J-S43025-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
SHERDINA WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 2728 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 27, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0910111-2002
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2015
Appellant, Sherdina Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered August 27, 2014, by the Honorable Christopher R. Wogan, Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. At issue in this appeal is whether a
sentencing judge is required to recuse himself after this Court vacated a
sentence due to apparent bias and remanded for re-sentencing. After careful
review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused recusal.
The genesis of this appeal is a judgment of sentence imposed when
Williams’s probation was revoked, after she repeatedly violated the
probationary terms by committing new crimes.1 This term of probation was ____________________________________________
1 The certified record on appeal does not contain any document whereby this panel can confirm the procedural history of this matter prior to September (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-S43025-15
imposed after Williams pled guilty, on October 15, 2001, to various charges
stemming from her actions in burglarizing several Catholic institutions. On
that same day, Williams was given an aggregate sentence of 11½ to 23
months’ imprisonment with immediate parole to an inpatient program,
followed by ten years’ probation.
On January 16, 2002, Williams was arrested after attacking a police
officer with a pair of scissors. On April 18, 2002, Williams pled guilty to
aggravated assault before the Honorable Sheila Woods-Skipper. The precise
nature of this sentence is unknown.
The incident relevant to this appeal took place on September 7, 2002,
when Williams broke into an employee’s office at Friends Hospital. The victim
caught Williams sitting behind her desk, rummaging through her belongings.
Once confronted, Williams attempted to escape by shoving the victim and a
security guard out of her way. A bench trial was held on January 3, 2003,
before the Honorable Christopher R. Wogan. Williams was found guilty of
burglary and simple assault.
On February 12, 2003 Williams was sentenced to an aggregate term of
40-80 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months’ probation. On March
_______________________ (Footnote Continued)
2002. However, a review of the parties’ brief and trial court’s opinion reveals no objections to the history set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014). We therefore take judicial notice of the history as set forth in that case.
-2- J-S43025-15
6, 2003, the sentencing court granted a motion for reconsideration and
reduced Williams’s sentence to 36-72 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24
months’ probation.
Due to the new convictions, the Honorable James J. Fitzgerald, III,
(who is now a senior judge on this Court) revoked Williams’s parole and
ordered her to serve the balance of her original sentence of imprisonment
for the 2001 charges.
Williams served six years of imprisonment and was released in 2009.
On January 24, 2010, while on probation, Williams was arrested in relation
to a traffic accident. On September 3, 2010, the Honorable Joseph J. O’Neill
sentenced Williams to three days to six months of imprisonment and six
months’ probation for driving under the influence of a controlled substance
and to two years’ probation for causing an accident that led to personal
injury or death.
On April 3 and 4, 2010, Williams and an accomplice were involved in
three separate burglaries, each inside of a Catholic Church or convent. On
March 4, 2011, Williams appeared before the Honorable Joseph A. Smyth
and pled guilty to three counts of burglary. Following the guilty plea,
Williams was sentenced to an aggregate term of seven to 20 years of
imprisonment.
On June 1, 2011, Williams appeared before Judge Wogan for a
probation violation hearing on the multiple outstanding sentences stemming
from the 2001-2002 criminal charges, including the instant case. At the
-3- J-S43025-15
conclusion of this hearing, Williams’s probation was revoked. On July 20,
2011, Williams filed a motion for recusal, which the court denied after a
hearing. On September 30, 2011, Williams was sentenced to an aggregate
term of 24 to 48 months of imprisonment, followed by one year of probation.
During sentencing, the trial court made a series of inappropriate statements.
Williams appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and that the
trial court erred in refusing to recuse. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 69
A.3d 735 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014), a panel
of this Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The
panel (the Honorable Christine L. Donohue filed a concurring statement in
which she concurred in the result) held that “[t]he sentence imposed was
unreasonable in its application of the principle of proportionality and,
therefore, it was manifestly excessive.” Id., at 744.
The panel further held that “[the] accumulation of inappropriate
remarks [by the court during sentencing] leads us to conclude that
Appellant’s sentence cannot be divorced from the appearance of bias.” Id.
More specifically, finding that “[t]he trial court’s bias or partiality was
demonstrated by its focus on repairing or correcting the perceived mistakes
of prior judges … ” Id., at 749. The panel also noted that the excessive focus
on Williams’s motive towards the specific “victimization of the Catholic
Church … [was] unsupported by the record.” Id. Again unsupported by the
record and further demonstration of bias was the sentencing court’s “use or
misuse of pseudo-medical terminology to describe Appellant's mental
-4- J-S43025-15
health.” Id. The panel also highlighted the “improper consideration of
Appellant’s gender and the court's subjective comparison of Appellant to
other members of Appellant's gender that were sentenced in his courtroom.”
Id.
However, the panel concluded that Williams had “not met her burden
of demonstrating bias during the preceding VOP hearing.” Id., at 750. Their
review of the record revealed that while there was evidence of bias during
the VOP hearing, “[i]t was not until that pattern of inquiry continued
throughout the course of the subsequent proceedings that the appearance of
bias rose to a critical level.” Id. Thus, they concluded that Judge Wogan did
not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse since it was prior to the
sentencing hearing, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. See id.
On remand for re-sentencing, Williams again moved for recusal. On
August 27, 2014, after the recusal hearing, the trial court requested the
cases originally before Judge Fitzgerald be reassigned. This left only the
burglary case, the one originally heard by Judge Wogan, in which he denied
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J-S43025-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
SHERDINA WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 2728 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 27, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0910111-2002
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2015
Appellant, Sherdina Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered August 27, 2014, by the Honorable Christopher R. Wogan, Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. At issue in this appeal is whether a
sentencing judge is required to recuse himself after this Court vacated a
sentence due to apparent bias and remanded for re-sentencing. After careful
review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused recusal.
The genesis of this appeal is a judgment of sentence imposed when
Williams’s probation was revoked, after she repeatedly violated the
probationary terms by committing new crimes.1 This term of probation was ____________________________________________
1 The certified record on appeal does not contain any document whereby this panel can confirm the procedural history of this matter prior to September (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-S43025-15
imposed after Williams pled guilty, on October 15, 2001, to various charges
stemming from her actions in burglarizing several Catholic institutions. On
that same day, Williams was given an aggregate sentence of 11½ to 23
months’ imprisonment with immediate parole to an inpatient program,
followed by ten years’ probation.
On January 16, 2002, Williams was arrested after attacking a police
officer with a pair of scissors. On April 18, 2002, Williams pled guilty to
aggravated assault before the Honorable Sheila Woods-Skipper. The precise
nature of this sentence is unknown.
The incident relevant to this appeal took place on September 7, 2002,
when Williams broke into an employee’s office at Friends Hospital. The victim
caught Williams sitting behind her desk, rummaging through her belongings.
Once confronted, Williams attempted to escape by shoving the victim and a
security guard out of her way. A bench trial was held on January 3, 2003,
before the Honorable Christopher R. Wogan. Williams was found guilty of
burglary and simple assault.
On February 12, 2003 Williams was sentenced to an aggregate term of
40-80 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months’ probation. On March
_______________________ (Footnote Continued)
2002. However, a review of the parties’ brief and trial court’s opinion reveals no objections to the history set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014). We therefore take judicial notice of the history as set forth in that case.
-2- J-S43025-15
6, 2003, the sentencing court granted a motion for reconsideration and
reduced Williams’s sentence to 36-72 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24
months’ probation.
Due to the new convictions, the Honorable James J. Fitzgerald, III,
(who is now a senior judge on this Court) revoked Williams’s parole and
ordered her to serve the balance of her original sentence of imprisonment
for the 2001 charges.
Williams served six years of imprisonment and was released in 2009.
On January 24, 2010, while on probation, Williams was arrested in relation
to a traffic accident. On September 3, 2010, the Honorable Joseph J. O’Neill
sentenced Williams to three days to six months of imprisonment and six
months’ probation for driving under the influence of a controlled substance
and to two years’ probation for causing an accident that led to personal
injury or death.
On April 3 and 4, 2010, Williams and an accomplice were involved in
three separate burglaries, each inside of a Catholic Church or convent. On
March 4, 2011, Williams appeared before the Honorable Joseph A. Smyth
and pled guilty to three counts of burglary. Following the guilty plea,
Williams was sentenced to an aggregate term of seven to 20 years of
imprisonment.
On June 1, 2011, Williams appeared before Judge Wogan for a
probation violation hearing on the multiple outstanding sentences stemming
from the 2001-2002 criminal charges, including the instant case. At the
-3- J-S43025-15
conclusion of this hearing, Williams’s probation was revoked. On July 20,
2011, Williams filed a motion for recusal, which the court denied after a
hearing. On September 30, 2011, Williams was sentenced to an aggregate
term of 24 to 48 months of imprisonment, followed by one year of probation.
During sentencing, the trial court made a series of inappropriate statements.
Williams appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and that the
trial court erred in refusing to recuse. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 69
A.3d 735 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014), a panel
of this Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The
panel (the Honorable Christine L. Donohue filed a concurring statement in
which she concurred in the result) held that “[t]he sentence imposed was
unreasonable in its application of the principle of proportionality and,
therefore, it was manifestly excessive.” Id., at 744.
The panel further held that “[the] accumulation of inappropriate
remarks [by the court during sentencing] leads us to conclude that
Appellant’s sentence cannot be divorced from the appearance of bias.” Id.
More specifically, finding that “[t]he trial court’s bias or partiality was
demonstrated by its focus on repairing or correcting the perceived mistakes
of prior judges … ” Id., at 749. The panel also noted that the excessive focus
on Williams’s motive towards the specific “victimization of the Catholic
Church … [was] unsupported by the record.” Id. Again unsupported by the
record and further demonstration of bias was the sentencing court’s “use or
misuse of pseudo-medical terminology to describe Appellant's mental
-4- J-S43025-15
health.” Id. The panel also highlighted the “improper consideration of
Appellant’s gender and the court's subjective comparison of Appellant to
other members of Appellant's gender that were sentenced in his courtroom.”
Id.
However, the panel concluded that Williams had “not met her burden
of demonstrating bias during the preceding VOP hearing.” Id., at 750. Their
review of the record revealed that while there was evidence of bias during
the VOP hearing, “[i]t was not until that pattern of inquiry continued
throughout the course of the subsequent proceedings that the appearance of
bias rose to a critical level.” Id. Thus, they concluded that Judge Wogan did
not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse since it was prior to the
sentencing hearing, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. See id.
On remand for re-sentencing, Williams again moved for recusal. On
August 27, 2014, after the recusal hearing, the trial court requested the
cases originally before Judge Fitzgerald be reassigned. This left only the
burglary case, the one originally heard by Judge Wogan, in which he denied
the motion to recuse himself. Judge Wogan proceeded to sentence Williams
to 2-4 years of imprisonment for violating her probation in the 2002 burglary
case. This timely appeal follows.
Williams’s lone argument on appeal is that the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in denying the motion for recusal. When addressing a
recusal motion we presume that judges of this Commonwealth are
honorable, fair and competent, and, when confronted with a recusal
-5- J-S43025-15
demand, have the ability to determine whether they can rule impartially and
without prejudice. See Commonwealth v. White, 734 A.2d 374, 384 (Pa.
1999). Our standard of review for denying a recusal motion is well settled.
It is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially. As a general rule, a motion for recusal is initially directed to and decided by the jurist whose impartiality is being challenged. In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that decision will not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of discretion. In reviewing a denial of a disqualification motion, we recognize that our judges are honorable, fair and competent.
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. 1998) (internal
citations omitted).
Williams makes no reference to any action—nearly three years after
the original indiscretion—that would point to the trial court’s inability to
conduct an impartial sentencing hearing. Rather, Williams seems to contend
that the trial court is biased against her. The question of whether a
particular judge has “a personal bias or interest which would preclude” the
ability to be impartial “is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the
jurist can make.” Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757, 764 (Pa. 1989)
(emphasis in original). Furthermore, the trial court’s self-assessment of
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whether its continued involvement creates an appearance of impropriety
remains unreviewable, absent an abuse of discretion. See Abu-Jamal, 720
A.2d at 89.
The trial court’s decision to deny the recusal motion was not an abuse
of discretion. After acknowledging the comments made during the 2011
hearing were inappropriate, the trial court transferred the probation
violations in which Judge Fitzgerald originally presided over, an obvious
attempt to diminish any appearance of bias, as it left only the case that the
trial court had originally heard.
In the alternative, Williams contends that “the lower court deliberately
misapprehended the Superior Court[‘s] holding[,] by which it is bound.”
Appellant’s brief, at 10. Although recusal on remand was not explicitly ruled
out, the panel concluded in Williams that “Judge Wogan did not abuse his
discretion at the time he refused to recuse himself.” 69 A.3d at 750.
Williams simply has not met her burden of showing that the order required
recusal on remand.
Judgement of sentence affirmed.
President Judge Gantman joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2015
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