BOYD, Acting Chief Justice.
This cause is before us to review a Public Service Commission order establishing the standard for obtaining a transportation brokerage license. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
Joseph Land & Company, Inc. applied for three auto transportation broker’s licenses for three different locations, Lake Placid, Leesburg and Lake Wales. The three applications were consolidated for one hearing which petitioners joined as protestants. The hearing examiner recommended that the applications be granted except as to seafood which is not an issue here. Petitioners filed a list of exceptions, asserting that section 323.31(2), Florida Statutes (1977)1 embodied the same standard con[958] tained in section 323.03(4), Florida Statutes (1977); 2 that the testimony at the hearing did not satisfy the standard; and that the “swing office” at Lake Wales was illegal. The commission denied the exceptions and granted the applications. In re Application of Joseph Land and Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 780154-ATB, 155-ATB, 156-ATB, Order No. 14925 (Fla.Pub.Ser.Comm., 1979). Petitioners seek review raising the same issues listed in their exceptions to the hearing examiner’s recommendation.
Petitioners’ claim that the standard for granting a transportation brokerage license under section 323.31(2), Florida Statutes (1977), is the same as the standard for granting certificates of public convenience under section 323.03(4), Florida Statutes (1977), is without merit. Section 323.03(4) provides that the proposed service must be “required by the present or future public convenience and necessity,” whereas section 323.31(2) provides that the proposed service need only be “consistent with public convenience and necessity.” (Emphasis supplied.) Apparently the latter provision was employed because the public has a lesser need to be protected from excessive competition among brokers than it does from among carriers. See generally, Gray Line Nat’l Tours Corp. v. United States, 380 F.Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Collette Travel Service Inc. v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 302 (D.R.I.1966). The divergent purposes of the statutes support the conclusion that an applicant for a broker’s license does not have to show as great a need for his service as does an applicant for a motor carrier certificate.
This conclusion is further supported by other differences between the two statutes. Section 323.03(4)(b) specifically provides that the commission must make an affirmative finding as to the “present necessity for the certificate.” Conversely, section 323.31(2) provides that the “[C]om-mission may deny any [broker’s] application when the need for the proposed service is not affirmatively shown.” By using the permissive word may, the legislature has implied that the commission may grant an application for a broker’s license when the need for the proposed service is not affirmatively shown.
We are not unmindful that our interpretation of section 323.31(2) requires an applicant for a broker’s license “to establish by substantial evidence . . . that the [959] issuance of a license to him would be consistent with the public convenience and necessity,” while at the same time relieving the applicant from affirmatively showing the need for issuing the license. This seeming contradiction can be resolved by finding that it is possible for an applicant to prove that the proposed service is consistent with public necessity without having to affirmatively show a public need for the service. Proof that a service is consistent with public necessity may be established by evidence showing the service is not totally duplica-tive of existing service. Such evidence would not “affirmatively” establish a need for the new service, but would at least tend to show the new service is not inconsistent with public necessity.
We now reach the issue of whether there is competent substantial evidence supporting the commission’s decision to grant the three applications. The commission found that the applicant had affirmatively shown the existence of a public need for a license at two of the locations. A score of witnesses testified to the need and convenience for a broker’s services at Lake Placid and Leesburg. Such extensive testimony is more than an adequate basis for supporting the commission’s determination.
As for the third application for a broker’s license at Lake Wales, although the commission found that an affirmative need had not been established, it granted the application. Lake Wales is presently being serviced by Sunland Brokers, Inc., which is owned and operated by the same person, Joseph Land, who owns and operates the applicant company. Mr. Land testified that a second license was needed which could be transferred from one location to another on a seasonal basis. Other witnesses’ testimony concerning the need for more brokers during the peak seasons establishes that the granting of the license would be consistent with public necessity.
Petitioner’s third point is that the Lake Wales license establishes a “swing office” in violation of section 323.31(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1977),3 and Rule 25-5.124, Florida Administrative Code.4 Those provisions provide that a separate license is required for each location a broker conducts business. But the commission may grant a seasonal transfer from one locality to another upon request. Rule 25-5.126, Fla.Admin. Code.5 Since the commission has not [960] granted approval for the applicant to operate at any location other than mentioned on the license, it has not violated either the statute or its rules.
The order under review is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SUNDBERG, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
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BOYD, Acting Chief Justice.
This cause is before us to review a Public Service Commission order establishing the standard for obtaining a transportation brokerage license. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
Joseph Land & Company, Inc. applied for three auto transportation broker’s licenses for three different locations, Lake Placid, Leesburg and Lake Wales. The three applications were consolidated for one hearing which petitioners joined as protestants. The hearing examiner recommended that the applications be granted except as to seafood which is not an issue here. Petitioners filed a list of exceptions, asserting that section 323.31(2), Florida Statutes (1977)1 embodied the same standard con[958] tained in section 323.03(4), Florida Statutes (1977); 2 that the testimony at the hearing did not satisfy the standard; and that the “swing office” at Lake Wales was illegal. The commission denied the exceptions and granted the applications. In re Application of Joseph Land and Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 780154-ATB, 155-ATB, 156-ATB, Order No. 14925 (Fla.Pub.Ser.Comm., 1979). Petitioners seek review raising the same issues listed in their exceptions to the hearing examiner’s recommendation.
Petitioners’ claim that the standard for granting a transportation brokerage license under section 323.31(2), Florida Statutes (1977), is the same as the standard for granting certificates of public convenience under section 323.03(4), Florida Statutes (1977), is without merit. Section 323.03(4) provides that the proposed service must be “required by the present or future public convenience and necessity,” whereas section 323.31(2) provides that the proposed service need only be “consistent with public convenience and necessity.” (Emphasis supplied.) Apparently the latter provision was employed because the public has a lesser need to be protected from excessive competition among brokers than it does from among carriers. See generally, Gray Line Nat’l Tours Corp. v. United States, 380 F.Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Collette Travel Service Inc. v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 302 (D.R.I.1966). The divergent purposes of the statutes support the conclusion that an applicant for a broker’s license does not have to show as great a need for his service as does an applicant for a motor carrier certificate.
This conclusion is further supported by other differences between the two statutes. Section 323.03(4)(b) specifically provides that the commission must make an affirmative finding as to the “present necessity for the certificate.” Conversely, section 323.31(2) provides that the “[C]om-mission may deny any [broker’s] application when the need for the proposed service is not affirmatively shown.” By using the permissive word may, the legislature has implied that the commission may grant an application for a broker’s license when the need for the proposed service is not affirmatively shown.
We are not unmindful that our interpretation of section 323.31(2) requires an applicant for a broker’s license “to establish by substantial evidence . . . that the [959] issuance of a license to him would be consistent with the public convenience and necessity,” while at the same time relieving the applicant from affirmatively showing the need for issuing the license. This seeming contradiction can be resolved by finding that it is possible for an applicant to prove that the proposed service is consistent with public necessity without having to affirmatively show a public need for the service. Proof that a service is consistent with public necessity may be established by evidence showing the service is not totally duplica-tive of existing service. Such evidence would not “affirmatively” establish a need for the new service, but would at least tend to show the new service is not inconsistent with public necessity.
We now reach the issue of whether there is competent substantial evidence supporting the commission’s decision to grant the three applications. The commission found that the applicant had affirmatively shown the existence of a public need for a license at two of the locations. A score of witnesses testified to the need and convenience for a broker’s services at Lake Placid and Leesburg. Such extensive testimony is more than an adequate basis for supporting the commission’s determination.
As for the third application for a broker’s license at Lake Wales, although the commission found that an affirmative need had not been established, it granted the application. Lake Wales is presently being serviced by Sunland Brokers, Inc., which is owned and operated by the same person, Joseph Land, who owns and operates the applicant company. Mr. Land testified that a second license was needed which could be transferred from one location to another on a seasonal basis. Other witnesses’ testimony concerning the need for more brokers during the peak seasons establishes that the granting of the license would be consistent with public necessity.
Petitioner’s third point is that the Lake Wales license establishes a “swing office” in violation of section 323.31(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1977),3 and Rule 25-5.124, Florida Administrative Code.4 Those provisions provide that a separate license is required for each location a broker conducts business. But the commission may grant a seasonal transfer from one locality to another upon request. Rule 25-5.126, Fla.Admin. Code.5 Since the commission has not [960] granted approval for the applicant to operate at any location other than mentioned on the license, it has not violated either the statute or its rules.
The order under review is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SUNDBERG, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
(a) Whether existing transportation service of all kinds is adequate to meet the reasonable public needs.
(b) The present necessity for the certificate in relation to the volume of existing or projected future traffic over such route or in such territory.
(c) The financial ability of the applicant to furnish adequate, continuous, and uninterrupted service at the times required therefor, and to meet the financial obligations of the service which the carrier proposes to perform.
(d) The effect on existing transportation facilities and service of all kinds, and particularly whether the granting of such certificate will or may seriously impair essential public service as provided by existing motor carriers.
(e) The fitness of the applicant properly to perform the proposed service and to conform to provisions of this part and the rules of the commission.
(f) The feasibility of the transportation proposed.
(2) When a transportation broker’s license is to be transferred from one locality to another, on a seasonal basis, the licensee shall submit a request on a form prescribed by the Commis[960] sion. Such forms may be obtained from the Transportation Department, Florida Public Service Commission, 101 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32304.
Requests shall be submitted in duplicate and, after approval by the Commission, the original copy shall be returned to the licensee to become a part of the license for the duration of the transfer period.
(3) If a transportation broker’s license is on seasonal transfer, it must be immediately transferred back to its permanent location or to another seasonal location at the end of the season or after sixty (60) days, whichever occurs first. Should the season extend beyond sixty days, an extension for a reasonable period of time may be granted at the current seasonal location. Requests for such extension shall be made on the form used for seasonal transfers and the same procedure shall be used in approving such extensions as in approving seasonal transfers.