J-S33042-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANTOINE S. WILLIFORD : : Appellant : No. 1186 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 25, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002153-2020
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2025
Appellant Antoine S. Williford appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his convictions for unlawful contact with a minor and related
offenses. Appellant argues that the imposition of lifetime registration
requirements under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act1
(SORNA) violate his due process rights and constitute an illegal sentence. We
affirm.
The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. Briefly,
on March 31, 2023, a jury convicted Appellant of statutory sexual assault,
unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of a minor, and indecent assault2
based on allegations that he had intercourse with a minor female victim. On ____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 – 9799.75.
218 Pa.C.S. §§ 3122.1(b), 6318(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i), and 3126(a)(8), respectively. J-S33042-24
July 7, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of one
to two years’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation. He was also
ordered to comply with SORNA’s registration requirements under Subchapter
H. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.
Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement in which he claimed, for the first time,
that Subchapter H was punitive and constituted an illegal sentence. The trial
court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining that Appellant’s claims “were
not raised” before Appellant filed his notice of appeal, and there was no factual
record on which the court could evaluate Appellant’s constitutional challenges
to SORNA. Therefore, the trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled
to relief.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. The imposition of a lifetime sex offender registration requirement pursuant to SORNA on [Appellant] is a violation of both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as this penalty goes beyond the prescribed statutory maximum based upon the General Assembly’s factual determination that [Appellant] “pose[s] a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4), a fact that was not submitted to the jury nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. The imposition of a lifetime sex offender registration punishment pursuant to SORNA on [Appellant] is illegal as it goes beyond the statutory maximums for felonies and misdemeanors as codified in 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1103 and 1104.
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
-2- J-S33042-24
Appellant’s claims are questions of law, for which our standard of review
is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Manzano,
237 A.3d 1175, 1178 (Pa. Super. 2020). “[T]he party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of persuasion.” Id. at 1180
(citation omitted). “A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be
declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the
constitution.” Commonwealth v. Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d 1210, 1214
(citations omitted).
Additionally, our Supreme Court has explained:
Whether a statute is punitive in nature is a threshold question for determining the viability of the various constitutional challenges [], including whether the legislation unconstitutionally usurps judicial power over sentencing in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, violates the United States Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and infringes upon the right to a trial by jury by failing to require that facts that increase the punishment imposed on the underlying crime be found [beyond] a reasonable doubt. It is a gateway inquiry, as legislation must be deemed to be in the nature of criminal punishment to invoke the protections of these constitutional provisions.
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316 A.3d 77 (Pa. 2024) (Torsilieri II)
(footnotes omitted).
In evaluating whether a statute is punitive, Pennsylvania courts apply a
“two-part test [that] consists of first determining whether the expressed
statutory purpose is to impose punishment, and if not, whether the statutory
scheme is so punitive in effect as to negate the legislature’s stated non-
-3- J-S33042-24
punitive intent, as assessed by the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors.”3 Id.
at 100 (citation omitted).
Finally, we note that this Court has remanded cases for further
proceedings in matters where the appellant challenged SORNA before the trial
court, but did not have an opportunity to present evidence in support of their
claims. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Asher, 244 A.3d 27, 33 (Pa. Super.
2020) (vacating and remanding “for a hearing at which the parties can present
evidence for and against the relevant legislative determinations” where the
appellant had preserved his SORNA claims but there was no factual record);
see also Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 350 EDA 2024, 2024 WL 4635259,
at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Oct 31, 2024) (unpublished mem.) (concluding that
remand was appropriate because the appellant “filed a timely post-sentence
motion asking the court to strike his SORNA registration requirements as
unconstitutional” but ultimately “did not have the opportunity to attempt to
meet his burden of establishing his SORNA challenges because the trial court
failed to hold a hearing “before appellant’s post-sentence motion period
expired”).4
However, this Court has declined to remand cases where the appellant
failed to raise a SORNA issue or present any evidence supporting that claim
before the trial court or on appeal. See Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at ____________________________________________
3 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating this Court may rely on unpublished decisions
of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value).
-4- J-S33042-24
1213-14, 1217-18. In Villanueva-Pabon, this Court noted that our Supreme
Court’s decision “in Torsilieri [I] ma[de] clear the importance of the scientific
evidence as it pertained to each of the constitutional issues raised.” Id. at
1217. However, the appellant in Villanueva-Pabon had “produced no
scientific evidence whatsoever to support his claims that underlying legislative
policy infringes on [the] appellant's rights[.]” Id. at 1218. Instead, this Court
explained that the appellant had “made a strategic decision to forego offering
live testimony in the hope that the trial court or this Court would stay any
decision on the merits pending the outcome of the remand hearing in
Torsilieri [I].” Id. Therefore, the Villanueva-Pabon Court rejected the
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J-S33042-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANTOINE S. WILLIFORD : : Appellant : No. 1186 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 25, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002153-2020
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2025
Appellant Antoine S. Williford appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his convictions for unlawful contact with a minor and related
offenses. Appellant argues that the imposition of lifetime registration
requirements under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act1
(SORNA) violate his due process rights and constitute an illegal sentence. We
affirm.
The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. Briefly,
on March 31, 2023, a jury convicted Appellant of statutory sexual assault,
unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of a minor, and indecent assault2
based on allegations that he had intercourse with a minor female victim. On ____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 – 9799.75.
218 Pa.C.S. §§ 3122.1(b), 6318(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i), and 3126(a)(8), respectively. J-S33042-24
July 7, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of one
to two years’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation. He was also
ordered to comply with SORNA’s registration requirements under Subchapter
H. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.
Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement in which he claimed, for the first time,
that Subchapter H was punitive and constituted an illegal sentence. The trial
court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining that Appellant’s claims “were
not raised” before Appellant filed his notice of appeal, and there was no factual
record on which the court could evaluate Appellant’s constitutional challenges
to SORNA. Therefore, the trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled
to relief.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. The imposition of a lifetime sex offender registration requirement pursuant to SORNA on [Appellant] is a violation of both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as this penalty goes beyond the prescribed statutory maximum based upon the General Assembly’s factual determination that [Appellant] “pose[s] a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4), a fact that was not submitted to the jury nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. The imposition of a lifetime sex offender registration punishment pursuant to SORNA on [Appellant] is illegal as it goes beyond the statutory maximums for felonies and misdemeanors as codified in 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1103 and 1104.
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
-2- J-S33042-24
Appellant’s claims are questions of law, for which our standard of review
is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Manzano,
237 A.3d 1175, 1178 (Pa. Super. 2020). “[T]he party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of persuasion.” Id. at 1180
(citation omitted). “A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be
declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the
constitution.” Commonwealth v. Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d 1210, 1214
(citations omitted).
Additionally, our Supreme Court has explained:
Whether a statute is punitive in nature is a threshold question for determining the viability of the various constitutional challenges [], including whether the legislation unconstitutionally usurps judicial power over sentencing in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, violates the United States Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and infringes upon the right to a trial by jury by failing to require that facts that increase the punishment imposed on the underlying crime be found [beyond] a reasonable doubt. It is a gateway inquiry, as legislation must be deemed to be in the nature of criminal punishment to invoke the protections of these constitutional provisions.
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316 A.3d 77 (Pa. 2024) (Torsilieri II)
(footnotes omitted).
In evaluating whether a statute is punitive, Pennsylvania courts apply a
“two-part test [that] consists of first determining whether the expressed
statutory purpose is to impose punishment, and if not, whether the statutory
scheme is so punitive in effect as to negate the legislature’s stated non-
-3- J-S33042-24
punitive intent, as assessed by the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors.”3 Id.
at 100 (citation omitted).
Finally, we note that this Court has remanded cases for further
proceedings in matters where the appellant challenged SORNA before the trial
court, but did not have an opportunity to present evidence in support of their
claims. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Asher, 244 A.3d 27, 33 (Pa. Super.
2020) (vacating and remanding “for a hearing at which the parties can present
evidence for and against the relevant legislative determinations” where the
appellant had preserved his SORNA claims but there was no factual record);
see also Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 350 EDA 2024, 2024 WL 4635259,
at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Oct 31, 2024) (unpublished mem.) (concluding that
remand was appropriate because the appellant “filed a timely post-sentence
motion asking the court to strike his SORNA registration requirements as
unconstitutional” but ultimately “did not have the opportunity to attempt to
meet his burden of establishing his SORNA challenges because the trial court
failed to hold a hearing “before appellant’s post-sentence motion period
expired”).4
However, this Court has declined to remand cases where the appellant
failed to raise a SORNA issue or present any evidence supporting that claim
before the trial court or on appeal. See Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at ____________________________________________
3 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating this Court may rely on unpublished decisions
of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value).
-4- J-S33042-24
1213-14, 1217-18. In Villanueva-Pabon, this Court noted that our Supreme
Court’s decision “in Torsilieri [I] ma[de] clear the importance of the scientific
evidence as it pertained to each of the constitutional issues raised.” Id. at
1217. However, the appellant in Villanueva-Pabon had “produced no
scientific evidence whatsoever to support his claims that underlying legislative
policy infringes on [the] appellant's rights[.]” Id. at 1218. Instead, this Court
explained that the appellant had “made a strategic decision to forego offering
live testimony in the hope that the trial court or this Court would stay any
decision on the merits pending the outcome of the remand hearing in
Torsilieri [I].” Id. Therefore, the Villanueva-Pabon Court rejected the
appellant's SORNA challenge and declined to remand the matter for further
proceedings. Id; see also Commonwealth v. Manzano, 237 A.3d 1175,
1182 (Pa. Super. 2020) (declining to remand for further proceedings and
concluding that “unlike the defendant in Torsilieri [I, the a]ppellant has
produced no scientific evidence whatsoever to support his claims that the
underlying legislative policy infringes on [the a]ppellant’s rights”).
In the instant case, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or
request that the trial court conduct a hearing on his claims.5 Additionally, ____________________________________________
5 We note that to the extent Appellant characterizes his claim as a challenge
to the legality of his sentence, this Court has held that SORNA’s registration requirements are “separate and apart from [the] term of incarceration” and that “the legislature did not limit the authority of a court to impose registration requirements only within the maximum allowable term of incarceration; in fact, the legislature mandated the opposite and required courts to impose (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5- J-S33042-24
Appellant does not present any evidence to support his claims on appeal.
Therefore, because Appellant has failed to present any evidence that
Subchapter H “clearly, palpably, and plainly” violates the constitution, see
Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1213-14, he is not entitled to relief.6
Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Kunselman joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 02/27/2025
____________________________________________
registration requirements in excess of the maximum allowable term of incarceration.” Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 173 (Pa. Super. 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Bricker, 198 A.3d 371, 377 (Pa. Super. 2018) (reiterating that a requirement for a defendant to register as a sexual offender for a period of time exceeding the lawful statutory maximum term of incarceration for his offense is not illegal).
6 Additionally, as noted previously, our Supreme Court ruled in Torsilieri II
that Subchapter H is not punitive and does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution. See Torsilieri II, 316 A.3d at 110. Therefore, even if Appellant requested a hearing, he would not be entitled to relief.
-6-