Granville and Franklin-counties, respectively and distinctly. Each of these counties had no interest in the claim of the other, but the county of Vance, as to parts of its citizens and taxable property, was interested adversely to Granville and Franklin counties, not jointly”, but severally and distinctly. In the nature of the matter, there was no substantial reason why the commissioners of the three counties should co-operate conjointly for the purpose specified; .there was substantial reason why the Commissioners of the county of Vance should act conjointly with the Commissioners of Granville County, as to the claims of that county, without regard to the similar claim of Franklin County. This interpretation is not unreasonable, and it seems that the parties acted upon it, certainly to some extent. Moreover, the defendant, in its answer, submits to have the matters in controversy settled by this action.
The fifteenth section of the statute recited above provides, that “that portion of the citizens and taxable property taken from the counties of Franklin and Granville and attached to the county of Vance, shall not be released from their proportion of the outstanding public debts of the said counties
contracted before
the passage of this act.” This provision created no new or additional liability; it simply continued an existing one, for the present purpose, as to the outstanding public debt of the county of Granville contracted before the enactment of this statute, the 5th of March, 1881. As to this debt, that part of the county of Granville which became a part of the county of Vance, ihe citizens and taxable property embraced by it, continued to be, in effect, a part of
the county of Granville. The intention was that the liability should continue to exist just as if the citizens and taxable property were still, and notwithstanding the erection of the county of Vance, part of the county of Granville.
Commissioners
v.
Commissioners,
79 N. C., 565. And in ascertaining and determining the proportion of the debt to be ¡¡aid by the citizens and taxable property so in the county of Vance, they should be treated as if in Granville County; they are neither to be favored nor discriminated against in ascertaining the outstanding debt, or the part of it, to be paid by them.
We are of the opinion that the exception of the appellant as to the sum of $3,450 42, paid after the 5th of March, 1881, upon judgments rendered and docketed before that date, must be sustained, because the money so paid was part of the taxes due and collected in, and as for, the year 1880. This sum of money, above that necessary to pay the current expenses of the county, wras properly applicable to the payment of such judgments. The tax-payers represented by the defendant paid the part thereof due from them, and for that purpose, just as did the other tax-payers of the county.
And so, also, and for the like reason, the exception as to the sum of $9,260.60, part of taxes collected in 1880, balance in hands of the County Treasurer on the 1st of September, 1881, must be sustained. The taxes, so far as appears, levied and collected, or collectible, in the year 1880, wrere intended to pay the current expenses of the county, and the whole surplus was properly applicable, first, to the outstanding debt on the 5th of March, 1881, and, generally, to any debt the county owed afterwards. The law contemplates that taxes shall be collected promptly, and that the money, when collected, shall be applied promptly to the payment of current county expenses, and io the payment of outstanding county debts due and payable. If the money to pay part of the debt was paid by the tax-payers as taxes, surely those
of them represented by the defendant should not be prejudiced by the delay to apply it to the payment of part of the debt until after the 5th of March, 1881. That would be rank injustice!
The exception founded upon the ground that the sum of $2,700 of the taxes of 1880 was applied to the payment of the current county expenses from the 5th of March, 1881, to the 1st of September, 1881, was not deducted in ascertaining the outstanding debt in question, cannot be sustained, because the taxes levied and collected, or collectible in 1880, were collected for, aud properly applied to, that purpose.
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MerriMON, C. J
-after stating the facts: The defendant contended in this Court that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and, therefore, the action must be dismissed. This objection is unfounded in any aspect of it. The parties have corporate capacity to sue and be sued, and the plaintiff may maintain an action against the defendant as to any cause of action against it it may have, of which the Court ordinarily has jurisdiction. It certainly has the right to have its cause of action and rights in and about the same, when denied and withheld,
litigated, settled, enforced and administered by appropriate judicial procedure — certainly in all cases where some particular effectual method of redress is not prescribed.
Clearly, the plaintiff alleges a cause of action. As to that part of the county of Vance taken from the county of Gran-ville, the statute creating the former county provides, as it might do, that “the citizens and taxable property” therein “shall not be released from their proportion of the outstanding” public debt of the county of Granville; and it prescribes further, that such proportion of that debt shall be ascertained and determined by certain County Commissioners “in such manner and by such method as may be agreed upon.” Thus, an important pecuniary liability to, and in favor of, the county of Granville was continued, to be settled and determined in the way prescribed. But the Commissioners directed and required to ascertain and determine that liability failed, neglected and refused, as is alleged, to ascertain and determine the same. Has the county of Gran-ville no redress in such case? Has the Court no jurisdictional authority to compel the defaulting Commissioners to a discharge of the duties imposed upon them by proper action and the application of pertinent principles of law and equity ? The very purpose of the Court is to afford appropriate remedy and grant relief. Such actions in cases in many respects like this have been oftentimes entertained.
The Code,
§§702-705;
Commissioners
v.
Commissioners,
79 N. C., 565.
It was further objected, that the statute provides that “said proportions (of the outstanding debt of the county of Granville), to be ascertained and determined by the County Commissioners of Granville, Franklin and Vance counties, in such manner and by such method as may be agreed upon,” and that the Commissioners of the County of Franklin were not called upon to join in the discharge of such duties, and are not parties to this- action. \\7e think that
this clause, properly interpreted, implies that the Commissioners of Vance and the Commissioners of Granville should have co-operated, for the purpose specified, as to the claim of Granville County, and the Commissioners of Vance and Franklin counties,.as to the like claim of Franklin County. The purpose was to ascertain and determine the claims of Granville and Franklin-counties, respectively and distinctly. Each of these counties had no interest in the claim of the other, but the county of Vance, as to parts of its citizens and taxable property, was interested adversely to Granville and Franklin counties, not jointly”, but severally and distinctly. In the nature of the matter, there was no substantial reason why the commissioners of the three counties should co-operate conjointly for the purpose specified; .there was substantial reason why the Commissioners of the county of Vance should act conjointly with the Commissioners of Granville County, as to the claims of that county, without regard to the similar claim of Franklin County. This interpretation is not unreasonable, and it seems that the parties acted upon it, certainly to some extent. Moreover, the defendant, in its answer, submits to have the matters in controversy settled by this action.
The fifteenth section of the statute recited above provides, that “that portion of the citizens and taxable property taken from the counties of Franklin and Granville and attached to the county of Vance, shall not be released from their proportion of the outstanding public debts of the said counties
contracted before
the passage of this act.” This provision created no new or additional liability; it simply continued an existing one, for the present purpose, as to the outstanding public debt of the county of Granville contracted before the enactment of this statute, the 5th of March, 1881. As to this debt, that part of the county of Granville which became a part of the county of Vance, ihe citizens and taxable property embraced by it, continued to be, in effect, a part of
the county of Granville. The intention was that the liability should continue to exist just as if the citizens and taxable property were still, and notwithstanding the erection of the county of Vance, part of the county of Granville.
Commissioners
v.
Commissioners,
79 N. C., 565. And in ascertaining and determining the proportion of the debt to be ¡¡aid by the citizens and taxable property so in the county of Vance, they should be treated as if in Granville County; they are neither to be favored nor discriminated against in ascertaining the outstanding debt, or the part of it, to be paid by them.
We are of the opinion that the exception of the appellant as to the sum of $3,450 42, paid after the 5th of March, 1881, upon judgments rendered and docketed before that date, must be sustained, because the money so paid was part of the taxes due and collected in, and as for, the year 1880. This sum of money, above that necessary to pay the current expenses of the county, wras properly applicable to the payment of such judgments. The tax-payers represented by the defendant paid the part thereof due from them, and for that purpose, just as did the other tax-payers of the county.
And so, also, and for the like reason, the exception as to the sum of $9,260.60, part of taxes collected in 1880, balance in hands of the County Treasurer on the 1st of September, 1881, must be sustained. The taxes, so far as appears, levied and collected, or collectible, in the year 1880, wrere intended to pay the current expenses of the county, and the whole surplus was properly applicable, first, to the outstanding debt on the 5th of March, 1881, and, generally, to any debt the county owed afterwards. The law contemplates that taxes shall be collected promptly, and that the money, when collected, shall be applied promptly to the payment of current county expenses, and io the payment of outstanding county debts due and payable. If the money to pay part of the debt was paid by the tax-payers as taxes, surely those
of them represented by the defendant should not be prejudiced by the delay to apply it to the payment of part of the debt until after the 5th of March, 1881. That would be rank injustice!
The exception founded upon the ground that the sum of $2,700 of the taxes of 1880 was applied to the payment of the current county expenses from the 5th of March, 1881, to the 1st of September, 1881, was not deducted in ascertaining the outstanding debt in question, cannot be sustained, because the taxes levied and collected, or collectible in 1880, were collected for, aud properly applied to, that purpose. At the time the statute creating the county of Vance was enacted, this money was, in contemplation of law, designated for, and devoted to, that purpose.'
The other exception, based upon the ground that the “county order” No. 196, dated and issued on the 5th of July, 1881, was not deducted from the debt in controversy, is groundless, because it appears that it was for a debt contracted before the 5th of March, 1881. It was contracted before, and properly constituted part of, the outstanding debt at that time. The order issued afterwards was merely evidence of it.
We are likewise of opinion that the exception, founded upon the ground that the sum of $5,000, the value of certain land of the county of Granville not necessary for public purposes, and which it owned in 1880, was not deducted from the outstanding debt mentioned, cannot be sustained. As we have seen, the citizens and taxable property represented by the defendant, for the purpose of ascertaining and determining their proportionate part of the outstanding debt in question, must be treated as if they and such taxable property were in, and part of, the county of Granville. So treating them, they had not the right, on the 5th of March, 1881, or at all, to have the real estate of the county, not necessary for public purposes, appropriated to the payment
of its outstanding debts. The law does not so appropriate it, specifically and necessarily. This could be done only at the instance of a creditor, in some appropriate way, or by the properly constituted authorities of the county. Its real estate referred to belonged to it for such lawful purposes as its constituted authorities might select, and they have the authority to determine when, and how, and to what purpose they will devote it. There is nothing in the statute creating 'the county of Vance that, in terms or by any reasonable interpretation, implies a purpose to devote or direct the appropriation of the proporty mentioned of the county of Granville to the paj’ment of its debts; nor does any purpose appear to give the tax-payers represented by the defendant any benefit of it in decreasing the amount of the outstanding debt, part of which they are required to pay, nor to secure to them any part of it, in any way, for any purpose. They had no more right to have this property applied in payment of the outstanding debt on the 5th of March, 1881, than other citizens of the county of Granville had at that time, with whom they were on an equal footing as to the debt in question. If, subsequently, the county authorities saw fit to sell the land and pay the county debt, they might do so, but the defendant could not have benefit of such sale, because those tax-payers whom it represents were not then citizens of Granville County. In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, when they became citizens of Vance County, they, as such, ceased to have any interest in the property of the county of Granville.
Commissioners
v.
Commissioners,
95 N. C., 189.
It may be that, if the land had been sold prior to the 5th of March, 1881, and turned into a cash fund, devoted to no particular purpose, that the defendant could have benefit of it, on the ground that when a county owes debts and has money not needed for a particular purpose, it ought at once
to pay its creditors, but the land was not sold until after the time mentioned.
The eighth exception is without merit, because, as we have seen, the taxes of 1880, so much thereof as was necessary for that purpose, were properly appropriated to the payment of the current county expenses of the fiscal year 1881.
What we have said disposes of all the exceptions. There is error. The account must be re-stated in accordance with this opinion, and the judgment modified accordingly, and, as thus modified, affirmed. To that end, let this opinion be certified to the Superior Court. It is so ordered.
Error.