Com. v. Yard, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 22, 2025
• Docket: 2011 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MICHAEL YARD : No. 2011 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001222-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MAY 22, 2025

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Michael Yard’s

motion in limine to preclude reference to certain of the victim’s injuries unless

there was evidence presented at trial that Yard may have caused them. We

affirm.

The Commonwealth charged Yard with homicide, endangering the

welfare of a child (“EWOC”), and aggravated assault of a child less than six

years of age, in connection with the death of his three-month-old son, who

died from blunt force trauma to the head while at home with Yard. 1 See

Criminal Information, filed 8/3/22. Regarding the charge of EWOC, the

Commonwealth alleged that “[Yard] . . . inflicted prior injuries to the minor

child resulting in fractured ribs which were observed at [the] time of autopsy

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a), 4304(a)(1), and 2702(a)(8), respectively. J-A03030-25

to have been inflicted several weeks prior to the victim’s death.” Id. at Count

2. An autopsy revealed that the fractured ribs showed signs of healing

consistent with trauma occurring two to three weeks before death. See

Affidavit of Probable Cause, filed 4/8/22, at 2.

Yard sought to exclude testimony regarding the rib fractures. See

Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief, filed 7/1/24, at 3 (unpaginated). He argued

the evidence constituted inadmissible prior bad acts, was unfairly prejudicial,

and lacked a causal connection to him. He pointed out that “there is no

quantum of proof suggesting [Yard] is the cause of the child’s fractured ribs”

and that “the child had a revolving door of caretakers, any of whom could

have been the cause of the child’s fractured ribs if an adult or other externality

is to blame at all.” Id. at 4 (unpaginated). He further argued that such

evidence was speculative and was offered “to show Mr. Yard had a propensity

to strike, injure, or otherwise abuse his child and thus must have inflicted a

fatal injury to [the child] on the date of his death.” Id.

At a hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth alleged that “[t]he rib

fractures are relevant . . . to the condition of the body at autopsy.” N.T.,

7/12/24, at 5. It further explained that there was “a very limited pool of

persons that could have had the opportunity to commit the abuse manifested

as the rib fractures, and [Yard] would be one of really two people[.]” Id. at 9.

Relying on Commonwealth v. Turner, 421 A.2d 1057 (Pa. 1980), the

Commonwealth argued the fractures were indicative of abuse. Id. at 12-14.

Yard responded that “many other people” were identified during the

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investigation of the case as having access to the child, in addition to Yard and

the child’s mother, including Yard’s father and the child’s aunt. Id. at 20-21.

The trial court concluded that the child’s fractures “tend[] to show that

the child was abused if committed by [Yard], which then could make it more

likely.” Id. at 22. It stated that “if [Yard] didn’t cause the rib fractures, it’s

not relevant to this case.” Id. at 23. The court ultimately decided to take the

motion under advisement and decide the admissibility of the evidence at trial.

Id. at 29. It “deem[ed] evidence of the rib fractures irrelevant unless and until

evidence is presented connecting [Yard] to the cause – as the cause – as a

potential cause or cause of the rib fractures.” Id. at 30. The court ordered:

Neither party shall reference or present any evidence or testimony, or make any statements concerning the minor victim’s rib fractures during voir dire, in opening statements, and until and unless evidence is presented tending to show that [Yard] caused or may have caused the rib fractures sustained by the minor victim.

Id. at 29-30; see also Order – Motion in Limine, filed 7/18/24. This timely

appeal followed.

The Commonwealth presents the following issue: “Did the trial court err

in excluding evidence of the victim’s rib fractures unless or until the court

believed, to its satisfaction, that [Yard] was the perpetrator, thus crippling the

Commonwealth’s presentation of its case to the jury?” Commonwealth’s Br.

at 4 (suggested answer omitted).

We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See

Commonwealth v. Luster, 234 A.3d 836, 838 (Pa.Super. 2020). An abuse

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of discretion occurs where there is an “overriding or misapplication of the law,

or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of

bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 754 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(citation omitted).

Relevant evidence is admissible if “it has any tendency to make a fact

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is

of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401 and 402. However,

relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is outweighed by a

danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,

undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

Id. at 403. Evidence of prior bad acts is “not admissible to prove a person’s

character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in

accordance with the character.” Id. at 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be

admitted for other purposes “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or lack of

accident.” Id. at 404(b)(2). When offered for another purpose as outlined by

Rule 404(b)(2), “this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Id.

The Commonwealth argues the child’s fractures are “relevant to show

the condition of the body at autopsy as well to refute the claimed accidental

nature of the child’s death.” Commonwealth’s Br. at 24. It notes that the

defense theory of the case is that the child “died with, rather than from, his

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head (brain) injuries.” Id. at 25. Based on this theory, the Commonwealth

maintains that the child’s fractures would indicate “child abuse.” Id. Citing

Turner and Commonwealth v. Earnest, 563 A.2d 158 (Pa.Super. 1989), it

argues that it “is entitled to the inference that [Yard] inflicted that fatal head

trauma and since he was one of two caregivers of the victim, he also had the

opportunity to cause the rib fractures two to three weeks before death.” Id.

at 24, 33. Additionally, the Commonwealth claims that the evidence is relevant

to the EWOC charge since the “course of conduct . . . is an additional fact, a

jury question, that impacts the grading of the offense.” Id. at 36. Finally, it

argues that Rule 404(b) is inapplicable since the fractures themselves are “not

an ‘unrelated crime.’” Id. at 35.

The trial court relied on Commonwealth v. Passarelli, 789 A.2d 708

(Pa.Super. 2001), to conclude “that if the Commonwealth can show evidence

that [Yard] had access to the child at the time the rib fractures occurred and

that he was one of two people that was the caretaker of the child during that

same time frame, then the evidence may be admissible.” Rule 1925(a)

Opinion, filed 9/10/24, at 4. It pointed out that “[t]here is no evidence of

record proving that [Yard] caused the child’s fractured ribs.” Id. at 3. The

Commonwealth, however, claims that Passarelli “recognized that the

evidence [of the victim’s fractures] was relevant despite the absence of a link

and utilized a cautionary instruction[.]” Commonwealth’s Br. at 32. The

Commonwealth maintains that the trial court held “that the evidence is not

relevant without proof of [Yard’s] link and does not discuss why a cautionary

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instruction could not be utilized to ensure that the jury does not improperly

consider the evidence.” Id.

We discern no abuse of discretion. Turner, Passarelli, and Earnest,

support the trial court’s conclusion. In Turner, the Commonwealth challenged

the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to submit to the

jury whether the defendant had inflicted the fatal injury on the child victim.

The child suffered his injuries while home with the appellee and the child’s

mother. The appellee admitted to beating the two-year-old but denied

inflicting the injuries that resulted in his death. The child died from blunt force

trauma, and the medical examiner testified that blunt force injury can occur

from striking the head on an object or the head being struck with an object.

Turner, 421 A.2d at 1058-59. The child did not have head injuries the night

before his death. Id. at 1058. The medical examiner explained that in order

for the injuries to have been from the child’s head striking something, “[t]here

would have to have – the head, would have to strike something else probably

at least ten different times.” Id. at 1059. We concluded that “[i]n light of

appellee’s earlier vicious beatings of the child, . . . the extreme unlikelihood

of accidental head injuries under the circumstances presented, the evidence,

and reasonable inferences therefrom, [was] clearly sufficient to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that appellant delivered the blows to the child’s head.” Id.

In Earnest, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his conviction for the involuntary manslaughter of a 15-month-old

child he babysat. The evidence at trial was that the child sustained the fatal

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injury while defendant was alone with her. The defendant contended that the

Commonwealth’s experts disagreed about the mechanism of injury. We found

no true disagreement and explained that regardless of the method of injury,

the defendant “was the only one who could have committed the act or acts.”

Earnest, 563 A.2d at 159. We pointed out that under precedents, a jury may

infer that an adult who has “sole custody of a child for a period of time, and,

during that time the child suffers wounds which unquestionably are neither

self-inflicted nor accidental, . . . that the adult inflicted the wounds.” Id. at

159-60 (quoting Commonwealth v. Paquette, 301 A.2d 837, 840 (Pa.

1973)).

In Passarelli, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with

numerous offenses including EWOC and simple assault for physical injuries to

a 3-month-old child’s head. On the day of the assault, the child’s mother had

gone to run errands and left the child in the care of Passarelli, the child’s

father. When the mother returned, she noticed that the child had a bump on

the back of her head that was not there previously. The mother took the child

to the hospital where it was determined that the child had “a possible skull

fracture” as well as “3 broken ribs, which were in the process of healing, a

linear skull fracture at the situs of the ‘bump,’ hemorrhaging in both frontal

lobes of the brain and swelling of the brain.” Passarelli, 789 A.2d at 710-11.

Medical experts determined that the injuries were a result of “shaken-impact

syndrome” and blunt impact to the child’s head. Id. at 711. At trial, the court

instructed the jury that it could consider the rib fractures for the sole purpose

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of determining whether the child “was the subject of shaken baby syndrome

or shaken impact baby syndrome[.]” Id. at 712. It told the jury that it could

not consider the fractures to determine if the bodily injury elements of

aggravated assault and simple assault were met. On appeal, Passarelli

challenged the court’s jury instruction, claiming that the jury could not

consider the fractures “for any purpose.” Id. We rejected this argument and

concluded that the court committed no error and properly limited the jury’s

consideration of the fractures regarding evidence of shaken baby syndrome.

Unlike in Turner, Yard did not admit to previously abusing the victim,

and there is no evidence that the child died because of the fractures. There

also is no evidence that at the time the child sustained the fractures he was

in the sole custody of Yard. Rather, as the trial court pointed out neither party

suggested that the child was in the sole care of Yard at the time of the

fractures. See Rule 1925(a) Op. at 3; N.T., at 9-11 (Commonwealth stating

that Yard, child’s mother, and child’s great grandmother had access to child

during period when child sustained fractures); 20-21 (Yard’s counsel listing at

least five different individuals, including Yard who had access to child during

period when child sustained fractures). Thus, the Commonwealth is not

entitled to an inference that Yard caused the fractures. Cf. Earnest, 563 A.2d

at 159-60. Additionally, Passarelli warrants the Commonwealth no relief.

There, the trial court permitted the admittance of the child’s fractures for a

limited purpose – shaken baby syndrome – that was supported by medical

testimony. Here, there is no similar evidence or medical testimony.

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We find Commonwealth v. Walter, 849 A.2d 265, 269-70 (Pa.Super.

2004), instructive. There, this Court vacated a first-degree murder conviction

for the death of an infant where the trial court admitted evidence of an

unrelated injury without any evidence connecting the defendant to the injury.

We concluded that “[t]he absence of any connection between Appellant and

the leg injury made this evidence irrelevant.” Walter, 849 A.2d at 269.

Similarly, here, because there has been no evidence connecting Yard to

the rib fractures, they are irrelevant. Furthermore, the absence of a

connection between the child’s injuries and Yard would improperly suggest a

prior bad act and the Commonwealth does not claim any of the Rule 404(b)(2)

exceptions to admit such evidence. The trial court acted within its discretion

in excluding the evidence until the Commonwealth established a connection.

Order affirmed.

Date: 5/22/2025

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