Hoke, J.,
after stating tbe case. Whatever right, may arise to tbe public in this case by reason of tbe fact that a public road lay along tbe banks of tbe creek (presumably a navigable stream), they did not include or embrace the easement sought to be established in this proceeding; tbe appropriation of an acre of defendant’s land “for tbe purposes of a public landing.” This right as proposed and described entirely exceeded tbe easement of a public highway and could only be acquired
in invitum,
except by condemnation and under tbe power of eminent domain.
Barrington v. Ferry Co.,
69 N. C., p. 169;
Pipkins v. Wynne,
13 N. C., p. 402;
Chambers v. Ferry,
6 Pa., 167; 3 Kents Commentaries, p. 420.
Tbe claim of the petitioners admits and proceeds upon the theory that the exercise of such power is required to uphold it as made. And we concur with the appellee and the ruling of the clerk thereon, that if this right of condemnation has been granted to the board of commissioners the occasion and necessity for its exercise rests very largely
in
their discretion.
Broadnax
v. Groom,
64 N. C., p. 244, cited and approved in several recent cases, notably in
Burgin v. Smith,
151 N. C., 567;
Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners,
150 N. C., 116;
Ward v. Commissions,
146 N. C., p. 534. Nor is the issue as to the quantum of damages one entitling the private owner to a common law jury trial as a matter of right.
State v. Jones,
139 N. C., p. 613;
R. R. v. Parker,
105 N. C., p. 246;
R. R. v. Davis,
19 N. C., p. 451;
Baumann v. Ross,
167 U. S., 548, 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, sec. 311.
After giving the matter, however, the full and careful consideration which its importance demands, the Court is of the opinion that the statutes controlling the question have not conferred upon the commissioners the right to acquire defendant’s property for the purpose indicated by condemnation, and that the judgment of the Superior Court to that effect and dismissing the petition on that ground must be affirmed.
There is general consensus of authority to the effect that the right of condemnation may not be exercised unless conferred by the law-making power in express terms or by necessary implication. In 1st Lewis’ Eminent Domain, sec. 240, the author says: “The exercise of the power being against common right, it cannot be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful language, but must be given in express terms or by necessary implication. If the act is silent on the'subject, and the powers given by it can be exercised without resort to condemnation, it is presumed that the Legislature intended that the necessary property should be acquired by contract. Thus the authority to construct and maintain booms, or bridges, does not carry with it the right to condemn property. If the act makes no provision for compensation, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend that the power of eminent domain should be exercised.”
And well considered decisions support the doctrine as stated.
U. S. v. Raners,
70 Fed., 748;
Schmidt v. Dinsmore,
42 Mo., 225; Chaffee’s appeal, 56 Mich., 244;
Allen v. Jones,
47 Indiana, 438;
People ex rel. Hayden v. City of Rochester,
50 N. Y., 438;
Tacoma v. State,
4 Wash., 64.
And while the courts may have differed at times in defining the necessity required for the grant of this power by implica
tion and are disposed to be less exacting in cases where the right is claimed in behalf of public corporations exercising their powers strictly for the public benefit (Lewis, sec. 240), there is eminent authority for the proposition that the right of condemnation will not arise by implication unless the necessity for it is so strong that without it the grant itself will be defeated. Thus in
Pa. R. R.’s
Appeal, 93 Pa., p. 159,
Gordon, J.,
delivering the opinion, said: “It is true that a franchise is property, and as such may be taken by a corporation having the right of eminent domain, but in favor of such right there can be no implication unless it arises from a necessity so absolute that, without it, the grant itself will be defeated. It must also be a necessity that arises from the very nature of things, over which the corporation has no control; it must not be a necessity created by the company itself for its own convenience or for the sake of economy. To permit a necessity, such as this, to be used as an excuse for interference with, or extinction of, previously granted franchises would be to subject these important legislative grants to destruction on a mere pretense, in fact, at the will of the holder of the latest franchise.” A position referred to and on a given state of facts approved by this Court in
Street Ry. v. Ry.,
142 N. C., p. 435. True there is a well recognized general principle, stated and approved in
Dewey v. R. R.,
142 N. C., p. 392, and in other cases, “That when a power is conferred by statute everything necessary to make it effective or requisite to attain the end is inferred.” But in applying the principle to the question of condemnation, this being in derogation of common right, the necessity must be determined in view of the principles heretofore stated, and in
Dewey’s case
the Court was careful to note that the power of condemnation in that case had been given in express terms.
Again the courts have held.that in certain instances the fact that an act of the Legislature conferring a given power had failed to provide any method of procedure for awarding compensation to the individual owners, would, of itself, afford sufficient evidence that the right of appropriation by condemnation was not intended.
Chamberlain v. Steam Cordage Co.,
41 N. J., Eq., p. 43. And a decision of our own Court is to the
effect that a statute which purports “to authorize the seizure of private property, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but making no provision for compensation to the owner, would be void.”
State v. Lyle,
100 N. C., p. 497, a case that has been referred to with approval in several recent decisions of the Court.
State v. Wells,
142 N. C., p. 594;
State v. Jones,
139 N. C., p. 619.
In the present case the power in question is claimed under and by virtue of chap. 23, Revisal 1905, sec. 1318, subsec. 19, in terms as follows: “The board of commissioners shall have power — subsec. 19 — to establish such public landings and places of inspection as the board of commissioners may think proper, and to appoint such inspectors in every town or city as may be authorized by law.” The statute purports to contain an enumeration of the general powers conferred on boards of commissioners throughout the State, and this subsection quoted being-sec. 1318, subsee. 19, expresses all the provision of our statute law relating to the subject to which we were referred by counsel or which we have been enabled to discover.
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Hoke, J.,
after stating tbe case. Whatever right, may arise to tbe public in this case by reason of tbe fact that a public road lay along tbe banks of tbe creek (presumably a navigable stream), they did not include or embrace the easement sought to be established in this proceeding; tbe appropriation of an acre of defendant’s land “for tbe purposes of a public landing.” This right as proposed and described entirely exceeded tbe easement of a public highway and could only be acquired
in invitum,
except by condemnation and under tbe power of eminent domain.
Barrington v. Ferry Co.,
69 N. C., p. 169;
Pipkins v. Wynne,
13 N. C., p. 402;
Chambers v. Ferry,
6 Pa., 167; 3 Kents Commentaries, p. 420.
Tbe claim of the petitioners admits and proceeds upon the theory that the exercise of such power is required to uphold it as made. And we concur with the appellee and the ruling of the clerk thereon, that if this right of condemnation has been granted to the board of commissioners the occasion and necessity for its exercise rests very largely
in
their discretion.
Broadnax
v. Groom,
64 N. C., p. 244, cited and approved in several recent cases, notably in
Burgin v. Smith,
151 N. C., 567;
Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners,
150 N. C., 116;
Ward v. Commissions,
146 N. C., p. 534. Nor is the issue as to the quantum of damages one entitling the private owner to a common law jury trial as a matter of right.
State v. Jones,
139 N. C., p. 613;
R. R. v. Parker,
105 N. C., p. 246;
R. R. v. Davis,
19 N. C., p. 451;
Baumann v. Ross,
167 U. S., 548, 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, sec. 311.
After giving the matter, however, the full and careful consideration which its importance demands, the Court is of the opinion that the statutes controlling the question have not conferred upon the commissioners the right to acquire defendant’s property for the purpose indicated by condemnation, and that the judgment of the Superior Court to that effect and dismissing the petition on that ground must be affirmed.
There is general consensus of authority to the effect that the right of condemnation may not be exercised unless conferred by the law-making power in express terms or by necessary implication. In 1st Lewis’ Eminent Domain, sec. 240, the author says: “The exercise of the power being against common right, it cannot be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful language, but must be given in express terms or by necessary implication. If the act is silent on the'subject, and the powers given by it can be exercised without resort to condemnation, it is presumed that the Legislature intended that the necessary property should be acquired by contract. Thus the authority to construct and maintain booms, or bridges, does not carry with it the right to condemn property. If the act makes no provision for compensation, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend that the power of eminent domain should be exercised.”
And well considered decisions support the doctrine as stated.
U. S. v. Raners,
70 Fed., 748;
Schmidt v. Dinsmore,
42 Mo., 225; Chaffee’s appeal, 56 Mich., 244;
Allen v. Jones,
47 Indiana, 438;
People ex rel. Hayden v. City of Rochester,
50 N. Y., 438;
Tacoma v. State,
4 Wash., 64.
And while the courts may have differed at times in defining the necessity required for the grant of this power by implica
tion and are disposed to be less exacting in cases where the right is claimed in behalf of public corporations exercising their powers strictly for the public benefit (Lewis, sec. 240), there is eminent authority for the proposition that the right of condemnation will not arise by implication unless the necessity for it is so strong that without it the grant itself will be defeated. Thus in
Pa. R. R.’s
Appeal, 93 Pa., p. 159,
Gordon, J.,
delivering the opinion, said: “It is true that a franchise is property, and as such may be taken by a corporation having the right of eminent domain, but in favor of such right there can be no implication unless it arises from a necessity so absolute that, without it, the grant itself will be defeated. It must also be a necessity that arises from the very nature of things, over which the corporation has no control; it must not be a necessity created by the company itself for its own convenience or for the sake of economy. To permit a necessity, such as this, to be used as an excuse for interference with, or extinction of, previously granted franchises would be to subject these important legislative grants to destruction on a mere pretense, in fact, at the will of the holder of the latest franchise.” A position referred to and on a given state of facts approved by this Court in
Street Ry. v. Ry.,
142 N. C., p. 435. True there is a well recognized general principle, stated and approved in
Dewey v. R. R.,
142 N. C., p. 392, and in other cases, “That when a power is conferred by statute everything necessary to make it effective or requisite to attain the end is inferred.” But in applying the principle to the question of condemnation, this being in derogation of common right, the necessity must be determined in view of the principles heretofore stated, and in
Dewey’s case
the Court was careful to note that the power of condemnation in that case had been given in express terms.
Again the courts have held.that in certain instances the fact that an act of the Legislature conferring a given power had failed to provide any method of procedure for awarding compensation to the individual owners, would, of itself, afford sufficient evidence that the right of appropriation by condemnation was not intended.
Chamberlain v. Steam Cordage Co.,
41 N. J., Eq., p. 43. And a decision of our own Court is to the
effect that a statute which purports “to authorize the seizure of private property, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but making no provision for compensation to the owner, would be void.”
State v. Lyle,
100 N. C., p. 497, a case that has been referred to with approval in several recent decisions of the Court.
State v. Wells,
142 N. C., p. 594;
State v. Jones,
139 N. C., p. 619.
In the present case the power in question is claimed under and by virtue of chap. 23, Revisal 1905, sec. 1318, subsec. 19, in terms as follows: “The board of commissioners shall have power — subsec. 19 — to establish such public landings and places of inspection as the board of commissioners may think proper, and to appoint such inspectors in every town or city as may be authorized by law.” The statute purports to contain an enumeration of the general powers conferred on boards of commissioners throughout the State, and this subsection quoted being-sec. 1318, subsee. 19, expresses all the provision of our statute law relating to the subject to which we were referred by counsel or which we have been enabled to discover. It will be noted that the law does not confer in express terms the power of eon-demning the lands of the citizen for the purpose indicated, and we are of opinion there is no such necessity shown as would justify the exercise of the power by implication. Furthermore there is no provision made for awarding compensation to the owner. And applying the principles approved and sustained by the authorities referred to we are impelled to the conclusion that in establishing these public' landings .provided for in sec. 1318, subsee. 19, the commissioners are confined to lands already dedicated to a public use sufficient to embrace or include the purpose proposed or that they must acquire- a site by agreement or purchase.
We
are confirmed in the view we have taken of this subsection by a perusal of the other portions of the statute. Thus in subsection 8 the commissioners are authorized to lay out, alter or discontinue public roads, to establish and settle ferries, to build and keep up bridges, etc., and this subsection further provides that in exercising the powers thus conferred the commissioners shall act under the “Eules, regulations, restrictions and penalties prescribed and imposed in the statute on
roads, ferries and bridges.” In this chapter referred to express provision is made for condemning land and awarding compensation therefor “in the case of roads and ferries,” "showing that the Legislature in framing this very statute had in mind the necessity of expressly granting the right of condemnation where they considered it desirable to confer it. We are not inadvertent to the great importance of having these public landings established at places convenient to the citizens of different communities, and if it is demonstrated that the well ordering of the affairs of the county require it, the Legislature will no doubt be quick to confer the power of condemnation for the purpose. But the granting or withholding such power is for the Legislature and not for the courts. And until the Legislature has seen fit to grant the power for a public use and in express terms or by necessary implication, we are not permitted to sanction or uphold its exercise. There is no error, and the judgment of the court below dismissing the action is
Affirmed.
Brown, J., not sitting.