Com. v. Williams, L.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 458 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S39032-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LEROY WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 458 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 11, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000125-2024

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 5, 2026

Leroy Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

following his guilty plea to possession with intent to deliver a controlled

substance (“PWID”).1 Additionally, Williams’s counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a

petition to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Because Williams has failed to show the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his

negotiated guilty plea, and our independent review discloses no non-frivolous

appellate issues, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

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1 See 35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(30). J-S39032-25

[I]n October [] 2023, . . . Williams . . . was arrested and charged with [PWID and related offenses]. . . . [He] entered a negotiated guilty plea to [PWID of f]entanyl.

Prior to entering his guilty plea, [Williams] indicated that he understood what was happening in court but that he had not had enough time to speak with his lawyer. Th[e c]ourt explained to [him] the sentencing guidelines and procedures and that [he] was presumed to be innocent. The [c]ourt passed [Williams’s] case until the end of the day to give him more time to speak with his lawyer.

Williams returned to the courtroom later in the afternoon, [and] assured th[e c]ourt that he had enough time to speak with his lawyer and that he wanted to “[a]ccept the plea and plead guilty[.]” [Plea] counsel colloquied [Williams,] who confirmed that he was 53 years old, had a high school diploma, that he could read and write, that he understood the terms of the guilty plea and that he was not under the influence of any substance that would affect his understanding. [Williams] confirmed that no one had forced, threatened or coerced him into pleading guilty and that he was doing so of his own free will. [Plea] counsel confirmed with [Williams] that together they had reviewed and completed the guilty plea statement and statement of post- sentence rights, and that [Williams] understood the documents.

Th[e trial c]ourt conducted its own colloquy of [Williams,] during which he confirmed that he understood what he was doing, had enough time to speak with his attorney and that he was satisfied with the advice he had received. Th[e c]ourt accepted [Williams’s] plea as knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Th[e c]ourt imposed [a below standard-range sentence of six-to-twelve years of imprisonment with five years of consecutive probation] upon [Williams,] consistent with the plea negotiations[,] and [Williams] indicated he had no questions of the [c]ourt.

[I]n September [] 2024, [Williams] filed a [post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.] [I]n January [] 2025, th[e c]ourt conducted a hearing on [the m]otion[,] at which [Williams] testified. . . . [The court later] denied [the m]otion. [Williams’s] timely . . .[a]ppeal followed. Th[e c]ourt issued an [o]rder [r]equiring a 1925(b) Statement. . . . [Counsel] filed a Statement of Intent to File an Anders/Santiago Brief [pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4)].

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Trial Ct. Op., 5/20/25, at 1-3 (citations to the record and footnotes omitted;

emphasis added).

As noted above, Counsel has filed an application to withdraw along with

an Anders brief. When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not

review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request

to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super.

2010). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and

wishes to withdraw from representation, he or she must do the following:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems worthy of this Court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(internal citation omitted). In Santiago, our Supreme Court addressed the

second requirement of Anders, i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and

required that the brief:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of

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record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Once counsel has satisfied these technical

requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial

court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the

appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188

A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

Here, Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw stating that after an

extensive review of the record and applicable law, she has concluded that this

appeal is wholly frivolous. See Pet. to Withdraw, 6/30/25, at ¶ 4. Counsel

has also filed a brief and provided it to Lloyd, and has advised Lloyd of his

right to proceed in this appeal, with private counsel or pro se, and to present

to this Court any other information or documentation relevant to his appeal.

See id. at ¶ 5; see also id. at Ex. 1 (letter to Williams informing him of the

right to retain new counsel or to submit on his own behalf additional

arguments). Counsel’s Anders brief includes a summary of the factual

procedural history of the appeal and explains her reasons for concluding that

the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Anders Brief at 6-17. Thus, we conclude

that Counsel has complied with the technical requirements of Anders and

Santiago, and we will proceed with an independent review of whether this

appeal is frivolous.

Counsel identifies the following issues for our review:

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Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to permit [Williams] to withdraw his guilty plea where the plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent?

Anders Brief at 13–14.

Our standard of review for challenges to the denial of a post-sentence

motion to withdraw a guilty plea is as follows:

We review the denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. 2018). “Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Gabra, 336 A.3d 1052, 1056–57 (Pa. Super. 2025).

As noted above, Williams’s issue concerns the trial court’s denial of his

post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court has explained:

Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established. A defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy, and he may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.

Id. at 1057 (internal citation omitted; emphasis added). Where the motion

to withdraw the guilty plea is made after sentencing, a defendant must

demonstrate manifest injustice would occur if the motion were denied. See

id. “Manifest injustice may be established if the plea was not tendered

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knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In determining whether a plea is

valid, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding

the plea.” Id (internal citation omitted).

Williams’s intended challenge is to the trial court’s denial of his post-

sentence motion in which he sought to withdraw his guilty plea because it was

involuntary. Williams argues the plea was involuntary because plea counsel

communicated with his, Williams’s, wife about the offer and asked her to tell

him, Williams, to take the plea. See Anders Br. at 14. Williams asserts that

had his wife not pressured him to take the plea—which she would not have

done absent plea counsel’s prompting—he would not have pleaded guilty. See

id.

The trial court considered Williams’s issue and concluded it merits no

relief:

Both defense counsel and this [c]ourt conducted a colloquy of [Williams] the day [he] entered his plea. In addition to the written guilty plea statement in which [Williams] acknowledged his understanding of what he was doing by pleading guilty, this [c]ourt and [Williams’s] attorney each questioned [him] extensively regarding [his] understanding of what he was doing and the rights he was giving up by entering a guilty plea. This court determined after inquiry . . . that his plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. [Williams’s] plea proceedings complied with the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 590.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/20/25, at 4.

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court

in denying Williams’s motion. We note that, initially, the court continued the

plea from one day into the next, and then a second time until later that second

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day, for Williams to have sufficient time to discuss the plea deal with his

attorney. See N.T., 9/11/24, at 3. After consulting with his attorney, Williams

pleaded guilty, and he affirmed under oath that, while his attorney was

prepared to try his case, Williams ultimately decided to plead guilty. See id.

at 16-17. Williams stated that it was his decision and that no one had forced,

threatened, or coerced him into entering the plea. See id. at 16. Additionally,

he affirmed he was pleading guilty of his own free will. See id.; accord Guilty

Plea Statement (Colloquy), 9/11/24, at ¶¶ 28-29 (indicating Williams’s plea

was voluntary and he answered the colloquy questions voluntarily). Further,

at the plea hearing, Williams indicated he understood the written colloquy and

declined to ask any questions of the court after the oral colloquy. See N.T.,

9/11/24, at 21. When given the opportunity for allocution, Williams declined

to say anything. See id. at 24. Additionally, we note that Williams received

as part of his negotiated sentence a six-to-twelve-year term of incarceration

with five years of consecutive probation, see id., below the guideline sentence

of fifteen to thirty years for a second PWID offense involving fentanyl. See

id. at 4.

Notwithstanding Williams’s sworn statements in the written and oral

colloquies that his below-guidelines plea was voluntary, he later asserted his

wife coerced him at the urging of his attorney. See N.T., 1/9/25, at 6. The

law however does not permit Williams to contradict his prior sworn statements

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about the voluntariness of his plea. See Gabra, 336 A.3d at 1057.2 As such,

we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Williams’s post-

sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and any challenge to the

disposition of Williams’s post-sentence motion is frivolous. Additionally,

following our own independent review, we conclude there are no non-frivolous

issues in the certified record. Consequently, we concur with Counsel’s

assessment that Williams’s appeal is frivolous. As such, we affirm the

judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 1/5/2026

2 To the extent Williams sought to withdraw his guilty plea because he was

dissatisfied with his sentence, see N.T., 1/9/25, at 11 (Williams informing the court of his dissatisfaction that he received consecutive probation while a co- defendant did not), Williams agreed to the consecutive probation, see N.T., 9/11/24, at 13 (guilty plea terms stated in open court prior to Williams’s oral colloquy); and, in any event, this is an insufficient basis for withdrawal of the plea. See Commonwealth v. Felix, 303 A.3d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. 2023) (providing that a defendant’s disappointment in the sentence does not constitute manifest injustice).

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