Combs v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

2010 Ohio 3148
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 12, 2010
Docket2009-08756-AD
StatusPublished

This text of 2010 Ohio 3148 (Combs v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Combs v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2010 Ohio 3148 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2010).

Opinion

[Cite as Combs v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2010-Ohio-3148.]

Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us

STEPHANIE COMBS

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPT. OF TRANS.

Defendant

Case No. 2009-08756-AD

Clerk Miles C. Durfey

MEMORANDUM DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiff, Stephanie Combs, filed this action contending that her 2005 Chevrolet Uplander truck was damaged on August 10, 2009 as a proximate cause of negligence on the part of defendant, Department of Transportation (ODOT), in maintaining a construction area on Kemper Road in Hamilton County. Specifically, plaintiff related that the running boards on her truck were “crushed” and became detached from scraping on the curb area at the entrance/exit to her place of employment (Valley Asphalt) which abuts Kemper Road. Plaintiff explained that “[t]he curb at this location was too high and damaged (the) running boards on my vehicle when I was leaving for lunch.” Plaintiff submitted photographs depicting the roadway construction area on Kemper Road at the entrance to Valley Asphalt. Additional submitted photographs depict plaintiff’s vehicle stopped at the entrance/exit of Valley Asphalt at Kemper Road. The photographs show an area of Kemper Road where the roadway surface has been milled in preparation for repaving. The milled portion of Kemper Road abuts an unmilled area of roadway surface over two feet wide that runs the length of Kemper Road. Concrete curbing perhaps six inches wide separates and spans the unmilled portion of Kemper Road at the entrance/exit to Valley Asphalt. The curbed area is raised approximately one inch from the unmilled portion of Kemper Road and as much as two inches above the paved area at the entrance/exit to Valley Asphalt. The submitted photographs of the Chevrolet Uplander show the vehicle stopped at the driveway approach to Valley Asphalt from Kemper Road. The back end of plaintiff’s vehicle is positioned on Kemper Road, with the middle and front of the vehicle parked across the raised area at the Valley Asphalt driveway approach. The photographs show the left side running board of plaintiff’s Chevrolet Uplander contacting with the raised roadway surface abutting the Valley Asphalt driveway approach. The running board on the vehicle appears to be intact. {¶ 2} Plaintiff asserted that the driveway approach at Valley Asphalt was rendered unsafe for vehicle traffic as a result of the milling operation conducted on Kemper Road. Plaintiff claimed that the difference in roadway surface elevation between the milled roadway and the intact driveway approach caused the running boards on the Chevrolet Uplander to be “crushed” and “came unattached.” Plaintiff related that the running boards “have to be replaced because they were ripped off the brackets.” In her complaint, plaintiff contended that her vehicle was damaged as a result of ODOT negligence in failing to correct the dangerous condition created by milling the surface on Kemper Road and leaving the driveway approach from Kemper Road to Valley Asphalt intact. Consequently, plaintiff filed this action requesting damages in the amount of $953.16, the stated cost of replacing the running boards on her vehicle. Plaintiff submitted an invoice showing that she had running boards installed on her Chevrolet Uplander on March 11, 2008, at a cost of $953.16. The $25.00 filing fee was paid and plaintiff requested reimbursement of that cost along with the damage claim. {¶ 3} Defendant acknowledged that the area where plaintiff’s stated property damage event occurred was located within the limits of a construction project under the control of ODOT contractor, Kokosing Construction Company, Inc. (Kokosing). Defendant explained that the particular construction project, “dealt with grading, draining, paving in part with concrete pavement and warranty asphalt pavement” as well as “[w]idening ramps at Kemper Road and Mostellar Road and installing a three sided culvert and existing culvert in Hamilton County.” Defendant advised that “[p]laintiff’s incident on Kemper Road places her near milepost 26.45, which is within the project limits.” Defendant asserted that Kokosing, by contractual agreement, was responsible for roadway damage, occurrences, or mishaps within the construction zone. Therefore, ODOT argued that Kokosing is the proper party defendant in this action. Defendant implied all duties, such as the duty to inspect, the duty to warn, the duty to maintain, and the duty to repair defects were delegated when an independent contractor takes control over a particular section of roadway. All work by the contractor was to be performed in accordance with ODOT mandated specifications and requirements and subject to ODOT approval. Furthermore, defendant maintained an onsite personnel presence in the construction project area. {¶ 4} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, she must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed her a duty, that it breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused her injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573,¶8 citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 77, 15 OBR 179, 472 N.E. 2d 707. Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she suffered a loss and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v. Ohio State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom the burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 145 Ohio St. 198, 30 O.O. 415, 61 N.E. 2d 198, approved and followed. {¶ 5} Defendant has the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 335, 3 O.O. 3d 413, 361 N.E. 2d 486. However, defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 189, 678 N.E. 2d 273; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 67 Ohio App. 3d 723, 588 N.E. 2d 864. The duty of ODOT to maintain the roadway in a safe drivable condition is not delegable to an independent contractor involved in roadway construction. ODOT may bear liability for the negligent acts of an independent contractor charged with roadway construction. Cowell v. Ohio Department of Transportation, Ct. of Cl. No. 2003-09343-AD, jud, 2004-Ohio-151. Despite defendant’s contention that ODOT did not owe any duty in regard to the construction project, defendant was charged with duties to inspect the construction site and correct any known deficiencies in connection with particular construction work. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (June 28, 2001), Franklin App. 00AP-1119. {¶ 6} Alternatively, defendant argued that neither ODOT nor Kokosing had any knowledge of “the driveway on Kemper Rd. prior to plaintiff’s incident.” Defendant pointed out that ODOT “records (copies submitted) indicate that no calls or complaints were received at the Hamilton County Garage regarding the driveway in question prior to her (plaintiff’s) incident.” Defendant contended that plaintiff failed to produce evidence establishing her property damage was attributable to either conduct on the part of ODOT or Kokosing. {¶ 7} Both plaintiff and defendant submitted a letter from Kokosing Claims Specialist, Pamela J. LeBlanc, regarding work performed on the construction project, specifically the driveway approach area where plaintiff’s damage occurred.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Knickel v. Department of Transportation
361 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1976)
McClellan v. Ohio Department of Transportation
517 N.E.2d 1388 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1986)
Kniskern v. Township of Somerford
678 N.E.2d 273 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1996)
Rhodus v. Ohio Department of Transportation
588 N.E.2d 864 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1990)
Feichtner v. Ohio Department of Transportation
683 N.E.2d 112 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1995)
Stevens v. Industrial Commission
61 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1945)
Neff Lumber Co. v. First National Bank
171 N.E. 327 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1930)
Bello v. Cleveland
138 N.E. 526 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1922)
Bussard v. Ohio Department of Transportation
507 N.E.2d 1179 (Ohio Court of Claims, 1986)
Cascone v. Herb Kay Co.
451 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
Shinaver v. Szymanski
471 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc.
472 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
White v. Ohio Department of Transportation
564 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1990)
Armstrong v. Best Buy Co.
788 N.E.2d 1088 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2010 Ohio 3148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/combs-v-ohio-dept-of-transp-ohioctcl-2010.