J-A26037-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRIS R. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 3072 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003105-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRIS R. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 3094 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003106-2018
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JULY 2, 2024
Appellant, Chris R. Williams, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment
of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,
following his bench trial convictions for simple assault, indirect criminal J-A26037-23
contempt, criminal mischief, and theft by unlawful taking.1 We vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
April 10, 2018, the Commonwealth charged Appellant at two criminal dockets
with burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, indirect criminal
contempt, terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, simple assault,
recklessly endangering another person, criminal mischief, harassment by
subjecting another to physical contact, and aggravated assault, following his
assault of his ex-paramour and her daughter. The court conducted a
preliminary hearing on April 23, 2018.
On May 29, 2018, the trial court held a pre-trial conference, and
Appellant requested a continuance because the Commonwealth had not
provided requested discovery. On June 28, 2018, the trial court held a
scheduling conference. At that time, the Commonwealth had not provided the
requested discovery. Nevertheless, the trial court scheduled the matter for a
jury trial on December 4, 2018.
On December 4, 2018, the parties appeared before the court. At this
time, the Commonwealth still had not provided Appellant with discovery, and
requested a continuance for further investigation. On April 12, 2019, the
parties again appeared before the trial court for a scheduling conference. The
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114; 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3304; and 3921,
respectively.
-2- J-A26037-23
Commonwealth requested an additional continuance to conduct further
investigation due to incomplete discovery.
On April 18, 2019, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. On April 23, 2019, the trial court held a hearing
on Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. During the hearing, the Commonwealth
argued that it had acted diligently in bringing the case to trial, noting its
submission of “numerous” subpoenas to Hahnemann Hospital seeking the
complainant’s medical records. In response, Appellant argued that the
Commonwealth had not acted diligently, due to the nine-month gap between
the issuance of the first subpoena on April 13, 2018, and the second subpoena
on January 22, 2019, which was after the original trial date. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the trial court decided that the Commonwealth had acted
diligently and denied relief.2
Following continuances for varying reasons which included a lack of
available judges and the COVID-19 pandemic, the case ultimately proceeded
to a bench trial on September 14, 2021. The trial court convicted Appellant
of simple assault, indirect criminal contempt, criminal mischief, and theft by
unlawful taking, and acquitted him of the remaining charges. On February 3,
2022, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of two to four years’
imprisonment plus two years of probation.
2 The court did not provide reasons to support its holding that the Commonwealth had acted diligently.
-3- J-A26037-23
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. Due to a breakdown in
communication with counsel, Appellant failed to timely appeal. Following a
successful Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)3 petition, the trial court restored
Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant timely filed nunc pro
tunc notices of appeal at each underlying docket on November 20, 2022.4
Thereafter, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant timely complied
on December 21, 2022.5
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion when it denied [Appellant’s] motion to dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A) where the trial did not begin until long after the adjusted run date and the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in bringing the case to trial?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3).
Our standard of review of a Rule 600 decision is as follows: “In general,
a trial court’s [ruling on] a Rule 600 motion is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion; however, it is subject to plenary review when the dispositive
question implicates legal issues.” Commonwealth v. Malone, 294 A.3d
3 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
4 This Court subsequently consolidated the appeals sua sponte.
5 Neither the jurist who heard the Rule 600 motion, nor the jurist who presided
over the trial, is currently a sitting trial judge in Philadelphia County. Thus, the trial court did not provide a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
-4- J-A26037-23
1247, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2023). “Our scope of review is limited to the record
evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the lower court,
reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
Commonwealth v. Burno, 638 Pa. 264, 313, 154 A.3d 764, 793 (2017).
[Rule 600] establishes a careful matrix protecting a defendant’s rights to be free from prolonged pretrial incarceration and to a speedy trial, while maintaining the Commonwealth’s ability to seek confinement of dangerous individuals and those posing a risk of flight, and to bring its cases in an orderly fashion.
Burno, supra at 313-14 (citation omitted).
Under Rule 600, the “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date
on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Next, the trial
court must determine whether any periods of time constitute excludable delay
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). In this calculation, “periods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the
computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods
of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
Where a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods
set forth in Rule 600, he may “file a written motion requesting that the charges
be dismissed with prejudice” on the grounds that this rule has been violated.
Pa.Crim.P. Rule 600(D)(1). Additionally, delay caused by the court is
excusable only if the Commonwealth shows that it exercised due diligence at
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J-A26037-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRIS R. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 3072 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003105-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRIS R. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 3094 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003106-2018
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JULY 2, 2024
Appellant, Chris R. Williams, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment
of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,
following his bench trial convictions for simple assault, indirect criminal J-A26037-23
contempt, criminal mischief, and theft by unlawful taking.1 We vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
April 10, 2018, the Commonwealth charged Appellant at two criminal dockets
with burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, indirect criminal
contempt, terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, simple assault,
recklessly endangering another person, criminal mischief, harassment by
subjecting another to physical contact, and aggravated assault, following his
assault of his ex-paramour and her daughter. The court conducted a
preliminary hearing on April 23, 2018.
On May 29, 2018, the trial court held a pre-trial conference, and
Appellant requested a continuance because the Commonwealth had not
provided requested discovery. On June 28, 2018, the trial court held a
scheduling conference. At that time, the Commonwealth had not provided the
requested discovery. Nevertheless, the trial court scheduled the matter for a
jury trial on December 4, 2018.
On December 4, 2018, the parties appeared before the court. At this
time, the Commonwealth still had not provided Appellant with discovery, and
requested a continuance for further investigation. On April 12, 2019, the
parties again appeared before the trial court for a scheduling conference. The
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114; 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3304; and 3921,
respectively.
-2- J-A26037-23
Commonwealth requested an additional continuance to conduct further
investigation due to incomplete discovery.
On April 18, 2019, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. On April 23, 2019, the trial court held a hearing
on Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. During the hearing, the Commonwealth
argued that it had acted diligently in bringing the case to trial, noting its
submission of “numerous” subpoenas to Hahnemann Hospital seeking the
complainant’s medical records. In response, Appellant argued that the
Commonwealth had not acted diligently, due to the nine-month gap between
the issuance of the first subpoena on April 13, 2018, and the second subpoena
on January 22, 2019, which was after the original trial date. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the trial court decided that the Commonwealth had acted
diligently and denied relief.2
Following continuances for varying reasons which included a lack of
available judges and the COVID-19 pandemic, the case ultimately proceeded
to a bench trial on September 14, 2021. The trial court convicted Appellant
of simple assault, indirect criminal contempt, criminal mischief, and theft by
unlawful taking, and acquitted him of the remaining charges. On February 3,
2022, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of two to four years’
imprisonment plus two years of probation.
2 The court did not provide reasons to support its holding that the Commonwealth had acted diligently.
-3- J-A26037-23
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. Due to a breakdown in
communication with counsel, Appellant failed to timely appeal. Following a
successful Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)3 petition, the trial court restored
Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant timely filed nunc pro
tunc notices of appeal at each underlying docket on November 20, 2022.4
Thereafter, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant timely complied
on December 21, 2022.5
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion when it denied [Appellant’s] motion to dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A) where the trial did not begin until long after the adjusted run date and the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in bringing the case to trial?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3).
Our standard of review of a Rule 600 decision is as follows: “In general,
a trial court’s [ruling on] a Rule 600 motion is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion; however, it is subject to plenary review when the dispositive
question implicates legal issues.” Commonwealth v. Malone, 294 A.3d
3 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
4 This Court subsequently consolidated the appeals sua sponte.
5 Neither the jurist who heard the Rule 600 motion, nor the jurist who presided
over the trial, is currently a sitting trial judge in Philadelphia County. Thus, the trial court did not provide a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
-4- J-A26037-23
1247, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2023). “Our scope of review is limited to the record
evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the lower court,
reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
Commonwealth v. Burno, 638 Pa. 264, 313, 154 A.3d 764, 793 (2017).
[Rule 600] establishes a careful matrix protecting a defendant’s rights to be free from prolonged pretrial incarceration and to a speedy trial, while maintaining the Commonwealth’s ability to seek confinement of dangerous individuals and those posing a risk of flight, and to bring its cases in an orderly fashion.
Burno, supra at 313-14 (citation omitted).
Under Rule 600, the “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date
on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Next, the trial
court must determine whether any periods of time constitute excludable delay
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). In this calculation, “periods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the
computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods
of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
Where a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods
set forth in Rule 600, he may “file a written motion requesting that the charges
be dismissed with prejudice” on the grounds that this rule has been violated.
Pa.Crim.P. Rule 600(D)(1). Additionally, delay caused by the court is
excusable only if the Commonwealth shows that it exercised due diligence at
-5- J-A26037-23
all relevant times during the proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Johnson,
___ Pa. ___, 289 A.3d 959 (2023). The Commonwealth “bears the burden of
proving due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Due diligence is
fact specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect
vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing that the Commonwealth
has put forth a reasonable effort.” See Burno, supra at 313-14 (internal
citations omitted). Notably, where the trial court does not conduct a Rule 600
due diligence analysis, the “proper action [is] to remand to the trial court to
determine whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence pursuant to
Rule 600.” Commonwealth v. Selenski, 606 Pa. 51, 60, 994 A.2d 1083,
1088 (2010).
Instantly, the trial court did not conduct any analysis of due diligence
on the record following the Rule 600 hearing. Although we could ordinarily
remand the matter for the trial court to issue a supplemental opinion (See
id.), we reiterate that the jurist who presided over Appellant’s Rule 600 motion
is no longer a sitting judge in Philadelphia County.
This Court has addressed an analogous situation in Commonwealth v.
Smith, 277 A.3d 595 (Pa.Super. 2022) (en banc), where the record following
a suppression hearing did not contain adequate information for this Court to
address the merits of the defendant’s claims. Id. at 599-600. In that case,
the suppression court failed to place factual findings or legal conclusions on
the record and left the bench prior to issuing a Rule 1925(a) opinion. See id.
-6- J-A26037-23
at 603, 606. The Smith Court concluded that it could not “properly review
the suppression court’s decision, and assess the arguments made by the
parties, based on the record currently before [the Court].” Id. at 605.
Therefore, the appropriate remedy was to remand for a new suppression
hearing. See id. at 606. Thus, the Court vacated and remanded for a new
suppression hearing. Id.
Since Smith, this Court has applied similar principles in Rule 600 cases
where the record is inadequate to conduct appellate review and the judge who
presided over the Rule 600 motion is unavailable. See Commonwealth v.
Davis, 1407 EDA 2022, 1408 EDA 2022, 1409 EDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed Aug.
17, 2023) (unpublished memorandum)6 (vacating order denying Rule 600
motion and judgment of sentence and remanding for new Rule 600 hearing).
See also Commonwealth v. DilFalco, 2180 EDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed Oct.
2, 2023) (unpublished memorandum) (same).
Here, at the conclusion of the Rule 600 hearing, the trial court stated,
“All right. I do find that the Commonwealth was duly diligent, and your motion
is denied.” (N.T. Rule 600 Hearing, 4/23/19, at 10). The trial court did not
discuss the specific facts of the case or engage in any analysis of the law as
applied to those facts. Nor did the trial court specify which periods of delay
were or were not attributable to the Commonwealth. The court did not issue
6 We may rely on unpublished decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019
for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
-7- J-A26037-23
a separate opinion explaining its denial of the Rule 600 motion, and this Court
does not have the benefit of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion explaining the trial
court’s reasoning and analysis. Under these circumstances, the best
resolution of this case is to vacate the order denying Appellant’s Rule 600
motion and to vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remand for a new
jurist to conduct a new Rule 600 hearing. See DilFalco, supra; Davis,
supra.
Upon remand, the trial court shall conduct a due diligence analysis when
deciding whether to grant or deny Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. If the trial
court finds a Rule 600 violation, it shall dismiss the charges against Appellant
with prejudice. If the trial court does not find a Rule 600 violation and denies
the motion, it may reimpose the judgment of sentence. See DilFalco, supra
(providing similar instructions upon remand); Davis, supra (same).
Judgment of sentence vacated. Order denying Appellant’s motion to
dismiss vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is
relinquished.
Date: 7/2/2024
-8-