J-A17026-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DANIEL CARL WYANT : : Appellant : No. 1479 WDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000307-1992
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DANIEL CARL WYANT : : Appellant : No. 1480 WDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000249-1992
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: July 18, 2025
Daniel Carl Wyant (“Wyant”) appeals from the orders dismissing his
serial petition1 filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).2 We affirm.
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1 The Commonwealth charged Wyant at two separate criminal dockets related
to the December 9, 1991 incident, and Wyant filed identical petitions at both dockets. For ease of review, we refer to a singular petition in this decision. 2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. J-A17026-25
In 1992, a jury convicted Wyant of killing Donald Kremer (“Kremer” or
“the victim”) during a robbery on December 9, 1991. We set forth the
underlying facts in our memorandum affirming Wyant’s judgment of sentence
on direct appeal:
[Wyant] and [co-defendant] Robert Grinnell ([“]Grinnell[”]) met J.J. Acosta [(“Acosta”)] along State Street in Erie, Pennsylvania, an area frequented by [gay men]. [Acosta] told [Wyant] that he was in the area “yanking” people. At this time, [Wyant] was in possession of a .25 caliber, semi-automatic pistol. [Wyant] and Grinnell entered into an agreement to rob any [gay man] who tried to pick one of them up. Thereafter, the victim, driving a green car, approached the three men, waiving for them to come over to the car. [Wyant] entered the car and instructed the victim to drive over to the train station. [Wyant] was to act as a decoy and then all three men would “overpower [the victim] and take the money and [they] were going to split it three ways.” It was during the events that transpired in the car that [Wyant] shot the victim. In a statement taken by police, [Wyant] claimed that the victim tried to grab him and, as he was trying to get away, the gun fired.
Commonwealth v. Wyant, 647 A.2d 268 (Pa. Super. 1994) (unpublished
memorandum at 2) (citation to transcript omitted).
We briefly discuss portions of the closing arguments that are pertinent
to the present appeal. Wyant conceded during closing that he, Grinnell, and
Acosta conspired to “get . . . Kremer’s money, or the money of someone who
they expected to stop there and try to pick up one of the boys because that’s
what they went to that location for.” N.T., 5/14/92, at 14. He argued that
“Kremer began to reach for him and to grab him immediately” when Wyant
entered the car. Id. at 17. Wyant claimed that he tried to abort the robbery
and exit the car but “Kremer drove . . . to a relatively secluded and dark spot,”
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suggesting that Wyant was not “in control of the situation.” Id. at 17-18.
Even after “[Wyant] took out the gun” Kremer “continued to come after him
and to grab at him.” Id. at 18-19. He then accidentally fired the gun.
The Commonwealth responded in its closing argument that Wyant and
Grinnell’s “whole plan involve[d] getting in the car with someone you know is
gay, luring him to a quiet secluded place on the theory that you are going to
be selling sexual favors for money.” Id. at 67. The prosecutor rhetorically
asked, “[Y]ou and your buddies are going to rob him and you are going to be
somehow shocked . . . if the guy touches your leg? Come on.” Id. The
Commonwealth asked the jury to reject the “self-serving aspects” of the
defendants’ statements. Id. Specifically addressing Wyant, the prosecutor
asked the jury to discount his statement that Kremer “continue[d] to make
sexual advances” even after Wyant threatened him with a firearm. Id. at 71.
As noted, we affirmed on direct appeal. Wyant did not seek further
review. He filed a total of six PCRA petitions over the next twenty-seven
years.3
3 We affirmed four of the PCRA court’s orders denying relief to Wyant. See Commonwealth v. Wyant, 241 A.3d 445 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Wyant, 81 A.3d 993 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Wyant, 29 A.3d 831 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Wyant, 698 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. 1997) (unpublished memorandum). An appeal docketed at 384 WDA 2017 was dismissed for the failure to file a brief, and an appeal docketed at 267 WDA 2013 was discontinued at Wyant’s request.
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On May 8, 2024, Wyant filed the underlying counseled PCRA petition,
his seventh. Therein, Wyant purported to raise two substantive claims based
on his discovery that his trial counsel, John Moore, Esquire (“Attorney Moore”),
had represented Kremer in criminal proceedings months before his murder.
Wyant’s first PCRA claim argued that Attorney Moore had divided loyalties,
which adversely affected his performance in several ways. According to
Wyant, various “acts and omissions [of Attorney Moore] benefit[t]ed . . .
Kremer at the expense of . . . Wyant, and, as such, prove that the conflict of
interest adversely affected [Attorney] Moore’s performance.” PCRA Petition,
5/8/24, at 17. The second claim alleged that the Commonwealth’s argument
in closing that Wyant’s account was self-serving violated Wyant’s
constitutional due process rights. In Wyant’s view, the criminal charges
against Kremer established that the Commonwealth “knew full well that
Kremer had a prior history of the same sexual abuse of children Wyant
accused him of engaging in with him.” Id. at 55.
Wyant acknowledged that his petition was facially untimely but argued
that the newly discovered facts and governmental interference exceptions to
the PCRA’s timeliness requirements applied. In support, the petition detailed
information conveyed to him by his friend, Deborah Mongenel (“Mongenel”).
According to Mongenel’s declaration attached to the petition, on November
27, 2023, she submitted a Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”)4 request to the Clerk
4 See 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
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of Courts for Erie County for information regarding Kremer’s criminal history.
The next day, the Clerk of Courts transmitted a criminal information and
several additional documents regarding charges filed against Kremer in 1991.
The criminal information charged Kremer with, among other crimes, criminal
solicitation and corruption of minors related to an incident where Kremer
provided beer to a seventeen-year-old and offered money for sex. The
materials provided by Mongenel further revealed that on September 9, 1991,
the Erie County District Attorney moved to admit Kremer into the county’s
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) program. A separate document
signed that same date by Kremer and Attorney Moore waived Kremer’s speedy
trial rights and agreed to the ARD placement. According to her declaration,
Mongenel mailed the documents to Wyant on November 29, 2023.
The PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, concluding that the petition was untimely and that Wyant
failed to plead an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Wyant did not file a
response to the Rule 907 notice. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on
November 12, 2024. Wyant filed timely notices of appeal at each docket.
Both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Wyant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing as untimely a conflict of interest claim in this murder case without first holding a hearing at which Wyant would have proven what he pled: that the claim met (a) the newly[ ]discovered facts exception to the time-bar because Wyant was unaware that his trial counsel jointly represented the murder victim on his own child sexual abuse case (with profound implications for Wyant’s defense)
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and could not have discovered that information sooner with the exercise of due diligence and (b) the governmental interference exception because the Commonwealth knowingly concealed counsel’s debilitating conflict?
2. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing as untimely the claim that the Commonwealth knowingly argued false evidence to the jury without first holding a hearing at which Wyant would have proven what he pled: that he met both the newly[ ]discovered facts and governmental interference exceptions to the time- bar?
Wyant’s Brief at 3.
We review the denial of PCRA relief to determine whether the record
supports the PCRA court’s factual determinations and its legal conclusions are
free of error. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz-Pagan, 322 A.3d 247, 251 (Pa.
Super. 2024). When supported by the record, the PCRA court’s credibility
determinations are binding on this Court. See id. However, we review the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. See id. We confine our review to the
findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, which we view in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the party who prevailed below.
See id. “To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition
without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of
fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 193 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of
sentence becomes final under the PCRA at the conclusion of direct review,
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including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking such review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
“PCRA time limits are jurisdictional in nature, implicating a court’s very power
to adjudicate a controversy.” Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa.
2014).
As explained above, Wyant did not seek further review after we affirmed
his judgment of sentence on direct appeal on May 10, 1994. His sentence
became final thirty days following our decision, when his time for seeking
review in our Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). As Wyant filed
the instant petition on May 8, 2024, it is facially untimely.
The General Assembly authorizes Pennsylvania courts to consider an
untimely PCRA petition only if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one
of three exceptions set forth under Section 9545(b)(1). These exceptions are
as follows:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
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Any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “shall be filed
within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Our Supreme Court has emphasized that “it is the
petitioner who bears the burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness
exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (Pa.
2008) (citation omitted).
Pertinently, to demonstrate governmental interference, the petition
must plead and prove that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1)(i). While not contained within the statutory text, our Supreme
Court requires the petitioner to establish that he acted with due diligence in
obtaining the information that formed the basis of his claim. See
Commonwealth. v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 2008).
To invoke the newly discovered facts exception, the petitioner must
allege and prove that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). “Due diligence demands
that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests; a
petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new facts earlier
with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Mickeals, 335 A.3d
13, 21 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted).
Additionally, in assessing whether the PCRA petition alleges and proves
a timeliness exception, we do not assess the merits of the underlying claims
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the petitioner intends to pursue. See Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221,
227–28 (Pa. 2016) (stating that “[o]nce jurisdiction has been properly invoked
. . . the relevant inquiry becomes whether the claim is cognizable under the
PCRA”). However, “the newly discovered facts exception, as well as the
requirements of Section 9545(b)(2) of the PCRA, are claim specific, not
petition based.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 324 A.3d 452, 468 (Pa. 2024).
Similarly, “[t]he governmental interference exception also is claim specific.”
Id. at 469 n.19. We therefore separately address for each claim whether
Wyant established that either exception applied.
In his first issue, Wyant argues that his petition adequately pled both
the newly discovered facts exception and the governmental interference
exception to, at minimum, justify an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim
that Attorney Moore had a conflict of interest based on his prior representation
of Kremer. He contends that he met the newly discovered facts exception
because Kremer’s criminal history was unknown to him until Mongenel’s RTKL
request, and he filed the claim within one year of Mongenel supplying the
relevant documents to him. Additionally, he argues that he met the
governmental interference exception because he adequately pled and would
have proven that the Commonwealth interfered with the presentation of this
claim by failing to disclose Attorney Moore’s conflict to either the trial court or
Wyant, despite knowing of the charges against Kremer and Attorney Moore’s
role in those proceedings. In this regard, Wyant emphasizes that Kremer
accepted ARD and those proceedings are sealed.
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Wyant argues that “the PCRA court erroneously asked only whether
Wyant could have found this information if he had tried, disregarding entirely
that Wyant had no reason to look.” Wyant’s Brief at 11. He asserts that there
was “no case-related reason to investigate” whether Attorney Moore had
previously represented Kremer, as it was the duty of both the Commonwealth
and Attorney Moore to disclose that fact to Wyant. Id. at 22. He maintains
that a defendant “may presume, given the regulation of the legal profession
and counsel’s ethical obligations to scrupulously avoid conflicts of interest,
that his attorney did not labor under a conflict.” Id. at 20. Accordingly, Wyant
argues that the fact he could have independently obtained the records is
irrelevant.
The PCRA court concluded, in pertinent part, that there was “no reason
Attorney Moore’s prior representation of Kremer could not have been
ascertained through the exercise of due diligence.” Rule 907 Notice,
10/22/24, at 5.5 The court noted that Wyant “was represented by multiple
attorneys from at least 2008 to 2016. No reason was advanced why [Wyant],
through prior counsel, could not have investigated the victim’s background for
facts involving his earlier criminal case . . . .” Id.
As a prefatory matter, we note that Wyant cites dozens of federal cases
to establish that he acted with due diligence, including the United States ____________________________________________
5 In its Rule 1925 opinion, the PCRA court relied on the rationale previously
stated in its Rule 907 notice and incorporated that document by reference. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/4/25, at 1.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). See
Wyant’s Brief at 22-23 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Williams . . . makes
clear that Wyant exercised due diligence.”). However, Wyant fails to
acknowledge that the cited cases do not interpret the PCRA’s statutory
language and would not be binding even if they did. Indeed, our Supreme
Court has rejected a similar attempt to treat Williams as relevant to an
analysis of the PCRA, as that case “interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) . . .
regarding the ability to obtain an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas
corpus action.” Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 100 n.8 (Pa.
2001); see also Stokes, 959 A.2d at 311 (rejecting the appellant’s reliance
on a United States Supreme Court decision because the High Court
“considered the propriety of a federal habeas matter, while in this case our
task is to determine whether [the appellant] has satisfied either of two
statutory exceptions to the state PCRA’s timeliness requirement”).
The proper question is simply whether the PCRA court correctly ruled as
a matter of law that Wyant failed to exercise due diligence as required by the
PCRA and relevant caselaw. We agree with the PCRA court that Wyant’s failure
to explain why he never attempted to seek any information regarding the
victim defeats his claim.
Wyant’s argument rests on the premise that he had no due diligence
obligations whatsoever because it was incumbent upon Attorney Moore and
the Commonwealth to disclose Attorney Moore’s prior representation of
Kremer. Wyant therefore maintains that he was entitled to passively rely on
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a third party supplying the information to him. In some circumstances, a
PCRA petitioner may not have proactive obligations. For instance, in our
recent decision in Commonwealth v. Hereford, 334 A.3d 903 (Pa. Super.
2025) (en banc), a jury convicted Isaiah Hereford (“Hereford”) of murdering
an occupant of an apartment during a robbery. Hereford filed a PCRA petition
citing the newly discovered facts exception, asserting “that a previously
unknown eyewitness . . . had come forward in February 2020 and would testify
that Hereford was not involved in the shootings.” Id. at 906. We rejected
the Commonwealth’s argument that Hereford failed to take reasonable steps
to protect his own interests, as the PCRA court had credited the witness’s
declaration that “he did not tell anyone what he saw on the night of the
murders until he contacted Hereford’s counsel because he was a known
trespasser and drug dealer in [the apartment complex].” Id. at 908.
We do not agree with Wyant that this is a case where he could rely on
a third party coming forward with information that he could not have
uncovered with due diligence. In the analogous context of cases involving
information that the Commonwealth was required to disclose in discovery, our
case law requires the defendant to establish due diligence. In Stokes, Ralph
Trent Stokes (“Stokes”) obtained files from the United States Postal Service6
and Philadelphia Police Department and invoked the newly discovered facts
6 Stokes had murdered a postal service employee who happened upon Stokes
and his co-defendant robbing a restaurant.
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and governmental interference exceptions to support a claim under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court concluded that Stokes failed to
establish due diligence and rejected his “argument . . . that a Brady claim
operates to negate — wholly — the statutory timeliness requirements set forth
in the PCRA.” Stokes, 959 A.2d at 311. Regardless of the Commonwealth’s
obligations to turn over the material in the first place, Stokes “was aware of
the files upon which he now relies several years before he ever sought them,
and because [Stokes] failed to explain why he did not request these files
earlier, he did not establish the due diligence required to excuse him from
over a decade of inaction.” Id. Relatedly, Stokes failed to explain “why it is
he sought the files in 2004, but failed to do so earlier.” Id.
Similarly, Wyant was aware that Attorney Moore represented him. That
alone supplied a sufficient basis to investigate for potential conflicts, especially
when, as he now maintains, Attorney Moore failed to adequately investigate
potential defenses. See Wyant’s Brief at 51 (“Had [Attorney] Moore been
more interested in presenting a case that Kremer was the catalyst for the
shooting in order to support his chosen defense of manslaughter/third-degree
murder, he would have secured . . . beneficial evidence from Wyant’s
family.”). Such palpable disinterest would have been known to Wyant, and
he failed to plead in his PCRA petition why he did not conduct any investigation
of his own regarding his trial counsel in the decades since his conviction.
Moreover, Wyant would have had particular cause to investigate whether
Attorney Moore had a conflict of interest in light of the fact that he alleged in
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a prior PCRA petition that his co-defendant’s counsel had an alleged conflict
of interest. See PCRA Petition, 12/16/08, at 8-11 (invoking newly discovered
fact and governmental interference exceptions to raise a claim that Grinnell’s
counsel had a conflict of interest where his paralegal was in a romantic
relationship with the trial prosecutor at the time of trial). Therefore, the PCRA
court correctly determined that the newly discovered evidence exception did
not apply.
We now turn to the governmental interference exception. The PCRA
court concluded that the due diligence analysis resolved this issue. See Rule
907 Notice, 10/22/24, at 7 (“As discussed in the previous section, Petitioner
failed to successfully plead and prove why [the] information concerning
Attorney Moore’s previous representation of the victim through the exercise
of due diligence, could not have been obtained earlier.”).
We agree. As the PCRA court correctly concluded, our Supreme Court
has held that the governmental interference exception requires a petitioner to
act with due diligence. See Stokes, 959 A.2d at 311. The Court has recently
“acknowledge[d] that questions may endure about the appropriateness of a
due diligence inquiry when analyzing timeliness under Section 9545(b)(1)(i)
of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Towles, 300 A.3d 400, 417 n.18 (Pa.
2023). Wyant, citing that observation from Towles and the concurring
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opinions by Justices Donohue and Wecht in that case,7 specifically argues that
this exception “imposes no diligence requirement.” See Wyant’s Brief at 34-
35.
Regardless of whether we agree with Wyant’s argument, this Court may
not overrule binding case law of our Supreme Court. See Commonwealth
v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012) (explaining that this Court has
a “duty and obligation to follow the decisional law of” our Supreme Court and
“[i]t is not our function to attempt reversing viable Supreme Court rulings”).
The majority in Towles explained that existing precedent imposes a due
diligence requirement on petitioners invoking the governmental interference
exception, and the Court declined to revisit the matter in its opinion, reserving
the issue “for another day and another case.” Towles, 300 A.3d at 414 n.14,
417 n.18.
We therefore conclude that the governmental interference exception
does not apply to Wyant’s PCRA claim premised on Attorney Moore’s conflict
of interest, as he failed to plead that he exercised due diligence in uncovering
the factual predicate of the claim. Because Wyant failed to plead the
7 See Towles, 300 A.3d at 418 (Donohue, J., concurring) (arguing that “case
law . . . concluding that th[e governmental interference] exception contains a due diligence component . . . is patently incorrect”); id. at 422 (Wecht, J., concurring) (agreeing “with Justice Donohue that our precedent grafting a due diligence requirement onto the governmental interference exception is misguided”).
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applicability of a timeliness exception regarding his claim that Attorney Moore
had a conflict of interest, Wyant’s first issue merits no relief.
In Wyant’s second issue, he argues that he established the applicability
of the newly discovered facts and governmental interference exceptions with
respect to his claim that the Commonwealth falsely argued in closing that
Wyant’s account of Kremer’s sexual advances was self-serving. Similar to
Wyant’s claim regarding Attorney Moore’s alleged conflict of interest, the
factual predicate for this claim is the existence of criminal charges against
Kremer, which he discovered when Mongenel forwarded him the results of her
RTKL request in November 2023. In Wyant’s view, Kremer’s criminal history
established “that Kremer had a prior history of the same sexual abuse of
children Wyant accused him of engaging in with him.” PCRA Petition, 5/8/24,
at 55.
For all the reasons set forth in our analysis of Kremer’s first issue, we
conclude that Wyant failed to establish that either timeliness exception
applied. Our conclusion that Wyant failed to establish due diligence in
investigating Kremer’s criminal history applies equally here as to the newly
discovered facts and governmental interference exceptions. Therefore,
Wyant’s second issue does not afford him relief.
Wyant has failed to show that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his
petition without a hearing on the basis that he did not adequately plead an
exception to the PCRA’s time bar. We therefore affirm.
Orders affirmed.
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DATE: 7/18/2025
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