Com. v. Young, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided December 29, 2017·No. 928 EDA 2016·Unpublished

Opinion

J-S71043-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

DARRYL YOUNG,

Appellant No. 928 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 24, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0006505-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2017

Appellant, Darryl Young, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his bench conviction of one count each of first-degree

murder, attempted murder, criminal conspiracy, recklessly endangering

another person, carrying firearms without a license, carrying firearms on

public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of a crime, and

two counts of aggravated assault.1 Appellant challenges the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.

We take the following facts and procedural history from our independent

review of the certified record. This case arises from the shooting of two men, ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 901(a), 903, 2705, 6106(a)(1), 6108, 907(a), and 2702(a), respectively. J-S71043-17

William Harriston, who died as a result of his injuries, and Shirvin McGarrell,

who sustained eleven gunshot wounds and survived.

On February 2, 2009, at approximately 8:00 p.m., McGarrell and his

daughter’s mother, Shaniece Thorton, were driving to McGarrell’s home after

finishing a shopping trip. As they approached the home, Thorton saw

Appellant, whom she recognized from the neighborhood, walking down the

street with two other men, whose faces were covered by their hoods.

Appellant motioned for McGarrell to come over towards him, and McGarrell

dropped Thorton off in front of the home so that she could bring their

purchases inside.

Meanwhile, Harriston and Darren Ricketts arrived at McGarrell’s home,

because they had plans with McGarrell for the evening. McGarrell asked

Ricketts to move his car, and as Ricketts proceeded to do so, gunfire broke

out. Ricketts saw Appellant run away with two guns in his hands. Appellant

then stopped and ran back to search McGarrell, before again fleeing from the

scene. Thorton also heard gunshots, from what sounded like more than one

gun, and she ran towards McGarrell, who had been shot in his stomach, chest,

legs, and arms.2

____________________________________________

2 Ricketts testified that, while on the way to the hospital, McGarrell spoke words that Ricketts interpreted as identifying Appellant as the shooter. (See N.T. Trial, 2/22/16, at 35, 50-51, 53-54). This testimony was somewhat inconsistent with the statement Ricketts gave to police after the shooting, and the trial court stated that it considered Rickett’s testimony on this particular point neutral. (See id. at 52-54; see also N.T. Trial, 2/24/16, at 43, 45).

-2- J-S71043-17

On February 11, 2009, nine days after the shooting, McGarrell gave a

statement to homicide detectives identifying Appellant as one of the shooters.

On August 13, 2013, inmate Charles Bryant reported to detectives that, while

he was incarcerated with Appellant, he asked Appellant about the Harriston

shooting, because Harriston was a close friend. Appellant confessed to

shooting Harriston and McGarrell, and explained that the bullets were intended

for McGarrell only, as retaliation for his involvement in another killing.

Appellant proceeded to a four-day bench trial in January and February

2016. At trial, McGarrell refused to identify Appellant as his assailant, despite

his earlier statement to the contrary. (See N.T. Trial, 2/22/16, at 62, 65-66,

68; N.T. Trial, 2/24/16, at 64). Appellant testified that he was present at the

scene of the shooting, but was not involved in it, and that he fled when the

gunfire started. (See N.T. Trial, 2/24/16, at 14, 17).

On February 24, 2016, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the

above-stated offenses. It imposed an aggregate term of incarceration of life

without the possibility of parole. The court denied Appellant’s timely post-

sentence motion on March 10, 2016. This timely appeal followed.3

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law, to establish [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges

3 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on April 26, 2016. The trial court judge is no longer sitting on the bench in Philadelphia County, and the record was forwarded to this Court without an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

-3- J-S71043-17

because the evidence presented at trial by the sole eyewitness was unreliable and not credible?

B. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence because the Commonwealth’s principal witness gave contradictory and inconsistent testimony concerning his observations of the incident and his identification of [Appellant], a material element of the crime charged[?]

(Appellant’s Brief, at 2) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting all of the charges against him. (See id. at 14-27). He argues that

the Commonwealth’s evidence was not believable because it was inconsistent

and contradictory, and the testimony of Ricketts and Bryant was fabricated.

(See id.). This issue is waived and does not merit relief.

We begin by noting,

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial [ ] in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

-4- J-S71043-17

Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 981 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal

denied, 163 A.3d 403 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

With regard to issue preservation, it is well settled:

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) provides, inter alia, “Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). In Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339 (Pa. Super.

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