Comeaux v. Stallion Oilfield Construction

911 F. Supp. 2d 413, 2012 WL 5988775, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169902
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedNovember 29, 2012
DocketNo. 2:09-1696
StatusPublished

This text of 911 F. Supp. 2d 413 (Comeaux v. Stallion Oilfield Construction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Comeaux v. Stallion Oilfield Construction, 911 F. Supp. 2d 413, 2012 WL 5988775, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169902 (W.D. La. 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM RULING

JAMES T. TRIMBLE, JR., District Judge.

Before the court are two motions: (1) “Motion for Summary Judgment” (R. # 27) filed by defendants, Stallion OilField Construction, LLC and Stallion Oilfield Services, Ltd. (collectively referred to as “Stallion”) and (2) “Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant, Red Willow Offshore, LLC” (R. # 24) wherein the movers seek a dismissal of all claims of plaintiffs, Gregory Comeaux, Tredale Boudreaux and Mary Mayeux, James A. Pearce, Jonas and Barbara Primeaux, Gaylin Richard, Karl and Jamie Styron, Francis Roman Theriot, Andy Vaughan, Terry and O’Sanna Vidrine, Ben and Michelle Welch, Yan[415]*415cy and Theresa Welch, Benny and Linda Welch. Defendants maintain that they at all times acted prudently and within industry standards and that Hurricane Ike constituted a classic case of “force majeure” preventing plaintiffs from any recovery against them and making summary judgment appropriate.

FACTUAL STATEMENT

Plaintiffs in this case are property owners in Cameron Parish who suffered damage to their property as a result of Hurricane Ike in September 2008. Plaintiffs allege that oilfield mats that belonged to or were in the custody of Stallion and being used by Red Willow Offshore LLC (“Red Willow”) were moved by Hurricane Ike’s storm surge. Plaintiffs allege that the mats struck their property causing significant damage.

Plaintiffs allege that after public advisories were issued by the National Hurricane Center, Stallion and Red Willow were negligent by failing to either secure the mats properly or relocate the stacks of oilfield mats. The oilfield mats were either under lease by Stallion to Red Willow during the relevant time period and/or were being stored at the Red Willow/J.C. Reina well site. Red Willow used some of the mats to gain access to the well site and as a pad for the Red Willow equipment. The mats are on average 12x8 feet and consist of three layers of wood or composite approximately 6 inches thick. Each mat weighs approximately 1200 to 1500 pounds.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, -depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, indicate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 A fact is “material” if its existence or nonexistence “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”2 A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.3 “As to issues which the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party’s claim.”4 Once the movant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.5 The burden requires more than mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleadings. The non-moving party must demonstrate by way of affidavit or other admissible evidence that there are genuine issues of material fact or law.6 There is no genuine issue of material fact if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party.7 “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly [416]*416probative, summary judgment may be granted.”8

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Stallion maintains that plaintiffs will not be able to satisfy their burden of proving that Stallion was negligent, and that plaintiffs will not be able to prove that the oilfield mats leased by Stallion to Red Willow caused the alleged damage to their property. Stallion also asserts the defense of “force majeure” or “Act of God.”

Red Willow maintains that plaintiffs cannot prove (1) negligence, (2) that Red Willow owned and/or had control over the mats that caused the damage, (3) that the mats caused damage, and (4) Red Willow also asserts a “force majeure” and/or “Act of God” defense.

The court asked the parties to provide supplement briefs regarding the law with respect to the liability between a lessor and lessee concerning custody and control of the mats. Stallion reiterates that because it is the lessor, it did not have the authority to “dispossess” Red Willow of the mats and it could not unilaterally remove the mats without risking liability to Red Willow. Stallion argues that plaintiffs have failed to submit proof that anything could have been done to prevent the mats from moving in response to Hurricane Ike’s ten foot storm surge.

Red Willow posits that a lease does not release an owner of all liability over the thing leased.9 The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that “an owner of a thing who transfers its possession, but not its ownership to another, continues to have the ‘garde’ of its structure”.10 “The person who has the garde of a thing is he who has the legal duty to prevent its vice or defect from harming another....”11 Thus, Red Willow avers that to be liable for damage caused by a thing and to have a duty under a negligence analysis, one must be the “owner or custodian” of the thing.12 Red Willow argues that plaintiffs have to prove that Red Willow had “custody” or “garde” of the mats at issue. Red Willow maintains that plaintiffs have presented no evidence to establish that the mats in question came from the Red Willow site rather than some other well operator or oilfield service company. Red Willow remarks that the mats are not marked for identification and cannot be distinguished from one supplier and/or owner to the next. Red Willow posits that it can only be held liable for some independent act of negligence.

Plaintiffs maintain that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the mats that caused the damage to their property were the same mats that were leased to Red Willow, or mats owned by Stallion that were being stored at the Red Willow well site. Plaintiffs also assert that there has been no proof that the additional mats being stored at the well site were being leased to Red Willow and/or were subject to the terms of the lease between Stallion and Red Willow. Negligence

As to their negligence claim, Plaintiffs will be required to prove that: (1) [417]*417each defendant had a duty to conform its conduct to a specific standard, (2) that conduct failed to conform to an appropriate standard, (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs injuries, (4) defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of plaintiffs injuries, and (5) actual damages.13

Stallion asserts that the summary judgment evidence establishes that the oilfield mats were laid down in a manner consistent with the industry standard, and that Red Willow did not request that Stallion do anything to the oilfield mats in anticipation of the arrival of Hurricane Ike.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
911 F. Supp. 2d 413, 2012 WL 5988775, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169902, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/comeaux-v-stallion-oilfield-construction-lawd-2012.