Commerce & Industry Insurance Company v. Contravest Management Company

S.D. Georgia

Commerce & Industry Insurance Company v. Contravest Management Company

DecidedApril 12, 2021

Docket4:21-cv-00011

StatusUnknown

This text of Commerce & Industry Insurance Company v. Contravest Management Company (Commerce & Industry Insurance Company v. Contravest Management Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Commerce & Industry Insurance Company v. Contravest Management Company, (S.D. Ga. 2021).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION COMMERCE & INDUSTRY INSURANCE ) COMPANY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) CV421-011 ) CONTRAVEST MANAGEMENT ) COMPANY, et al. ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter was assigned to the undersigned. See docket. Because of a previous partnership relationship with the law firm which has appeared to represent a defendant (docs. 7 & 9), and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I recuse. Two federal statutes govern judicial disqualification due to conflict of interests. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, only applies when “a party . . . makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit . . . .” Since no such affidavit has been filed, it does not apply here. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 455, “places a judge under a self-enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist.” United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by J.W. by and through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 904 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018). Courts have generally recognized that prior partnership in the law firm representing a party is not an absolute bar ona judge’s hearing a case. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (prior partnership in law firm not grounds for recusal); Apex Oil Co. v. Apex Oil, 981 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1992) Gudge with prior partnership in law firm that represented party involved in case was not required to recuse); Ford v. Bank of Am., 2000 WL 1028238, * 2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2000) (unpublished) (disqualification not required because of judge’s prior employment with law firm representing defendants). Nevertheless, judges typically observe a two-year recusal period from cases involving their prior law firms. Draper, 369 F.3d at 1281 (citing Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. II, Ch. V, Compendium § 3.3-1(b) (2008)). It is vital that litigants and the public see that the judicial process is fair impartial. Accordingly, I will exercise my discretionary power to

recuse in this case. The Clerk is, therefore, DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the assigned District Judge for reassignment. SO ORDERED, this 12th day of April, 2021.

Mtpnon~A [lap ideas Mag United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of Georgia

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION COMMERCE & INDUSTRY INSURANCE ) COMPANY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) CV421-011 ) CONTRAVEST MANAGEMENT ) COMPANY, et al. ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter was assigned to the undersigned. See docket. Because of a previous partnership relationship with the law firm which has appeared to represent a defendant (docs. 7 & 9), and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I recuse. Two federal statutes govern judicial disqualification due to conflict of interests. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, only applies when “a party . . . makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit . . . .” Since no such affidavit has been filed, it does not apply here. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 455, “places a judge under a self-enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist.” United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by J.W. by and through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 904 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018). Courts have generally recognized that prior partnership in the law firm representing a party is not an absolute bar ona judge’s hearing a case. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (prior partnership in law firm not grounds for recusal); Apex Oil Co. v. Apex Oil, 981 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1992) Gudge with prior partnership in law firm that represented party involved in case was not required to recuse); Ford v. Bank of Am., 2000 WL 1028238, * 2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2000) (unpublished) (disqualification not required because of judge’s prior employment with law firm representing defendants). Nevertheless, judges typically observe a two-year recusal period from cases involving their prior law firms. Draper, 369 F.3d at 1281 (citing Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. II, Ch. V, Compendium § 3.3-1(b) (2008)). It is vital that litigants and the public see that the judicial process is fair impartial. Accordingly, I will exercise my discretionary power to

recuse in this case. The Clerk is, therefore, DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the assigned District Judge for reassignment. SO ORDERED, this 12th day of April, 2021.

Mtpnon~A [lap ideas Mag United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of Georgia

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