Com. v. Williams, K.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 7, 2025
• Docket: 1520 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S24028-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KAYLA MARIE WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 1520 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0001276-2023

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: October 7, 2025

Kayla Marie Williams appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence

entered following her summary conviction for defiant trespass.1 We affirm.

At Williams’s bench trial, Michelle Kraynak testified that she worked as

a front office assistant at the MedExpress Urgent Care in Peters Township.

N.T., Nov. 1, 2024, at 5. She testified that in March 2023, Williams came in

for an appointment. Id. at 5-6. She stated that while Williams was in a back

room for her medical appointment, Kraynak found a letter of termination in

Williams’s chart in the computer system. Id. at 7. The letter was dated

February 10, 2023, and addressed to Williams. Id. at 10. It stated that it had

come to MedExpress’s “attention that on Friday, February 3, 2023, [Williams]

engaged in behavior which was disruptive and inappropriate,” and “[f]or the

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). J-S24028-25

safety and well-being of our staff and patients, we are unable to tolerate

intimidating or disruptive behavior in our urgent care clinics, or via virtual

care.” Id. at 10-11. The letter stated that MedExpress would be “unable to

continue to provide [Williams] with medical care, and ask[ed] that [she] not

present to a MedExpress Urgent Care Center, or request a virtual visit.” Id. at

11.

Kraynak showed the doctor the letter, and the doctor decided to

continue to treat Williams that day. Id. at 12. When Williams checked out,

Kraynak gave her the notes from that day’s visit and provided her with a copy

of the letter and reminded her that she was not allowed on MedExpress

premises. Id.

Kraynak testified that when Williams’s test results came in, the doctor

gave her the results by phone and told her that she could enter MedExpress

to pick up a physical copy of the results but would not be allowed to be seen

for further treatment. Id. at 13.

Kraynak testified that in May 2023, Williams came to the MedExpress

and asked for an appointment. Id. at 13-14. Kraynak told Williams that she

could give Williams the test results but that Williams could not be seen by a

provider. Kraynak stated that Williams “got very aggressive, stating that

[they] were being racist.” Id. at 15. Kraynak testified that Williams got her

phone out and tried to make a video. Id. Kraynak agreed that Williams raised

her voice and used curse words. Id. Kraynak testified that she asked Williams

to leave at least 10 times and that she stayed for 15 to 20 minutes. Id. at 16.

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Kraynak stated that there was another worker at the front desk, a nurse came

from the back, and there were three to four patients in the waiting room. Id.

Kraynak said they called the police because Williams would not leave. Id. at

17.

On cross-examination, Kraynak testified that Williams had permission

to enter the MedExpress to pick up her test results. Id. at 19-20. She further

stated that MedExpress does not have cameras. Id. at 20.

A former nurse at the Peters Township MedExpress, Dina Wass, testified

that in May 2023, she was working when Williams entered the premises. Id.

at 22-23. She said she was in the back and knew “there was something going

on” that “at first . . . wasn’t too bad,” but then she heard the “commotion

increase.” Id. at 24-25. She stated that it “had gone on for so long,” that she

went to see what was going on. Id. at 25. She testified she went into the

waiting room and saw Williams, and saw another patient “kind of approaching”

Williams. Id. at 25-26. Wass testified that she asked if they were together

and when she learned they were not, she put her arms out and told Williams

she had to leave. Id. at 26. When asked if it appeared that the individuals

were in a verbal confrontation, Wass stated, “Possibly, yes, it was just not

normal.” Id. She testified that Williams had her phone in Wass’s face, and

that Willaims kept yelling at her, “You’re inferior.” Id. at 27. Wass testified

she got Williams to go into the vestibule and to leave the building. Id. Wass

testified she asked Williams to leave about five times, and Williams kept

yelling. Id. at 28. She stated her interaction with Williams lasted about two

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minutes. Id. at 30-31. She testified the Peters Township MedExpress does not

have cameras. Id. at 31.

A patient at MedExpress, Cheryl Whitehead, testified that at the time of

the incident she was seated about five feet away from the check-in window.

Id. at 33. She stated there were three or four other sets of people in the

waiting room. Id. at 34. She said Williams kept asking to be tested, and that

Williams escalated the conflict, while the employees at the front desk did not

yell back. Id. at 35. Whitehead testified that Williams was recording the

incident. Id. at 36. She said Williams was there when she arrived, and the

conflict lasted eight to 10 minutes after she arrived. Id. at 34, 36. Whitehead

stated that she did not get involved, but did pay attention. Id. at 36. She

testified that she stood up when Williams said she was going to get something

from her car. Id. at 37. She agreed that a MedExpress employee came into

the waiting room and escorted Williams out. Id. at 38. She stated the

employee asked Williams to leave a couple times. Id.

Williams testified that prior to the March 2023 visit she had not known

that she was not allowed at MedExpress locations, and she had not received

the letter that was in her chart. Id. at 45. She testified that when the

employee informed her of the letter, she told the employee that she had never

been to the MedExpress location mentioned in the letter. Id. at 46. She

testified that she went to MedExpress in May 2023 to retrieve her medical

records, and had confirmed three or four times that she could pick them up.

Id. She testified that when she arrived she asked for her medical records, and

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they told her that they were refusing to give her the paperwork, that she was

not privileged to be there, and that she had to leave. Id. at 47. She testified

she asked if she “[c]ould . . . at least speak to the doctor . . . about [her]

concerns,” and they said no. Id. She testified she was there for one to two

minutes. Id. at 48. She testified she was not “outwardly angry” and was not

yelling. Id. at 55-56. On re-direct, Williams said that MedExpress had

cameras, stating “there’s a few really big cameras in the lobby.” Id. at 61.

The trial court found Williams guilty of criminal trespass.2 The court

sentenced Williams to pay a fine of $300.00. She appealed.3

In her brief, Williams states the following as reasons for her appeal:

a.) Insufficient Evidence

b.) Improper Admission of Hearsay Evidence

c.) Inconsistent Testimonies by the Witnesses

d.) Legal Errors by Judge Costanzo

e.) Misconduct by Judge Costanzo

f.) Improper Prosecutorial Conduct by the District Attorney(s)

g.) False Testimonies by the Witnesses

h.) Improper Exclusion of Defense Evidence

2 The court found Williams not guilty of disorderly conduct.

3 Following trial, the court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Williams filed

a pro se post-trial motion. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that because Williams was convicted of a summary offense, she was precluded from filing post-sentence motions. Order, filed Nov 21, 2024 (citing Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779, 784 (Pa.Super. 1996) and Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D)).

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i.) The District Attorney(s) Withholding Exculpatory Evidence

j.) Obvious Bias by the Witnesses for Why They Lied

k.) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

l.) Conflict of Interest Between My Attorney that Represented Me and the District Attorney(s) that I was not made aware of before the November 1st hearing.

Williams’s Br. at 1.

Williams waived all issues except her challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. A 1925(b) statement “shall concisely identify each error that the

appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be

raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). A concise statement that “is

too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the

functional equivalent to no Concise Statement at all.” Commonwealth v.

Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Where

a Rule 1925(b) statement fails “to identify with sufficient detail the issues to

be raised on appeal, . . . those issues are waived.” Commonwealth v.

Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 701 (Pa. 2020).

In her Rule 1925(b) statement, Williams raised issues identical to those

listed in her appellate brief. Her issues as stated failed to specify the alleged

hearsay, trial court errors or misconduct, improper prosecutorial conduct,

false testimony, excluded evidence, withheld evidence, bias, ineffectiveness,

or conflict of interest that she intended to challenge. Other than her sufficiency

claim, the issues listed in the Rule 1925(b) statement were vague and did not

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allow the trial court to identify the issues. Williams therefore waived the issues

for appellate purposes. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Williams also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her

summary trespass conviction. She argues the Commonwealth presented “no

real evidence” to support the conviction. Williams’s Br. at 2 (emphasis

removed). She claims the court based its decision on inconsistent witness

testimony, and that the witnesses lied and changed their testimony. Williams

claims she cannot be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the

testimony of non-credible witnesses who “were caught lying/changing their

stories multiple times.” Id.

To the extent this issue challenges the court’s credibility findings and is

based on alleged inconsistent testimony, it raises a challenge to the weight of

the evidence. To the extent it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we

find the claim lacks merit.

A weight claim must be presented to the trial court in the first instance

on pain of waiver, usually in a post-sentence motion, except in appeals from

summary convictions. There is an exception for summary convictions because

a criminal defendant who has been convicted of a summary offense – such as

Williams – cannot file post-sentence motions. In such a case, we will entertain

the weight issue without remand if the trial court has already addressed it.

See Commonwealth v. Damerjian, No. 2055 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 4103986,

at *2-*3 (Pa.Super. 2023) (unpublished mem.) (citing Commonwealth v.

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Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779, 784-785 (Pa.Super. 1994)). As the trial court has

already considered Williams’s weight argument, we will review it.

Williams claims that the witnesses said that she entered MedExpress

without being given permission to do so, but alleges the witnesses “were

caught during questioning . . . to admitting they gave [her] permission that

day to enter.” Williams’s Br. at 2. She next claims that one witness said

Williams had an argument with other patients, but other witnesses admitted

that she had not argued with other patients. Id. at 3. She further claims the

witnesses lied when they said there were no cameras in the MedExpress lobby.

Id. In addition, Williams claims that “in the discovery” a witness said Williams

leaned her head over the front desk counter. Id. She argues this could not

have happened as there were blockers over the front desk preventing her from

leaning her head over the counter. Williams further claims that MedExpress

gave her permission to pick up her paperwork, but they would not give it to

her, and they called the police because she said she would file a lawsuit.

We review a trial court’s denial or grant of a weight claim for an abuse

of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 323 A.3d 807, 823 (Pa.Super.

2024). When a trial court reviews a challenge to the weight of the evidence,

it must determine whether “notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with

all the facts is to deny justice.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer,

744 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. 2000)). “A new trial should not be granted because of

a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would

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have arrived at a different conclusion.” Id. (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at

752). The trier of fact is “free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and

to determine the credibility of witnesses.” Commonwealth v. James, 268

A.3d 461, 468 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Houser, 18

A.3d 1128, 1135-36 (Pa. 2011)).

The trial court concluded that it “heard testimony from each witness

presented by the Commonwealth and [Williams], along with any alleged

inconsistencies, falsities, and biases in the testimony of those witnesses.” Trial

Ct. Op., filed Jan. 29, 2025, at 12. It noted that each witness was subject to

cross-examination. Id. It found that it was “free to believe all, part, or none

of the testimony,” resolve any inconsistences, falsities, or biases, and judge

the witnesses’ credibility. Id. It found the Commonwealth’s witnesses credible

and concluded the challenge to the weight of the evidence should be

dismissed. Id. This was not an abuse of discretion.

The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Therefore, “[o]ur

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa.Super. 2019). When

reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “must determine

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as

verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc)

(citation omitted). “Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of

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fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a

reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.” Id. (citation

omitted).

A person is guilty of defiant trespass if “knowing that [s]he is not

licensed or privileged to do so, [s]he enters or remains in any place as to

which notice against trespass is given by . . . actual communication to the

actor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). Therefore, the Commonwealth must

establish that the defendant “entered or remained upon property without a

right to do so; 2) while knowing that [s]he had no license or privilege to be

on the property; and 3) after receiving direct or indirect notice against

trespass.” Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 A.3d 714, 718 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(citation omitted, emphasis removed).

Here, the trial court found the Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence to support the trespass conviction. It explained that Kraynak testified

that Williams had been informed that MedExpress could not provide her

medical care and that she was prohibited from presenting at MedExpress

locations. Trial Ct. Op. at 8. The court pointed out Kraynak presented Williams

with a letter informing her of the prohibition, and that a doctor from

MedExpress informed Williams she had permission to enter for the purpose of

picking up test results, but not for the purpose of seeking medical care. Id. at

9. The court further found that the record established that Willliams knew that

she was permitted at the MedExpress location for the limited purpose of

picking up test results, but nonetheless insisted that she be seen for medical

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treatment. Id. It found that Williams “ignored the repeated requests to leave

and remained on the premises for an extended period of time.” Id. It found

that the testimony of Kraynak and Wass, witnesses the court found credible,

established that Williams was told to leave a minimum ten times, but remained

for 15 to 20 minutes. Id.

We agree with the trial court that the evidence supports the trespass

conviction. The testimony establishes that Williams was informed she could

no longer seek medical care at MedExpress locations, that she had permission

to enter for the sole purpose of retrieving paperwork, that she sought medical

care when she came to MedExpress in May 2023, and that she refused to leave

when repeatedly asked to do so. Her challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 10/07/2025

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