Com. v. White, R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 14, 2024
• Docket: 248 MDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S43040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ROBBI LYNN WHITE : No. 248 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered January 12, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000433-2022

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JUNE 14, 2024

The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the Court of Common

Pleas of Bradford County (“trial court”) granting the petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed by Appellee, Robbi Lynn White, and dismissing the charges against

Appellee. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On June 2, 2022, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with three

counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver 1 related

to three incidents where Appellee allegedly sold methamphetamine to two

confidential informants (“CI”) in January 2022. At the July 27, 2022

preliminary hearing in this matter, the Commonwealth presented the

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). J-S43040-23

testimony of Bradford County Detective David Hart, who had extensive

training with drug investigations. N.T., 7/27/22, at 3-4, 23-25.

Detective Hart testified regarding three controlled buys of

methamphetamine from Appellee using two CIs during January 2022. Id. at

4-5, 7, 13. The buys occurred at 925 South Main Street, an apartment

building in Towanda Township; Appellee resided in the rear basement

apartment of that building and, according to Detective Hart, was known to sell

drugs from that location for over a decade. Id. at 5, 22, 27. As described by

Detective Hart during the preliminary hearing, each of the three controlled

buys followed the same pattern: Detective Hart and other members of the

Bradford County Drug Task Force met with the CIs, and the CIs informed them

that they could make a purchase of methamphetamine from Appellee at the

above stated address. Id. at 4-5, 12, 21. Detective Hart or another member

of the Task Force then searched the CIs for contraband and provided them

with a quantity of pre-recorded buy money. Id. at 5, 12, 21. The CIs then

were dropped off in the vicinity of 925 South Main Street, and the officers

watched the CIs walk three quarters of the way up the driveway towards the

building, where they disappeared from view. Id. at 5-6, 13, 21, 32. The CIs

then returned a few minutes later and were driven to a predetermined location

where they were searched again, and they provided law enforcement with a

quantity of methamphetamine that the CIs said had been sold to them by

Appellee. Id. at 6, 8-9, 11, 14, 21.

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Notably, during the third purchase, after the CI had disappeared from

view walking down the driveway of 925 South Main Street, Detective Hart

observed Appellee walk out from the building into view and then return to the

building prior to the CI exiting after the sale had been completed. Id. 14, 16,

30. The drugs obtained during the controlled buys field-tested as

methamphetamine, and the Commonwealth had received laboratory test

results back for two of the three buys also indicating a positive result. Id. at

9-10, 14-15, 22.

The CI did not testify at the preliminary hearing. At the conclusion of

the preliminary hearing, the magisterial district judge bound the charges over

for trial. Id. at 36.

Appellee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court

asserting that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of the

identity of the individual who sold methamphetamine to the CIs when it relied

solely on the hearsay testimony of Detective Hart. The Commonwealth filed

a responsive brief, in which it argued that it had presented sufficient evidence

that the crimes were committed and that Appellee had committed them. The

Commonwealth asserted that it held a well-recognized qualified privilege to

withhold the identity of its confidential source and that it had no duty to

disclose the identity in this case where the defendant had not even requested

to reveal the CI’s identity. The Commonwealth further asserted that, if the

trial court determined that the CI’s identity should be disclosed, the

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Commonwealth would make the CI available to testify at a hearing on the

habeas petition.

The trial court granted the habeas petition in a January 12, 2023 order.

In an accompanying opinion, the trial court relied on Commonwealth v.

Harris, 269 A.3d 534 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Harris I”), aff’d ___ A.3d ___,

2024 WL 2120894 (Pa., filed May 13, 2024), in which this Court held that,

pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 542(E), the Commonwealth is

precluded “from relying on hearsay alone at a preliminary hearing to establish

a prima facie case that the defendant committed a crime.” Id. at 548. In

rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that it was not required to divulge

the CI’s identity in order to prevail at the preliminary hearing, the trial court

stated that “[a]lthough the Commonwealth has a qualified privilege to

withhold the identity of a confidential source,” its reliance “solely on hearsay

for each material element of the offense” at the preliminary hearing violated

Appellee’s due process rights. Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/23, at 7.

The Commonwealth then filed this timely appeal,2 in which it raises the

following two issues:

2 Although the charges were dismissed by the trial court without prejudice, we

nevertheless have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Harris I, 269 A.3d at 538-39 (citing Commonwealth v. Merced, 265 A.3d 786, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 2021)).

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A. Did the Suppression Court err in granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds/reasoning of Harris/McClelland?[3]

B. Did the Suppression Court err in finding that the Commonwealth did not present a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing?

Commonwealth Brief at 3 (lower court answers and suggested answers

omitted).

“[A]n appellate court will review a grant or denial of a petition for writ

of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion, but for questions of law, our standard

of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth

v. Harris, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 WL 2120894, at *5 (Pa., filed May 13, 2024)

(“Harris II”). Here, we are presented with a question of law regarding the

evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case.

Commonwealth v. Sutton, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 WL 1163627, at *2 (Pa.

Super., filed March 19, 2024). “We review a decision to grant a pre-trial

petition for a writ of habeas corpus by examining the evidence and reasonable

inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth.”

Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en

banc).

“At a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of

proving the prima facie case, which is met when it produces evidence of each ____________________________________________

3 See Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020). In McClelland, our Supreme Court held that, under Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E), the Commonwealth may not rely exclusively on hearsay evidence to establish a prima facie case against a defendant at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 734- 36.

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of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable cause

to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense.” Sutton, 2024

WL 1163627, at *3 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wroten, 257 A.3d 734, 742

(Pa. Super. 2021)); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D) (“At the preliminary

hearing, the issuing authority shall determine from the evidence presented

whether there is a prima facie case that (1) an offense has been committed

and (2) the defendant has committed it.”). “The evidence supporting a prima

facie case need not establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

but must only demonstrate that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the

judge would be warranted in permitting the case to proceed to a jury.”

Sutton, 2024 WL 1163627, at *3 (quoting Wroten, 257 A.3d at 742). Under

Rule 542(E),

Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing authority in determining whether a prima facie case has been established. Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense, including, but not limited to, those requiring proof of the ownership of, non-permitted use of, damage to, or value of property.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E).4

In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in

dismissing the charges against Appellee in the “unique situation” here where

4 To the extent Rule 542(E) uses the term hearsay, it should be understood

as referring only to inadmissible hearsay, i.e. an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted that does not fall under a hearsay exception. See Harris II, 2024 WL 2120894, at *6 n.8. Hearsay, as used in this memorandum, also refers only to inadmissible hearsay.

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it relied on the hearsay testimony of a CI at the preliminary hearing.

Commonwealth Brief at 11. The Commonwealth states that it enjoys the

qualified privilege to protect the CI, whose identity is known only to law

enforcement at this time. While conceding that the privilege is not absolute,

the Commonwealth asserts that it exists until the defendant makes a motion

to disclose and prevails on that motion; here, Appellee has not even made

such a request.5 The Commonwealth notes the policy rationale underlying the

qualified privilege and states that upholding the trial court’s ruling here would

“resonate throughout” the law enforcement community and “the frequency

and willingness of CIs to work with law enforcement would” be greatly

diminished. Id. at 13.

The Commonwealth distinguishes Harris I and the cases upon which it

relies, including McClelland, as they involve the interpretation of 2013

amendments to Rule 542, see Harris I, 269 A.3d at 542, and did not address

the qualified privilege that long predated the amendments under review in

those cases. The Commonwealth contrasts Harris I, which involved the

testimony of a shooting victim who failed to appear at two preliminary hearing ____________________________________________

5 In order to overcome the qualified privilege, “a defendant must first establish, pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 573(B)(2)(a)(i), that the information sought is material to the preparation of the defense and that the request is reasonable.” Commonwealth v. Ellison, 213 A.3d 312, 316 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “Only after the defendant shows that the identity of the confidential informant is material to the defense is the trial court required to exercise its discretion to determine whether the information should be revealed by balancing relevant factors, which are initially weighted toward the Commonwealth.” Id. (citation omitted).

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listings and may never appear at trial, id. at 537, from the present case,

where the Commonwealth avers that it remains in contact with the CI and has

every intention of calling that individual to testify at trial.

This Court recently addressed this precise issue, on very similar facts,

in Sutton. In that case, a detective testified at the preliminary hearing that,

on two occasions, he verified that there were no drugs or money on a CI’s

person, supplied the CI with pre-recorded buy money, observed the CI enter

and exit Sutton’s residence, and the CI then handed over suspected

methamphetamine with no other contraband or money found on their person.

2024 WL 1163627, at *1. The detective then repeated the CI’s out-of-court

statement to him that Sutton was the individual who sold the

methamphetamine. Id. After the charges were bound over, the trial court

granted Sutton’s habeas petition and dismissed the charges pursuant to

Harris I. Id. at *2.

We reversed, distinguishing Harris I on the basis that it did not involve

the use of a CI and holding that our earlier decision “does not vitiate

jurisprudence that has promoted an accountable, prescribed system

recognizing a qualified privilege of keeping informants’ identities confidential

and permitting use of their statements to law enforcement at preliminary

hearings.” Id. at *4. We stated that Harris I does not represent “a sweeping,

policy-changing holding that would undo” the qualified privilege at the

preliminary hearing stage of the proceedings, recognizing that “such a result

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would hamper the effects of law enforcement to enforce the laws against the

illegal use of controlled substances.” Id. at *5-6.

We concluded in Sutton that the trial court erred by granting the habeas

petition, a ruling that effectively required the Commonwealth to disclose the

CI’s identity at the preliminary hearing, particularly where “the

Commonwealth certified with the trial court that the CI will be produced at

trial” and Sutton “had not established at the preliminary hearing that the

qualified privilege rubric required disclosure” of the CI’s identity. Id. at *4;

see also id. at *6-7. We additionally noted that the Commonwealth had

established a “connection” between Sutton and the controlled buys where the

detective testified at the preliminary hearing that he had witnessed the CI

enter Sutton’s residence possessing only prerecorded buy money and exit

possessing only methamphetamine. Id. at *6.

Subsequent to our decision in Sutton and the briefing of this appeal,

our Supreme Court issued its decision affirming Harris I. The Court held in

Harris II that,

based on the plain language of Rule 542, [] inadmissible hearsay alone may not be used to prove a prima facie case as to the defendant’s identity. This means the Commonwealth at a preliminary hearing is required to produce some non-hearsay or admissible hearsay evidence to sustain its prima facie burden as to the defendant’s identity.

Harris II, 2024 WL 2120894, at *8. Like this Court’s decision, Harris II did

not address our qualified privilege jurisprudence. Nor does Harris II

represent “a sweeping, policy-changing holding that would undo” the qualified

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privilege, Sutton, 2024 WL 1163627, at *6, as our Supreme Court’s decision

was confined to a textual analysis of the interplay between Rule 542(D) and

(E).6 Therefore, we conclude that Harris II does not impair our holding in

Sutton providing that the Commonwealth is permitted to rely on the out-of-

court statements of a CI as related to a law enforcement officer.

Accordingly, pursuant to Sutton, we conclude that the trial court erred

in determining that the Commonwealth did not present a prima face case

merely because it relied on hearsay testimony of Detective Hart regarding

Appellee’s involvement in the delivery of methamphetamine. The

Commonwealth produced other, non-hearsay evidence at the preliminary

hearing, including Detective Hart’s testimony that he searched the CIs before

entering and upon exiting Appellee’s apartment and found that the CIs had

obtained methamphetamine while inside the apartment during each of the

controlled buys. Furthermore, Detective Hart provided non-hearsay testimony

establishing Appellee as the perpetrator of the crime, including his knowledge

that Appellee resided in and sold drugs out of an apartment at 925 South Main

Street and the detective’s observation of Appellee outside the apartment

during one of the controlled buys. Cf. Harris II, 2024 WL 2120894, at *8

(providing that the Commonwealth may not rely on “inadmissible hearsay

6 Harris II was a divided decision, and the lead opinion only carried a majority

to the extent it was based upon “an examination of the plain text of Rule 542” and not to the extent it “justifie[d] its conclusion for reasons other than the text of Rule 542.” 2024 WL 2120894, at *8 (Donohue, J., concurring).

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alone . . . to prove a prima facie case as to the defendant’s identity”). Finally,

as in Sutton, the Commonwealth states that it will produce the CI at trial.

Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, see Dantzler, 135 A.3d at 1111, we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Appellee committed

the charged offenses.7 See Sutton, 2024 WL 1163627, at *6-7;

Commonwealth v. Strope, No. 249 MDA 2023, 2024 WL 1715348, at *3

(Pa. Super., filed April 22, 2024) (holding, under Sutton, that trial court erred

when ruling that Commonwealth had failed to establish a prima facie case that

Strope committed controlled substance offenses where Commonwealth relied

on detective’s hearsay testimony repeating CI’s statement that Strope sold

drugs to CI in addition to non-hearsay evidence establishing Strope’s identity

as the wrongdoer and Commonwealth represented that CI would testify at

trial) (non-precedential decision cited for its persuasive value, see Pa.R.A.P.

126(b)).

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

7 Because Appellee only challenged the issue of whether the Commonwealth’s

proof was sufficient to establish his identity as the individual who committed the crimes in his habeas petition, we need not address whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish each of the elements of the three charged crimes. See Harris II, 2024 WL 2120894, at *5-6 (observing that Rule 542(D) places on the Commonwealth “dual” and “independent” burden at a preliminary hearing to “‘prove a prima facie case’ both with respect to the elements of the crimes and the defendant’s identity”) (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D); emphasis in original).

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/14/2024

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