Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shillito Realty Co.

39 F.2d 830, 69 A.L.R. 1266, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 10621, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 4155, 1930 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9290
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedApril 10, 1930
Docket5402, 5403
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 39 F.2d 830 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shillito Realty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shillito Realty Co., 39 F.2d 830, 69 A.L.R. 1266, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 10621, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 4155, 1930 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9290 (6th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

JONES, District Judge.

By petitions to review, the Commissioner of. Internal Revenue challenges the correctness of. the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals finding the respondents to have been affiliated corporations during the fiscal years 1918, 1919, and 1920. Whether the facts support the Board’s order is the sole question. The facts not being materially in dispute, decision turns upon the meaning of section 240(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 as applied to the relationship of these two respondent corporations.

The John Shillito Company, referred to hereinafter as the store company, was organized under the laws of Ohio on June 22, 1882, with an authorized capital stock of $2,000,000, consisting of 20,000 shares of common stock of $100 par value per share, which was issued to acquire the business of its predecessor partnership established in 1830. It conducts a retail department store. In 1914 it caused to be incorporated the Shillito Realty Company; hereinafter referred to as the realty company, for the purpose of converting a portion of its fixed assets into liquid working capital. The authorized capital of the new corporation was $1,200,,000, divided equally into preferred and common stock, both with full voting power. To this company the store company deeded its land and buildings used for store purposes, receiving in payment therefor $600,000 in cash and all of the common stock of the realty company of the par value of $600,000. The cash payment was from money secured from the sale of the preferred stock of the realty company to stockholders of the store company and to others. Thereafter the realty company made a perpetual lease of the property to the store company at an annual rental of $72,000 and the payment by the lessee of all taxes, insurance, assessments against the property, and all other operating expenses of the lessor. An option to repurchase the property after ten years, for $1,-200,000 was provided in the lease. Upon formal request of the store company, the realty company reduced the annual rental to $36,000 on June 25, 1918. The only business of the realty company was the ownership of the property used by the store company, the collection of the rental therefor, and the declaration and payment of dividends solely out of the money received as rent under the lease. Its office was in the office of the store company. Its officers and directors were at all times the nominees of Stewart Shillito, president of both companies. At *832 each stockholders’ meeting, the stock of the minority interests was voted by proxies given to a committee of which John Shillito was chairman. During the time in question, the store company directly owned all of the 6,-000 shares of common stock of the realty company, and of the 6,000 shares of preferred stock outstanding 1,862 shares were owned by stockholders and officers of the store company. Thus the store company and its stockholders and officers owned approximately 66 per cent, of all of the outstanding stock of the realty company, common and preferred. The remaining 34 per cent, of the total amount of stock was all preferred stock. Of this 34 per cent, approximately 15 per cent, was owned or held by employees of the store company and approximately 11 per cent, was owned by business associates of Stewart Shillito, president of both companies, and who owned 55 per cent, of the stock of the store company.

Section 240(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1082) provides as follows: “For the purpose of this section two or more domestic corporations shall be deemed to be affiliated (1) if one corporation owns directly or controls through closely affiliated interests or by a nominee or nominees substantially all the stock of the other or others, or (2) if substantially all the stock of two or more corporations is owned or controlled by the same interests.”

The Commissioner contends that the relationship of these two corporations cannot satisfy the test of either statutory definition of affiliated corporations authorized to file a consolidated return, and that “stock eontrol” means something more than is presented by the ownership and control shown here. But we think the question largely turns on the character of the preferred stock of the realty company and also the status of the 34 per cent, of such stock which may be said to be outside owned.

That ownership or control of substantially all of the stock contemplates domination by virtue of stock rather than by management or majority is not to be disputed in the face of the plain words of the statute. But the stock that controls is the stock that has the power to dominate the business and the voting strength to make that domination effective. If such a situation exists, you may have á business unit and affiliated corporations within the meaning of the statute. In addition to the ownership and control of the stock as disclosed by the facts in this casé, the realty company was a creature of the store company, and was dominated by the latter in such manner that no diversity of interest could materially affect its control or management. The only purpose of its existence was to promote the interests of the store company, no more. No considerable amount of stock was in the hands of what might be called outside interests, or in the hands of those who, if hostile or adverse, could materially affect its control, operation, or management. No possible adverse interest may be perceived in the ownership of outside preferred stock. The relationship and mutual dependency of the two companies was such as to effect a complete unity of interest and enterprise. The corporate activity of the realty company was non-existent save for purposes of the store company. It was a single business enterprise. It is true that the preferred stock had voting rights, but to what purpose? It could neither increase its dividend nor redeem itself, nor influence the policy or purpose of its management. At the request of the store company, the annual rental provided by the lease was reduced one-half by the realty company.

We think the term “stock,” as used in the statute, is clearly intended to mean stock with a potential voting power which, if asserted, will be effective in the management or control of the corporation. This preferred stock was so hedged with limitations that it was ineffective in respect to any control or domination. Its annual dividend of 6 per cent, was fixed. It was to be paid in full on liquidation, and was redeemable at the option of the store company, after 1924, for $105 per share. The preferred stock bore no burden of taxation and exercised no voice in the management or policy of the company, nor did it have any hazards or benefits to be reckoned with in the return of income for taxation. Its redeemability gave it the color of indebtedness.

We think this ease stronger on the facts than Great Lakes Hotel Company v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 30 F.(2d) 1.

The ownership of stock which may vote, but not be effective in control, can have but little influence in the domination of the corporation. Substantially all of the stock which was effective in control was owned or controlled by the same interests. For practical purposes, the ownership or control of the 34 per cent, of preferred stock of the realty company was so, ineffective in control as to be disregarded. The meaning of the words “substantially all the stock,” urged *833 by the Commissioner here, is not exactly that which his regulation interprets it to be.

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39 F.2d 830, 69 A.L.R. 1266, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 10621, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 4155, 1930 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commissioner-of-internal-revenue-v-shillito-realty-co-ca6-1930.